State of Minnesota v. Angie Lynn Schimming

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2088

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Angie Lynn Schimming,
Appellant.

Filed August 31, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-24-1165

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Timothy C. Rank, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Bentley, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for fourth-degree assault,

appellant Angie Lynn Schimming argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that she acted intentionally when her knee struck a hospital worker. We

affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Schimming with one count of assault in the

fourth degree pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.2231, subdivision 2(2) (2022).

Schimming waived her right to a jury, and the district court found her guilty following a

bench trial. The following factual summary is drawn from the district court’s factual

findings based on the trial evidence.

Schimming has a history of episodes of confusion that can last for days. During

these episodes, Schimming experiences a variety of symptoms, including being unable to

communicate freely, responding to questioning only with “yes” or “no” answers, and being

unable to answer questions about the date, time, or her address. Schimming’s daughter

(A.B.) and Schimming’s roommate (D.W.) testified to these episodes occurring at least

four times and as many as ten times in the past. Due to these episodes, Schimming’s

daughters acquired power of attorney over Schimming. D.W. monitors Schimming’s

behavior and informs A.B. if he suspects Schimming is experiencing an episode.

On February 6, 2024, D.W. contacted A.B. because Schimming was confused. A.B.

testified that she attempted to speak with Schimming over the phone but that Schimming

was not “in the state of mind” to respond to questions. A.B. then contacted a nonemergency

line to obtain medical attention for Schimming. Ambulance paramedics arrived and asked

Schimming questions, including what day it was, which Schimming was unable to answer.

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Schimming arrived by ambulance at St. Cloud Hospital. L.L., a patient care

extender1 working in the emergency department, was assigned to Schimming. L.L. took

Schimming’s vitals and helped her into a hospital gown before starting an IV on

Schimming. L.L. testified at trial that Schimming did not seem “with it” and that she was

aware that Schimming had been admitted for confusion. Throughout her interaction with

Schimming, L.L. explained to Schimming what she and hospital staff were doing because

it is part of the “nursing code” to inform patients of what is being done to them. L.L.

described Schimming’s response throughout this process as “playing possum,” by which

she meant that Schimming was holding her eyes closed, not moving, and not reacting to

questions. Schimming became upset when L.L. started placing the IV.

After the IV was placed, L.L. assisted a nurse to administer a catheter to obtain a

urine sample from Schimming. Schimming became upset and began moving her arms and

legs. At this point, another nurse, S.B., heard yelling from Schimming’s room and went to

investigate. S.B. saw Schimming “flailing,” so S.B. attempted to restrain Schimming so

that she would not harm anyone. While S.B. was holding Schimming down, Schimming

struck L.L. on the cheekbone with her knee. L.L. described the strike as “harder than a

slap” and like being punched in the face. The strike left a red mark that others—including

S.B., a law-enforcement investigator, and a hospital security staff member—observed. Just

after striking L.L. with her knee, Schimming turned her head, looked at S.B., “hock[ed] a

1
A patient care extender checks patients into the emergency room and performs tasks like
starting IVs and using catheters, among other responsibilities.

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loogie,” and spat it in S.B.’s face. Schimming testified that she did not recall striking L.L.

or spitting at S.B. and that she is not fabricating her episodes.

After finding Schimming guilty of fourth-degree assault, the district court stayed

imposition of a sentence and placed Schimming on probation for two years.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Schimming argues that the evidence that led to her conviction was insufficient to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she acted intentionally when she struck L.L. on the

cheekbone with her knee.2

Appellate courts “use the same standard of review in bench trials and in jury trials

in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733

(Minn. 2011). “The relevant standard of review depends on whether the factfinder (the

district court here) reached its conclusion of law based on direct or circumstantial

evidence.” State v. Peterson, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018). “[D]irect evidence is evidence

that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without

inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation

omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether

2
At trial, Schimming asserted a defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness. The
defense requires that the appellant be “laboring under such a defect of reason, from [mental
illness], as not to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong” at the time of the alleged
criminal act. Minn. Stat. § 611.026 (2022). The district court noted that “confusion and
delirium can exist without necessarily absolving an individual of culpability for their
actions” and concluded that Schimming had not satisfied the requirements for a finding of
not guilty by reason of mental illness. Schimming does not challenge that determination in
this appeal.

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the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial

evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct

evidence.” Id.

“When the direct evidence of guilt on a particular element is not alone sufficient to

sustain the verdict,” appellate courts apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.

Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). No direct evidence of Schimming’s

intent was presented at trial. Because the state presented no direct evidence of Schimming’s

intent, we agree with the parties that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review

applies.

Under the circumstantial-evidence standard, an appellate court performs a two-step

analysis:

The first step requires us to winnow down the evidence
presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of
the [fact-finder’s] verdict, which results in a subset of facts that
constitute the circumstances proved. At the second step, we
consider whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and
not as discrete, isolated facts, are consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt.

