State of Minnesota v. J. G. Z

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2062

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

J. G. Z.,
Appellant.

Filed August 31, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-21-875

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Jeffrey D. Albright, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)

Dylan Wallace, Henson & Efron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying his petition to expunge the
records related to his domestic-assault conviction that was entered after he pleaded guilty

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in 2022. Because the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous, we reverse and
remand for the district court to reevaluate the petition in light of this opinion.
FACTS
The following summarizes the factual findings in the district court’s written order,
supplemented by the record relevant to the issues on appeal. Appellant J.G.Z. was arrested
in October 2021. Respondent State of Minnesota filed a complaint that charged J.G.Z. with
three counts: domestic assault by strangulation, child endangerment, and domestic assault
involving the intentional infliction of bodily harm. On the day of the alleged offense,
law-enforcement officers received a report of a domestic incident involving J.G.Z. and
E.M.B., with whom J.G.Z. has two children. Their son, who was three years old at the time,
was also present. The complaint alleged that J.G.Z. acted violently towards E.M.B. and
injured E.M.B. and their son.
In January 2022, J.G.Z. entered into a plea agreement with the state. J.G.Z. pleaded
guilty to misdemeanor domestic assault involving the intentional infliction of bodily harm
in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining counts and recommending a stay of
imposition of the sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(2) (2020) (providing that
whoever “intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm” against “a family or
household member” is guilty of a misdemeanor).
At the plea hearing, J.G.Z. pleaded guilty, testified to a factual basis, and agreed that
he and E.M.B. “had a verbal disagreement” that “turned physical.” J.G.Z.’s attorney asked,
“[D]uring that interaction, you struck [E.M.B.] with the intent to cause harm, correct?”
J.G.Z. replied, “I mean restrain, I wouldn’t say struck, but yeah.” J.G.Z. acknowledged that

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he harmed E.M.B. and “caused her some pain.” The district court accepted J.G.Z.’s guilty
plea, dismissed the remaining counts, stayed imposition of a sentence, and placed J.G.Z.
on probation for up to one year. J.G.Z. successfully completed probation. 1
In May 2025, J.G.Z. petitioned the district court to expunge the records related to
the 2022 domestic-assault conviction. In his petition, J.G.Z. indicated that he was eligible
for expungement because he was convicted of a misdemeanor and had “not been convicted
of a new crime for at least two years since discharge of the sentence for the crime.” See
Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3) (2024).
J.G.Z.’s petition stated that he was seeking expungement “for employment purposes
and for a Developmental Disability (DD) Waiver for [his] daughter.” J.G.Z. explained, “I
currently work as a blackjack dealer at a casino. I would like to apply to be a Pit Boss,”
which “would mean more pay, full time work, and benefits.” J.G.Z. added, “Regarding the
DD waiver, my daughter has some developmental disabilities including autism, I would
like to apply to be her paid parent caregiver through the [Minnesota Department of Human
Services]” (DHS), but J.G.Z. explained that his conviction would be “a disqualifying
offense for DHS purposes.” J.G.Z. also stated that his criminal record would “make it
difficult” for him to find housing should he “need to move at some point.”
J.G.Z.’s petition also summarized the steps he had taken towards rehabilitation:
Shortly after this incident, I was granted sole custody of my
two children. . . . Since the offense I have focused on raising
my children and being a good role model for them . . . . I am
concentrating on being a loving, supportive parent. I have

1 The record does not contain a probation discharge order. In its expungement order, the
district court found that J.G.Z. “successfully completed” his probation.

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maintained employment and have worked at the same place
since 2012.

