State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2089

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Rahma Abukar Abdi,
Respondent.

Filed June 1, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-25-326

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael T. Walters, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s pretrial order granting
respondent Rahma Abukar Abdi’s motion to suppress evidence and to dismiss charges of
second-degree drug possession and giving a false name to a peace officer. The state argues
that the district court erred by determining that law enforcement lacked reasonable,
articulable suspicion to pat-frisk Abdi and by suppressing the evidence seized from the
pat-frisk and a subsequent search incident to Abdi’s arrest. We affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s written factual findings after a
contested omnibus hearing as well as other evidence admitted at the hearing.
On the morning of January 8, 2025, a Rochester law enforcement officer (first
officer) attended training in Rosemount. During the return drive to Rochester, first officer
pulled into a gas station and recognized a man, R.J., at the station. First officer called
dispatch and “verified [R.J.] had an active arrest warrant.” Because he was in plain clothes,
first officer called for backup and followed the car in which R.J. was a passenger and which
another man, J.C., was driving.
After the car parked, R.J. entered an apartment building through a door that led to
two apartments: units five and six. One unit was “upstairs to the left,” and the other was
“on the bottom floor.” Because units five and six share a common entry area, it “was not
clear to the officers” whether R.J. entered unit five or six. Eventually, law enforcement
learned that R.J. was in unit five and that the driver, J.C., lived in unit six.
3
Law enforcement “set up a perimeter” around the building to ensure that R.J. “did
not escape through a window or back door.” Officers determined that R.J. “was the sole
occupant” of his apartment unit and talked to R.J. “through a window and negotiated his
surrender.” During negotiations, first officer “heard one of his partners claim they heard
[R.J.] ‘say something about a gun.’” After about ten or 20 minutes, R.J. exited the building
and was arrested.
Officers searched R.J.’s person and did not find a firearm. Law enforcement was
“concerned about the presence of a gun” because R.J. was frantic and anxious, “had taken
an extended period to exit the apartment,” and was subject to an arrest warrant for being
“a felon in possession of a firearm.” Officers believed that R.J. “either hid the gun or did
something with the gun inside the apartment.”
Law enforcement “decided to seek a search warrant” for units five and six and for
the car in which R.J. was a passenger. While the warrant applications were in process, law
enforcement “maintained the perimeter they had established and documented anything
suspicious with it, as well as anybody who came in or out of the building, to preserve the
chain of custody.”
1
While law enforcement was maintaining the building perimeter, Abdi walked out of
the door shared by units five and six. First officer testified that Abdi exited the building
around ten to 30 minutes after R.J. was arrested and that first officer suspected Abdi was
“carrying [R.J.’s] gun, trying to simply evade law enforcement by just walking by.” Abdi

