Joe Hoffman v. State Farm Fire and Casualty

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1982

Joe Hoffman,
Appellant,

vs.

State Farm Fire and Casualty,
Respondent.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CV-25-615

Anthony A. Remick, Neven Selimovic, Hellmuth & Johnson PLLC, Edina, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Scott G. Williams, Lindsey A. Streicher, HAWS -KM, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Timothy D. Johnson, Alexandra J. Anderson, Smith Jadin Johnson, PLLC, Bloomington,
Minnesota (for amicus curiae United Policyholders)

Dale O. Thornsjo, Lance D. Meyer, O’Meara Wagner, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
amicus curiae The Insurance Federation of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this insurance-coverage dispute, appellant insured argues that the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to respondent insurer was improper because equitable
doctrines applied that extended the insurance policy deadline for the payment of
replacement-cost benefits. The insured further argues that the district court erred by
determining that coverage did not exist for repairs required by code and mold remediation.
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Joe Hoffman owns a seasonal hunting cabin in rural New York Mills that
is insured by respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty. The policy provides coverage for
accidental loss subject to certain exclusions, and the parties agree as to the basic aspects of
the policy. The policy exclusions include damage caused by mold, burst pipes that were
not maintained at 55 degrees Fahrenheit or higher, and aggravation of loss due to neglect
by the insured. In the event of a covered loss, State Farm must pay actual cash value
(ACV), and if the insured completes the repairs by the deadline established in the policy,
State Farm must pay replacement cost value (RCV). 1 For the RCV benefit, the policy

1 ACV is a “legal term of art that refers to the ‘actual loss’ sustained by the insured.” Wilcox
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 874 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Brooks Realty,
Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 149 N.W.2d 494, 500- 01 (Minn. 1967)). The policy defines ACV
to mean “the value of the damaged part of the property at the time of loss, calculated as the
estimated cost to repair or replace such property, less a deduction to account for pre-loss
depreciation.” RCV differs from ACV in that the insurer pays “for the cost of replacing
the loss or damaged property at current prices rather than limiting payment to the actual

3
requires payment to repair property damaged as part of the loss in accordance with
minimum state or local codes (code upgrades). The policy has a two-year deadline that
applies to performing repairs to obtain RCV, demanding an appraisal, and filing a lawsuit
regarding the loss.
On April 24, 2022, Hoffman discovered that a water line burst at the cabin, causing
damage to the property. Because Hoffman lives in Florida and visits the property only four
or five times a year, the exact date on which the damage occurred is unknown. Hoffman
reported the loss to State Farm on April 26 and hired a public adjuster, Jacob Sachs, to
manage the claim.2
State Farm inspected the property on May 11, 2022, and requested additional
information on whether heat had been maintained at the cabin. Around July 5, Sachs
informed State Farm that Hoffman used propane to heat the cabin. State Farm then
contacted the propane company and, by July 8, confirmed that the cabin was heated at the
time the water line burst. State Farm then issued a payment of $18,428.35 based on its
estimate of the ACV, a portion of which State Farm identified as coverage for
water-damage costs and a different portion of which it identified as coverage for
water-mitigation costs. State Farm estimated the RCV to be $21,987.94.

cash or depreciated value of the loss or damaged property.” St. Matthews Church of God
& Christ v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 981 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Minn. 2022).

2 A public adjuster is any person who, for compensation in first-party claims, “acts or aids,
. . . on behalf of an insured in negotiating for, or effecting the settlement of, a claim for loss
or damage covered by an insurance contract.” Minn. Stat. § 72B.02, subd. 6(1) (2024).

