In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Tyler James Michael Tillman.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1999

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Tyler James Michael Tillman.

Filed May 4, 2026
Affirmed
Segal, Judge*

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-PR-24-45

MacKenzie Guptil, Pine City, Minnesota (for appellant Tyler James Michael Tillman)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, James Austad, Lisa Broos, Assistant Attorneys General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent Chisago
County Health & Human Services)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order committing him for an indeterminate
period as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) under Minn. Stat. § 253D.07 (2024). He
argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that he allegedly

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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sexually assaulted two females without calling them as witnesses at the commitment
hearing. Tillman also argues that the district court erred by finding that he met the criteria
to be an SDP. We affirm.
FACTS
Chisago County filed a petition in April 2024 seeking the civil commitment of
appellant Tyler James Michael Tillman as an SDP.1 Tillman was 35 years old at the time
of the commitment hearing. Tillman has two past convictions, one in 2010 for third-degree
criminal sexual conduct and one in 2020 that occurred in Wisconsin for third-degree sexual
assault. Tillman has been incarcerated since his second conviction. These are his only
criminal convictions aside from traffic offenses.
At the commitment hearing, the county presented evidence of alleged sexual
conduct related to six different females that occurred over a ten-year span between 2008
and 2018, including the two sex-offense convictions. Four of the females were underage,
including one female who was only 14. Two of the females, A.R.C. and S.G., testified at
the commitment hearing. The underlying facts related to the sexual incidents involving the
other four females were submitted through law enforcement and court records. The
incidents are summarized below in chronological order.
2

1 The petition also sought commitment of Tillman as a sexual psychopathic personality,
but the county withdrew that portion of the petition prior to the commitment hearing.

2 The incident summaries are taken from the district court’s findings and the testimony of
A.R.C. and S.G. In his trial testimony, Tillman does not challenge on appeal the district
court’s summaries of the incidents. Tillman largely denied that the sexual encounters were
nonconsensual, including the two assaults to which he pleaded guilty.
3
C.E.M.
Tillman’s first sexual-offense conviction arose out of a sexual assault that occurred
in 2008. The victim in that case, C.E.M., was 16 years old at the time of the offense, and
Tillman was 18. C.E.M. reported that she had dated Tillman for about five months, and
that she first began having sex with him when she was 15 years old. She broke off their
relationship but agreed to meet with him after he called and texted her. Tillman picked her
up, drove her to his father’s home, and took her to his bedroom. She said that they talked
for about two hours when Tillman began kissing her and reached for the drawer where she
knew he kept condoms, to which she told him no, that was not what she wanted. Tillman
then laid on top of her, took his clothes off, held her arms against the headboard of the bed,
pulled off a leg of her sweatpants and underwear, and penetrated her. C.E.M. repeatedly
told him no and to stop. Tillman drove her home afterward, telling her he was sorry. He
also called and texted her the next morning telling her he was probably going to turn
himself in to the police.
Tillman was charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct, to which he pleaded
guilty in 2010. The district court sentenced him to 48 months stayed, with up to 15 years
of supervised probation. While on probation, Tillman’s probation officer received reports
that Tillman was having sexual encounters with underage girls, including A.R.C. and S.G.
The officer repeatedly directed Tillman that he was to have no contact with girls under the
age of 18.
Tillman was found to be in violation of the terms of his probation three different
times. The first two times were for offenses such as having pornography on his phone and
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being arrested for a sex offense without notifying his probation officer. As a consequence
of the violations, he was ordered to serve time in jail and complete various types of
programming but was maintained on probation. After the district court found that Tillman
had violated the terms of his probation for the third time in 2022 based on his second
sexual-assault conviction, the district court revoked his probation and executed his
sentence.
A.R.C.
In 2011, Tillman (then age 21) had a relationship with A.R.C., a 17 -year-old girl
who was in foster care. A.R.C. testified at the commitment hearing that Tillman was her
first boyfriend and that she was a virgin until he had sex with her against her will. She said
that she met him online through social media and that they then saw each other in person
seven to ten times, typically in his truck at the beach where she would sit on his lap and
they would kiss. She testified that Tillman would ask her if sh e wanted to have sex and
that she told him no. One night, Tillman drove over in his truck around 10:00 p.m., and
she got into his truck, and they began “making out.” She testified that he then started
pushing her down in the truck seat until he was on top of her and held her arms above her
head while he pulled her shorts down. A.R.C. said she told him to stop, that she “wasn’t
ready for that,” but that Tillman nevertheless put his penis into her vagina. She said that
when he was done, she pulled up her shorts and went into her house “dumbfounded.”
A.R.C. explained that for the next few years she was in a downward spiral and
believed that Tillman’s actions impacted her ability to form healthy relationships and that
she puts herself in a lot of dangerous situations because of it.
5
S.G.
In 2013, Tillman (then age 23) entered into a relationship with S.G., a 16-year -old
girl. S.G. testified at the commitment hearing that she met Tillman at the beach, dated him
for about nine months, and had sexual intercourse with him at least 15 times. S.G. said
that it was difficult to end the relationship with Tillman because after it had ended, he
would still show up in the school parking lot waiting for her and he would go to places
where he knew she “hung out.” She said this conduct only stopped when he went to jail
for an offense that did not involve her. S.G. testified that she believes that Tillman
manipulated her and preyed upon her for sex.
A.A.J.
In the early morning hours of January 1, 2014, Tillman picked up A.A.J., a 14-year-
old girl, and brought her to a party. Tillman was nine years older than A.A.J. Once at the
party, A.A.J. started to feel sick and went to a bedroom in the house where the party was
being held so that she could lie down. Tillman asked her if she wanted to have sex, to
which she replied that she was 14 years old. Tillman told her that he would not bring her
home unless she had sex with him, and A.A.J. then agreed. They began to have sexual
intercourse, when A.A.J. began to cry in pain and asked him to stop, which he did. Tillman
was charged with third -degree criminal sexual conduct, but the state later dismissed the
case after the court granted Tillman’s motion for disclosure of certain of A.A.J.’s mental-
health and chemical-dependency records.