1 First officer testified that a district court judge denied the search-warrant applications for
unit six and the car.
4
spoke to officers, “claimed she was uninvolved and said, ‘I’m just gonna walk down the
street and leave.’”
First officer told Abdi that they were seeking a search warrant, asked Abdi “to
identify herself, and told her she would be searched before being allowed to go on her
way.” Abdi stated that she “did not have an I.D. on her” and gave a false name. Law
enforcement checked that name for pending warrants, and the name search was “clear of
warrants.” Thus, “the officers were unaware that [Abdi] had a warrant for her arrest.” Abdi
told first officer that she had been visiting her friend, V., in unit six. First officer believed
that V. lived with J.C., who drove R.J. to the apartment building.
First officer asked another officer (second officer) to conduct a pat-frisk of Abdi.
First officer testified that he suspected Abdi “might now be carrying” R.J.’s gun. During
the pat-frisk, second officer “felt something she believed might be a pocketknife, which
turned out to be a lighter.” Second officer continued the pat-frisk and “could clearly see a
Minnesota I.D. card” in Abdi’s coat pocket. Second officer “removed the I.D. from
[Abdi’s] pocket” and gave it to first officer. T he name on the identification card did not
match the name Abdi had given earlier.
Using the identification card from Abdi’s pocket, law enforcement learned that Abdi
had an active arrest warrant. After arresting Abdi, officers searched her and found illegal
drugs later determined to be 46.2 grams of cocaine and 8.8 grams of methamphetamine.
The state charged Abdi with two counts: second-degree drug possession under
Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2024), and giving a false name to a peace officer
under Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd. 2 (2024). Abdi moved to suppress the evidence
5
stemming from the pat-frisk and to dismiss the charges, arguing that law enforcement did
not have reasonable, articulable suspicion “of criminal activity or weapons possession”
when second officer conducted the pat-frisk of Abdi.
In September 2025, the district court held a contested omnibus hearing. The district
court received testimony from first and second officers as well as a register of actions that
showed Abdi had an active arrest warrant on January 8, 2025. The officers testified to the
events summarized above.
In a December 2025 written order, the district court determined that, at the time
second officer pat-frisked Abdi, law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion that Abdi
“was committing a crime” or that she “was dangerous.” The district court concluded that
the pat-frisk “was an unconstitutional search violating the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
and Minnesota Constitutions.” While the district court recognized that the “attenuation
doctrine” is an exception to the exclusionary rule and “allows evidence to be admitted if
the police’s conduct and the evidence are interrupted by intervening circumstances,” the
court determined that “[t]his exception does not apply .” The district court suppressed the
evidence stemming from the pat-frisk and dismissed both charges.
The state appeals.
DECISION
The state seeks reversal of the district court’s order suppressing the evidence found
on Abdi along with a remand to reinstate the charges. “When reviewing a district court’s
pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual
findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations
6
de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “A
finding is clearly erroneous when there is no reasonable evidence to support the finding or
when an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
occurred.” State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 2012).
This opinion concludes that the state’s appeal makes the required threshold showing
of critical impact, that the pat-frisk search of Abdi was unconstitutional, and that the district
court properly applied the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence stemming from the
pat-frisk. Because the state did not raise its arguments about suppression of the
identification-card evidence and the dismissal of the false-name charge in district court,
they are forfeited and we do not address them.
I. The state satisfied the critical-impact requirement.

When the state appeals a pretrial order, it must show not only error but also “that
the order will have a critical impact on its ability to prosecute the case.” State v. McLeod,
705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). The state can satisfy the
critical-impact standard if the challenged ruling either “completely destroys the state’s
case” or “significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.” Id. (quotations
omitted). Abdi does not argue that the district court’s order lacked critical impact. Because
the suppression of the evidence resulted in dismissal of the charges against Abdi, we
conclude that the state has shown critical impact. See Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502 (stating
that the dismissal of charges following suppression of evidence meets the critical-impact
requirement).
7
II. The second officer’s pat-frisk of Abdi was unconstitutional.

The state argues that the pat-frisk was valid because (A) Abdi lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her person and (B) law enforcement had reasonable, articulable
suspicion to conduct the pat-frisk. We address each argument in turn.
A. Abdi had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the pat-frisk.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable government
searches and seizures of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV;
Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quotation omitted).
Under the Constitution and applicable caselaw, law enforcement may not search a
person without a valid search warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, such as
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a search incident to arrest. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S] earches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well- delineated
exceptions.”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 25, 28 (recognizing constitutionality of warrantless search
of a person incident to arrest and limited search for weapons based on reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity by the person searched).
A person seeking to invoke these constitutional rights must demonstrate “a
reasonable expectation of privacy” in their person or in the “area or items searched.” State
8
v. McMurray , 860 N.W.2d 686, 691 (Minn. 2015) (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in garbage set on curb for collection); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 9
(recognizing “the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person”). Here, the district court determined that the “right to privacy in one’s own person
is well established” and “[n]o exception to this expectation of privacy applies in this case.”
On appeal, the state argues that Abdi, as a fugitive from an active arrest warrant, did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that, therefore, no warrant or exception
was required. Abdi counters that “no court has ever held that the mere existence of an arrest
warrant, which law enforcement is not aware of” at the time of a search, “diminishes an
individual’s expectation of privacy and allows law enforcement to conduct a search of the
individual.”
In support of its position, the state makes three arguments, which we consider in
turn. First, the state asks us to extend caselaw holding that probationers, along with a few
other individuals, have a diminished expectation of privacy and may be subjected to
warrantless searches. See State v. Anderson , 733 N.W.2d 128, 139-40 (Minn. 2007)
(holding that reasonable suspicion may support law enforcement’s warrantless search of a
probationer’s house).2 We d ecline to extend probationer caselaw to persons subject to

