Hykeem Green, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2006

Hykeem Green,
Relator,

vs.

Zerorez, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 52064597-3

Hykeem Green, Eagan, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Zerorez, Inc., St. Louis Park, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Melannie M. Markham, Keri A. Phillips, Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Relator challenges the determination of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that he
quit his employment and was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits. We affirm.
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FACTS
Relator Hykeem Green began employment with respondent employer Zerorez Inc.
on April 2, 2025, as a full-time cleaning technician. On May 24, 2025, Green worked his
final shift. Sometime during the last week of May, Green’s father died and Green traveled
to Jamaica to be with his family, make funeral plans, and handle his father’s estate. Green
informed his supervisor of his father’s death, and Green’s supervisor told him to “take the
time he needed,” although the company generally allowed only between three and five days
of bereavement leave.
While Green was in Jamaica, he exchanged text messages with his supervisor
regarding when he would return to work. Green indicated that he would return on June 11,
but he did not appear for his shift that day or communicate with the employer. The next
day, the supervisor texted Green, requesting an update. Green replied, explaining that he
had not returned because he had “family stuff still going on.” He also stated, “Honestly, I
get it if Zerorez has to terminate. I just don’t feel motivated to come back.”
Between June 12 and June 25, the supervisor continued to text Green about
returning to work and offered to work with Green about the timing of his return. Green
advised that he could be at work on July 8, “definitely for sure.” Green did not appear for
work on July 8 and texted his supervisor that day, “just wanna let you know, man I don’t
think I’ll be coming back my father left me some assets and I’m just gonna focus on that.”
The same day, a human-resources agent for the employer sent an email to Green
that stated, “[The supervisor] let me know you will not be returning so I have terminated
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your employment effective today,” and provided separation information. Green did not
respond to the email or text his supervisor again.
Green applied for unemployment benefits through respondent Minnesota
Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED). 1 Green indicated to
DEED that he was discharged and explained that his manager kept pressuring him to come
back to work and that he was not allowed the proper time to grieve his father’s death. He
also stated that he received an email informing him that he was no longer employed with
the company.
On August 14, 2025, DEED issued a determination of ineligibility for
unemployment benefits because Green quit for a personal reason not related to his
employment. Green requested a hearing, and at a hearing before a ULJ two weeks later,
the human- resources agent appeared for the employer and explained that the employer
understood Green’s July 8 text message to be a voluntary resignation. Green asserted that
he did not quit. Green claimed that he told the manager he would not be coming back at
the time the manager requested and that he felt pressure d to return to work and was not
given enough time to grieve the loss of his father. The ULJ inquired as to whether Green
sought any medical care or therapy; Green confirmed he does not have any mental-health
diagnoses.
When the ULJ asked why a “termination” email was sent if Green decided not to
return, the human-resources agent explained that the employer sends an email to all

1 DEED “is the primary responding party to any judicial action involving an unemployment
law judge’s decision.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(e) (2024).
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employees who are leaving employment to confirm the date of separation and provide
benefits and pay information, regardless of whether the employment ended voluntarily or
involuntarily.
The ULJ determined that Green was not eligible for unemployment benefits because
he quit for personal reasons and no exception applied. The ULJ did not credit Green’s
testimony that he was discharged, and the ULJ found that the text Green sent before the
employer sent the separation email contained plain language indicating that he did not plan
to return to work. The ULJ also found that, even if the employer misunderstood Green’s
text, Green did not respond to the separation email or otherwise clarify that he did not
intend to quit.
On September 3, 2025, Green requested reconsideration of the ULJ’s order, arguing
that the order contained factual and legal errors as to whether he quit. He asserted that his
departure from the company “was due to circumstances outside [his] control and should
not be considered a voluntary quit.” Green also stated that he remained willing to return
to work after the disagreement about termination was resolved.
In an October 23, 2025 decision, the ULJ affirmed the order because Green’s final
text message to his supervisor and lack of subsequent communication supported the ULJ’s
finding that Green quit.
Green appeals.
DECISION
In Green’s principal brief, he argues that the ULJ erred by determining that he was
discharged for misconduct. But the ULJ did not determine that Green was discharged for
5
misconduct; the ULJ determined that he quit. Green argues in his reply brief that he did
not quit because his final text message was not an unequivocal resignation and that the
employer’s final email to him demonstrates that he was terminated. Generally, issues not
raised or argued in a principal brief cannot be raised in a reply brief. Moorhead Econ. Dev.
Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010). “ But we have considered issues or
theories a party failed to raise in its principal brief, especially when those theories were
argued [to the original decisionmaker] and both parties addressed the theory in their briefs.”
Id. Because the parties made arguments to the ULJ regarding whether Green quit, DEED
briefed the issue, and Green’s reply brief makes relevant arguments, we address those
arguments.
When reviewing a ULJ’s benefits-eligibility decision, we may affirm, remand for
further proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the relator
may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are, as
relevant here, affected by an error of law or are unsupported by substantial evidence. Minn.
Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2024).
“We review de novo a ULJ’s determination that an applicant is ineligible for
unemployment benefits.” Fay v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev., 860 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn.
App. 2015) (quotation omitted). In so doing, we review “a ULJ’s findings of fact in a light
most favorable to the decision, and will not disturb the findings so long as there is evidence
in the record that substantially supports them.” Gonzalez Diaz v. Three Rivers Cmty.
Action, Inc., 917 N.W.2d 813, 815-16 (Minn. App. 2018). “Substantial evidence is (1) such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;
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(2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any
evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its entirety.” Dourney v. CMAK Corp.,
796 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Ineligibility for unemployment benefits is governed by Minnesota Statutes
section 268.095 (2024). An applicant for unemployment benefits is ineligible for benefits
if they quit their employment unless an exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1.2
“A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the employment was, at the
time the employment ended, the employee’s.” Id., subd. 2(a). A ULJ determines whether
a quit occurred based on a preponderance of the evidence. See Minn. Stat. § 268.031,
subd. 1 (2024).
“Whether an employee has been discharged or voluntarily quit is a question of fact
subject to our deference.” Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC, 814 N.W.2d 25,
31 (Minn. App. 2012); see also Ward v. Delta Airlines, 973 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Minn. App.
2022) (“Whether an employee quit is a question of fact for the ULJ. This court will not
disturb a ULJ’s findings if the evidence substantially sustains them.” (citation omitted)),
rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 2022). “When witness credibility and conflicting evidence are
at issue, we defer to the decisionmaker’s ability to weigh the evidence and make those
determinations.” Nichols v. Reliant Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 720 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Minn. App.
2006).