In a letter filed with the district court, the state opposed J.G.Z.’s petition for four
reasons. First, the state argued that the potential benefits of expungement for J.G.Z.’s
employment and for him to qualify as a paid parent caregiver were “speculative” and lacked
documentation. Second, the state maintained that J.G.Z.’s domestic-assault conviction
could support enhancement of similar offenses until 2032 and, therefore, sealing his
criminal record would create “a significant burden on law enforcement agencies” in a ny
future prosecution. Third, the state argued that the circumstances alleged in the complaint,
especially the injury to J.G.Z.’s son, weighed against expungement. Finally, the state
contended that too little time had passed since J.G.Z.’s offense.
The district court held a hearing on J.G.Z.’s expungement petition in
September 2025.2 J.G.Z., who represented himself at the hearing, elaborated on his
financial hardship, stating that (1) he “receive[s] no child support from the children’s
mother”; (2) his pay as a blackjack dealer “has been cut about 40 percent due to [his] pool
tips dropping off”; and (3) after the conviction, he was “deactivated” from a “Door Dash
delivery job” following an annual background check, leading to an estimated loss of
“around $45,000 of income over the past three years.” J.G.Z. added that the cost of rent
and utilities for his home “comes about to 80 percent” of his income. The state relied on
the arguments in its written submission, as summarized above.

2 The first hearing in August 2025 was continued to allow J.G.Z. to file additional
supporting documents. J.G.Z. filed no documents after the August hearing.

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The district court denied J.G.Z.’s petition. In a written order and memorandum, the
district court found that J.G.Z. “met the eligibility threshold” for expungement and had
“made progress since the incident occurred.” But the district court explained that “the
seriousness of the offense,” the “presence and injury of a child,” the “short passage of time”
since the offense, and the administrative burden created by sealing J.G.Z.’s record led to
its determination that “the proven benefits [of expungement] are not commensurate with
the disadvantages to the public and public safety.”
J.G.Z. appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court abused its discretion in denying J.G.Z.’s petition under
Minn. Stat. § 609A.03 (2024).

Appellate courts review the denial of an expungement petition for abuse of
discretion. State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn. 2013). Under this standard,
appellate courts “will not overrule the district court unless the court exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary or capricious manner or based its ruling on an erroneous interpretation of
the law.” State v. R.H.B., 821 N.W.2d 817, 822 (Minn. 2012). We review a district court's
findings of fact supporting a decision on expungement for clear error. State v. A.S.E.,
835 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Minn. App. 2013). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when they
are “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not supported by the evidence as
a whole.” State v. Schultz, 676 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted).
We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493,
503 (Minn. 2013).

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Minnesota’s expungement statutes set out threshold eligibility requirements and
provide the procedure and analysis that a petitioner and courts must follow on a petition to
expunge the records related to a criminal offense. See generally Minn. Stat. §§ 609A.01-.06
(2024). Relevant to J.G.Z.’s petition is section 609A.02, subdivision 3(a)(3), which
provides that a “petition may be filed under section 609A.03” if “the petitioner was
convicted of a . . . misdemeanor” and “has not been convicted of a new crime for at least
two years since discharge of the sentence for the crime.”
Statutory expungement by petition is “an extraordinary remedy.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609A.03, subd. 5(a). A petition for expungement is “to be granted only upon clear and
convincing evidence that it would yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the
disadvantages to the public and public safety of: (1) sealing the record; and (2) burdening
the court and public authorities to issue, enforce, and monitor an expungement order.” Id.,
subd. 5(a)(1)-(2). The statute sets out a 12-factor test for determining whether
expungement should be granted:
(1) the nature and severity of the underlying crime, the
record of which would be sealed;
(2) the risk, if any, the petitioner poses to individuals or
society;
(3) the length of time since the crime occurred;
(4) the steps taken by the petitioner toward
rehabilitation following the crime;
(5) aggravating or mitigating factors relating to the
underlying crime, including the petitioner ’s level of
participation and context and circumstances of the underlying
crime;
(6) the reasons for the expungement, including the
petitioner’s attempts to obtain employment, housing, or other
necessities;
(7) the petitioner’s criminal record;

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(8) the petitioner ’s record of employment and
community involvement;
(9) the recommendations of interested law enforcement,
prosecutorial, and corrections officials;
(10) the recommendations of victims or whether victims
of the underlying crime were minors;
(11) the amount, if any, of restitution outstanding, past
efforts made by the petitioner toward payment, and the
measures in place to help ensure completion of restitution
payment after expungement of the record if granted; and
(12) other factors deemed relevant by the court.