2 The state also cites caselaw that is distinguishable and not helpful. See, e.g., State v.
Stephenson, 760 N.W.2d 22, 23 (Minn. App. 2009) (holding that appellant lacked a
subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy in a home he owned but was precluded
from by an order for protection); United States v. Ward, 561 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2009)
(holding that “prison escapees cannot invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment”
and claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room); United States v. Causey,
834 F.2d 1179, 1185 n.11 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that a defendant who is arrested subject
to a valid warrant cannot “complain that the police finally got round to executing a valid
9
arrest warrants. No precedential caselaw holds that persons subject to an arrest warrant lack
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their person. Rather, long-standing caselaw provides
that law enforcement may conduct a warrantless search incident to the execution of a valid
arrest warrant. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 & n.20. Abdi was pat-frisked before her arrest warrant
was executed.
Second, the state relies on the collective-knowledge doctrine and argues that,
because “somebody in the warrants division” knew Abdi had an active arrest warrant, that
knowledge should be imputed to the officer who pat-frisked Abdi. See State v. Conaway,
319 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1982) (stating that the collective-knowledge doctrine pools the
knowledge of the police force in establishing the basis for seizure of a person). The state
did not make this argument to the district court, so we need not consider it on appeal. See
Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (stating that appellate courts generally
will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court).
In any event, this argument is unavailing. Under the collective-knowledge doctrine,
“the officer who conducts the search is imputed with knowledge of all facts known by other
officers involved in the investigation, as long as the officers have some degree of
communication between them.” State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 789 (Minn. 2007)
(emphasis added). Nothing in the record establishes that the officers involved in this
investigation knew of Abdi’s arrest warrant at the time of her pat-frisk. Thus, the
collective-knowledge doctrine does not apply.

warrant”). None of these cases consider or address a warrantless search of a person. Abdi
was not a prison escapee and does not challenge the execution of the arrest warrant.
10
Third, the state argues that advancements in new technology, including
facial-recognition technology, “diminish a fugitive’s reasonable expectation that they can
go out in public, in broad daylight, without being identified.” But no record evidence
suggests that officers used facial-recognition technology to identify Abdi before the
pat-frisk. More fundamentally, this technology merely accelerates law enforcement’s
ability to identify a person or determine whether someone has an arrest warrant. New
technology does not erode the long-standing requirement that officers have either
reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a valid arrest before a warrantless search may
be conducted. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22; Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
In sum, we conclude that Abdi had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her person
at the time of the pat-frisk.
B. Law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a
pat-frisk of Abdi.

