Ann Anderson v. Cooperative Response Center, Inc., Department of Employment and Economic Development

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2066

Ann Anderson,
Relator,

vs.

Cooperative Response Center, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed August 17, 2026
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51790384-3

Samantha Kleiser, Brianna Boone, Russell Squire, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal
Services, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)

Gregory J. Stenmoe, Grant Gibeau, Trish Palermo, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent employer)

Melannie M. Markham, Keri A. Phillips, Katrina Gulstad, Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent
department)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Cochran ,
Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A customer-service call center discharged employee Ann Anderson after she talked
over a caller and ignored the caller’s several requests to speak to a supervisor, behaviors
the center had previously warned Anderson to cease. An unemployment -law judge
affirmed a decision by the department of employment and economic development denying
Anderson’s application for unemployment benefits on the ground that she was discharged
for misconduct. Anderson a ppeals by certiorari. We affirm because the findings of her
behavior constitute employment misconduct, no exception applies, and substantial
evidence in the record supports the misconduct finding.
FACTS
Cooperative Response Center Inc. staffs and operates a telephonic customer-service
call center for its utility-company clients . Cooperative Response employees answer
incoming calls to address caller problems. It trains each of these employees on its customer-
service expectations, including the duty to assist “irate, angry, or difficult customers
professionally” without the employee interrupting or raising her voice. If a caller asks to
speak to a supervisor, Cooperative Response instructs its employees that they may attempt
to defuse the situation if they believe it is possible, but if the caller continues to request a
supervisor, the employee must transfer the caller promptly.
Cooperative Response hired Ann Anderson in 2020. Since then, Cooperative
Response twice formally placed Anderson on a performance-improvement plan after
incidents in which Anderson argued with and talked over callers and ignored their requests

3
to speak to a supervisor. Anderson completed her first performance-improvement plan in
2022 and the second in early 2025.
Anderson took the call that led to her termination in May 2025. The unemployment-
law judge (ULJ) who conducted the hearing detailed the relevant circumstances of the call
in the following findings of fact:
Anderson took a customer call about an outage.
Anderson directed the customer to reset the breakers at the
customer’s home. The customer said she and her husband had
medical issues, wanted an expedited response, and could not
navigate the stairs to reset t he breakers. Anderson asked for
more information about the customer’s medical issues. The
customer asked to speak to a supervisor. Anderson began
explaining why more medical information would be helpful.
The customer continued to ask to speak to a supervis or in a
firm but not loud voice. After requesting transfer to a
supervisor four times, the customer raised her volume because
Anderson continued to talk over the customer. The customer
then made two additional requests to speak to a supervisor
before Anderson transferred the call.

Cooperative Response discharged Anderson later that month , citing “ongoing
behavior concerns” that culminated in the referenced call about which her supervisors
concluded that “[Anderson] fell back into old habits of being rude and argumentative.”
Anderson applied for unemployment benefits, and the Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED) deemed her ineligible because she was
discharged for employment misconduct.
Anderson appealed DEED’s decision and appeared before a ULJ for an evidentiary
hearing where she testified to her version of events. The ULJ listened to the recorded May
call. A Cooperative Response human -resources employee testified about the company’s

4
expectations and training, summarized above. She described Anderson’s behavior during
the subject call as serious misconduct because she talked over the caller, raised her voice,
did not transfer the caller to a supervisor promptly after being asked five times, and pressed
the caller for medical information that the caller clearly did not want to provide. She said
that Anderson’s first attempt to explain to the caller why she wanted the medical
information aligned with company t raining but emphasized that Anderson should have
understood that she was not required to get this information and should have transferred
the caller sooner.
The ULJ found that Cooperative Response discharged Anderson for employment
misconduct. The ULJ credited the company’s testimony over Anderson’s to the extent the
two conflicted , and the ULJ found that Cooperative Response reasonably expected its
employees to follow its training, including transferring callers to a supervisor immediately
upon a second request, without argument. The ULJ concluded that Anderson’s failure to
meet this expectation was serious because it fit her pattern of violative behavior, affirming
DEED’s decision to deny Anderson’s application for unemployment benefits . Anderson
requested reconsideration of the ULJ’s decision, and the ULJ affirmed it.
Anderson appeals by certiorari to this court.
DECISION
Anderson asks us to reverse the ULJ’s decision that she engaged in benefits -
disqualifying employment misconduct, arguing that the decision is flawed as a matter of
law and as a matter of fact. An employee discharged for employment misconduct, meaning
“any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct . . . that is a serious violation of the

5
standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect ,” is ineligible to
receive unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subds. 4(1), 6(a) (2024). A
“serious” violation is one that is important when considering the context of the employee’s
job. Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 461 (Minn. 2016). We review de
novo whether an employee’s act qualifies as employment misconduct . Skarhus v.
Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006). Our de novo review satisfies us
that the ULJ correct ly concluded that Anderson’s conduct constitutes employment
misconduct.
The ULJ found that Cooperative Response discharged Anderson for fail ing over
time to meet its expectations under several behavioral standards. The ULJ found that she
engaged in misconduct by repeatedly violating Cooperative Response’s reasonable
expectations for its employees despite multiple warnings. See Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc.,
796 N.W.2d 312, 314, 317 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that an employee’s pattern of
breaching a known policy is a serious violation). Anderson does not dispute that
Cooperative Response reasonably expected its employees to handle calls respectfully and,
according to company training, to avoid talking over callers and transfer them to a
supervisor upon request without delay . Cooperative Response had twice previously
disciplined Anderson for violating this standard. And by violating it again in the May 2025
call, Anderson established a pattern of misbehavior serious enough to qualify as
employment misconduct.
Anderson argues against this conclusion by emphasizing that she was essentially
discharged for having failed to demonstrate the caller- engagement skills of de -escalation