4
The parties agree that Sachs disagreed with the estimate immediately; however, the
record reflects no communication between State Farm and either Sachs or Hoffman from
July 8, 2022, to February 2023. In February 2023, State Farm emailed Sachs regarding a
“sub flooring” building code upgrade and stated that RCV could be released with a signed
contract or upon submission of a completed invoice. Between June 2023 and
September 2023, State Farm and Sachs engaged in additional communication about code
upgrades. Sachs argued that State Farm should cover the cost of bringing both the framing
and floor joints up to code. State Farm denied coverage for code upgrades, explaining on
four occasions that the policy does not cover the cost of bringing undamaged items up to
code.
In October 2023, Sachs emailed State Farm an estimate prepared by a contractor
with whom he works, referred to the damage to the cabin as a “constructive total loss,” and
requested $327,187.5 6 as the RCV. The parties agree that State Farm rejected this
estimate, and the record reflects no further communication until February 2024.
On February 19, 2024, Sachs emailed State Farm, asking if an industrial hygienist
would perform testing on the property because, “[g]iven the amount of time that the water
was standing in the basement . . . from the burst pipe, it would no longer be considered
grey water, but black.” State Farm responded that the policy excludes coverage for mold
and that a condition of the policy is that the insured must protect the property from further
damage or loss, and State Farm reminded Hoffman that the two-year policy deadline to
receive the RCV benefit was approaching. On April 19, 2024, five days before the
two-year deadline lapsed, Hoffman demanded an appraisal and served State Farm with a

5
summons and complaint. Due to scheduling conflicts, the appraisal was not completed
until December 10, 2024.
The appraisal awarded the amount of loss at $35,185 for ACV, which State Farm
immediately paid, and determined the RCV to be $52,872. The appraisal also listed another
RCV amount of $86,966 that included $19,112 for code upgrades and $67,854 for mold
remediation “subject to coverage.” The record shows that Hoffman had still not begun to
make any repairs.
State Farm answered the complaint, denying that it was required to pay RCV
because repairs were not completed within two years after the date of loss as required by
the policy. State Farm also denied the appraisal amounts for code upgrades and mold as
excluded from coverage. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and after
a hearing, the district court issued its order granting summary judgment for State Farm.
Hoffman appeals.
DECISION
Hoffman makes three main arguments that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment for State Farm. First, Hoffman argues that equitable doctrines should
prevent State Farm from enforcing the policy’s two-year deadline for RCV benefits.
Second, he argues that the appraisal’s identification of code upgrades is sufficient to
establish that he is entitled to those amounts. Third, he argues that State Farm delayed
handling of his claim and caused mold growth in the cabin and that, therefore, he should
receive mold coverage. In the alternative, Hoffman contends that summary judgment was

6
improper because genuine issues of material fact remain. We address each argument in
turn.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
On appeal, we determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact that preclude
summary judgment and whether the district court properly applied the law. St. Matthews,
981 N.W.2d at 764. “The interpretation of an insurance policy and the application of the
policy to the undisputed facts of a case are questions of law that [an appellate] court reviews
de novo.” Com. Bank v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015).
Appellate courts “interpret insurance policies using the general principles of
contract law.” Midwest Fam. Mut. Ins. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628, 636 (Minn. 2013).
“In general, an insurer’s liability is determined by the insurance contract as long as that
insurance policy does not omit coverage required by law and does not violate applicable
statutes.” Kelly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 666 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn. 2003).
“Our objective when interpreting an insurance policy is to ascertain and give effect to the
intentions of the parties as reflected in the terms of the policy.” King’s Cove Marina, LLC
v. Lambert Com. Constr. LLC , 958 N.W.2d 310, 316 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
“We construe an insurance policy, if possible, so as to give effect to all provisions.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “We give unambiguous policy language its plain and ordinary
meaning.” Id.

