Stausi Jeff Duross, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2009

Stausi Jeff Duross,
Appellant,

vs.

Margaret Stewart,
Respondent.

Filed July 6, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-HC-25-9281

Stausi Jeff Duross, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Margaret Stewart, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A person signed a residential lease agreement and paid a security deposit. The
landlord refused to give the person the keys to the apartment before the first rent payment
was made. The person filed a lock-out petition to gain access to the apartment. The district
court dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner was not a “residential tenant”
on the ground that she did not actually occupy the apartment and did not have a legal right
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to occupy the apartment because rent had not been paid. We conclude that the district court
erred because the factual record does not clearly show that the first rent payment was due
at the beginning of the lease term or that the payment was a condition precedent of a legal
right to occupy the apartment. We further conclude that parol evidence is necessary to
resolve ambiguity in the lease agreement. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the district
court for further proceedings.
FACTS
On November 4, 2025, Stausi Jeff Duross and a co-signer signed a lease agreement
for an apartment near downtown Minneapolis, with a specified term of November 10, 2025,
to October 31, 2026. Duross paid a security deposit of $1,099 on the same day.
On November 10, 2025, Duross texted the landlord’s agent, Margaret Stewart, to
make arrangements to obtain the keys to the apartment. Stewart refused to give the keys
to Duross because no rent payment had yet been made. At Duross’s request, Stewart sent
the co-signer an e-mail message with instructions for paying rent via an online portal.
Neither the co-signer nor Duross made a rent payment on November 10, 2025.
On November 11, 2025, Duross texted Stewart again, saying that she was “in lawful
possession” of the apartment because she had paid the security deposit. Stewart responded
by saying that “rent must be paid prior to getting keys.”
On November 12, 2025, Duross petitioned the district court using a form captioned
“Verified Petition for Possession of Residential Rental Property Following Unlawful
Removal or Exclusion. ” See Minn. Stat. § 504B.375 (2024). Duross attached a copy of
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the lease agreement and additional documents. Duross requested an order requiring
Stewart to give her access to the apartment and also requested damages.
The district court conducted a hearing on November 17, 2025. Four days later, the
district court filed a three-page order with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
district court reasoned that a person may file a petition under section 504B.375 only if the
person is a “residential tenant” and that Duross was not a “residential tenant” because she
was not physically occupying the apartment and neither she nor her co-signer had paid rent.
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the petition. Duross appeals.
DECISION
Duross argues that the district court erred by dismissing her petition on the ground
that she was not a “residential tenant” of the apartment.
The statut e on which Duross’ s claim is based allows a “residential tenant” to
commence an action to “recover possession of the premises” upon the “actual or
constructive removal or exclusion of” the residential tenant. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375,
subd. 1(a). The purpose of the statute is “to provide an additional and summary remedy
for residential tenants unlawfully excluded or removed from rental property.” Id., subd. 5.
A petition filed pursuant to section 504B.375 often is called a “lockout petition.” See
Murphy v. Aeon, 24 N.W.3d 679, 683 (Minn. App. 2025), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 27,
2025).
The term “residential tenant” is defined in chapter 504B to mean “a person who is
occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a lease or contract, whether oral or
written, that requires the payment of money or exchange of services.” Minn. Stat.
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§ 504B.001, subd. 12 (2024). In Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016),
the supreme court interpreted the statutory definition of “residential tenant” in a case with
facts that were similar but not identical to the facts of this case. The petitioner in
Cocchiarella entered into an oral lease agreement with a landlord, paid a security deposit,
and paid the first month’s rent, but the landlord did not allow the petitioner to move into
the apartment. Id. at 623. She filed a lock-out petition, which was dismissed on the ground
that she was not physically occupying the premises and, thus, was not “occupying a
dwelling in a residential building,” as required by the statutory definition of “residential
tenant.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
On appeal, the supreme court focus ed on the words “is occupying” and held that a
