In Re the Custody of the Children of: Matthew Prescott Beale v. Sara Elizabeth Aase

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1984

In Re the Custody of the Children of:

Matthew Prescott Beale, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Sara Elizabeth Aase,
Appellant.

Filed September 14, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-17-2387

Matthew Prescott Beale, Bethel, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Matthew L. Fling, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bentley, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this parenting-time modification dispute, appellant mother Sarah Elizabeth Aase
argues that the district court erred by not considering respondent father Matthew Prescott
Beale’s motion to modify parenting time to be a de facto motion to modify custody and
that father failed to satisfy the requirements to modify custody. In the alternative, mother

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argues that the district court erred by awarding father excessive parenting time and by
modifying child support. We affirm.
FACTS
Mother and father have two children together, ages eight and nine at the time of the
district court order at issue. In June 2019, following the parties’ stipulation, the district
court filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order awarding joint legal custody
to the parties and sole physical custody to mother, subject to a parenting-time schedule.
Father’s parenting time consisted of every Tuesday from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., every
other weekend from Friday at 4:00 p.m. to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., and Thursdays from 4:00
p.m. to 6:30 p.m. on the weeks father did not have weekend parenting time.
In October 2021, father filed a motion asking, among other things, that the district
court modify the parenting-time schedule. In November 2021, the district court filed an
order partially granting father’s motion, modifying the parenting- time schedule. The
November 2021 order did the following:
• Maintained father’s parenting time every other weekend and every
Tuesday from 4:00 p.m.to 8:00 p.m.
• Increased father’s weekend parenting time to Friday at 4:00 p. m. to
Monday morning at school drop off or 9:00 a.m. when no school.
• Added overnight parenting time on Thursdays during the summer during
the week when father did not have weekend parenting time and maintained
father’s parenting time on Thursday from 4:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. during the
school year.

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In August 2024, father filed a motion seeking modification of custody to joint
physical custody. In September 2024, the district court denied father’s custody-
modification motion, maintain ing the then-existing November 2021 parenting-time
schedule.
In September 2025, father filed a motion seeking modification of parenting time,
modification of child support, reimbursement for work-related childcare costs, and transfer
of venue to Hennepin County. Father’s proposed parenting-time modification sought a
week-on/week-off schedule with transitions occurring on Monday morning at school
during the school year and, if the parenting-time modification was granted, modification
of child-support obligations.
Father attached an affidavit in support of his motion. Father’s affidavit asserted that
his proposed modification of parenting time served the best interests of the children
because “[t]he proposed schedule will reduce the number of exchanges between the
households,” reduce stress related to short visits, and allow the children to participate in
more activities as they get older. Father asserted that more overnights are “developmentally
appropriate” now that the children are older. The affidavit also asserted that the
arrangement supports the children’s spiritual development because the children attend
church with father and his family during his parenting time and mother “does not support
[the children’s] spiritual development.” Additionally, father’s affidavit described that the
children have been “exhibiting significant behavior issues” and have missed a significant
amount of school and that father has not been effective at redirecting their behaviors due

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to his limited parenting time. Father also raised concerns about the children’s “unfettered
access” to their mobile phones and the internet.
Mother filed a memorandum in opposition to father’s motion, arguing that father’s
motion should be considered a de facto motion to modify custody and should be dismissed
because a custody-modification motion cannot be brought within two years of a prior
custody order, absent circumstances not present here. Mother filed an affidavit stating that
she does not believe that a week-on/week-off parenting-time schedule would benefit the
children, citing the older child’s “emotional issues related to spending time at [father’s]
home,” father’s “refusal to participate in family counseling,” that the children’s primary
residence has always been with mother, and that her home is “closer to where their friends
reside” and to the children’s activities. Mother’s affidavit generally contends that the
children’s issues with behavior and school performance are not connected to father’s lack
of parenting time and that she has made sufficient efforts to address these concerns, such
as enrolling both children in summer tutoring, and father has not offered to assist with the
related transportation or cost.
In October 2025, the district court granted father’s motion to modify parenting time
and child support. The district court concluded that father’s motion was “a request for a
modification of parenting time and not a modification of custody” and applied the best-
interests-of-the-child standard as provided in Minnesota Statutes section 518.175,
subdivision 5(b) (2024). Additionally, the district court ordered mother to reimburse father
$1,560.54 for childcare costs and pay $559 per month for childcare expenses and
transferred venue to Hennepin County. According to mother’s brief, the parties