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I. The district court did not err by granting summary judgment for State Farm
on whether Hoffman was entitled to RCV.
Under SECTION I–LOSS SETTLEMENT, the policy states that State Farm “will
pay the cost to repair or replace . . . subject to the following” and that, “until actual repair
or replacement is completed, [State Farm] will pay only the actual cash value of the
damaged part of the property.” The policy also states that, “to receive any additional
payments on a replacement cost basis, you must complete the actual repair or replacement
of the damaged part of the property within two years after the date of loss” and notify State
Farm within 30 days after the work has been completed.
Hoffman does not dispute that he failed to meet this condition. Hoffman instead
argues that certain equitable doctrines —hindrance, impossibility, repudiation, and
estoppel—apply here and thus “it is readily apparent” that application of the two-year
deadline would be unjust and inequitable. He asserts that, once he demanded an appraisal
and started the judicial process, the repair deadline should have been treated as tolled or
flexibly applied. Hoffman served his summons, complaint, and demand for appraisal on
April 19, 2024. 3 The deadline to complete repairs was no later than April 24, 2024.
Hoffman has made no effort to begin repairs.

3 Hoffman asserted breach of contract. To prevail on a breach -of-contract claim, the
plaintiff must prove that (1) an agreement was formed, (2) the plaintiff performed any
conditions precedent to demand performance by the defendant, and (3) the defendant
breached the contract. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ill. Paper & Copier Co., 848 N.W.2d 539,
543 (Minn. 2014). We have questioned before whether a plaintiff can bring a
breach-of-contract action and assert impossibility or impracticability because “these legal
theories are defenses to a breach-of-contract claim, excusing a party for not performing a
required act.” Fitness Int’l, LLC v. City Ctr. Ventures, LLC, No. A22-1057, 2023 WL
2230321, at *4 (Minn. App. Feb. 27, 2023), aff’d, 9 N.W.3d 526 (Minn. 2024). The

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An insurer may be estopped from asserting a time limitation contained in an
insurance policy if the facts “show that it would be unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable
to allow the defense to be interposed.” L & H Transp., Inc. v. Drew Agency, Inc. ,
403 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn. 1987) (quotation omitted). Although Hoffman’s brief is not
specific about which equitable doctrine he is asserting, we address each theory in turn.
Impossibility
Hoffman argues that, once an insured initiates a lawsuit, the deadline to complete
repairs must be extended to a reasonable time after its resolution because it is impossible
to complete repairs when the amount of coverage and scope of repairs have not been
established. Hoffman also asserts that, if he had followed State Farm’s original estimate
and completed only around $22,000 of proposed work, he would have had to either rip out
and redo that work later or pay out-of-pocket and risk the repairs not being reimbursed.
The supreme court has defined the doctrine of impossibility to allow a contractual
duty to be excused “due to the existence of a fact or circumstance of which the promisor at
the time of the making of the contract neither knew nor had reason to know.” Powers v.
Siats, 70 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Minn. 1955). Under such circumstances, performance becomes
impossible. Id. But “[t]he distinction between objective and subjective impossibility is
not to be overlooked.” Id. In other words, performance may be excused for objective

supreme court affirmed our decision, and in addressing the doctrine of frustration of
purpose, noted that neither caselaw nor the Restatement of Contracts “directly address[es]
whether the doctrine of frustration of purpose can be used affirmatively by a plaintiff in a
claim for breach of contract.” Fitness Int’l, LLC, 9 N.W.3d at 532-33. We analyze
Hoffman’s equitable arguments here, assuming without deciding that the doctrines may be
applied in this manner.

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impossibility (meaning that no one could perform the obligation), but not for subjective
impossibility (meaning that a particular party was unable to perform the obligation). The
impossibility defense is not available to a party who learns that performance will be
impossible in time to avoid the impossibility but fails to do so. Id.
At the time of making the contract, Hoffman knew or had reason to know of the
two-year deadline because the policy provision on RCV expressly states the deadline .
Hoffman’s failure to begin completing repairs was not “due to the existence of a fact or
circumstance” that he neither knew nor had reason to know. As soon as State Farm issued
its estimate on July 8, 2022, Hoffman knew that the scope of repairs and amount payable
were in dispute.
Even if we assume impossibility could apply here, there were several occasions on
which Hoffman had an opportunity to avoid it. Hoffman asserts that negotiations were
ongoing and the parties remained in “active adjustment” for two years, but the record belies
this assertion. State Farm’s position remained consistent. Hoffman asserts that State Farm
“undervalued the claim from the start ,” but he did not demand appraisal until a few days
before the two-year deadline and never started repairs. And it was not until October 31,
2023, that Sachs provided an independent estimate, referred to the property as a “total
constructive loss,” and requested RCV in the amount of $327,187.56. It was therefore
obvious by that date, if not before then, that the parties were nowhere near reaching an
agreement.