Id., subd. 5(c). Upon the grant of an expungement petition, the remedy available is limited
to “sealing the [expunged] records and prohibiting the disclosure of their existence or their
opening except under court order or statutory authority.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.01. The
expungement statute does not authorize “the destruction of records or their return to the
subject of the records.” Id.
The district court found that J.G.Z. met the threshold eligibility requirements for
statutory expungement. 3 The district court applied the 12 -factor test and concluded that
factors one through six and factor nine weighed against expungement, factors seven and
eight favored expungement, there was “no victim input” under factor ten, and factors
eleven and twelve did not apply . On appeal, J.G.Z. argues that the district court clearly

3 Among the eligibility requirements is that “the petitioner has not been convicted of a new
crime for at least two years since discharge of the sentence for the crime.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3). The state suggests in its brief that J.G.Z. filed his petition before
the two-year waiting period had elapsed. The state failed to make this objection in district
court; it is therefore forfeited on appeal, and we may decline to consider it. See Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts generally address
only those questions previously presented to and considered by the district court). Even so,
J.G.Z. filed his expungement petition in May 2025, about two years and four months after
his probation expired.

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erred in its factual findings and erred in its legal analysis and conclusions under factors one
through six. J.G.Z. does not challenge the district court’s findings and conclusions as to the
remaining factors. Thus, we consider the parties’ arguments about factors one through six.
Factor One: The Nature and Severity of the Underlying Crime
Under the first factor, the district court stated that it would “consider reliable record
materials to understand the context of the incident.” Referring to allegations in the criminal
complaint, the district court stated, “The Court treats these as allegations reflected in the
record, not as findings that expand the scope of the plea.” But the district court then found
that the “presence of a child, the reported injury to the child, and the allegation and evidence
of strangulation are aggravating circumstances that weigh against sealing the records.”
(Emphasis added.)
J.G.Z. argues that the district court’s “consideration of unproved allegations related
to dismissed charges” warrants reversal and remand. J.G.Z. maintains that “the only
evidence and allegations related to the underlying offense that the district court could
properly consider as part of its analysis” was the “evidence presented under oath
establishing the factual basis for [J.G.Z.’s] conviction.”
We conclude that the district court clearly erred in determining that aggravating
circumstances existed based on factual findings supported only by allegations in the
criminal complaint. In State v. A.S.R., this court considered whether the district court
clearly erred in finding that an expungement petitioner had engaged in conduct that was
charged but not proved. 906 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Minn. App. 2017). A.S.R. was charged with
“providing false identification to gain access to an airport security area” in violation of a

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Metropolitan Airport Commission (MAC) ordinance. Id. at 528. MAC alleged that A.S.R.
applied for an airport badge and “had improperly marked a box . . . indicating that he
should receive ‘escort’ authority.” Id. The charge was later dismissed, and A.S.R. petitioned
for expungement. 4 A.S.R., 906 N.W.2d at 528. The district court denied expungement of
the charge, based in part on its finding that A.S.R. “sought ‘escort’ privileges to which he
was not entitled by altering an application for his badge.” Id. at 529, 532.
We concluded that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous and reversed
and remanded. Id. at 532-33. We reasoned that the stipulation to dismiss charges against
A.S.R. “supports no more than a finding that A.S.R. was alleged to have engaged in
particular conduct.” Id. at 532 (emphasis added). Thus, the district court “clearly erred by
finding that A.S.R. engaged in the underlying charged—but never proven—conduct.” Id.
(emphasis added).
Here, the district court stated that it treated the criminal complaint as “allegations”
and not “findings .” But the district court weighed the conduct alleged in the complaint
against expungement and described the unproven conduct as “aggravating circumstances.”

4 A.S.R. petitioned for expungement under section 609A.02, subdivision 3(a)(1) (2016),
which applies when “all pending actions or proceedings were resolved in favor of the
petitioner.” A.S.R., 906 N.W.2d at 529 (quotation omitted). For petitions brought under
subdivision 3(a)(1), there is a statutory presumption in favor of expungement and the
burden shifts from the petitioner to the opponent of expungement to establish “by clear and
convincing evidence that the interests of the public and public safety outweigh the
disadvantages to the petitioner of not sealing the record.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.03,
subd. 5(b). The state argues that A.S.R. is inapplicable to J.G.Z.’s appeal because, unlike
J.G.Z., A.S.R. was “entitled to presumed statutory expungement.” This distinction may be
relevant in some cases but does not change our analysis of what evidence a district court
may consider when applying the 12-factor test.