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subsequently agreed there was an error in the calculation of monthly childcare expenses,
and the error was corrected by stipulation of the parties.1
Mother appeals. The appeal was stayed pending mediation, and the stay was
subsequently dissolved. Father is self-represented and did not file a brief in this appeal.
This court ordered that the case be determined on the merits as provided in Minnesota Rule
of Civil Appellate Procedure 142.03.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that father’s
motion was not a de facto motion to modify physical custody.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering father’s
motion as a motion to modify parenting time instead of a de facto motion to modify
physical custody and that grounds do not exist to modify custody.
The standard that a district court uses to address whether to modify parenting time
is different from the standard a district court uses to address whether to modify custody.
Compare Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 (2024) (modification of parenting time) with
Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (2024) (modification of custody). Thus, the nature of the relief sought
by a movant drives the legal standard that the district court will apply to that request for
relief. Generally, the “[d]etermination of the applicable statutory standard and the
interpretation of statutes are questions of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.”
Christensen v. Healey, 913 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted); see Bayer

1 Although we do not see documentation of this stipulation in the record, the parties do not
dispute it.

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v. Bayer, 979 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Minn. App. 2022) (making a similar observation). But
“whether a [movant’s] proposed change [in a parenting arrangement] modifies parenting
time or amounts to a de facto change in physical custody is to be determined by assessing
the impact of the change, not [the motion’s] label.” Bayer, 979 N.W.2d at 510. And a
district court’s “determination of whether a proposed change [in a parenting arrangement]
constitutes a de facto modification of physical custody” is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 512. Accordingly, when a movant seeks parenting-arrangement-related
relief, the legal question of whether the district court will apply the standard for modifying
parenting time or the standard for modifying custody is driven by the district court’s
underlying discretionary decision regarding whether the requested relief is to modify
parenting time or to modify custody.
When a parent moves to modify parenting time rather than modify custody, the
district court must grant the motion if it does not change the child’s primary residence and
the “modification would serve the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 5(b). The best-interests standard requires the district court to “consider and evaluate
all relevant factors” within a statutory list of 12 factors that include “the effect on the child’s
well-being” and “the benefit to the child in maximizing parenting time with both parents
and the detriment to the child in limiting parenting time with either parent.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2024).
If, on the other hand, a motion proposes a custody modification, the standard is not
simply the child’s best interests; rather, additional requirements must be met. See Minn.
Stat. § 518.18(d). The requirement that would be relevant here is that “the child’s present

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environment endangers the child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s
emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is
outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child.” Id. (iv).
To determine which standard applies, courts consider whether a proposed
modification effectively modifies the parent with physical custody’s “routine daily care
and control” of the child. Christensen, 913 N.W.2d at 442.
In Christensen, the supreme court declined to establish a bright -line rule “that
automatically treats a request for equal parenting time as a request to modify physical
custody,” id. at 442-43, noting that doing so would conflict with Minnesota Statutes section
518.175, subdivision 5(c), which states that “[a] modification of parenting time which
increases a parent’s percentage of parenting time to an amount that is between 45.1 and
54.9 percent parenting time is not a restriction of the other parent’s parenting time.” “In
other words, a motion for equal parenting time should not be treated as a motion for joint
physical custody entirely on the basis that the sole physical custodian would no longer have
the majority of the parenting time.” Christensen, 913 N.W.2d at 442. Instead, courts
“should consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the proposed
modification is a substantial change that would modify the parties’ custody arrangement,”
considering factors such as “the apportionment of parenting time, the child ’s age, the
child’s school schedule, and the distance between the parties’ homes, but these factors are
not exhaustive.” Id. at 443.
Mother argues that, under Christensen, father’s “50/50 parenting time proposal is
an increase that is substantial enough to change [mother’s] ‘routine daily care and control’

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of the children.” Mother points primarily to the facts that the proposed parenting-time
schedule results in the children’s spending “more time traveling from home to school” and
“a substantial increase in their time in a child care facility” compared to the “little or no”
time spent in daycare prior to the change.2
In Christensen, like here, the parties had joint legal custody, while the mother had
sole physical custody, subject to the father’s parenting time. 913 N.W.2d at 439. The parties
agreed that, during the school year, the father would have visitation every other weekend
from Friday after school through Monday morning, when the father would bring the child
to school, and every other week during the summer. Id. The father subsequently brought a
motion requesting that the alternating week in the summer be extended to the entire year,
asserting that the child was not doing well in school and lacked stability in the mother’s
home. Id. The district court denied the father’s motion, concluding that his motion was a
de facto motion to modify custody and that, under that standard, he had failed to prove