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Both parties cite Bonde v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., No. C7-95-1957,
1996 WL 422504 (Minn. App. July 30, 1996) , to support their positions. 4 The policy in
Bonde allowed a payment of RCV if the repairs were completed within 180 days after the
loss. 1996 WL 422504, at *2. The insured argued that the insurer frustrated compliance
with the policy condition or made it impossible. Id. This court stated that “an insurer that
relies strictly on a 180 -day clause is vulnerable to these arguments”—impossibility and
voidness—and that there is merit to an impossibility argument when an insured
demonstrates that a failure to receive the full payment rendered it infeasible to complete
the repair within 180 days. Id. However, the insured in that case did not offer sufficient
evidence to show entitlement to RCV because he had expressed only an intent to rebuild
and had made no repairs despite receiving a substantial payment from the insurer. Id. at
*3. The insured’s argument failed because he relied on general assertions and produced
no evidence that the rebuilding delay was tied to the fact that additional monies were not
available. Id.
We find Bonde’s reasoning that the insured provided an insufficient offer of
evidence persuasive as applied to this case. Hoffman argues that, had he completed the
preappraisal scope of work, he would have had to redo that work or pay out of pocket;
however, the record contains no information that suggests that Hoffman could not have
used the funds issued to begin repair, that he did not have additional funds available, or
that initiating any repair would have required him to redo the work later. Hoffman also

4 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but may be cited as persuasive
authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

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asserts that more damage was caused because water remained in the cabin for two years.
But Hoffman received around $18,000 from State Farm in July 2022, a portion of which
was specifically allocated for water mitigation. And Hoffman has done no more than
express an intent to rebuild. Hoffman has therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact that it was impossible to complete the repairs within two years.
Hindrance
Hoffman next asserts that the policy language means that he has a duty to proceed
with repairs only when disputes over coverage are settled, that these are not yet settled, and
that, until they are settled, it is not possible to proceed with repairs. He explains that the
policy requires three steps—first, the insurer adjusts the loss; second, the insurer pays the
ACV; and third, the insurer pays the RCV when repairs are completed. Hoffman asserts
that State Farm failed to fulfill step two of paying the ACV because it did not pay the
appraisal-determined amount until after the appraisal occurred. This argument can be
summed up as a claim that State Farm hindered Hoffman from completing the conditions
required for Hoffman to receive RCV.
Minnesota courts have held that “the party to a contract cannot take advantage of
the failure of a condition precedent when the party itself has frustrated performance of that
condition.” In re Hennepin Cnty. 1986 Recycling Bond Litig., 540 N.W.2d 494, 502 (Minn.
1995). A party also may not “unjustifiably hinder the other party ’s performance of the
contract.” Id. (quotation omitted). Under Minnesota law, “[i]f a party to a contract
unjustifiably prevents the occurrence of a condition precedent, then that party’s duty to
perform is not excused.” Minnwest Bank Cent. v. Flagship Props. LLC, 689 N.W.2d 295,