6
and refraining from being rude and argumentative , which Anderson describes as merely
“soft skills .” She maintains that “failure to meet an employer’s expectations for
improvement of soft skills is not employment misconduct by itself.” Anderson cites no
legal authority to support her implied premise that the absence of subjectively measured ,
so-called soft skills cannot constitute misconduct. Caselaw contradicts the premise. We
have concluded, for example, that a n employment- misconduct determination w as
supported by evidence that an employee was “ rude to customers, fellow employees, and
supervisory personnel.” Montgomery v. F & M Marquette Nat ’l Bank, 384 N.W.2d 602,
605 (Minn. App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. June 13, 1986). We similarly concluded that a
misconduct determination can rest on a finding that an employee was “aggressive and
offensive with customers.” Pitzel v. Packaged Furniture & Carpet, 362 N.W.2d 357, 357
(Minn. App. 1985). Because Cooperative Response has the right to reasonably expect its
customer-service employees to be courteous and polite rather than rude and argumentative
with callers, and because caselaw does not except the failure to maintain “soft skills”
categorically from employment misconduct, Anderson’s argument fails.
The unemployment -benefits statute does list certain conduct as exceptions from
employment misconduct , and Anderson asserts that three of them apply. Whether an
exception applies is a question of law we consider de novo. Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 343–
44. Anderson argues that her conduct meets the exception for good-faith errors in
judgment. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(6) (2024). But the judgment -error
exception applies only to conduct that requires an employee to exercise her judgment.
Potter v. N. Empire Pizza, Inc., 805 N.W.2d 872, 87 7 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied

7
(Minn. Nov. 15, 2011). And Cooperative Response’s expectation that its customer-service
employees engage courteously and refrain from rudeness is not a matter left to employee
discretion. It is doubt lessly true, as Anderson implies, that whether a person’s brusque
behavior crosses the line into being discourteous and rude can be a matter of a supervisor’s
discretionary judgment. But the question here is not whether any supervisor accurately
judged the behavior as rude ; it is whether Cooperative Response affords its customer-
service employees discretion in deciding whether to engage customers rudely. It does not.
Because Anderson’s decision whether to engage rudely instead of courteously was not a
decision that Cooperative Response left to her judgment, the conduct that led to her
discharge does not qualify as a judgment-error exception.
Anderson argues too that her conduct meets the inefficiency or inadvertence
exception. Conduct that results from an employee’s “inefficiency or inadvertence” is not
employment misconduct. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(2) (2024). Anderson here
cabins her failure to transfer the May 2025 caller to her supervisor quickly as a single
matter of inefficiency. But we base our review on the ULJ’s supported factual findings ,
which we construe in the light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision. Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d
at 344. And the ULJ found that Cooperative Response discharged Anderson for having
failed to meet its expectations over time, involving a series of incidents of which the May
2025 call was simply the last. This finding defeats Anderson’s mere-single-inefficient-
incident argument.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Anderson’s contention that the ULJ wrongly
considered her conduct underlying her performance -improvement plan s because an

8
employee’s prior unsatisfactory conduct that did not contribute to her discharge falls
outside the scope of an ineligibility determination. Lumpkin v. N. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 209
N.W.2d 397, 401 (Minn. 1973) . The ULJ found that Anderson’s pattern of shortcomings
contributed to her discharge, and the testimony of the company’s representative supports
this finding. Her past conduct factored into the rationale for her discharge, and we therefore
see no error in the ULJ’s considering it in the employment-misconduct assessment.
Anderson also unconvincingly maintains that she was discharged for “simple
unsatisfactory conduct,” which is another statutory exception from the misconduct
definition. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(3) (2024). In doing so, she likens this case to
Bray v. Dogs & Cats Ltd. , where we reversed a misconduct determination because the
employee “attempted to be a good employee but just wasn’t up to the job.” 679 N.W.2d
182, 185 (Minn. App. 2004 ). Our reasoning in Bray does not apply here. W e based our
reversal in that case not just on the employee’s not being “up to the job” but also on the
fact that she “ was unable to perform her duties to the satisfaction of the employer.” Id.
(emphasis added). By contrast here, the ULJ did not find that Anderson could not do the
job to her employer’s satisfaction but that, despite repeated warning and performance-
improvement plans, she would not do the job to her employer’s satisfaction. The exception
does not apply.
Anderson argues too that, as a matter of fact, she did not engage in employment
misconduct because the record does not support the ULJ’s finding that Cooperative
Response had a policy requiring her to transfer callers to a supervisor immediately on a
caller’s second request . We review ULJ decisions to determine whether they rest on

9
“substantial evidence,” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5) (2024), which, among other
things, is evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate. Minn. Ctr. for Env’t
Advoc. v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency , 644 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Minn. 2002). When
reviewing a decision for substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the most favorable
light to the ULJ’s decision and defer to her credibility determinations. Dourney v. CMAK
Corp., 796 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn. App. 2011). Cooperative Response’s human-resources
employee’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ULJ’s contested
finding. She testified that Cooperative Response expected and trained Anderson to transfer
a caller to a supervisor without any further attempt at de -escalation if the caller asks for a
supervisor “multiple times, such as two.” She discussed this standard when explaining how
new employees are “instructed how to handle a customer who’s demanding to speak to a
supervisor.” And the ULJ chose to credit this testimony over Anderson’s. It is true that the
ULJ might have interpreted the testimony differently rather than conclude that the policy
required transfer after a caller’s second request. But viewed in the light most favorable to
the decision , th e testimony constitutes substantial evidence and defeats Anderson’s
argument.
Affirmed.