State of Minnesota v. Paul Armando Orocio

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2085

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Paul Armando Orocio,
Appellant.

Filed September 28, 2026
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-24-4441

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that the complainant

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previously viewed pornography, and that one of appellant’s convictions must be vacated.
We affirm.
FACTS
In 2024, 14-year -old A.G. reported that his uncle had “ anally penetrated him
approximately 6 years ago.” Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Paul
Armando Orocio with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (e)(i) (2016).
At the pretrial hearing, Orocio requested to play for the jury a portion of a video
from A.G.’s interview at the Midwest Children’s Resource Center. In the video, A.G.
stated that, between sixth and eighth grades, he viewed pornography that a friend sent him
as a joke. The prosecutor argued that, following a report of sexual abuse, it is routine
during a medical examination to ask a child if they were exposed to pornography.
Additionally, A.G.’s statement was irrelevant to whether Orocio sexually assaulted A.G.,
and a jury could potentially draw a “negative inference” from hearing that A.G. viewed
pornography. Conversely, Orocio argued that the evidence was relevant because A.G.
revealed “in graphic terms that [an assault] happened to him and he’s been exposed to
pornography at the time that he’s talking about [it].” The district court determined that
A.G.’s disclosure of viewing pornography is “sexual conduct” that is inadmissible under
Minn. R. Evid. 412, the rape-shield law.
At Orocio’s jury trial, A.G. testified that, when he was seven or eight years old,
Orocio “raped . . . him when [Orocio] was drunk.” He explained that, late one night ,
Orocio stumbled into his room and woke A.G. A.G. could smell alcohol. Orocio covered

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A.G.’s mouth, laid him out, and pulled his pants down. A.G.’s chest was down and his
“rear end was exposed.” A.G. testified that Orocio put his penis in A.G.’s rectum. He said
that it was “burning,” and it felt like his skin was “tearing.” Orocio told A.G. that he would
“kill” him if he told anyone.
A.G. testified that, in early 2024, he was thinking about ending his life and talked
to his brother about the things that bothered him, including feeling “used” by his friends
and that his girlfriend was ignoring him. He also told his brother about the sexual assault
because he was “practically deteriorating” because he had never told anyone.
Orocio testified that he had been to A.G.’s home once or twice a year and had spent
the night. Orocio testified that he had only been alone with A.G. in A.G.’s room a few
times. Orocio testified that he did not assault A.G. because he would “remember something
like that.” On cross- examination, Orocio admitted that he would drink an excessive
amount of alcohol when he was at A.G.’s home. But he testified that he never “blacked
out completely that [he would] not remember [his] actions.”
The jury found Orocio guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Orocio to 156
months in prison. The original warrant of commitment shows convictions for the two
offenses. Later, t he district court filed an amended sentencing order, indicating that the
appropriate disposition for count two is a verdict of guilty. An amended warrant of
commitment shows a conviction for count one and “[f]ound guilty [n]o adjudication” for
count two. This appeal followed.

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DECISION
Evidentiary Ruling
Orocio argues that the district court abused its discretion by declining to admit
evidence that A.G. viewed pornography.
Appellate courts review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114, 123 (Minn. 2024). A district court “abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted). E ven if a district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence,
appellate courts will reverse only if the exclusion was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). “An error in excluding
[defense] evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence
fully realized, a [reasonable] jury would have reached the same verdict.” State v. Olsen,
824 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27,
2013).
In a criminal-sexual-conduct case, “evidence of the victim’s previous sexual
conduct shall not be admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the
presence of the jury[.]” Minn. R. Evid. 412(1). Evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual
history is “highly prejudicial,” Olsen, 824 N.W.2d at 340, and “ general[ly] irrelevan[t],”
State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 867 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996).
But it may be admissible if an exception to rule 412 applies and “the probative value of the