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300, 303 (Minn. App. 2004) (citing Hennepin Cnty. 1986 Recycling Bond Litig.,
540 N.W.2d at 502-03) (concluding that Minnwest did not hinder the other party’s
performance because Minnwest had no contractual duty to perform).
Under the plain language of policy, it is clear that receipt of appraisal-determined
ACV is not a condition precedent to obtaining RCV benefits. The policy states, “until
actual repair or replacement is completed, we will pay only the actual cash value,” and, “to
receive any additional payments on a replacement cost basis, you must complete the actual
repair or replacement of the damaged part of the property within two years.” Recovery of
RCV is optional and not contingent on the payment of appraisal-determined ACV. We
thus reject Hoffman’s hindrance argument.
Equitable Estoppel
Hoffman next discusses estoppel, citing two federal district court cases that consider
equitable estoppel : New Oil Christian Center v. Guideone Mutual Insurance Co.,
No. 22-CV-2136 (MJD/ECW), 2025 WL 642914 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2025), and Axis
Surplus Insurance Co. v. Condor Corp., No. 20-CV-789 (DSD/KMM), 2023 WL 1767269
(D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2023). Hoffman argues that these cases support that State Farm should
be estopped from invoking the two-year deadline because there was no lack of action by
Hoffman and he remained in active adjustment with State Farm for nearly two years.
“Equitable estoppel prevents the assertion of otherwise valid rights where one has
acted in such a way as to induce another party to detrimentally rely on those actions.”
Pollard v. Southdale Gardens of Edina Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 698 N.W.2d 449, 454 (Minn.
App. 2005) (quotation omitted). “The application of equitable estoppel ordinarily presents

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a question of fact, unless only one inference may be drawn from the facts.” Id. A party
seeking to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel has the burden of proving three
elements: (1) promises or inducements were made; (2) they reasonably relied upon the
promises; and (3) they will be harmed if estoppel is not applied. Eide v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 492 N.W.2d 549, 556 (Minn. App. 1992).
The insurance policy in New Oil limited recovery for damage to a building roof to
ACV and placed a two-year time limit to make any repairs needed to comply with city code
(compliance costs). 2025 WL 642914, at *4. The insurer denied coverage entirely for over
a year, claiming the reported damage preexisted the policy. Id. at *1, *5. An appraisal
determined the ACV and compliance costs , and the insurer paid the ACV. Id. at *1.
However, the insurer denied any further liability for compliance costs because it asserted
that compliance costs do not apply to an ACV policy and, in the alternative, that the two-year
deadline to make compliance repairs had already passed. Id. The federal district court
determined that, under the policy and Minnesota law, the insurer was required to pay
compliance costs. Id. at *4. It then determined that, based on the particular facts of the
case, it would be unjust to allow the insurer to assert the limitation because the insurer was
at fault for the delay in the case, would not agree to an appraisal until after numerous
requests, and repeatedly denied any coverage for over a year. Id. at *5.
In Axis Surplus, the insurer consistently denied coverage and refused to participate
in an appraisal. 2023 WL 1767269, at *1. After the district court ordered an appraisal, the
insurer paid out the ACV but refused to pay RCV under the policy, arguing that the insured
failed to meet the condition precedent of beginning repairs “as soon as reasonably possible

14
after the loss or damage.” Id. at *1-2 (quotation omitted). The federal district court
determined that “facts and circumstances show[ed] that [the insured] reasonably waited for
the coverage dispute to resolve before committing to over $2 million in replacement work.
The delay was due to Axis’s persistent denial of coverage, which included this lawsuit and
a related appeal, rather than [the insured’s] lack of action.” Id. at *2 (footnote omitted).
These cases are not binding on this court, and neither is factually analogous.5 Unlike
in these federal cases, here, State Farm did not deny coverage entirely, it promptly paid the
ACV, and it never declined to participate in the appraisal process. Furthermore, the
two-year deadline was well known to Hoffman at the time he requested the appraisal,
unlike the insured in Axis Surplus, who was required to perform “as soon as reasonably
possible.”
The record here does not establish that the delay in requesting an appraisal is
attributable to State Farm; rather, it appears that Hoffman caused the delays. The record
reflects multiple lengthy time periods during which no communication occurred, including
from March until May 2023 and between June and November 2023. When Sachs
communicated with State Farm , he raised new allegations about damage to the property
and code upgrades on nearly every occasion. Meanwhile, State Farm maintained a
consistent position—denying coverage for code upgrades on four separate occasions. On
September 18, Sachs reported another new issue to State Farm via email and stated that he