person may be deemed to be “occupying” leased premises if the person has a legal right to
do so, even if the person is not physically occupying the premises. Id. at 627-28. The
supreme court reasoned that, in the context of a residential lease agreement, the word
“occupying” must be understood to refer to “a tenancy in real property,” which “includes
the legal right of occupancy” and is created by a lease agreement. Id. at 626 (emphasis
omitted) (citing The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1782 (4th ed.
2000), and Black’s Law Dictionary 1694 (10th ed. 2014)). The supreme court clarified
that “the right of possession is transferred when the lease agreement gives the tenant control
over the property and the power to exclude all others.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second)
of Property: Landlord & Tenant § 1.2 (Am. L. Inst. 1977), and Goodwin v. Clover, 98 N.W.
322, 323 (Minn. 1904)). The supreme court concluded that “a tenant who holds the present
legal right to occupy residential rental property pursuant to a lease or contract satisfies the
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definition of ‘residential tenant’” and, thus, “has the right to bring an unlawful removal or
exclusion petition under” section 504B.375, subdivision 1, “upon the effective date of a
lease agreement.” Id. at 627. This court has explained that, if the existence of a legal right
to occupy depends on a condition precedent, it is necessary to inquire into whether the
condition precedent has been satisfied. Hegenes Properties, LLC v. Rodriguez, ___
N.W.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 1465627, at *6-8 (Minn. App. May 26, 2026) (applying
Cocchiarella in eviction case under section 504B.291), petition for rev. filed (Minn. June
26, 2026).
In this case, the lease agreement is unclear as to whether Duross’s legal right to
occupy the apartment is conditioned on payment of rent. The cover page of the lease
agreement states essential terms, such as the date the lease “begins,” November 10, 2025;
the amount of the security deposit and the “total due,” $1,099; and the amount of “monthly
rent” and the “total monthly due,” also $1,099. The four pages that follow contain 30
single-spaced paragraphs of text. Paragraph 2, entitled “Term,” states that the lease “shall
commence on the earlier of the date tenant(s) take(s) possession of the premises or the first
day of the lease.” Paragraph 4, entitled “Rent,” states, “Tenants shall pay . . . to landlord
as rent for the premises the sum stated above per month in advance or by the 1st of each
calendar month.” Paragraph 4 also provides for “an 8% late fee if rent is not received by
the 2nd of every month.” These and other provisions of the lease agreement do not clearly
state when the first rent payment was due and whether timely payment of rent was a
condition precedent to Duross’s legal right to occupy the apartment under the lease
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agreement. The issue is complicated by the fact that the lease term was to begin in the
middle of a month.
The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law. Staffing
Specifix, Inc. v. TempWorks Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 913 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Minn. 2018). A
contract is ambiguous if it is “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id.
In that event, the ambiguities must be “resolved by admitting extrinsic evidence of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the transaction to reveal the parties’ intent.” Windcliff
Ass’n, Inc. v. Breyfogle, 988 N.W.2d 911, 918 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). If
extrinsic or parol evidence is admitted, “the interpretation of ambiguous terms becomes a
question of fact.” Staffing Specifix, 913 N.W.2d at 692.
The lease agreement in this case is ambiguous with respect to when the first rent
payment was due and whether payment of rent was a condition precedent to the legal right
to occupy the apartment. Accordingly, parol evidence is necessary. See Nord v. Herreid,
305 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Minn. 1981) (concluding that parol evidence was admissible to
determine existence of condition precedent in lease agreement). In the absence of a
determination that the lease agreement required the first rent payment to be made on
November 10, 2025, and that timely payment of rent was a condition precedent of the
transfer of the legal right of occupancy, there is no factual basis for the district court’s
conclusion that Duross was not a “residential tenant” when she filed the lock-out petition.
Therefore, we reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings. The
district court shall allow the parties to introduce parol evidence relevant to when the first
rent payment was required to be made and whether payment of rent was a condition
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precedent of Duross’s legal right to occupy the apartment under the lease agreement. The
district court shall make findings of fact concerning whether and when Duross acquired a
legal right to occupy the apartment and then shall determine whether Duross was a
“residential tenant” when she filed the lock-out petition.
Reversed and remanded.