In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Joseph Harju.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2013

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Joseph Harju.

Filed June 8, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Commitment Appeal Panel
File No. AP23-9061

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Aaron Winter, Emily Doyle, Assistant Attorneys General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Direct Care and Treatment Executive Board)

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Joseph Fischer, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for St. Louis County)

Francis X. Hughes, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent Joseph Harju)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
In this appeal from a commitment appeal panel (CAP) decision granting
respondent’s petition for discharge from civil commitment under a due-process analysis,
appellant argues that the CAP’s decision should be reversed because several findings

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
supporting the CAP’s conclusion that respondent’s mental illness is in remission and that
respondent is no longer dangerous are clearly erroneous. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2008, St. Louis County petitioned to civilly commit respondent Joseph Harju as
a sexually dangerous person (SDP) after he was convicted of and served sentences for
criminal sexual conduct involving six adolescent males ranging from 8 to 15 years old. 1
Harju waived his right to a hearing, stipulated to the civil commitment, and admitted that
he was a SDP. In July 2009, a district court found that Harju met the criteria for continued
commitment as an SDP and ordered indefinite civil commitment.
Harju has resided at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) since his civil
commitment in 2009. At the time this appeal was filed, Harju was 72 years old and was in
the second phase of the three-phase treatment program at MSOP. The second phase
focuses on the person’s offending patterns, along with identifying and resolving the
underlying issues and motivations related to offending behaviors. In 2016, Harju stopped
attending treatment groups. In 2022, Harju moved to MSOP’s assisted living unit because
of his deteriorating health and difficulty completing his activities of daily living. He re-
engaged in treatment shortly thereafter.
Harju undergoes yearly mental-health assessments (MHAs) while at MSOP. The
MSOP providers diagnosed Harju with , among other things, “Other Specified Paraphilic

1 The evidence supporting the county’s petition included that Harju suffered from disorders
that prevented him from exercising adequate control over his sexual impulses, Harju had
previously been admitted to three sex-offender treatment programs but had not completed
treatment, and expert opinions that Harju was highly likely to re-offend.
3
Disorder, Adolescent Pubescent Males” and “Other Specified Personality Disorder, with
Antisocial Features.” Dr. Ankarlo, an MSOP treatment psychologist, completed MHAs in
2023 and 2024, which stated that Harju’s diagnosis of “Other Specified Paraphilic
Disorder, Adolescent Pubescent Males,” was “in remission, in a controlled environment.”
2
But in the 2025 MHA, Dr. Ankarlo removed the terms “in a controlled environment” and
“in remission” from Harju’s diagnoses because, according to Dr. Ankarlo, “‘in a controlled
environment’ [did] not meet DSM- 5[3] criteria.” Dr. Ankarlo also determined that Harju
“[did] not meet criteria [for ‘in remission’] due to the fact that he has not spent time in the
community.” The terms “in remission” and “in a controlled environment” are also referred
to as “specifiers.”
In 2022, Harju filed a petition with the Special Review Board (SRB) for a reduction
in custody, including either transfer, provisional discharge, or full discharge from his civil
commitment. The SRB recommended that Harju’s petition be denied. Harju petitioned
for rehearing before the CAP, and the parties appeared for a first-phase hearing in
September 2024. After the hearing, the CAP issued an order granting appellant Direct Care
and Executive Treatment Executive Board’s (the board) motion to dismiss Harju’s petition
under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 42.02(b) as it related to transfer, provisional
discharge, and full discharge under the statutory criteria. But the CAP denied the board’s
motion to dismiss as it related to discharge under a due-process analysis and set the matter