6
K.S.B.
In April 2018, K.S.B., an adult female, reported that she was sexually assaulted by
Tillman. K.S.B. told police that she was homeless (she had lost her housing at a halfway
house) and had been staying at Tillman’s house because she had nowhere else to go. K.S.B.
reported that, on the day of the incident, Tillman texted her that “he was really horny” and
was coming home to “bang” her. When Tillman arrived at the house, he began to kiss her,
and she repeated that she was not in the mood and told him “no” and “it’s not happening.”
Tillman told her that she wanted it and pulled down her pants and underwear. K.S.B. said
that Tillman then held her down on the bed and forced himself inside her. K.S.B. submitted
to a sexual-assault examination, which revealed a partial major male DNA match for
Tillman. Tillman told police he could have sex with K.S.B. whenever he wanted because
she was homeless and he was helping her out. Tillman was charged with third- degree
criminal sexual conduct—force or coercion, but the state dismissed the case before trial,
stating that they could not prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
J.R.M.
In November 2018, Tillman (then age 24) sexually assaulted J.R.M., his 18-year-
old cousin. On the night of the assault, Tillman drove an hour from Minnesota to
Wisconsin where J.R.M. was working an evening shift at a group home. J.R.M. went out
to his truck to have a cigarette with him and told him that she would not be able to come
back out from work that night. When her shift ended a couple of hours later, she noticed
that Tillman was still parked in the driveway of the group home. He asked her to smoke
another cigarette with him in the truck before she went home. After finishing the cigarette,
7
Tillman leaned over to hug her, which was okay with J.R.M. because they were cousins.
He then repositioned himself, putting his arms over hers and holding her arms down to her
sides. When Tillman began kissing her neck, J.R.M. said she needed to leave and go home.
Tillman, however, continued to hold her down, put down the back of the seat so that she
was laying on her back, and pulled down her pants and underwear. J.R.M. attempted to
resist and told him no, but he used his knees to force her legs apart and inserted his penis
into her vagina.
Tillman was charged in Wisconsin with second-degree sexual assault and pleaded
guilty to an amended count of third-degree sexual assault in January 2020. The Wisconsin
court sentenced him to four years in prison and three years of extended supervision.
The county initiated a civil-commitment petition while Tillman was still
incarcerated. The district court appointed Dr. Michael Thompson as the initial examiner
and, at the request of Tillman, the district court appointed Dr. Thomas Alberg as the second
examiner. Both doctors interviewed Tillman and prepared reports concluding that Tillman
met the criteria for commitment as an SDP , the same conclusion reached by the county’s
pre-petition screener. The examiners opined that Tillman’s conduct was harmful to the
involved females, that Tillman suffered from unspecified paraphilic disorder which caused
him to lack adequate control over his sexual conduct, and that he was highly likely to
engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future. They also opined that Tillman needed
intensive inpatient treatment and that the Minnesota Sex Offender Program was the only
available alternative for that treatment.
8
The district court held a commitment hearing over four days in April and May 2025.
At the hearing, the district court heard testimony from Tillman, A.R.C., S.G., and
Drs. Thompson and Alberg. Tillman also presented testimony from a girlfriend, M. S.,
whom Tillman had been involved with since 2017, and M.S.’s father. M.S and her father
testified that they were aware of the allegations against Tillman, that M.S. intended to
marry Tillman, that Tillman could come live with them if he was released, and that M.S.’s
father had a job for Tillman. The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and order for commitment, finding that the county had proven by clear and convincing
evidence that Tillman satisfied the criteria for civil commitment as an SDP and that no less
restrictive alternative was available. Tillman filed a motion for a new trial, which the
district court denied.
DECISION
In his appeal, Tillman challenges the district court’s order for his indeterminate
commitment as an SDP, alleging that it was based on inadmissible evidence and that the
district court’s findings were not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
An SDP is defined as a person who “(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct as defined in subdivision 8 [of section 253D.02] ; (2) has manifested a sexual,
personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage
in acts of harmful sexual conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16 (2024). If these three
elements are established by clear and convincing evidence, the person is subject to
commitment as an SDP, “unless the person establishes by clear and convincing evidence
that a less restrictive treatment program is available.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3.
9
We first address Tillman’s challenge to the admission of evidence related to A.A.J.
and K.S.B.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the law-
enforcement investigation records and reports re lated to incidents of sexual
conduct involving A.A.J. and K.S.B.