2 The ULJ’s order addressed whether Green had a good reason to quit caused by the
employer under section 268.095, subdivision 3, and whether it was medically necessary
for him to quit under section 268.095, subdivision 1(7). Green did not assert that either
exception applied before the ULJ or on appeal.
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Green first argues that a quit requires a clear and unequivocal resignation and that
his July 8 text message expressed uncertainty. Green provides no legal authority
supporting the proposition that a quit must be clear and unequivocal. A quit is a question
of fact that the ULJ determines based on a preponderance of the evidence. See Minn. Stat.
§ 268.031, subd. 1. And we will affirm the ULJ’s finding that Green quit so long as it is
supported by substantial evidence. See Ward, 973 N.W.2d at 652. Because the parties
presented conflicting evidence as to whether Green quit, the ULJ had to make a credibility
determination.
The ULJ received evidence that, after much back and forth, Green told his
supervisor that he could return to work on July 8 “definitely for sure ,” but that Green did
not appear for work that day and instead texted his supervisor, “just wanna let you know,
man I don’t think I am going to be coming back my father left me some assets and I’m just
gonna focus on that.” The ULJ determined that these statements constituted a resignation
in plain language. The ULJ also made a factual finding that Green never followed up again
or otherwise indicated to the employer that he planned to return to work, and the ULJ
determined that this further supported the finding that Green quit.
Green cites Stassen to support his position that the ULJ’s finding that he quit was
erroneous. In Stassen, the employee sent an email that was “reasonably interpret[ed] as
resignation.” 814 N.W.2d at 31. The email explained the employee’s current employment
“transition” and said that “several matters . . . make continuing on extremely unpleasant,”
among other statements. Id. The employee claimed that he did not quit and was instead
attempting to gain support or invite negotiation for a severance. Id. We upheld the ULJ’s
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finding, stating that “the most logical conclusion is that Stassen intended to quit.” Id.
Contrary to Green’s assertion, Stassen supports the ULJ’s finding here because Green’s
text message was also reasonably interpreted as a resignation.
Next, Green argues that the employer’s email confirming his separation
demonstrates that the employer, not Green, ended the employment relationship. The
subject line of the email stated, “Termination of Employment,” and the body stated, “[The
supervisor] let me know you will not be returning so I have terminated your employment
effective today.”
Section 268.095, subdivision 5, states that a “discharge from employment occurs
when any words or actions by an employer would lead a reasonable employee to believe
that the employer will no longer allow the employee to work for the employer in any
capacity.” At the hearing, the human-resources agent testified that that a “termination”
email is sent to everyone whose employment is ending to confirm the date of separation
and to provide benefits and pay information. The ULJ credited that testimony and found
that the email “confirm[ed] Green’s resignation” rather than effected a discharge by the
employer.
The ULJ’s finding that Green resigned via text message prior to the email supports
their conclusion as to the separation email. While that email, outside of the context here,
may appear to communicate that the employer was discharging the employee, the ULJ’s
finding that it was merely a confirmation of Green’s decision to quit is supported by the
record and within the ULJ’s purview of credibility determinations. The ULJ also found it
significant that, if Green’s text message was misconstrued and he did not intend to quit,
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Green could have responded to the email or attempted to correct the misunderstanding, but
he did not.
Green cites Nichols, but that opinion also supports the ULJ’s decision. In Nichols,
the relator informed the supervisor that she had to leave work, then gathered up her
belongings and left without communicating with her employer for two days. 720 N.W.2d
at 594. The ULJ rejected the relator’s argument that her employer had a duty to contact
relator to ascertain if she truly intended to quit or not. Id. The ULJ in Nichols found that
the relator’s statements were indicative of someone who was leaving employment and that
her failure to contact her employer or return to work for two days supported their finding
that the relator had quit. Id. at 594-95. We determined that the ULJ’s conclusion was
supported by the record. Id. at 595. Similarly, Green made statements to the employer that
indicated he was leaving employment and after which he did not contact the employer
again. The ULJ’s finding that the “termination email” the employer sent was a
confirmation of Green’s decision to quit is supported by substantial evidence.
Because the ULJ’s finding that Green quit is supported by substantial evidence in
the record, we affirm the ULJ’s determination that Green is ineligible for unemployment
benefits.
Affirmed.