“Absent a warrant, the State has the burden to show that a search or seizure falls
within one of the specifically established and well delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement.” State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 37 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). A
law enforcement officer may conduct a brief pat-frisk to search for weapons if the officer
has (1) “a reasonable, articulable suspicion” that the person to be searched “might be
engaged in criminal activity” and (2) a reasonable belief that the person might be armed
and dangerous. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 30). If both requirements are met, the officer may temporarily detain the person
and “conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing” to “discover weapons which
11
might be used to assault” the officer. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. This limited search for weapons
is known as a pat-frisk. A pat-frisk allows “the officer to pursue his investigation without
fear of violence”—not to discover evidence of a crime. State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239,
251 (Minn. 2007).
To determine whether reasonable suspicion supported a pat-frisk, courts perform
“an objective examination of the totality of the circumstances” known to law enforcement
at the time of the search . State v. Lemert, 843 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 2014). Courts
examine reasonable suspicion “from the perspective of a trained police officer, who may
make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Although the threshold for reasonable suspicion is “not high,” State v. Diede,
795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted), it requires “more than an
unarticulated hunch.” State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Minn. 1989) (quotation
omitted). Reasonable suspicion “must be directed at the person to be frisked.” In re Welfare
of C.T.B., 24 N.W.3d 651, 656 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted). The person’s “[m]ere
proximity to, or association with, a person who may have previously engaged in criminal
activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, absent some other factor.” Id .
(quotation omitted).
Relying on first officer’s testimony, the district court found that law enforcement
continued to investigate after R.J.’s arrest, seeking a firearm that R.J. “was not allowed to
possess”—i.e., they sought to “collect evidence of a crime they suspected [R.J.] had
committed.” The district court determined that first officer’s suspicion that Abdi “was
trying to remove evidence from the crime scene” was not specific to Abdi because it
12
“would have applied to anyone leaving” the apartment building. The district court also
determined that, even if it were reasonable to believe that R.J. gave Abdi a firearm, first
officer “had no reason to believe [Abdi] was dangerous.”
On appeal, the state argues that “there was a reasonable and articulable basis to frisk
Abdi.” The state lists these circumstances: R.J. “was frantic, anxious, and uncooperative
when he evaded apprehension by entering the apartment ”; R.J. “mentioned a gun and
officers knew that [his] arrest warrant was related to a gun possession charge”; “it took
time to convince [R.J.] to surrender”; R.J. “left the apartment without a gun”; and Abdi
“came out of the same common entrance leading to only two apartments.”
Abdi counters that these circumstances did not establish reasonable suspicion as to
Abdi and that “law enforcement had no other information that would create any suspicion
that [Abdi] was involved in criminal activity, was armed, or was dangerous.” Abdi
emphasizes that a pat-frisk “is not an investigatory tool to obtain evidence related to an
investigation,” including the firearm R.J. allegedly possessed.
We conclude that the circumstances cited by the state to support the reasonableness
of the pat-frisk pertain almost exclusively to R.J., not Abdi, and therefore do not establish
reasonable suspicion to search Abdi. See id. (stating that the officer’s suspicion must be
“directed at the person to be frisked” (quotation omitted)). We also conclude that no
particularized evidence suggests Abdi was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the
pat-frisk and that her “mere proximity” to R.J. before he was arrested did not establish
reasonable suspicion justifying a pat-frisk. Id. at 658.
13
The supreme court’s decision in C.T.B. is instructive. There, law enforcement
officers responded to a dispatch report of a man “pointing a handgun at people at a light
rail station.” Id. at 654. A few minutes later, officers saw the same man inside a nearby
pizza restaurant. Id. One of the officers also saw three or four other people, including
C.T.B., “all close to each other, roughly within a conversational distance of the original