2 Additionally, mother argues that the fact that the district court adopted father’s proposed
order “without any material modification” indicates that the district court did not
thoroughly consider the required factors under Christensen. “A district court’s verbatim
adoption of a party’s proposed findings and conclusions of law is not reversible error per
se” and is “generally an accepted practice,” though “it raises the question of whether the
court independently evaluated the evidence.” Schallinger v. Schallinger, 699 N.W.2d 15,
23 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005 ). Mother points to the fact that
the parties subsequently corrected part of the order by stipulation because of mathematical
errors. But by mother’s own admission, the district court made some edits to father’s
proposed order, such as deleting phrases and re-numbering paragraphs. In addition, the
district court made other edits throughout father’s proposed order, and, though those edits
were not substantive, they indicate that the court reviewed the full order in detail.
Moreover, the district court’s findings appear sufficient to allow meaningful appellate
review. We are not persuaded that the order shows that the district court failed to
independently evaluate the evidence.

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endangerment as outlined in Minnesota Statutes section 518.18(d)(iv). Id. We reversed. Id.
The supreme court granted review and reversed, upholding the district court’s
determination that the father’s motion was a de facto motion to modify custody. Id. at 443.
The supreme court reasoned that the father’s proposed modification was “substantial,”
would affect half of all school days, “would change [the mother’s] daily care and control
of the child from nearly every school day to half of all school days ,” and would result in
the child spending approximately two hours traveling from the father’s home to school
each weekday during the weeks the child was at the father’s home. Id. at 442.
The district court here distinguished this case from Christensen:
In the present case, and unlike Christensen, Father has
weekday parenting time during the school year, including
Tuesday, every other Thursday from after school until
8:00 p.m.[3] in addition to every other weekend. So, Father is
already an integral part of the daily control and care of the
children on those days. The parties also reside in the same
school district. Father indicated that the drive to school would
only increase the children’s commute by approximately 10
minutes.

Based on the current circumstances, the Court finds that the
current motion is a request for a modification of parenting time
and not a modification of custody. Therefore, the best interests
standard applies.

We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination. See Bayer, 979
N.W.2d at 512. Though some of the facts of this case are similar to those in Christensen,
there are also meaningful differences. The apportionment of parenting time under the

3 The district court’s order notes that “Father’s affidavit indicates that [the parents] have
informally extended [Thursday evening parenting time] to 8 p.m.”

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modified schedule changes from one or two evenings per week during the school year (one
evening plus one alternating overnight during the summer) and every other weekend to a
week-on/week-off schedule. The weekend time spent with each parent does not change
under the modified schedule. Father’s Monday-Thursday weekday parenting time changes
from afternoon/evening parenting time on three days over a two- week period (one an
overnight during the summer) to four overnights every other week.
The change certainly increases father’s parenting time. But other factors discussed
in Christensen are not present. There is no large increase in the children’s commute, for
example. And, as father pointed out in his motion, the children are now older and longer
stretches of parenting time and more overnights are more appropriate given their
involvement in extracurricular activities. The distance between the parties’ homes is
unclear from the record, but the district court found that the children’s school commute
increases by approximately ten minutes from father’s house. Neither party has alleged that
the children’s school schedule or daily routine would be significantly changed under the
new schedule. Mother’s “routine daily care and control” of the children would certainly
decrease during her off-weeks. Christensen, 913 N.W.2d at 442. But, as the district court
pointed out, father already spent regular time with the children during each week of the
two-week schedule, and past modifications have increased his weekday parenting time
over the years.
In Bayer, we found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that
a modification of parenting time from a 50/50 split to a 29/71 parenting time split was a de
facto modification of custody, noting that the new parenting schedule would mean that

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father would have “almost no interaction with the children on school days” and mother
would have a “substantially more important role” in the children’s daily routines. Bayer,
979 N.W.2d at 512 (quotations omitted). In Bayer, unlike here, the parents had joint
physical custody. Id. at 509.
In both Bayer and Christensen, the district court’s determination that a parenting-
time modification constituted a custody modification was upheld as not an abuse of
discretion. Though the facts in this case are somewhat comparable to those in Bayer and
Christensen, the district court’s conclusion here was the opposite. Mother’s argument
hinges on the factual similarity between these cases but fails to account for the deference
we give to the district court’s decision, requiring that we limit our review of the district
court’s application of the Christensen factors “to determining whether the district court
misapplied the law, or delivered a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Id. at 512 (quotation omitted). And we conclude that, under the facts here, the district
court’s determination does not misapply the law or go against logic or facts on the record.
Again, a motion for equal parenting time does not constitute a request for de facto custody
modification simply because the sole physical custodian “would no longer have the
majority of the parenting time.” Christensen, 912 N.W.2d at 442. Because mother’s
argument depends mostly on her decreased parenting time, and none of the other factors
outlined in Christensen (children’s age, school schedule, or the distance between the
parties’ homes) weigh in favor of mother, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
treating father’s motion as a parenting-time motion. Therefore, it did not legally err in
applying the best-interests standard.