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The district court’s reasoning indicates that it found J.G.Z. had engaged in the conduct
alleged in the complaint. See A.S.R., 906 N.W.2d at 532. Thus, as in A.S.R., the district
court clearly erred by making findings based on unproven allegations in the complaint.
The state argues that A.S.R. is distinguishable because A.S.R.’s false-identification
charge was dismissed and there was “no admission” to any of the underlying conduct. In
contrast, J.G.Z. “admitted on the record that he assaulted” E.M.B. We are not persuaded.
The relevant distinction is between allegations that have been prove d—including through
a defendant’s testimony and admissions in a plea hearing—and those that have not. J.G.Z.’s
testimony at the plea hearing did not adopt or admit that the incident involved strangulation
or that his son was present or injured.
Alternatively, the state contends that this court should not follow A.S.R.’s ruling on
the criminal complaint allegations because it is “dictum and not precedential.” We
disagree. Our conclusion in A.S.R. that the district court relied on clearly erroneous findings
was essential to our decision that the district court abused its discretion in denying A.S.R.’s
expungement petition. Id. at 532-33; see Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d
601, 611 (Minn. 2016) (stating that “a ruling not necessary to the decision of a case can be
regarded as only dictum” (quotation omitted)).
The state also argues that the statutory language of factors one, five, and twelve
“logically allows the district court to consider other pieces of information that have not
been admitted to or found beyond a reasonable doubt when considering statutory
expungement.” We need not decide under what circumstances it would be appropriate for
the district court to consider allegations in a complaint. Here, the district court clearly erred

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by relying solely on the complaint to find that specific conduct amounted to aggravating
circumstances. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in concluding that factor one
weighed against expungement.
Factor Two: Risk the Petitioner Poses to Individuals or Society
The district court noted that J.G.Z.’s “lack of criminal history” and completion of
domestic-abuse programming mitigated the risk of recidivism. The district court also stated
that “this appears to be a situational offense.” But the district court concluded that
factor two weighed against expungement because “this incident involved an intimate
partner who was holding a child during the assault.”
The district court relied solely on the complaint for its finding that E.M.B. was
holding a child during the assault. As discussed above, it was clear error for the district
court to make findings based on unproven allegations and then weigh those findings as
proven facts that disfavor expungement.
Also, caselaw explains that the “situational” nature of the offense favors
expungement because generalized or speculative risk cannot by itself be a basis to deny
expungement. For example, in State v. D.R.F ., this court reversed and remanded the denial
of D.R.F.’s expungement petition after he was acquitted of a charge of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct. 878 N.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Minn. App. 2016). D.R.F. did not appear for his
trial and was apprehended and tried about 18 months later. Id. at 35. In support of its denial
of D.R.F.’s subsequent expungement petition, the district court stated D.R.F.’s “absconding
from a charge is relevant in the event he should be charged with a future offense, as it
would influence the setting of bail or other security.” Id. at 36. The district court found,

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“Should this record be sealed the information would not be available for a court to
consider.” Id.
We disagreed, stating there was no “unique or particularized harm to the public”
from “the hypothetical situation in which appellant commits some offense in the future and
is charged with a crime, bail is set too low because of the state’s inability to bring up the
bench warrant history of appellant’s expunged crime, and appellant then absconds.” Id.
(quotation omitted). We concluded that the risk of a second nonappearance for trial was
“simply too speculative to constitute clear-and-convincing evidence.” Id.
5
Here, the district court acknowledged that J.G.Z.’s offense was “situational,” relied
on unproven allegations, and made no findings that J.G.Z. posed a future risk of harm to
any individuals or to society. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in concluding
that the risk of harm outweighed the mitigating circumstances such that factor two weighed
against expungement.
Factor Three: The Length of Time Since the Crime Occurred
The district court stated that “only a few years have passed since this violent offense,
and Minnesota law preserves use of this conviction to enhance any future assault-related
offense for [ten] years.” The district court concluded that factor three “weighs against
sealing the records” of J.G.Z.’s case “prior to the expiration of the look-back period.”