2 The 2023 MHA uses the phrase “in sustained remission.”

3 DSM-5 is the abbreviation for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual fifth edition.
4
for a second-phase hearing. In reaching this decision, the CAP stated: “Dr. Ankarlo was
not called to testify but, taking all inferences in the light most favorable to [Harju] and
making no credibility determinations, there is sufficient competent evidence that [Harju’s]
sexual disorder may be in remission.” It added that it was “not making a final
determination on whether [Harju’s] sexual disorder is in remission and whether [Harju]
can be considered dangerous given his extensive health conditions.”
About a year later, the parties appeared for the second-phase hearing. The board
presented testimony from Dr. Ankarlo; the MSOP Clinical Court Services Director (MSOP
director); and Dr. Scharf, a forensic evaluator for the board. Harju presented testimony
from Dr. Evenson, a psychologist; Dr. Vietanen, a psychologist and independent examiner
for the state; and himself. After the hearing, the CAP issued an order granting Harju’s
petition for a full discharge, concluding that “the board did not show by clear and
convincing evidence that [Harju] continues to have the requisite mental illness or
abnormality and dangerousness to support continued civil commitment.”
The board appeals.
DECISION
The board challenges the CAP’s decision granting Harju’s petition for full discharge
from his indeterminate civil commitment.
We review the CAP’s findings supporting its decision to grant a discharge from civil
commitment for clear error. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 223
(Minn. 2021). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of
the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. at 221 (quotation
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omitted). When reviewing factual findings for clear error, “we view the evidence in a light
favorable to the findings” and “will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on
the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). We do not find our own facts, reweigh
the evidence, or reconcile conflicts in the evidence. Id. at 221-22.
We also “need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or
demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [CAP ].” Id. at 222 (quotation omitted).
“Rather, because the factfinder has the primary responsibility of determining the fact
issues . . . an appellate court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all the
evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably supports the decision.” Id.
(quotation omitted). In short, “[w]hen the record reasonably supports the findings at issue
on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for
inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted); see In re Civ.
Commitment of Fugelseth, 907 N.W.2d 248, 256 (Minn. App. 2018) (stating that the
“question is not whether the record could support a finding that [the civilly committed
person] is still dangerous to the public; the question is whether the [CAP] clearly erred by
finding that [the civilly committed person] is no longer dangerous to the public.”), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018).
A person who is civilly committed as a SDP may seek a reduction in custody by
petitioning the SRB for transfer, provisional discharge, or full discharge. Minn. Stat.
§§ 253D.27, subd. 2, .29-.31 (2024). After the SRB issues its findings and
recommendation, the person committed, the county attorney, or the executive board “may
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petition the [CAP] . . . for a rehearing and reconsideration” of the SRB’s decision. Minn.
Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 1(a) (2024). “The petitioning party . . . bears the burden of going
forward with the evidence, which means presenting a prima facie case with competent
evidence to show that the person is entitled to the requested relief.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.28,
subd. 2(d) (2024). “The proceeding in which a committed person produces evidence is
commonly referred to as a ‘first-phase hearing.’” Coker v. Jesson, 831 N.W.2d 483, 486
(Minn. 2013).
After the first-phase hearing, the party opposing the petition may move to dismiss
the petition under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(b) by arguing that, when
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, the petitioner did not
meet their burden. Id. at 489. Here, the CAP granted the board’s motion dismiss as it
related to transfer, provisional discharge, and discharge under the statutory criteria. But
the CAP denied the board’s motion to dismiss and scheduled a second-phase hearing as it
related to discharge under a due-process analysis.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 7. “The Due Process Clause confers rights on persons who are civilly committed because
civil commitment ‘constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty.’” In re Civ. Commitment
of Opiacha, 943 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Minn. App. 2020) (quoting Addington v. Texas , 441
U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).
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A committed person is entitled to discharge from civil commitment under the Due
Process Clause if they are “no longer mentally ill or is no longer a danger to himself” and
if “the nature and duration of commitment [do not] bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual [was] committed.” Lidberg v. Steffen, 514 N.W.2d 779,
783 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted); see also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575
(1975) (“[T]here is . . . no constitutional basis for confining [mentally ill persons]
involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.”).
Due process does not require “any particular mental condition as a prerequisite for
a person’s ongoing civil commitment.” Opiacha, 943 N.W.2d at 228. But the Due Process
Clause allows a state to civilly commit a person only if the person lacks the ability to
control his or her behavior. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 -14, (2002); see also
Opiacha, 943 N.W.2d at 228-29 (explaining that a person who has been civilly committed
as mentally ill and dangerous is entitled to discharge under the Due Process Clause if the
person does not have serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior due to a mental
illness or mental abnormality). Minnesota Supreme Court caselaw also suggests that once
a person’s mental illness is in remission, they are entitled to be discharged from civil
commitment. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994) (stating that “if there
is a remission of [petitioner’s] sexual disorder, if his deviant sexual assaultive conduct is
brought under control,” the petitioner “is entitled to release”). Accordingly, the board, as
the party opposing the discharge, had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Harju’s discharge should be denied because he had the requisite mental illness and
8
dangerousness to support continued civil commitment.4 Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(d);
Opiacha, 943 N.W.2d at 227.
The board argues that several of the CAP’s findings supporting its decision to grant
Harju’s discharge under a due-process analysis are clearly erroneous and that the record as
a whole does not support the CAP’s order. It asserts that the CAP, “simply ignored the
record and concluded on its own, with no support, that Mr. Harju does not have a mental
illness necessitating his commitment and because of his age and health he does not
physically pose a risk to the public.” We address each of the board’s arguments in turn.
I. The CAP did not clearly err in finding that the board did not meet its burden
to show that Harju continues to have a mental illness.