suspect.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The officer testified that, based on his experience,
he knew “if there’s multiple individuals at one place and there’s someone known to have a
firearm, that sometimes it could be passed around to a different individual, especially when
that suspect knows that [law enforcement is] looking for him or he was involved in an
incident recently.” Id. Relying on these observations, an officer pat -frisked C.T.B. and
found a handgun in his sweater pocket. Id. The state charged C.T.B. with unlawful
possession of a firearm. Id. at 653.
C.T.B. moved to suppress the handgun, arguing that the pat-frisk was
unconstitutional because “the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he
was armed and dangerous” and his “mere physical proximity” to the original suspect was
“not enough to support reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a warrantless search.”
Id. at 653-54. The district court denied C.T.B.’s motion to suppress. Id. at 654. This court
affirmed, concluding that “the totality of the circumstances made it objectively reasonable
for the police to think that the suspect had handed the firearm to one of the young men who
was standing with the suspect when the police approached, including C.T.B.” Id. at 655
(quotation omitted).
14
The supreme court reversed, holding that “C.T.B.’s mere proximity to the original
suspect, combined with the officer’s general knowledge that people in groups may pass
weapons to others to avoid detection, was not sufficient to create a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to justify a Terry pat-frisk.” Id. at 658. The supreme court emphasized that there
must be reasonable suspicion “ directed at the person to be frisked” and that an officer’s
knowledge that “weapons can be passed to evade detection, without more,” does not allow
police to pat-frisk “every individual standing near the original suspect.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
The suspicion underlying Abdi’s pat-frisk is even more speculative than the
suspicion described in C.T.B. First, unlike the officers in C.T.B., who received a report of
a man brandishing a gun, first officer testified that he heard another officer state that R.J.
said “something about a gun” or “something mentioned about a gun.” Even if these vague
statements “about a gun” support reasonable suspicion that R.J. possessed a gun, they do
not support reasonable suspicion that Abdi possessed R.J.’s gun when she exited the
apartment building. First officer had no more than an unarticulated hunch that Abdi was
carrying a gun. See Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 827 (stating that an officer must have a
“particular and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity” (quotation omitted)). And a mere hunch does not establish reasonable suspicion
to conduct a pat frisk. C.T.B., 24 N.W.3d at 656.
Second, Abdi’s proximity to R.J. was slight at best and supported only by
speculation from law enforcement. The district court found that law enforcement officers
knew the shared apartment door led to two units, that R.J. was alone in his unit before he
15
was arrested, and that Abdi admitted visiting V. in unit six. But the record did not establish
that Abdi and R.J. knew each other, were in the same room, or were even in the same
apartment unit. We acknowledge that R.J.’s driver, J.C., lived in the unit that Abdi was
visiting before the pat-frisk. Still, no facts connected Abdi to R.J.
The state also argues that it was “reasonable to stop and frisk Abdi, not only for
officer safety, but to effectively freeze the scene” while law enforcement obtained a search
warrant. In its brief, the state offers no authority to support its freeze -the-scene argument.
And the state did not present this issue to the district court. Therefore, we decline to
consider it on appeal. See State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 806 (Minn. 2016) (declining to
address issues raised in an appellate brief “but were not adequately argued or explained”);
Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357 (declining to address issues that were not raised in district court).
In short, law enforcement may not use a pat -frisk to investigate a crime. See
Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 251 (stating that a pat-frisk is not an investigatory tool). Record
evidence supports the district court’s finding that officers pat-frisked Abdi to find evidence
of R.J.’s crime, not for officer-safety purposes and not based on reasonable suspicion.
Because officers searched Abdi to investigate and acquire evidence against R.J. based on
mere speculation and a hunch that Abdi possessed R.J.’s firearm, the pat-frisk was
unconstitutional under Terry. 392 U.S. at 25, 28.
III. The evidence from Abdi’s pat-frisk and the search incident to her arrest must
be suppressed.