5 We note that attempts to apply the analysis in New Oil, on which Axis Surplus relies, to
facts similar to those here, including identical policy provisions, have recently failed in the
federal district court. See, e.g., Krebsbach v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 24-CV-2241
(PJS/SGE), 2026 WL 816771, at *5 n.7 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2026).

15
had attached photographs to support the request, but no photographs were attached. State
Farm followed up four times for the photo graphs and never received a response. And the
next month, Sachs requested $327,187.56 for the RCV.
The record contains a February 2023 email from a State Farm employee stating, “I
have added the sub flooring as a building code upgrade and can be added to the claim when
incurred,” as part of the RCV valuation. The circumstances surrounding this email are not
entirely clear, but State Farm’s correspondence from July 2023 through December 2024 is
clear that it would not provide coverage for code upgrades to undamaged items. Five days
before the two-year deadline, Hoffman demanded appraisal and served State Farm with a
summons and complaint. While the appraisal supports a conclusion that State Farm
undervalued the ACV by $16,756.65, nothing in the record supports that State Farm
delayed the process to avoid paying the RCV.
Although the federal district court cases involved a denial of coverage, Hoffman
argues that a denial is not required to support entitlement to an equitable remedy and states
that the test is whether enforcement of a contractual condition would be “unjust,
inequitable, or unconscionable” under the supreme court’s opinion in L & H .
6 But this
narrow view of L & H is not supported.
In L & H, a case involving an insurance coverage dispute, the supreme court stated,
“A defendant’s conduct can be such as to estop that defendant from asserting a time

6 Hoffman also contends that State Farm effectively denied coverage for all amounts
exceeding $21,987.94. But the dispute as to ACV does not involve a denial of coverage;
it involves a dispute as to the amount of loss.

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limitation contained in an insurance policy; however, the facts must also show that it would
be unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable to allow the [limitation] defense to be
interposed.” 403 N.W.2d at 227 (quotation omitted). The supreme court then concluded
that the elements of estoppel were not established because the insurer made no
representations upon which L & H relied to its detriment, negotiations did not lull L & H
into inactivity, and “mere denial of liability is not the sort of act which estops [an insurer]
from asserting the limitations defense.” Id.
The party invoking the equitable-estoppel doctrine must show that it reasonably and
detrimentally relied on representations made by the other party. Hydra-Mac, Inc. v. Onan
Corp., 450 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 1990); see also Lake Superior Ctr. Auth. v. Hammel,
Green & Abrahamson, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 458, 473 (Minn. App. 2006) (“When a party
allegedly responsible for remedying a defect in real property makes assurances or
representations that the defect will be repaired, that party may be estopped from asserting
a statute-of-limitations defense if the injured party reasonably and detrimentally relied on
the assurances or representations.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 23, 2006).
[W]aiver or estoppel is established by an insurer’s request or
delay to permit further investigation or to obtain additional
proofs of loss which cannot be furnished until after or near the
expiration of the limitation period, or by its express or implied
admissions of liability, coupled with prolonged negotiations
through adjusters during which [the] insured is led to believe
that his claim will be settled.