Tillman argues that the district court erred by admitting the law-enforcement
investigation records and reports (police reports) relating to A.A.J. and K.S.B. because
(a) they were unreliable, and (b) their admission violated his due-process rights.
Appellate courts “afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on
evidentiary matters, and . . . will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that
discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015). Appellate courts
“review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a new trial for an abuse of discretion.”
Christie v. Est. of Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018). A district court abuses its
discretion if its findings of fact are unsupported by the record or if it improperly applies
the law or if it resolves the question in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on
record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). De novo review is
applied in assessing claims of due-process violations. Williams v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
830 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 2013).
The procedural provisions of the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act
(MCTA), which are made applicable to SDP petitions by Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 2,
direct that the district court “shall admit all relevant evidence” and “make its determination
upon the entire record pursuant to the Rules of Evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7
(2024). Additionally, rule 15 of the MCTA rules provides that the district court “may admit
10
all relevant, reliable evidence, including but not limited to the respondent’s medical
records, without requiring foundation witnesses.” Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat.
Act 15. Together, these provisions “require[] the district court to determine relevancy in
accordance with the rules of evidence,” but “do[] not require application of other rules of
evidence.” In re Civ. Commitment of Williams, 735 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Minn. App. 2007),
rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2007). “A presumption of admissibility applies in
commitment proceedings, and the district court has discretion to determine the
admissibility of evidence.” Id.
Here, Tillman filed a motion in limine seeking to suppress admission of the police
reports. The district court reserved ruling on the motion until all witness testimony was
presented. The court ultimately denied the motion, explaining that the police reports were
relevant to the issues of whether Tillman engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct
and the likelihood that he would engage in such conduct in the future. The district court
further noted that the police reports were created near in time to the alleged incidents, and
that Tillman had the opportunity to testify about both alleged incidents. Finally, the district
court stated that it “could weigh [Tillman’s] credibility, weigh [Tillman’s] testimony
against the information in the police reports, and make a factual finding,” reinforcing that
it would not simply accept the challenged evidence at face value, but would independently
weigh that evidence against the other evidence and testimony presented at the hearing.
Tillman argues that the police reports were unreliable because, even though criminal
charges were brought against Tillman related to the sexual-assault claims of both A.A.J.
and K.S.B., the county attorneys dismissed the complaints before trial. The A.A.J.
11
complaint was dismissed after the district court allowed discovery of certain of her mental-
health and chemical-dependency records; the K.S.B. complaint was dismissed because the
county attorney determined that the case could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact that the county attorneys dismissed the cases before trial, however, is not
determinative of the reliability of the evidence. See In re Civ. Commitment of Ramey, 648
N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. App. 2002) (“[T]he course of conduct need not consist solely of
convictions but may also include conduct amounting to harmful sexual conduct, of which
the offender was not convicted.”) , rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002); In re Civ.
Commitment of Stone, 711 N.W.2d 831, 837 (Minn. App. 2006) (citing Ramey).
Indeed, we rejected a similar challenge to the admission of police reports in the
Williams case, which also involved an SDP commitment. 735 N.W.2d at 732 (noting that
there is “no statutory basis for” requiring that all victims must testify at a commitment
hearing). In Williams, we found no abuse of discretion by the district court in admitting
similar evidence when the documents “were generated closely in time to the events they
describe, and . . . include[d] the accounts of first-hand witnesses, the victims.” Id. The
police reports here, as in Williams, were generated “closely in time” to the events and
include firsthand statements by both A.A.J. and K.S.B., as well as Tillman. 3 Also similar
to Williams, the district court here diligently reviewed the evidence in question and

