Estate of Robert N. Roningen, a/k/a Robert Noel Roningen (Special and Formal - Supervised)

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2016

Estate of Robert N. Roningen,
a/k/a Robert Noel Roningen (Special and Formal - Supervised)

Filed July 13, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-PR-10-529

William D. Paul, William D. Paul Law Office, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellants)

Mark L. Knutson, Beaumier Trogdon Orman Hurd & Viegas PLLP, Duluth, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
In this probate- related dispute, appellants argue that, as nonparties to the probate
and fraudulent-transfer matters arising from decedent’s death, the district court lacked
personal jurisdiction1 over them because they were never sued. We agree and reverse and
remand with instructions to the district court to dismiss the action with prejudice.

1 This matter could be viewed as a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction as well. Our
analysis will address personal jurisdiction because the parties have cast this action as such.
2
FACTS

On January 4, 2010, Robert N. Roningen (Roningen) died intestate. In December
2010, Darryl Coons (Coons), the trustee of the Lloyd K. Johnson Revocable Trust U/A
October 29, 2004 (the trust), petitioned for appointment of a special administrator of the
Estate of Roningen (the estate). Coons included a schedule of Roningen’s heirs to include
appellants Margaret A. Roningen (Roningen’s wife) and his children, Chris Roningen and
Jean Kronzer.
Coons filed a written statement of claim, indicating that the estate was indebted to
the trust resulting from a judgment entered against Roningen in 2009.2 The claim form
contains the following notation: “Claim may be presented to Personal Representative or
filed with Court Administrator. Presentation of claim does not commence any
proceeding.” In January 2011, the district court appointed Coons as the estate’s special
administrator, whose sole purpose was to collect assets for the estate to pay the Roningen
judgment.
Over the next several years, Coons, in his capacity as the special administrator of
the estate, served discovery demands on appellants, seeking, a mong other things,
information related to whether Roningen transferred property to appellants to avoid
payment of the judgment. The district court filed several orders compelling appellants to
respond to discovery. When appellants provided discovery, Coons deemed it incomplete
and continued to move the district court to compel discovery.

2 The judgment was renewed in 2019 in the amount of $1,200,167.73.
3
In March 2014, Roningen’s son, Robert Roningen (Robert), was appointed personal
representative of the estate. In February 2016, Robert reported to the district court that he
completed an investigation and determined that Roningen had no estate assets for at least
ten years prior to Roningen’s death. Coons, however, continued to pursue discovery.
Appellants moved the district court for an order confirming that the district court did not
have personal jurisdiction over them as it related to the trust’s claims. In October 2016,
the district court filed an order stating that it believed that discovery was necessary and
denied appellants’ motion to bar discovery for lack of jurisdiction. The district court also
removed Robert as personal representative and appointed Coons as personal representative.
Approximately seven years later, in February 2024, the trust moved for summary
judgment “requesting that the [c]ourt recover assets for the [e]state” to satisfy the
judgment. The trust alleged that Roningen had violated the Minnesota Uniform Voidable
Transactions Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 513.41-.51 (2024), when he was insolvent and transferred
assets to his wife who then fraudulently transferred assets to her children and her attorney.
In April 2024, the trust moved for the appointment of a successor special
administrator after Coons died. Respondent Erik Torch was appointed as the successor
trustee of the trust, and the district court appointed Torch as special administrator.
Appellants again questioned jurisdiction because a lawsuit had not been commenced, and
that if a lawsuit had been commenced, “such [a] lawsuit cannot be maintained by a special
administrator.” The district court denied appellants’ request, stating that, when it appointed
Coons as special administrator, it determined that it had jurisdiction, and this ruling has
been “restated or incorporated in all subsequent [c]ourt [o]rders.”
4
In July 2024, appellants moved for dismissal of all “claims” against them for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court denied appellants’
motion, finding: “A special administrator may have the same powers, and be a personal
representative in effect, in a formal proceeding. As a special administrator was
appointed . . . [appellants’] argument that no lawsuit has been commenced for lack of a
personal representative is without merit.” The district court also denied the trust’s motion
for summary judgment.
In February 2025, before a different district court judge, appellants again challenged
jurisdiction. Following a hearing, the district court denied appellants’ motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and determined that it had
jurisdiction over appellants. This appeal followed.
DECISION

Appellants argue that, as nonparties to the probate and fraudulent-transfer matters,
and because they had never been sued outside of these matters, the district court lacked
jurisdiction over them. The district court determined that it had jurisdiction over appellants
despite neither special administrator suing appellants. The district court reached this
conclusion because it found that a special administrator has the same powers as a personal
representative. Whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law reviewed de novo.
V.H. v. Est. of Birnbaum, 543 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Minn. 1996). But in reviewing a district
court’s ruling regarding whether personal jurisdiction exists, appellate courts “must apply
the facts as found by the district court unless those factual findings are clearly erroneous.”
Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008).
5
Here, the district court cited the following statutes in determining that the special
administrator had the same powers as a personal representative. Under Minn. Stat.
§ 524.3-616 (2024),
A special administrator appointed by the registrar in
informal proceedings pursuant to section 524.3-614(1) has the
duty to collect and manage the assets of the estate, to preserve
them, to account therefor and to deliver them to the general
personal representative upon qualification. The special
administrator has the power of a personal representative under
the chapter necessary to perform these duties.

And under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-617 (2024),

A special administrator appointed by order of the court
in any formal proceeding has the power of a general personal
representative except as limited in the appointment and duties
as prescribed in the order. The appointment may be for a
specified time, to perform particular acts or on other terms as
the court may direct.

Based on these provisions, a special administrator may act with the same powers as
a personal representative. Here, the special administrator had the sole duty to collect assets
for the estate to satisfy the judgment in favor of the trust.
Appellants assert, however, that even if the special administrator acted with the
same powers as a personal representative, the special administrator failed to commence a
lawsuit to prosecute an alleged fraudulent conveyance.
The [personal] representative may recover any property which
the decedent may have disposed of with intent to defraud
creditors, or by conveyance or transfer which for any reason is
void as to them. Upon the application of any creditor and upon
making the payment of or providing security for the expenses
6
thereof as directed by the court, the representative shall
prosecute all actions necessary to recover the property.

Minn. Stat. § 525.391 (2024).
Appellants claim that the statute uses “shall prosecute,” which means a separate
action outside of a probate proceeding. Torch, the special administrator, argues that a
separate lawsuit is not necessary. He argues that the statement of the claim filed in
December 2010 indicated that Roningen’s heirs were parties to the matter, that the heirs
wrongfully obtained assets from Roningen, and that the assets are recoverable as part of
the probate proceeding.
A personal representative may “prosecute or defend claims, or proceedings in any
jurisdiction for the protection of the estate and of the personal representative in the
performance of duties.” Minn. Stat. § 524.3- 715(22) (2024) (emphasis added). The “or”
indicates a differentiation between actions. See Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279,
283 (Minn. 2008) (recognizing courts “normally interpret the conjunction ‘or’ as
disjunctive rather than conjunctive”). These actions are also different because, within
probate, the personal representative is recovering assets that belong to the estate. To
prosecute, such as the case here, it is alleged that the property belongs to the estate and it
was fraudulently conveyed, but whether there was a fraudulent conveyance is contested.
In this case, the personal representative must pursue a claim in a civil lawsuit. Bec ause
appellants were not sued, the district court did not have jurisdiction over them. We reverse
and, on remand, the district court shall dismiss the action with prejudice.
Reversed and remanded.