O’Donnell v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 116 N.W.2d 680, 684 (Minn. 1962) (citations omitted); see
also Semler Constr., Inc. v. City of Hanover , 667 N.W.2d 457, 466 (Minn. App. 2003)
(“Generally, for equitable estoppel to apply, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the

17
defendant, through his language or conduct, induced the plaintiff to rely, in good faith, on
this language or conduct to his injury, detriment or prejudice.” (quotation omitted)), rev.
denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2003).
Hoffman does not point to any caselaw in which Minnesota courts have applied the
quoted language from L & H without also requiring that each element of equitable estoppel
be met. And Hoffman points to nothing in the record that indicates that State Farm made
any representations, whether through language or conduct, upon which Hoffman
detrimentally relied or caused delays that led Hoffman to believe the claim would be
settled.
Hoffman asserts that the parties were in active adjustment for nearly two years, but
even when the record is viewed in a light most favorable to Hoffman, State Farm remained
consistent in its positions and provided responses to requests within a matter of days on
each occasion. Hoffman did not demand an appraisal until a few days before the two-year
deadline, and this delay is not attributable to State Farm.
7
Extension of Minnesota Law

Hoffman appears to be asking this court to adopt a bright-line rule that filing a
lawsuit to dispute coverage automatically extends contractual deadlines until the dispute is
resolved. He states that insureds must be permitted whatever amount of time is necessary
to challenge the insurance company’s decision without losing benefits. The insurance

7 Amicus United Policyholders explains that real-world repair timelines are affected by
factors beyond an insured’s control, such as contractor availability, permitting delays,
material shortages, and particularly in Minnesota, weather conditions. But the record here
does not contain facts such as those identified by the amicus.

18
policy at issue provides no such tolling provision, and there is no binding precedent in
Minnesota that provides for tolling deadlines in insurance contracts in these
circumstances.8 “[T]his court is limited in its function to correcting errors.” LaChapelle
v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000).
“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it
does not fall to this court.” Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987),
rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987).9

8 Hoffman’s reply brief argues that the reasonable-expectations doctrine applies here
because a reasonable insured who purchases replacement-cost coverage “expects,
objectively and reasonably, that proceeding through the proper steps to dispute the scope
of repairs will not result in eliminating the very coverage being sought.” Since Atwater
Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985),
was decided no Minnesota appellate opinion has applied the doctrine to provide coverage
in contravention of unambiguous policy terms. Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d
41, 49 (Minn. 2008). Atwater has been limited, if not to its specific facts, at least to
circumstances where the exclusion from coverage was unreasonably hidden. Id. Here,
there is no suggestion that the two-year limitation was ambiguous or hidden, and thus, no
legal authority supports this argument.

9 The district court relied on two Eighth Circuit opinions as well as other state and federal
district court opinions to explain that it was not persuaded that mere undervaluation of
ACV constitutes hindrance sufficient to excuse compliance with a repair deadline.
Hoffman argues that this was error because those opinions did not address Minnesota law,
but he also does not point out any particular distinction. Hoffman also says that, unlike the
facts of those cases, he did not delay and did not wait to invoke appraisal. For the reasons
already discussed above, Hoffman’s attempt to distinguish his case based on those facts is
belied by the record. And although federal decisions may be persuasive, we need not dive
into whether those decisions support a rule that undervaluation alone is insufficient to
excuse compliance with a repair-deadline provision because Minnesota caselaw and the
facts here are sufficient and dispositive. See Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 1, 4
(Minn. App. 1985). While we agree with the district court that Hoffman’s arguments can
be summarized as asserting that mere undervaluation of a claim should give rise to
equitable principles, we need not adopt a bright-line rule because Hoffman has failed to
establish entitlement to any of the equitable relief he seeks under Minnesota law and the
facts of this case.

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Issues of Material Fact
As an alternative to his equitable arguments, Hoffman argues that summary
judgment was improper because there are genuine issues of material fact, including
whether the two-year deadline was reasonable, whether State Farm engaged in unfair
settlement practices by failing to reply to communications within ten business days
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 72A.201, subdivision 4(2) (2024), and whether
contractors would commit to the repair project without knowing the total insurance payout.
But Hoffman did not raise these arguments and did not otherwise argue to the district court
that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Appellate
courts consider only those issues presented and considered by the district court. Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Hoffman’s alternative arguments are forfeited.
We therefore conclude that, because Hoffman failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the applicability of an equitable doctrine and the district court did
not err by determining that the policy’s two-year deadline applied, the district court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on Hoffman’s RCV claim.10
II. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of State
Farm on the issue of mold remediation.
Hoffman argues that State Farm’s improper delay “undoubtably caused the mold
growth” and therefore he is entitled to recover the cost for mold remediation as determined