State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026) (quotation and citation omitted). At the

second step, appellate courts draw their own inferences and “do not defer to the factfinder

but examine the reasonableness of the inferences” independently. Id. at 483 (quotation

omitted). If the circumstances proved “support a reasonable inference that is inconsistent

with guilt,” the evidence is insufficient and the conviction must be reversed. Id. (quotation

omitted). But, if a proposed hypothesis of innocence “seem[s] unreasonable” given the

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entirety of circumstances proved, the conviction should be affirmed. State v. Taylor, 650

N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002).

The circumstantial-evidence standard is applied on an element-by-element basis.

State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39-40 (Minn. 2016); see also Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478

(discussing the standard in terms of particular elements). Schimming was convicted of

fourth-degree assault-harm of “a physician, nurse, or other person providing health care

services in a hospital emergency department” under Minnesota Statutes section 609.2231,

subdivision 2(2). “Assault-harm” is defined as “the intentional infliction of or attempt to

inflict bodily harm upon another.” State v. Dorn, 887 N.W.2d 826, 829 (Minn. 2016)

(quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(2) (2014)). Schimming does not contest that L.L.

was a person providing health-care services in a hospital emergency department or that

L.L. suffered demonstrable bodily harm. Thus, the only element at issue is whether

Schimming’s strike to L.L.’s cheek was intentional.

Assault-harm is a general-intent crime. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309-10

(Minn. 2012). General intent “requires only that the defendant engaged intentionally in

specific, prohibited conduct.” In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 808 n.10 (Minn.

2000) (quotation and emphasis omitted). “Specifically, for assault-harm,” the defendant

“must intentionally apply force to another person without [the person’s] consent.” Dorn,

887 N.W.2d at 831; see also State v. Lampkin, 994 N.W.2d 280, 292 (Minn. 2023)

(applying this language). The state need not prove an intent to “cause a particular result”

but rather “that the blows to complainant were not accidental but were intentionally

inflicted.” Dorn, 887 N.W.2d at 831 (quotations omitted).

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Circumstances Proved

Beginning with the first step, the circumstances proved regarding Schimming’s

intent are as follows:

• On February 6, 2024, Schimming’s daughter, A.B., suspected that Schimming
was experiencing an episode of confusion and sought medical intervention.

• Paramedics arrived and took Schimming to the hospital.

• After Schimming arrived at the hospital, L.L. and a nurse were tasked with her
care.

• L.L. observed that Schimming did not initially seem to be “with it.”

• L.L. suspected that Schimming was “playing possum,” which meant that
Schimming was holding her eyes shut, not moving, and not reacting to questions.

• L.L. started an IV on Schimming, at which point Schimming began to become
upset.

• L.L. and the nurse began to administer a catheter to test Schimming’s urine, and
Schimming became upset and started to move her arms and legs.

• S.B. heard yelling from Schimming’s room and went to assist.

• Schimming continued to move her arms and legs while restrained by S.B., at
which point Schimming’s knee struck L.L.’s cheekbone.

• Shortly thereafter, Schimming turned her head toward S.B., looked at S.B.,
“hock[ed] a loogie,” and spat it in S.B.’s face.

Reasonable Inferences

With the relevant circumstances proved identified, we next consider the reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from them. See Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478. When viewed as a

whole and not as discrete, isolated facts, the circumstances proved must be consistent with

guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. Id.

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Schimming does not contest that the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt.

Rather, she contends only that the circumstances proved also support a rational hypothesis

inconsistent with guilt—namely, that she did not have the requisite intent. She argues that

she was “in an altered mental state” such that she was “incapable of forming the requisite

general intent for assault.” She further argues that striking L.L. with her knee was a

“primal” or reflexive response to an invasive medical procedure. But, when we consider

the circumstances proved as a whole and not as discrete facts, Schimming’s argument is

unreasonable.

First, immediately after striking L.L. with her knee, Schimming turned her head

toward S.B., looked at S.B., drew up phlegm, and spat it in S.B.’s face. When she did so,

she demonstrated her present ability to act intentionally and her awareness of the

individuals around her. Furthermore, prior to the catheter procedure, Schimming appeared

to be “playing possum.” She was trying to avoid engaging with hospital staff by closing

her eyes, not moving, and refusing to answer questions. This conduct indicates that

Schimming was conscious of her surroundings and of the individuals interacting with her.

Additionally, when the catheter procedure started, L.L. began moving her arms and legs.

The natural and probable consequence of Schimming’s flailing while in close proximity to

hospital staff is that she would make contact with someone. See State v. Colgrove, 996

N.W.2d 145, 152 (Minn. 2023) (holding that intent may be inferred from the fact that “a

person intends the natural and probable consequences” of their actions). And finally,

Schimming flailed for long enough to attract the attention of S.B. outside of Schimming’s

room and continued to flail as S.B. attempted to restrain her. Schimming’s sustained action

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indicates an intent to resist—either the procedure or restraint—rather than a sudden, knee-

jerk, “primal” reaction to discomfort. Examining these inferences as a whole, we conclude

that it is unreasonable to infer that Schimming did not intend the natural and probable

consequence of her actions—specifically, that she would make contact with the hospital

staff attending to her when she was kicking her legs.

Because Schimming’s hypothesis that she struck L.L. due to an accidental, reflexive

reaction is unreasonable, the evidence is sufficient to prove that she acted intentionally.

Affirmed.

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