The state argues that, even if the pat-frisk were unconstitutional, the district court
should not have applied the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence that law
16
enforcement obtained. “The exclusionary rule prohibits evidence obtained in violation of
an individual’s constitutional rights from being used in a criminal proceeding against the
victim of the illegal search or seizure.” State v. Douglas, 29 N.W.3d 187, 191 (Minn.
2025); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) (setting out the
exclusionary rule, otherwise known as the fruit-of-the-poisonous -tree doctrine). T he
exclusionary rule allows courts to suppress evidence “obtained either during or as a direct
result of an unlawful” search or seizure. State v. McDonald -Richards, 840 N.W.2d 9, 15
(Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
The district court rejected the state’s challenge to application of the exclusionary
rule. Whether the exclusionary rule supports the suppression of evidence is a question of
law that appellate courts review de novo. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn.
2004). The central question is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quotation omitted). It is the state’s burden to
“demonstrate that the connection between the unlawful conduct and the challenged
evidence is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct.” State v. Barajas,
817 N.W.2d 204, 218 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16,
2012).
17
A. The state forfeited its exclusionary-rule challenge to the false -name
evidence obtained during the pat-frisk.

For the first time o n appeal, the state challenges suppression of the false-name
evidence. Generally, appellate courts only consider issues presented to and considered by
the district court. Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357. In district court, the state argued only that, if
the pat-frisk was unlawful, “the evidence seized following the defendant’s arrest on a valid
warrant should not be suppressed.” (Emphasis added.) The state maintained that “the
existence of a valid arrest warrant for [Abdi] attenuated the connection between the
[pat-frisk] and the drugs seized.” (Emphasis added.) Because the state did not challenge
suppression of the identification card found in the pat-frisk, we decline to address the issue
on appeal.
The state also argues for the first time on appeal that the false-name charge should
not be dismissed even if the identification card is suppressed. The state urges that “Abdi’s
criminal act of giving a false name and birth date to a police officer were complete prior to
the [pat-frisk] that revealed Abdi’s ID card” and that suppression of “Abdi’s identification
card itself would not prevent the State from proving the elements at trial and establishing
Abdi’s identity by other independent means.” Because th e state also did not present this
issue to the district court, we decline to consider it. See id.
B. The Warndahl factors support suppression of the drug evidence.
As to the drug evidence obtained after the pat-frisk, the state argues that the
exclusionary rule “should not be applied, based on the attenuation doctrine.” The state cites
Utah v. Strieff, which provides that evidence “is admissible when the connection between
18
unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some
intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that
has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” 579 U.S.
232, 238 (2016) (quotation omitted).
Abdi asserts that “there is no binding precedent adopting the attenuation doctrine as
a valid exception to the exclusionary rule in Minnesota.” But Minnesota courts have long
recognized that some evidence is too attenuated from an illegal search or seizure to be
suppressed under the exclusionary rule. See State v. Engel, 18 N.W.3d 540, 550 (Minn.
App. 2025) (listing caselaw and recognizing that “intervening circumstances” can “purge”
certain evidence from the “taint” of an unlawful search or seizure), rev. granted (Minn.
June 17, 2025).
To determine whether evidence should be suppressed, courts weigh four factors,
often called the Warndahl factors: (1) “the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct”;
(2) “intervening circumstances”; (3) “whether law enforcement would have obtained the
evidence without the illegal conduct”; and (4) “the temporal proximity between the illegal
conduct and allegedly resulting evidence.” State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 161 (Minn.
2020); see also State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Minn. 1989) (listing four factors).
“No single factor is dispositive, ” and “we must balance all of these factors.” State v.
Bergerson, 659 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Minn. App. 2003). We therefore consider the Warndahl
factors to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies to the drug evidence seized from
Abdi.
19
Purpose and Flagrancy of Police Misconduct
The purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct in conducting an unlawful search
“is especially important, because the aim of the exclusionary rule is to deter police
misconduct by removing the incentive to disregard constitutional guarantees.” State v.
Bale, 267 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1978). A “purposeful or flagrant violation” of a
person’s Fourth Amendment rights favors suppression, while law enforcement negligence
does not. Strieff, 579 U.S. at 241-42.
The state argues that law enforcement officers “were engaged in an active criminal
investigation searching for a firearm” and thus the pat-frisk of Abdi was not “systemic,
purposeful, and flagrant misconduct.” Abdi counters that “law enforcement abused its
power” by “searching her without any suspicion” that she “had committed any crime, was
armed, or was dangerous.”
We agree with Abdi. As discussed above, second officer’s pat-frisk of Abdi was not
supported by federal or Minnesota caselaw. This record shows that law enforcement
pat-frisked Abdi in a purposeful attempt to find evidence of R.J.’s crime—not in a reasoned
effort to ensure officer safety. Caselaw rejects using pat-frisk searches to investigate
crimes. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 251. At the time of the pat-frisk, law enforcement officers
knew only that Abdi had been in the same apartment building as R.J. Yet “[m]ere proximity
to . . . a person who may have previously engaged in criminal activity is not enough to
support reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 844. And law
enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Abdi under Terry.
392 U.S. at 28. Because officers purposefully pat-frisked Abdi to obtain evidence of R.J.’s
20
crimes and did so in violation of clearly established caselaw, the search was flagrant and
purposeful police misconduct.3 This factor favors suppressing the drug evidence.
Intervening Circumstances
The state argues that the “active felony warrant for Abdi’s arrest was a critical
intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of the allegedly illegal stop and
frisk.”4 Abdi counters that the arrest warrant was not an intervening circumstance because
“the record unequivocally demonstrates that law enforcement learned of the arrest warrant
by conducting an unconstitutional search.”5