3 We also note that the statements of A.A.J. and K.S.B. were contained in reports to police.
It is a crime to make a false report to police. See Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 1 (2024).
Cf. State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. App. 1998) (evaluating reliability of an
informant’s tip to police in a criminal case, noting that an informant’s credibility may be
“enhanced because the informant is presumably aware that he or she could be arrested for
making a false report”).
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specified by page numbers the portions of the exhibits that were not relevant. We thus
discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in admitting the police reports related to
the assault allegations of A.A.J. and K.S.B.
Tillman also argues that admission of the evidence violated his right to due process
because A.A.J. and K.S.B. did not testify at the hearing. We rejected that claim in Williams,
and we are not persuaded by Tillman’s arguments that there is good reason to deviate from
that precedent here. Id. at 732 -33 (rejecting a due-process challenge in an SDP civil-
commitment appeal based on the admission of out-of-court statements without presenting
testimony from the declarant).
We reject Tillman’s due-process argument because, first, there is no right to
confront witnesses in a civil proceeding as exists in criminal cases. See, e.g., In re Irwin,
529 N.W.2d 366, 373 (Minn. App. 1995) (noting that commitment proceedings are civil in
nature and that the Confrontation Clause applies only in criminal cases), rev. denied (Minn.
May 16, 1995). And second, Tillman had a full opportunity to rebut the county’s evidence.
The district court specifically noted that Tillman testified concerning the A.A.J. and K.S.B.
allegations and that the district court would weigh that testimony against the police reports.
And as noted in Williams, Tillman could have called A.A.J. and K.S.B. as witnesses
himself if he wanted to cross-examine them. 735 N.W.2d at 732. We thus discern no
violation of Tillman’s due-process rights in admitting the A.A.J. and K.S.B. evidence.
4

4 This is not to say that petitioners can prove SDP cases by relying too heavily on hearsay.
As we stated in Williams, “we do not lightly dismiss . . . concern[s] about fairness as it
regards the consideration of hearsay.” 735 N.W.2d at 732. SDP commitments entail a
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II. The district court did not err by determining that Tillman qualifies as an
SDP.

Tillman argues that the district court erred in its determination that there is clear and
convincing evidence that he meets any of the three criteria set out in the definition of an
SDP in Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a): that he (1) “engaged in a course of harmful
sexual conduct”; (2) “ has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or
dysfunction”; or (3) is “likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.”
Appellate courts “review de novo whether there is clear and convincing evidence in
the record to support the district court’s conclusion that appellant meets the standards for
commitment.” In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003). A district court’s
civil-commitment determination “must be justified by findings based upon evidence at the
hearing.” In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). Appellate courts review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error, viewing the record in the light most favorable
to the district court’s findings, see In re Civ. Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 807
(Minn. App. 2014), and defer to a district court’s credibility determinations, see In re
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222-23 (Minn. 2021).
A. Course of Harmful Sexual Conduct

The first element of the SDP definition is that the person “has engaged in a course
of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 8” of section 253D.02. Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.02, subd. 16(a)(1). That subdivision defines “harmful sexual conduct” as “sexual