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evidence is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature.” Olsen,
824 N.W.2d at 340 (quotation omitted).
Orocio argues that the source-of-knowledge exception applies here. “[A district]
court has discretion to admit evidence tending to establish a source of knowledge of or
familiarity with sexual matters in circumstances where the jury otherwise would likely
infer that the defendant was the source of the knowledge.” State v. Benedict,
397 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1986); see also State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 307 (Minn.
2015) (stating that when defendant asserts victim “fabricated the sexual conduct,” aspects
of victim’s sexual history may be used to establish “a source of knowledge or familiarity
with sexual matters in circumstances in which lack of knowledge is the likely inference to
be drawn by the fact finder”).
Orocio relies on Benedict to argue that the district court failed to conduct a balancing
test to determine the admissibility of the evidence. See 397 N.W.2d at 341 (stating district
court should balance probative value of evidence against potential for causing unfair
prejudice); see also State v. Kroshus, 447 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Minn. App. 1989) (stating
district court must balance probative value of source-of-knowledge evidence against its
potential for unfair prejudice), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1989).
Here, the district court determined that A.G.’s disclosure of viewing pornography
related to his report of the sexual assault; thus, the evidence was governed by rule 412.
While it does not appear that the district court explicitly conducted a balancing test, at the
hearing when the district court considered whether to admit the evidence, the prosecutor
argued that the evidence was irrelevant to whether Orocio assaulted A.G., but a jury could

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potentially draw a “negative inference” from hearing that A.G. viewed pornography. The
district court also heard Orocio’s arguments as to why the evidence was relevant.
Therefore, the district court heard arguments about the probative value versus the potential
for prejudice at the same time that it made its ruling.
We conclude that the source-of-knowledge exception does not apply here because
the cases that Orocio relies on involved circumstances when it could have been inferred
that the accused was the sole source of the victim’s sexual knowledge. When considering
whether the accused was the sole source of the victim’s sexual knowledge, the victim’s age
is relevant. In Benedict, for example, the victim was five years old, but he had obtained
sexual knowledge from his family. 397 N.W.2d at 338, 340-41. The supreme court
determined, however, that the evidence was inadmissible because the probative value was
weak and it had the potential to cause unfair prejudice. Id. at 341.
In Kroshus, the victim was an adult resident of a group home who was
developmentally delayed and had the mental age of a 7 1/2 year old. 447 N.W.2d at 204.
While the source-of-knowledge exception applied because the victim had previously
described a sexual abuse that would tend to show she had an alternative source of
knowledge, this court determined that excluding the evidence was harmless. Id. at 205.
Here, the evidence of an alternative source of sexual knowledge was A.G. viewing
pornographic material a friend sent to him in sixth through eighth grades. A.G. was 14
years old, however, when he reported the assault. A.G. was in high school, he had an older
brother, and he had a girlfriend. It is unlikely that a jury would infer that A.G. could have
only obtained the sexual knowledge from Orocio. Even though the district court did not

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explicitly conduct a balancing test, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
declining to admit the evidence.
And even if the district court abused its discretion, the decision to exclude the
evidence was harmless. A.G. testified that Orocio was drunk and sexually assaulted him.
A.G. described the assault in detail . See State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn.
2004) (stating conviction can rest on uncorroborated testimony of single credible witness);
Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2016) (stating that in sexual-assault prosecution, testimony
of victim need not be corroborated). Orocio admitted that he stayed at A.G.’s home during
the time of the assault and that he would drink alcohol in excess, though he denied
assaulting A.G. because he would “remember something like that .” It was reasonable for
the jury to reach the guilty verdict. See State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 479 (Minn. 2026)
(stating that it is the role of the jury to weigh evidence and witness credibility). Because
the evidence that A.G. viewed pornography would not have changed the jury’s verdict, any
error by the district court in declining to admit the evidence was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Multiple Convictions
Orocio argues that one of his convictions must be vacated. But the amended warrant
of commitment shows that the district court entered a conviction for count one and imposed
a sentence of 156 months in prison for count one. The amended warrant of commitment
shows “[f]ound guilty [n]o adjudication” for count two. See Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2024);
State v. Bowser, 307 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Minn. 1981). The amended warrant of commitment
shows that the district court corrected the error by adjudicating count one only and not

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formally adjudicating count two. See State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284
(Minn. 1984).
Affirmed.