Paraphilic Disorder

First, the board challenges the CAP’s determination that the board “did not produce
clear and convincing evidence that [Harju’s] mental illness is not remitted.” The board
argues that the CAP “mischaracterized and ignored the entire record showing Mr. Harju’s
sexual disorder is not in remission,” and erroneously concluded that Dr. Ankarlo was “told”
to remove the “in remission” specifier from Harju’s diagnosis during the 2025 MHA.
In reaching this conclusion, the CAP reasoned that “[n]othing changed factually or
with regard to [Harju’s] presentation or behaviors between the 2023 and 2024 MHAs,”
which previously included the “in remission” specifier. The CAP “found it troubling that
Dr. Ankarlo was told to remove the specifier, and Dr. Ankarlo testified he now understands

4 At oral argument in this court the board agreed that it had the burden at trial to prove both
that Harju continued to have a mental illness and continued to be dangerous to the public.
9
he was in error as to his reading of the DSM by including the ‘in remission’ specifier.”
The CAP also noted: “Dr. Ankarlo testified that his diagnosis did not change, just the
specifier.”
The board contends that these findings are clearly erroneous because “[n]owhere
does the record even slightly imply that Dr. Ankarlo was ‘told’ to remove [the remission]
specifier.” To support this argument, the board points to Dr. Ankarlo’s testimony that “he
independently changed the specifier after reviewing the applicable DSM criteria,” and
“specifically testified that no one directed or influenced him to make the change.” The
board also suggests that Harju’s diagnosis is not in remission because Dr. Scharf never
included “in remission” with Harju’s paraphilic-disorder diagnosis and the MSOP director
was unaware of any information suggesting that the diagnosis was in remission. We
disagree that the CAP clearly erred in finding that the board did not meet its burden to show
that Harju’s paraphilic disorder was not in remission.
We acknowledge that Dr. Ankarlo testified about his reasons for removing the “in
remission” specifier in the 2025 MHA. The record shows that Dr. Ankarlo removed “in
remission” from Harju’s diagnosis on his own accord after he reviewed the DSM-5. But
the CAP’s reasoning “that Dr. Ankarlo was told to remove the specifier” is reasonably
supported by Dr. Ankarlo’s testimony that, although he ultimately agreed with his
supervisor’s suggestion, he removed “in remission” from Harju’s diagnosis only after
receiving feedback from a supervising psychologist.
The CAP’s finding that “there was no clear and convincing evidence that [Harju’s]
paraphilic disorder that was considered remitted has in fact changed,” is also reasonably
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supported by the record. Dr. Ankarlo authored the 2023, 2024, and 2025 MHAs. In both
the 2023 and 2024 MHAs, Dr. Ankarlo diagnosed Harju with “Other Specified Paraphilic
Disorder, Adolescent Pubescent Males, In Remission, In a Controlled Environment.” “In
remission” was “added to reflect that client has not engaged in any deviant sexual activity
for an extended period of time.” Dr. Ankarlo removed the “in remission” specifier in 2025
because Harju did “not meet the criteria due to the fact that he has n ot spent time in the
community that is required.” But, as the CAP concluded, nothing in the 2025 MHA, or the
record as a whole, suggests that anything changed factually or with regard to Harju’s
presentation or behaviors.5 And it was the board’s burden to show that the discharge should
be denied. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(d); Coker, 831 N.W.2d at 486.
Several witnesses testified that including the “in remission, in a controlled
environment,” specifier with a diagnosis like Harju’s is not necessarily improper. Dr.
Ankarlo himself agreed that the DSM-5 does not preclude the use of remission and/or in a
controlled environment when there is no time in the community. The MSOP director,
testified that “[t]ypically, you’d want to see an uncontrolled environment around five years
of evidence that behaviors have not reoccurred,” but he also acknowledged that he had seen
the “in remission, in a controlled environment” diagnosis in several cases involving
individuals in MSOP. And Dr. Scharf testified that, according to the DSM-5, “in