significant intrusion on personal liberty, and “fundamental fairness is the touchstone of due
process in proceedings where personal liberty is at stake.” Id.
14
conduct that creates a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to
another.” Id., subd. 8(a) (2024). Criminal sexual conduct in the first through fourth degrees
is rebuttably presumed to create a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional
harm. Id., subd. 8(b) (2024). The statute does not define what constitutes a “course” of
harmful sexual conduct, but caselaw has defined it as a “systematic or orderly succession;
a sequence.” Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 837 (quotation omitted). Caselaw also advises that a
“course of harmful sexual conduct” includes “both conduct for which the offender was
convicted and conduct that did not result in a conviction.” Id.
Here, the district court found that Tillman had engaged in harmful sexual conduct
based on, among other things, Tillman’s own acknowledgment that he harmed C.E.M.,
A.R.C., S.G., A.A.J., and J.R.M. In addition, the district court credited the testimony of
Drs. Thompson and Alberg that “all six women and/or girls were likely to have suffered
harm as a result of [Tillman’s] behavior,” along with the testimony of A.R.C. and S.G. as
to the harm they suffered due to Tillman’s conduct. As noted above, we defer to such
credibility findings. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222-23. The district court thus found that
Tillman failed to rebut the presumption that harmful sexual conduct occurred with regard
to the C.E.M. and J.R.M. convictions and found clear and convincing evidence of harmful
sexual conduct that created a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm
with regard to A.R.C., S.G., A.A.J., and K.S.B.
The district court also found that the conduct was part of a course of conduct, noting:
The allegations span a period of approximately ten
years, with five of them occurring while [Tillman] was on
probation for the CEM case and in spite of his probation
15
agent’s attempts to intervene through requiring treatment,
limiting [Tillman’s] contact with minors, and imposing other
conditions meant to lessen the risk that he would continue to
engage in harmful sexual behavior.
In support of its finding, the district court pointed to the “similar[ity of the] fact patterns,”
which involved “victims under the age of 18, victims who were vulnerable, and the use of
force.” Finally, the district court commented that “[t]he CEM and JRM convictions alone
would be sufficient to form a course, but the allegations of [Tillman’s] conduct as it relates
to ARC, SG, AAJ, and KSB provide additional evidence that [Tillman] engaged in a course
of harmful sexual conduct.”
Tillman challenges the district court’s reliance on his conduct regarding A.A.J.,
K.S.B., S.G., and A.R.C. For A.A.J. and K.S.B., Tillman reiterates his arguments under
the first issue—that the district court should not have admitted the police reports because
the charges were dismissed and they did not testify at trial. As discussed above, the district
court did not err by admitting this evidence.
Regarding S.G., Tillman argues that his conduct should not have been considered
as evidence of a “course of harmful sexual conduct” because there was no evidence that he
ever sexually assaulted her. Although it is true that S.G. did not allege that she was
assaulted, the fact remains that S.G. was only 16 years old at the time that Tillman—who
was 23—initiated a sexual relationship with her. She testified that she was too young at
the time to know what she was getting into and that it made her upset and angry. She
stated: “I feel like the relationship was only for sex, and for him, I was an easy target for
16
that.” She also testified that after she broke off the relationship, he continued to follow
her, showing up in the parking lot of her high school and the places that she “hung out.”
In addition to S.G.’s testimony, both Drs. Thompson and Alberg testified that S.G.
likely suffered psychological and emotional harm as a consequence of the sexual
relationship with Tillman. And nothing in the definition of “harmful sexual conduct”
requires a physical assault for conduct to be considered harmful. Moreover, the evidence
related to S.G. was just one of six examples of harmful sexual conduct in the record. Thus,
even if the S.G. evidence was to be set aside, five other examples remain.
As to A.R.C., Tillman argues that his conduct should not have been included
because she testified that she “does not blame [Tillman]” and that she “put herself in a lot
of dangerous situations.” Tillman’s reliance on this testimony is disingenuous. A.R.C.
testified that Tillman sexually assaulted her when she was only 17 and living in foster care.
Tillman was 21. She testified that she thought she loved him and repeatedly told him that
she was not ready to engage in sex in the days prior to the assault and while the assault was
occurring. She further testified that the assault caused her to become more vulnerable and
put herself in dangerous situations because she did not know what a healthy relationship
looked like. And significantly, Tillman acknowledged in his testimony that A.R.C. was
“probably” hurt by his actions, because they involved “sex without dating,” declaring that
he was not in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship with her.
We thus discern no error by the district court in its determination that there was clear
and convincing evidence that Tillman engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct.
17
B. Sexual, Personality, or Other Mental Disorder Causing a Lack of Control
over Sexual Impulses

