Dujuan M Walker, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2034

Dujuan M Walker,
Appellant,

vs.

Paul Schnell, Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections,
Respondent,

John Doe, Challenge Incarceration Program Director/Designee,
Defendant.

Filed June 22, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-25-2896

Dujuan M. Walker, Lino Lakes, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant, an inmate who applied unsuccessfully to the Challenge Incarceration
Program (CIP), brought this action against respondents, personnel associated with the CIP,
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seeking an order compelling them to admit him to the CIP. The district court granted
respondents’ motion to dismiss appellant’s claims. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2018, appellant Dujuan M. Walker was convicted of assault and robbery in
Georgia and was incarcerated for about a year. He is now committed to the Minnesota
Department of Corrections (DOC). In November 2024, appellant applied for admission to
the CIP. In March 2025, he learned that he had been denied admission. He filed a civil
complaint against respondents Commissioner Paul Sch nell and a John Doe, whom
appellant identified as the CIP “Director/Designee.” He subsequently filed an amended
complaint that added a defendant, respondent Shannon Reimann, described as “ CIP
Warden.” Respondents moved to dismiss appellant’s amended complaint.
After a video hearing, the district court granted respondents’ motion, relying in part
on Minn. Stat. § 244.17, subd. 3 (2024) (providing that those who have been convicted of
various crimes, among them assault and robbery, are ineligible for the CIP). Appellant
challenges the denial.
DECISION
“[S]tatutory construction is a question of law, which we review de novo. ” Lee v.
Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009). “The application of statutes . . . to undisputed
facts is a legal conclusion and is reviewed de novo.” City of Morris v. Sax Invs., Inc., 749
N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2008).
The following offenders are not eligible to be placed in
[CIP]:

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(1) offenders who are committed to the commissioner ’s
custody following a conviction for murder,
manslaughter, criminal sexual conduct, assault, or
any other offense involving death or intentional
personal injury;
(2) offenders who were convicted within the preceding
ten years of an offense described in clause (1) and
were committed to the custody of the commissioner.

Minn. Stat. § 244.17, subd. 3 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that appellant (1) was
convicted within the last ten years of assault and robbery, and (2) is now committed to the
custody of the commissioner.
Appellant states that the word “and ,” emphasized in the quotation above , denotes
causation so that, because his Georgia assault and robbery convictions were not the cause
of his being committed to his present Minnesota DOC custody, they are irrelevant to his
CIP eligibility. The district court rejected this argument: “In reading the statute as a whole,
it is clear that the legislature’s purpose was to exclude certain persons who have committed
serious, violent offenses from CIP.” We agree.
“The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
[l]egislature.” State v. Moore , 10 N.W.3d 676, 680 (Minn. 2024). “In ascertaining the
intention of the legislature,” courts may be guided by the presumption that “the legislature
does not intend a result that is absurd.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2024). The district court did
not err in concluding that Minn. Stat. § 244.17, subd. 3, applies to render appellant
ineligible for the CIP.
In appellant’s memorandum opposing respondents’ motion to dismiss, he added
words to the statute: “The plain language of § 244.17, subd. 3(2), reveals that the legislature
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intended to disqualify CIP applicants who were convicted of an enumerated offense within
the preceding 10 years and were committed to the Commissioner’s custody as a
consequence of said conviction.” (Emphasis added.) But courts may not read words into
the statute that are not present. See In re Minn. Living Assistance, Inc ., 934 N.W.2d 300,
305 (Minn. 2019) (rejecting an argument because it “would require us to read words into
the statute that are not present.”); see also Reimringer v. Anderson, 960 N.W.2d 684, 688
(Minn. 2021) (noting that, in the context of a treble damages claim requiring proof of both
unlawfulness and bad faith, “the word ‘and’ serves as a conjunctive link between two
distinct elements in a statute or rule”).
The statute says “and”; it does not say “as a consequence” or “were therefore
committed” or “because of this, were committed,” all of which, along with synonymous
phrases, were available if the legislature had wanted to express causation instead of
conjunction. One element of Minn. Stat. § 244.17, subd. 3(2), is that offenders were
convicted of a listed offense within the last ten years, and the other element is that they
were committed to the custody of the commissioner. There is no requirement that thei r
current commitment to the custody of the commissioner result ed from their conviction of
a listed offense in the last ten years.
Affirmed.