10 Hoffman also argues that he is entitled to the appraisal award’s identification of repairs
needed to comply with code. The policy provides for coverage to bring damaged property
into compliance with state or local building code. But such coverage is available only
under RCV. Because we have concluded that Hoffman is not entitled to RCV, we need
not address this issue.

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by the appraisal. He asserts that State Farm inappropriately shifted the burden of
disproving an exclusion to him when it demanded documentation that he was maintaining
heat on the property at the time the water line burst.
On May 11, 2022, after inspecting the property, State Farm requested
documentation showing that heat was maintained on the property. When Hoffman failed
to provide it, State Farm followed up on June 25, requesting a utility bill and information
about the age of the interior structure of the cabin. State Farm was informed around July 5
that propane was used to heat the property, and by July 8, State Farm had verified with the
propane company that heat was maintained at the cabin. Hoffman argues that this
two-month delay occurred during a “critical period” and caused the mold growth. He
points to State Farm’s July 8, 2022 statement of loss that included line items for a
dehumidifier, removal of wet insulation, and application of an antimicrobial agent to the
floor.
First, we are not convinced that State Farm improperly shifted any burden. State
Farm was requesting additional information to process the claim, and the policy requires
that Hoffman cooperate with any requests for additional information from State Farm. But
we conclude that, even if State Farm improperly requested information, our analysis does
not change because Hoffman failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact and the policy
excludes coverage for mold.
The loss occurred on or before April 24, 2022. The record contains no information
on when any mold appeared, and the suggestion that mold was growing on the property
was not raised until February 2024, when Sachs emailed State Farm asking if State Farm

21
would like to arrange for testing “[g]iven the amount of time that the water was standing
in the basement.” But Hoffman received around $18,000 from State Farm in July 2022 for
water damage and water mitigation. 11 Hoffman’s argument that the two-month delay
between May 11 and July 8, 2022, caused the need for nearly $70,000 in mold remediation
is an unsupported assertion, which is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
See Nicollet Restoration, Inc., v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. 1995).
Moreover, the parties do not dispute that the policy excludes coverage for mold.
“The doctrine of estoppel may not be used to enlarge the coverage of an insurance policy.”
Shannon v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 276 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Minn. 1979); see also Malakowsky v.
Johannsen, 374 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn. App. 1985) (“Estoppel may not be used to create
coverage where none is provided for in the contract.”).
Hoffman attempts to distinguish this caselaw by arguing that he is not seeking to
expand coverage— he is seeking to prevent State Farm from invoking an exclusion to
coverage. But this attempt fails because the plain language of the policy excludes coverage
for mold and estoppel does not create coverage where it does not exist. See Malakowsky,
374 N.W.2d at 818-19 (applying Shannon and concluding that estoppel cannot be used to
create coverage when an undisputed exclusion bars such coverage). In conclusion,
Hoffman’s assertion that State Farm “caused” the mold does not raise a genuine issue of

11 Under the policy, Hoffman had a duty to “protect the property from further damage or
loss” and to “make reasonable and necessary temporary repairs required to protect the
property.” The record shows that, despite receiving the payout for water mitigation,
Hoffman took no action to protect or repair the property.

22
material fact, not only because Hoffman provided no evidence to support the assertion, but
also because mold is excluded from coverage under the policy.
In sum, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment for State Farm.
The policy has a two-year deadline to perform repairs to receive RCV benefits, and no
equitable doctrine applies to extend or toll that deadline. Moreover, because there is no
genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment was proper as to repairs related to mold.
Affirmed.