The second element of the definition of an SDP is that the person “has manifested a
sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02,
subd. 16(a)(2). The person’s mental disorder must make it “difficult, if not impossible, for
the person to control his dangerous behavior.” In re Linehan (Linehan IV), 594 N.W.2d
867, 875 (Minn. 1999) (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). “[A]n offender’s history
of harmful sexual conduct and a high likelihood of future dangerousness, coupled with a
mental illness or dysfunction, demonstrates that an offender will find it difficult to control
behavior.” Ramey, 648 N.W.2d at 268.
In support of its determination that Tillman met the second element, the district
court relied on the testimony of Drs. Thompson and Alberg, who both diagnosed Tillman
with unspecified paraphilic disorder and testified that this caused Tillman to lack adequate
control over his sexual behavior. Dr. Thompson testified that the fact that Tillman was
implicated in at least four sexual assaults, and that he continued to offend despite being
sanctioned for violating the terms of his probation, supported his conclusion that Tillman
lacked control over his sexual behavior. The district court found the opinions of both
doctors on this issue to be credible. Quoting Dr. Thompson, the district court noted that
Tillman’s history, as demonstrated by the incidents involving the six females, “illustrates
a lack of control over his sexual behavior that appears immune to legal consequences or
court imposed sanctions.”
18
Tillman argues that the evidence does not sufficiently distinguish him from a
“typical offender that can be dealt with in the prison system.” Tillman relies on In re
Martinelli, where this court reiterated the constitutional requirement that “serious difficulty
in controlling behavior” must distinguish the dangerous sexual offender from the typical
criminal recidivist. 649 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. App. 2002) (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)). But in Martinelli, we concluded that “a judicial finding of ‘lack
of control’ based on expert testimony tying that ‘lack of control’ to a properly diagnosed
mental abnormality or personality disorder . . . adequately distinguishes the offender
subject to commitment from the ‘typical recidivist’ offender.” Id. Here, the district court
did exactly that. It made a finding of “lack of control” based on the opinions of both
Drs. Thompson and Alberg that Tillman’s diagnosis caused him to lack adequate control
over his sexual behavior.
Tillman argues that the district court did not place adequate weight on the fact that
he had reached the age of 35, which reduces his actuarial risk of re-offense, and that he was
incarcerated for a “substantial” period of time (approximately four years) immediately
prior to the commitment petition, asserting that the prison time could serve as an effective
deterrent to re- offense. But the district court was within its discretion to weigh this
consideration against the expert’s opinions and Tillman’s history of probation violations.
As an appellate court, we are not at liberty to reweigh that evidence. See Kenney, 963
N.W.2d at 222-23; see also In re Civ. Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 24 (Minn.
2014) (“[T]he district court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess
credibility . . . .”).
19
The district court did not err by determining that there was clear and convincing
evidence that Tillman has a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder that causes him to
lack adequate control of his sexual impulses.
C. Likely to Engage in Acts of Harmful Sexual Conduct

The third element of the definition of an SDP is that the person “is likely to engage
in acts of harmful sexual conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a)(3). The Minnesota
Supreme Court has interpreted “likely” under this statute to mean “highly likely.” Ince,
847 N.W.2d at 22. There are six factors (the Linehan factors) to be considered when
determining whether a person is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct:
(a) the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
education, etc.); (b) the person’s history of violent behavior
(paying particular attention to recency, severity, and frequency
of violent acts); (c) the base rate statistics for violent behavior
among individuals of this person’s background (e.g., data
showing the rate at which rapists recidivate, the correlation
between age and criminal sexual activity, etc.); (d) the sources
of stress in the environment (cognitive and affective factors
which indicate that the person may be predisposed to cope with
stress in a violent or nonviolent manner); (e) the similarity of
the present or future context to those contexts in which the
person has used violence in the past; and (f) the person’s record
with respect to sex therapy programs.