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II. The district did not err by awarding more parenting time to father.
In the alternative, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by
awarding “substantially more” parenting time to father.
Mother asserts that, even if father’s proposed modification was not a de facto
custody modification, the endangerment standard still applies, citing Braith v. Fischer, 632
N.W.2d 716 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001). But in Braith, one of
the parents raised allegations of child endangerment and we held that “[s]ubstantial
modifications of visitation rights require an evidentiary hearing when, by affidavit, the
moving party makes a prima facie showing that visitation is likely to endanger the child’s
physical or emotional well being.” 632 N.W.2d at 721 (emphasis added). Here, no party
has alleged endangerment. As a result, the district court properly applied section 518.175,
subdivision 5(b), and the best-interests factors outlined in section 518.17 (2024).
Mother further argues that the district court erred by failing to consider the following
concerns: (1) increasing father’s parenting time to every other week is “sudden and
dramatic,” (2) mother assists with the children’s educational needs, (3) father’s allegations
regarding the children’s school attendance and behavioral issues as well as mother’s
previous move to Crookston and relationship with her boyfriend “were inappropriate
because those allegations were made by [father] as support for his” previously denied
custody motion, and (4) mother has always been the children’s primary caregiver “with
very little participation from [father].” Mother contends that , if the district court had
reviewed the evidence , “the only conclusion it could have reached would have been a

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denial of [father’s] motion.” Mother does not specifically challenge any of the district
court’s findings on the best-interests factors.
The arguments are unpersuasive. The district court’s order did address the concerns
raised by mother within its consideration of the best-interests factors. For example, the
district court explained that the proposed parenting-time schedule would result in far fewer
exchanges and limit “the amount of transitions between the parties’ homes,” which the
district court acknowledged “is difficult for the children” under the current schedule. The
district court also noted that father’s proposed parenting schedule would “not change the
children’s home, school, or community” and would allow father to be more involved in
educational, extracurricular, and religious decisions. Additionally, mother cites no
authority to explain why the “only conclusion” that was acceptable under these facts was
to deny father’s motion. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of
the best-interests standard in modifying parenting time.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the parties’ child
support obligations.

Mother contends that, if this court reverses or remands the district court’s decision,
the previously ordered child support and child obligations should be restored. Mother also
argues that it is inconsistent for the district court to have “determine[d] that a parenting
time modification is not substantial while simultaneously determining that the modification
is substantial for purposes of determining monetary obligations.”
The district court found that its grant of father’s parenting-time motion constituted
a substantial change in circumstances, noting:

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Application of the child support guidelines to the parties’
current circumstances results in an amount that is more than
$75 and 20% lower than Father’s current child support
obligation. Therefore, it is presumed that Father’s current child
support obligation is unreasonable and unfair. There was no
evidence presented to overcome this presumption.

The district court factored in father’s increased childcare costs for the school year and
summer under father’s proposed parenting-time schedule to make this calculation.
Mother is correct that, if we were to reverse the district court’s grant of father’s
motion, there would no longer be a substantial change in circumstances requiring a child
support modification. But, because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by modifying parenting time, we conclude that it also did not abuse its discretion
by modifying child support.
Additionally, mother argues that the district court’s decision is internally
inconsistent because the district court determined that the proposed parenting-time
modification was not “substantial” for purposes of constituting a de facto modification of
physical custody but is “substantial” for purposes of child support. The argument
misconstrues the standards applied to each analysis. Under Christensen, a modification of
parenting time is not a de facto modification of physical custody when the modification is
not “substantial enough” to change “the routine daily care and control” of the children—
and even then, it is only part of the analysis. 913 N.W.2d at 442. The relevant question for
child-support modification, on the other hand, is whether a “substantial change in
circumstances” has occurred. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (2024). Child support and

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parenting time are governed by different statutory provisions, and the district court
appropriately applied the respective standards to each determination.
Affirmed.