5 Harju notes that Dr. Ankarlo was approached by the supervising psychologist about one
month after the CAP granted the second-phase hearing, and contends that the only thing
that had changed between the 2024 and 2025 MHAs was that the CAP had granted the
second-phase hearing. The CAP did not explicitly consider this timing in reaching its
decision.
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remission” and “in a controlled environment” could be used as specifiers for “other
specified paraphilic disorder,” but then later explained that she did not “believe that’s an
appropriate diagnosis to the client.”
Dr. Evensen, one of Harju’s witnesses, also agreed that, according to the DSM- 5,
“other specified paraphilic disorders can be specified as in remission and/or occurring in a
controlled environment.” And lastly, Dr. Vietenen, who the CAP specifically found
credible, explained that “the specifier in remission for other specified paraphilic disorder
can apply even if someone has not spent time in the community.” Dr. Vietenen testified
that nothing “forecloses or precludes [Dr. Ankarlo’s] use or his application of [other
specified paraphilic disorder in remission, in a controlled environment].” She also
explained: “In remission means that somebody is making progress towards managing the
symptoms of the disorder,” and that “[t]he person is not struggling with distress or
dysfunction related to the disorder.” By contrast, “[f]ull remission means that the
symptoms[] [and] the behaviors are no longer apparent.”
The record shows that Dr. Ankarlo determined that Harju had not engaged in any
deviant sexual activity for an extended period of time. And while he later removed “in
remission, in a controlled environment” from Harju’s diagnosis because he agreed with a
supervising psychologist’s feedback about interpreting the DSM-5, Harju’s behaviors had
not changed. And other experts explained that the specifier “in remission, in a controlled
environment” is not improper. The CAP therefore did not clearly err in finding that the
board did not meet its burden to show that Harju’s mental illness was not in remission.

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Personality Disorder

The board also argues that the CAP “ignored the entire record showing Mr. Harju’s
personality disorder to be reasonably related to his initial commitment.” The board
maintains that “the documentary evidence and testimony show that [Harju] still has a
personality disorder requiring treatment and supervision for such a disorder in his current
setting.” In its order, the CAP “did not find clear and convincing evidence that [Harju’s]
personality disorder . . . [is] severe enough to support continued civil commitment.” The
CAP noted that Harju “does not have a full Antisocial Personality Disorder,” and there was
not “clear and convincing evidence that [Harju’s] personality disorder was so severe and
present to satisfy the mental illness or mental abnormality prong for due process.” We
conclude that this finding is not clearly erroneous.
Dr. Scharf described Harju’s personality disorder in a risk assessment as “an
enduring maladaptive pattern of behavior and/or inner experience that interferes with his
social functioning.” For Harju, the personality disorder manifests “as a persistent disregard
for rules and laws imposed on him, disregard for the rights of others, and a lack of guilt,
remorse, and empathy as manifested by the ability and willingness to manipulate and take
advantage of others for personal gain.” And, as the board notes, Dr. Scharf testified about
how Harju’s personality disorder is reasonably related to his sexual offending and opined
that Harju still needs treatment and supervision for that disorder.
But there is other evidence in the record supporting the board’s finding that Harju’s
personality disorder is not severe, such that the CAP’s finding is not clearly erroneous.
While Dr. Scharf agreed that Harju needed treatment and supervision for his personality
13
disorder, she also testified that “I do think that the other specified paraphilic disorder is the
primary diagnosis for which he requires treatment at this time.” And Harju’s most recent
MHA states that Harju has not received any Behavioral Expectation Reports since 2013.6
The record also shows that Harju engaged in treatment after moving to the assisted living
unit, was willing to meet with a primary therapist, and “was described as cooperative and
no concerns with rule violations were identified.” This evidence demonstrates that while
Harju could perhaps benefit from further treatment, he does not have “serious difficulty in
controlling [his] behavior” due to his personality disorder. See Opiacha, 943 N.W.2d at
229. We therefore conclude that the CAP’s findings about Harju’s personality disorder
were not clearly erroneous.
II. The CAP did not clearly err in finding that the board did not meet its burden
to show that Harju continues to be dangerous.