5 The state argues that D.R.F. is “inapposite” because the state bore the burden to prove
that expungement was not warranted. See D.R.F., 878 N.W.2d at 35. While the burden of
proof differs from this case, D.R.F. is instructive because we reviewed the application of
the second factor of the 12-factor test.

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While the district court accurate ly states that J.G.Z.’s offense could contribute to
enhance a future domestic assault or fifth-degree assault offense within ten years, it erred
in its legal analysis for two reasons. First, the expungement statute provides a two-year
waiting period for J.G.Z.’s offense. Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3). The district court
effectively used the ten-year look-back period as a bar to expunging J.G.Z’s conviction,
which would contravene the waiting period provided in the expungement statute. Second,
expungement does not preclude enhancement of future offenses because “an expunged
record may be opened for purposes of a criminal investigation, prosecution, or sentencing,
upon an ex parte court order.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 7a(b)(1) (emphasis added).
Because the statutory waiting period for expungement of J.G.Z.’s offense is two years, the
district court abused its discretion in weighing this factor against expungement based on
the enhancement look-back period.
Factor Four: Petitioner’s Steps Towards Rehabilitation
The district court weighed factor four, although in combination with factor three,
and concluded that it weighed against expungement. But the district court found only
“genuine positives” on J.G.Z.’s steps toward rehabilitation, including his completion of
probation without violation, no new convictions, and continued employment. Because
district court’s conclusion on factor four was contrary to its findings, we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion in weighing this factor against expungement.
Factor Five: Aggravating or Mitigating Factors Relating to the Underlying Crime
The district court concluded that J.G.Z.’s offense was “aggravated by the presence
of a child, the child’s reported injuries, and the allegation that the victim was strangled.”

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For the reasons set out in our analysis of factor one, the district court clearly erred in its
factual findings and erred in its legal analysis of factor five by relying on unproven
allegations in the complaint.
Factor Six: Reasons for the Expungement
The district court acknowledged the “sincerity” of J.G.Z.’s attestation that “the
conviction is an employment barrier at the casino” but noted that “there is no
documentation” to support any adverse employment consequences. The district court also
rejected J.G.Z.’s argument that sealing his criminal record would provide a benefit to him
and his family by allowing him to become a paid caregiver for his disabled daughter, stating
that expungement would “erase the very information DHS needs to evaluate whether
[J.G.Z.] should be entrusted as a licensed caretaker for a vulnerable person.” The district
court concluded that this factor weighed against expungement.
J.G.Z. argues that “a petitioner is not required to provide documentary evidence to
prove the alleged employment benefits that expungement would provide” and that the
district court therefore clearly erred in finding that he had not shown that factor six favored
expungement. J.G.Z. emphasizes that the district court “failed to comment on [his]
unrefuted claim that he had been terminated from his Door Dash delivery job as a result of
his conviction.” J.G.Z. also argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that
expungement would “erase” information required by DHS.
J.G.Z. is correct that the district court failed to analyze his termination from
DoorDash. Caselaw shows that a history of unsuccessful attempts to gain employment is a
relevant consideration on a petition for expungement. For example, in State v. N.G.K.,

15
N.G.K. testified that he “applied for a job with another company and was not considered
because of his prior conviction” and that expungement was “necessary in order to move to
the next level in his career.” 770 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation marks
omitted). This court determined that the district court “did not clearly err” by finding that
N.G.K. had “demonstrated difficulties in securing employment” despite his “somewhat
vague” evidence. Id. at 180-81 (quotation omitted).6
In contrast, in State v. H.A., H.A. testified that “he had applied for a position in
airport security and feared that his record would adversely affect his employability.”
716 N.W.2d 360, 362 (Minn. App. 2006). This court concluded that the “difficulties in
securing employment” factor did not favor expungement because H.A. “did not indicate a
history of unsuccessful employment attempts” and instead “appeared to be seeking
expungement in order to obtain a specific position.” Id. at 364.
Although the district court failed to address J.G.Z.’s loss of his DoorDash job, the
record contains insufficient evidence for us to conclude that the district court erred in
determining that this factor weighs against expungement. Because we remand for other
reasons, however, the district court may reweigh this factor , taking into account J.G.Z.’s
loss of employment with DoorDash.