3 Abdi also contends that the warrant check of Abdi, which occurred before the pat-frisk,
“on its own, was flagrant misconduct.” Abdi relies on State v. Johnson, which held that
law enforcement needs reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrant check. 645 N.W.2d 505,
511 (Minn. App. 2002). Abdi did not present this argument in her motion to suppress, the
district court did not analyze the issue, and t he state did not address the issue on appeal.
We therefore decline to consider this issue. See Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357.

4 On appeal, the state argues that other intervening circumstances existed, including
(1) Abdi’s voluntary disclosure of the drug evidence after her arrest and (2) Abdi’s decision
to lie to officers about her name and possession of an identification card.
We acknowledge that the commission of a new crime by a defendant generally
purges the taint of an unlawful search or seizure, especially in the context of a defendant
fleeing or resisting law enforcement. See City of St. Louis Park v. Berg, 433 N.W.2d 87,
89 (Minn. 1988) (“This court has rejected the contention that evidence of a defendant’s
resistance to an illegal arrest must be suppressed as forbidden fruit of a Fourth Amendment
violation by the police.”). The state, however, did not present the se other intervening
circumstances to the district court, so they are forfeited on appeal. See Roby, 547 N.W.2d
at 357 (stating that appellate courts generally will not consider matters not argued to and
considered by the district court).
5 By contrast, Abdi conceded in district court that the arrest warrant was “a critical
intervening factor that sufficiently attenuates the link between the unlawful [pat-frisk] and
discovery of the ID card and drugs.” See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.
1988) (stating that, generally, a party may not shift theories on appeal). Because it is the
state’s burden to prove that the attenuation doctrine applies, Barajas, 817 N.W.2d at 218,
and we review this issue de novo, Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 359, we do not deem this issue
21
The facts in this appeal have strong parallels to those in Streiff, in which the United
States Supreme Court determined that a preexisting arrest warrant was an intervening
circumstance. 579 U.S. at 240. In Strieff, law enforcement received an anonymous tip that
there was drug activity at a house. Id. at 235. For about a week, an officer surveilled the
house and observed visitors leaving minutes after arriving. Id. The officer saw Strieff leave
the house, detained him, and asked for his identification. Id. The officer discovered that
Strieff had an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation and arrested him. Id. When the
officer searched Strieff incident to his arrest, the officer found drugs and drug
paraphernalia, and the State of Utah later charged Strieff with related offenses. Id. at 235-
36. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the detention and subsequent
search was unlawful. Id. at 236. The district court acknowledged that the stop was unlawful
but refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the drug evidence seized by law enforcement.
Id. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and ordered suppression of the drug evidence. Id.
The United States Supreme Court considered, in part, “how the attenuation doctrine
applies where an unconstitutional detention leads to the discovery of a valid arrest
warrant.” Id. at 237. The Supreme Court determined that Strieff’s arrest warrant strongly
favored allowing the incriminating evidence because “the warrant was valid, it predated
[the officer’s] investigation, and it was entirely unconnected with the stop.” Id. at 240. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision to suppress the drug evidence against Streiff,