Risk Assessment

The board contends that the CAP’s finding that Harju is no longer dangerous is
clearly erroneous because the finding is manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.
To support this argument, the board points to Dr. Scharf’s testimony about Harju’s most
recent risk assessment. Dr. Scharf testified that Harju remains dangerous to the public and
the risk assessment “suggests that he is in the above average Static risk category compared
to others who have sexually offended and also continues to present the dynamic risk factors
that are reflective of his event dynamic from the time he was offending.”

6 A Behavioral Expectation Report is a report that is created when a participant violated a
behavioral expectation.
14
The CAP specifically “did not find Dr. Scharf’s opinion of continued mental illness
persuasive.” It concluded that there was not “clear and convincing evidence that [Harju]
could physically pose a risk to adolescent males, which were his victim pool.” The board
maintains that the CAP ’s findings are inconsistent with the evidence because the CAP
ignored Dr. Scharf’s risk assessment, erroneously found that Dr. Scharf “did not factor in
[Harju’s] advanced age and physical condition into her risk analysis,” “incorrectly
characterized Dr. Scharf’s perception of Mr. Harju’s age and physical condition,” and
“incorrectly characterized Mr. Harju’s matrix scores as it relates to his sex-offender
specific treatment goals.” We disagree with the board.
While Dr. Scharf testified that Harju remains dangerous to the public, the CAP “is
not bound by the recommendations of the experts, unless the experts’ testimony is so
positive as to exclude all doubt as to the matter on which they are given and unless based
on testimony, which is positive, consistent, unimpeached, and uncontradicted.” Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 225 (quotation omitted). And the record shows that the CAP did not ignore
the risk assessment but focused on “not whether there was more treatment [Harju] could
do but whether there was clear and convincing evidence of mental illness to require
continued civil commitment.”
The CAP was more concerned with how Harju’s physical health and age directly
impacted his potential to be dangerous to the community, which Dr. Scharf could not
answer as she was focused on unmitigated treatment. And while Dr. Scharf was generally
aware of Harju’s age and health conditions and accounted for them in a portion of the
assessment, she was not familiar with details or names of his health conditions And,
15
relying on the most recent MSOP treatment progress reports, the CAP disagreed with the
opinions in the record that Harju’s physical health is stable and well managed and that
neither his age nor his health precludes his ability to participate in treatment. The record
supports the CAP’s findings that Harju needs assisted living care, becomes easily winded,
has little involvement outside of his living unit, and spends most of his time in his room.
And the record reasonably supports the CAP’s conclusion that Harju’s “treatment team
tends to attribute his lack of participation more to low motivation and less to his physical
health, but this was not demonstrated to the [CAP] to be the case.” Accordingly, the CAP’s
findings about Harju’s continued dangerousness are not clearly erroneous.
Aftercare

Lastly, the board asserts that the CAP “erred as a matter of law when it relied on
section 253D.35 in support of its conclusion that []Harju is not dangerous to the public.”
We review issues of statutory interpretation and the CAP’s application of the law to the
facts of a particular case de novo. Fugelseth, 907 N.W.2d at 253. Section 253D.35 requires
MSOP to “provide the supervision, aftercare, and case management services for a person
under commitment as a sexually dangerous person.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.35, subd. 1 (2024)
(emphasis added). The board contends that “section 253D.35 clearly and unambiguously
does not obligate the b oard to provide aftercare service to a client discharged from civil
commitment because [the provision] is only applicable to ‘a person under commitment.’”
Assuming without deciding that the board’s interpretation of section 253D.35 is
correct, the board argument is unavailing because the CAP did not rely on section 253D.35
to reach its decision. In its order, the CAP mentions that “it is not ideal to go directly to
16
full discharge” and cites section 253D.35 for the proposition that MSOP and the county
have “mandated aftercare obligations upon discharge from civil commitment. ” But the
CAP ultimately clarified that any aftercare obligations are not relevant, stating: “Although
an important consideration, adjustment back to society is not relevant to the due process
analysis.” We therefore conclude that the CAP did not err as a matter of law by referencing
Minnesota Statutes section 253D.35.
Affirmed.