In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994).
Here, the district court, again relying on the opinions of Drs. Thompson and Alberg,
found that all six factors supported that Tillman was highly likely to engage in harmful
sexual conduct in the future. And while it considered Tillman’s argument that he is no
different from the typical recidivist who can be deterred by prison, it noted that Tillman
has continued to reoffend while on probation, despite being sanctioned twice by the court
20
for probation violations before his probation was finally revoked after his conviction for
the sexual assault involving J.R.M.
Tillman challenges the district court’s determinations under each factor.
1. Relevant Demographic Characteristics
The first factor is “ the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
education, etc.).” Id.
Here, the district court determined that Tillman’s demographics —male, unstable
relationship history, unstable work history, and history of chemical dependency—
supported that he was highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future. It
also noted that Tillman’s age of 35 “slightly minimized” the risk.
Tillman argues that his age should have outweighed the other concerns. But Tillman
fails to demonstrate that his age so significantly reduced his actuarial risk that the district
court erred by not according it greater weight. “The district court is free to determine the
weight to be attributed to any particular piece of evidence, . . . based on the record in an
individual case.” Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 24. We thus discern no error by the district court in
according less weight to the fact that Tillman had reached the age of 35.
2. History of Violent Behavior
The second factor is “the person’s history of violent behavior (paying particular
attention to recency, severity, and frequency of violent acts).” Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at
614. Here, the district court pointed to Tillman’s two sexual-assault convictions, noting
that both involved physical restraint of the two victims, and that several of the other
incidents also involved physically restraining the victims so that he could sexually
21
penetrate them against their will. The district court further noted that the most recent
assault, the conviction related to J.R.M., involved an escalation because, in addition to
holding her down, Tillman forced her legs apart. The court noted that “[t]his escalation,
combined with the fact that [Tillman’s] victims have been primarily young and/or
vulnerable, gives the Court great concern.” The district court also credited the opinions of
Drs. Thompson and Alberg, who both testified that Tillman’s history demonstrates violent
behavior and supports that he is highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the
future.
Tillman argues that there was no evidence that he used violence regarding A.A.J.—
the 14-year-old he had sex with at a New Year’s party as a condition of driving her home.
He contends that his conduct toward A.A.J. should not have been considered under this
factor. It is not clear, however, that the district court placed much if any reliance on
Tillman’s interactions with A.A.J. in connection with this factor. The district court
referenced Dr. Thompson’s opinion in his report that Tillman utilized “instrumental
violence” as “an aspect of the offenses against AAJ, KSB, and JRM,” but the court does
not mention this elsewhere in its analysis of this factor. In addition, the A.A.J. incident is
only one of six examples of harmful sexual conduct presented by the county. And the
district court credited the evidence that Tillman forcibly removed clothing and physically
restrained his victims to accomplish sexual penetration with C.E.M., A.R.C., K.S.B., and
J.R.M.— providing evidence of a history of violent behavior. Thus, if there was an error
with regard to consideration of A.A.J., we would consider it a harmless error. See Minn.
R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored).
22
Tillman also makes a series of additional arguments under this factor which are
unpersuasive. He argues once again that the district court should not have admitted
evidence regarding A.A.J. and K.S.B., but as discussed above, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the admission of this evidence. He argues that there was no use of weapons
or “additional physical assaults,” but the factor does not require that “violent behavior”
include weapons or “additional physical assaults.” He argues that he had no history of
“nonsexual violence,” but this fact was noted and was weighed in Tillman’s favor by both
Drs. Thompson and Alberg. Finally, Tillman attempts to attack the credibility of
Drs. Thompson and Alberg, but the district court found their testimony to be “credible and
of significant weight,” and we defer to such findings. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222-23.
The district court did not err by determining that this factor supported that Tillman
was highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future.
3. Base Rate Statistics
The third factor is “the base rate statistics for violent behavior among individuals of
this person’s background (e.g., data showing the rate at which rapists recidivate, the
correlation between age and criminal sexual activity, etc.).” Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 614.
Here, the district court considered Tillman’s scores on several actuarial measures
and risk-assessment tools, and the testimony by Drs. Thompson and Alberg about these
tools. The district court referenced the following actuarial and risk-factor assessments
utilized by Drs. Thompson and Alberg, including the Static-99R, the Stable-2007, the Sex
Offender Risk Appraisal Guide, the Sexual Violence Risk-20, and the Hare Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised 2nd Edition. The district court noted that both examiners opined that
23
the scores from these assessments support that Tillman is “highly likely to reoffend.” The
district court found that both examiners “credibly testified regarding how they scored
[Tillman] on their respective assessments” and “that both examiners have credibly testified
and provided other information that would indicate that [Tillman’s] base rate statistics
reflect that [Tillman] is highly likely to reoffend.” The district court expressly noted that
in evaluating “the actuarial measures and other risk assessment tools and risk factors . . .
[t]he Court is mindful of and does not overemphasize or double count risk factors that may
be considered in multiple assessments.”
Tillman asserts error in the use of the Static-99R tool. Tillman argues that his risk
for re-offense under the Static-99R would have been higher if some of his victims were
male or he had non-sexual offenses. But the absence of these potential factors does not
detract from Tillman’s other risk factors. Tillman also argues that he was considered under
the wrong category. Dr. Thompson testified that, under the methodology of the tool,
Tillman was compared to other sex offenders in the “high risk” or “high needs” pool
because the county petitioned for him to be committed. If Tillman had been categorized
as being in the “routine needs” group, his risk for re-offense would have been lower. But
this does not mean that it was error for the examiners to place Tillman in the “high needs”
category.
Dr. Thompson explained in his testimony that he placed Tillman in the “high needs”
category based on the design of the tool. And Tillman presented no evidence that either
24
examiner used the tool incorrectly. 5 The district court had the opportunity to hear and
evaluate Tillman’s cross-examination of Dr. Thompson on this issue and had discretion to
weigh the credibility of the experts’ testimony and the methods they used. We thus discern
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s findings related to the Static-99R, which was
just one of the five assessment tools utilized by the examiners.
The district court did not err by determining that this factor supported that Tillman
was highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future.
4. Sources of Stress in the Environment
The fourth factor is “the sources of stress in the environment (cognitive and affective
factors which indicate that the person may be predisposed to cope with stress in a violent
or nonviolent manner).” Id.
Here, the district court relied on testimony that it found credible from
Drs. Thompson and Alberg regarding Tillman’s predicted difficulties with finances,
housing, employment, and chemical use. 6 It also expressed doubts about Tillman’s post-
release plans that involved him moving in with M.S .’s family and, while M.S.’s father
testified that he had a job waiting for Tillman on his release, the district court noted that it
was not clear how long the job would be available, whether it would involve year -round
work, and whether the rate of pay would be sufficient to cover Tillman’s expenses. The