conceded by Abdi and consider whether Abdi’s arrest warrant was an intervening
circumstance.
22
reasoning that, once the officer “discovered the warrant, he had an obligation to arrest
Strieff.” Id.
The warrant for Abdi’s arrest was valid, predated the investigation of R.J., and was
unrelated to the pat-frisk. After law enforcement officers learned about Abdi’s warrant—
an intervening circumstance—they had a duty to arrest Abdi. And like the drug evidence
in Strieff, law enforcement discovered the drug evidence on Abdi during a search incident
to her arrest. Thus, the arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance that weighs against
suppression of the drug evidence.
Whether Police Would Have Obtained the Evidence Without Unlawful Conduct

Neither party addresses whether law enforcement would have obtained the drug
evidence without unlawful police conduct. As discussed above, law enforcement officers
lacked reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity or dangerousness by Abdi to justify
the pat-frisk. If the officers had not performed the unlawful pat-frisk, they likely would not
have found Abdi’s identification card, learned her real name, discovered the active arrest
warrant, conducted a search incident to arrest, and discovered the drug evidence. We
therefore conclude that this factor favors suppression of the evidence.
Temporal Proximity Between the Unlawful Search and the Evidence

Close temporal proximity between the unlawful search and discovery of evidence
of a crime by a defendant generally favors applying the exclusionary rule; conversely, if
“substantial time elapses” between the search and discovery of evidence, that fact weighs
against applying the exclusionary rule. Strieff, 579 U.S. at 239 (quotation omitted)
(concluding that the discovery of drug evidence “only minutes after the illegal stop”
23
favored suppression); see also Leonard, 943 N.W.2d at 162 (concluding that a two- hour
time period between an illegal search and the resulting discovery of evidence favored
suppression).
The state argues that, “as to the temporal proximity, the drugs were not discovered
at the scene during the initial [pat-frisk] nor during the initial search incident to arrest.” 6
Abdi counters that the state did not meet its burden to present “any evidence regarding how
and when law enforcement obtained” the drug evidence. Abdi maintains that the record
“only establishes” that she “was searched, arrested, and that law enforcement found—at
some unknown time and location—controlled substances on her person.”
The record shows that law enforcement did not discover the drug evidence during
the pat-frisk. Instead, law enforcement discovered the drug evidence during a separate
search incident to Abdi’s arrest. This suggests that the evidence was temporally removed
from the unlawful search. Even so, the record does not show the circumstances of the
search incident to Abdi’s arrest. Thus, we conclude that absence of temporal proximity
slightly favors allowing the drug evidence.
Evaluating all four Warndahl factors, two favor allowing the drug evidence and two
favor suppression. Abdi’s preexisting arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance that
limited the taint of the unlawful pat-frisk. And law enforcement did not discover the drug

6 The state asserts that law enforcement discovered the drug evidence “when Abdi was in
a squad car” on the way to jail and told officers that “she had contraband.” To support this
argument, the state cites the criminal complaint. This is not evidence. See State v. Pierce,
792 N.W.2d 83, 89 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that “a criminal complaint is an assertion,
not evidence”). Because the record does not support the state’s assertions, we decline to
consider them in our analysis.
24
evidence during the pat-frisk but during a subsequent search incident to arrest, suggesting
that the evidence was somewhat attenuated from the pat-frisk. But caselaw establishes that
law enforcement engaged in flagrant and purposeful misconduct by pat-frisking Abdi
without reasonable suspicion that she was armed, dangerous, or committing a crime. And
law enforcement likely would not have discovered the drug evidence without the unlawful
police conduct. On balance, we conclude these last two factors tip the scales and favor
suppressing the drug evidence.
Thus, the district court did not err in granting Abdi’s motion to suppress the
evidence and to dismiss the drug and false-name charges.
Affirmed.