6 N.G.K. involved a petition for expungement under the district court’s inherent authority.
770 N.W.2d at 179-80; see also State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn. 2008)
(discussing statutory and inherent authority as separate bases for expungement). One factor
in evaluating a petition for inherent-authority expungement is “the extent that a petitioner
has demonstrated difficulties in securing employment.” N.G.K., 770 N.W.2d at 180
(quotation omitted). Because factor six of the statutory expungement test directs courts to
consider “the petitioner’s attempts to obtain employment,” Minn. Stat. § 609A.03,
subd. 5(c)(6), caselaw on inherent-authority expungement clarifies this point.

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As for J.G.Z.’s argument about the likely outcome of a DHS background check on
him, we agree that the district court was mistaken that expungement would “erase”
information needed by DHS. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.01 (“Nothing in this chapter
authorizes the destruction of records or their return to the subject of the records.”). And as
J.G.Z. acknowledges, “even expunged records may be retrieved if requested by state
agencies.” J.G.Z. cites Minnesota Statutes section 609A.03, subdivision 7a, which sets out
purposes for which an expunged record of conviction may be reopened. Based on J.G.Z.’s
concession, we assume without deciding that DHS would be able to retrieve the records of
his expunged conviction for the purpose of a background check. Given this concession,
J.G.Z. has not shown how expungement would resolve his difficulty in passing a DHS
background check and therefore does not persuade us that the district court abused its
discretion in finding that factor six favored expungement.
In sum, because the district court erred in its analysis of five out of seven factors
that it weighed against expungement and relied extensively on unproven allegations in its
analysis, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying J.G.Z.’s
petition for statutory expungement.
Final Analysis
J.G.Z. argues that the district court erred in its final analysis and its balancing of the
benefits of expungement against the disadvantages to the public and public safety. J.G.Z.
contends that the district court applied an incorrect standard of proof by requiring him to
present evidence that the benefits of expungement would “outweigh the burden of
expungement on the State . . . rather than simply showing that these benefits are

17
commensurate with the burden.” See Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(a) (requiring “clear
and convincing evidence” that expungement “would yield a benefit to the petitioner
commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and public safety” (emphasis added)).
The district court’s written decision included a single statement that J.G.Z.’s “need
for expungement does not outweigh” the “significant administrative burden” on
prosecutors and law-enforcement agencies. But the district court’s decision generally stated
and applied the correct standard. Although the district court erred in its analysis of several
factors, in context, we discern no error in the standard of proof in the court’s final analysis.
As required by the expungement statute, the district court balanced the 12 factors and
denied expungement because “the proven benefits [were] not commensurate with the
disadvantages to the public and public safety.”
II. Inherent-Authority Expungement

Besides granting a petition under the expungement statute, a district court may order
expungement under the court’s inherent authority. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d at 274.
Expungement under the court’s inherent authority “extends only to records held by the
judicial branch.” R.H.B., 821 N.W.2d at 820 n.1. A court may consider a petitioner’s
eligibility under both sources of authority. See, e.g., State v. K.M.M., 721 N.W.2d 330, 332
(Minn. App. 2006) (remanding a petition for expungement of a dismissed indictment “for
findings as to expungement of the indictment under statutory and inherent authority”).
J.G.Z. argues that the district court “committed reversible error by failing to
consider [his] request for expungement pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority.”
Because we reverse the district court’s denial of statutory expungement, we need not reach

18
this issue. On remand, the district court may decide in the first instance whether J.G.Z.
requested expungement under the court’s inherent authority, and if so, whether
expungement is warranted.
In sum, the district court erred in concluding that factors one through five weighed
against expungement and therefore abused its discretion in denying J.G.Z.’s petition for
statutory expungement. We reverse and remand for the district court to reevaluate J.G.Z.’s
petition in light of this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.