5 It should be noted that both examiners revised their Static-99R scores from a five to a
four when Tillman turned 35, because his age reduced his actuarial risk of re-offense.

6 The record shows that Tillman had been previously assessed as having a severe alcohol-
dependency problem, for which he had been through treatment.
25
court also expressed doubt about the ability of M.S. to hold Tillman accountable because
he had engaged in “sexual offending behavior while he was dating” her—the sexual
assaults of K.S.B. and J.R.M.—and that the evidence showed that Tillman “has been unable
to hold himself accountable for his own actions.” The district court determined that this
factor supported that Tillman was highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the
future.
Tillman argues that the Minnesota Department of Corrections would provide
intensive monitoring if he were released into the community and that, because he is now
older, he is likely able to handle stress more effectively. These arguments, however, just
ask this court to reweigh the evidence, and do not establish an abuse of discretion by the
district court. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222-23.
We thus discern no error by the district court in its determination on this factor.
5. Similarity of Present or Future Context
The fifth factor is “the similarity of the present or future context to those contexts
in which the person has used violence in the past.” Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 614.
Here, the district court observed that, although Tillman may change his living
situation, his exposure to young adult females would be no different. The district court
noted that Tillman had used social media in the past to make connections with young
females, even though his probation officer instructed him not to have contact with underage
girls, and that this avenue would still be available to him while living with M.S.’s family.
The district court also expressed skepticism concerning the re-offense prevention plan that
Tillman had prepared. The district court commented that, although the “plan somewhat
26
lowers the Court’s concerns, because [Tillman] has failed to make meaningful efforts at
treatment and cannot articulate what he has learned in past treatment,” the plan was
“superficial and unlikely to address his needs to sufficiently lower the risk he poses to the
community.” The district court thus determined that this factor supported that Tillman was
highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future.
Tillman argues that the district court failed to consider that the statutorily required
“intensive supervised release” would be more effective than his past probation conditions.
But the district court was within its discretion to weigh this against Tillman’s history and
known risk factors. See, e.g., Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 24.
The district court did not err by determining that this factor supported that Tillman
was highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future.
6. Record in Sex Therapy Programs
The sixth factor is “the person’s record with respect to sex therapy programs.”
Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 614.
Here, the district court relied on the expert’s classification of Tillman as an
“untreated sex offender” because he had failed to complete several treatment programs,
having been terminated for absences and re-offenses and, for the programs he did complete,
he could not articulate what he had learned in the program. The district court noted that
Tillman “consistently failed to prioritize his participation in sex offender treatment and
what treatment he has participated in has made little to no impact on him.” Accordingly,
the district court determined that this factor supported that Tillman was highly likely to
engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future.
27
Tillman argues that the district court failed to consider his completion of chemical-
dependency treatment and “demonstrated” intent to participate in sex-offender treatment.
But the district court was within its discretion to rely instead on Tillman’s failure to
complete sex-offender treatment. See Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 24.
The district court did not err by determining that this factor supported that Tillman
was highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future. 7 Consequently, we
discern no error in the district court’s determination that the third SDP criterion was
satisfied.
Affirmed.

7 Tillman also reiterates here his argument that he has not been sufficiently distinguished
from the typical recidivist offender, which we addressed above.