Dustin A. Grzesik, et al v. City of Pine Springs

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2093

Dustin A. Grzesik, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

City of Pine Springs,
Respondent.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-23-69

Chad D. Lemmons, Rebecca Duren, Kelly and Lemmons, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellants)

Kevin S. Sandstrom, Eckberg Lammers, P.C., Oakdale, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Segal ,
Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A couple bought a residential parcel in one city (Grant) on the border of another city
(Pine Springs), with two access drives, one terminating in Grant and the other terminating

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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in Pine Springs. The City of Pine Springs ordered th e couple to cease accessing its road,
relying on a Pine Springs ordinance, and erected a barrier on the road preventing vehicular
access. The couple unsuccessfully petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus
ordering Pine Springs to remove the barrier. Because the district court correctly determined
that the Pine Springs Zoning Code prohibits access from the couple’s residence to the city’s
public road, we affirm.
FACTS
Dustin Grzesik and his wife, Joanne Sum -Ping (the Grzesiks), purchased a
residential parcel in 2020 in the City of Grant near the border that separates Grant and the
City of Pine Springs. The parcel has two drives, one accessing Ideal Avenue in Grant and
the other running across other private property and accessing the 64th Street cul-de-sac in
Pine Springs. The City of Pine Springs’ authority to prohibit vehicular use of the 64th Street
access point is the focus of this dispute.
The Grzesiks’ drive reaches the 64th Street access point by crossing Outlot C, a n
undeveloped parcel in Pine Springs that the Grzesiks do not own. Outlot C is part of the
Winmar Estates subdivision, and it is owned by several Winmar Estates residents. The
previous owners of the Grzesik property occasionally but infrequently entered or exited it
through the 64th Street access point. But the Grzesiks began using it frequently, prompting
complaints by neighbors. The Pine Springs City Council discussed the controversy in
meetings during which some members raised safety concerns.
Pine Springs wrote the Grzesiks in 2021, advising them that accessing their property
by the 64th Street access point violated the city’s zoning ordinances. Those ordinances

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prohibited the creation of access drives without a permit from the city engineer, and they
also prohibited public-road access to residential dwellings using private-property
easements. The city ordered the Grzesiks to cease vehicular access to 64th Street. The
Grzesiks refused to comply. The city then erected a barrier blocking the contested access
point.
The Grzesiks petitioned the district court in January 2023 for a writ of mandamus
ordering the city to remove the barrier. They contend ed that they held a prescriptive
easement in the access drive. The district court denied the petition after a 2025 trial.
The trial included documentary and testimonial evidence. Susan Schultz, the wife
of the late prior owner Paul Schultz, testified that her husband had purchased the property
sometime in the 1970s and that they lived there together from 1987 until 2020, when they
sold it to the Grzesiks. She testified that they used both access drives. She said that t he
Ideal Avenue drive was more difficult because it was steep and particularly troublesome
during periods of inclement weather involving heavy rain or snow. But she acknowledged
her signature on the U.S. mail receipt of a 1987 letter from the city ordering the Schultzes
to cease use of the 64th Street access.
Grzesik testified that he and his wife began using the 64th Street access daily shortly
after moving onto the property. He echoed the Schultz testimony about the difficulty of
using the Ideal Avenue drive by comparison to the 64th Street drive, especially during
inclement weather.
The former mayor of Pine Springs testified that before 1978 the development now
known as the Winmar Estates subdivision consisted of “open fields and lands.” He testified

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that the city’s zoning ordinances, including those at issue in this dispute, were adopted in
1973 and remain unaltered. And he testified that the city never issued the prior owners a
permit for the 64th Street access . Another city council member tasked with digitizing the
city’s ordinances testified corroboratively that the ordinances have remained unchanged.
The Pine Springs city planning consultant testified that the city’s zoning code
derived from the Washington County model zoning ordinances and that it was common for
cities to regulate driveway access points. He gave multiple reasons for the restrictions
generally and particularly regarding access over private -property easements, including
safety concerns and aesthetics. He also testified that the Winmar Estates subdivision
likewise required permits from the city for access drives and also did not allow driveways
over outlots.
The district court concluded that the Grzesiks’ use of the 64th Street access violated
the Pine Springs Zoning Code, specifically sections 423.02 and 423.03, respectively
prohibiting unpermitted driveway access and access to residential dwellings by private
easement. It found that the city enacted the ordinances before any use of the 64th Street
access from the Grzesik parcel and that the city’s enforcement was not arbitrary or
capricious. The district court also observed that the Winmar Estates covenants prohibited
private driveways over Outlot C. It did not address the Grzesiks’ assertion that they held a
prescriptive easement over Outlot C to reach 64th Street.
The Grzesiks appeal.

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DECISION
The Grzesiks offer several theories supporting their appeal. They contend first that
the district court erred by failing to resolve their prescriptive -easement claim . They
maintain too that the controlling zoning ordinances are either not enforceable against them
or otherwise defective. And they assert that the city’s action was arbitrary and capricious.
None of their arguments is convincing.
I
Whether the Grzesiks hold a prescriptive easement in the driveway over Outlot C to
the connection to 64th Street is both beyond the scope of their mandamus petition and
irrelevant to its disposition. The petition asks specifically that “ the Court issue a Writ of
Mandamus . . . compelling the City of Pine Springs to remove all barriers which interfere
with the Petitioner’s access to 64th Street North.” And the prescriptive-easement issue is
irrelevant to the petition’s disposition because the question of whether the Grzesiks have
the legal right to bar the City of Pine Springs from barricading the driveway from accessing
64th Street does not depend on the separate issue of whether they have the legal right to
traverse the driveway from their property to the 64th Street access point—their alleged
private-roadway easement over Outlot C. A district court is not required “ to expressly
acknowledge and address every argument made.” St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Carter , 913
N.W.2d 678, 686 (Minn. 2018) . The district court ruled that the Grzesiks ’ use was
prohibited under sections 423.02 and 423.03 of the Pine Springs Zoning Code. Section
423.02 prohibits unpermitted driveway access to city roads , and section 423.03 provides
that “[a]ccess to any residential dwelling via private easement shall be prohibited.” Pine

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Springs, Minn., Zoning Code §§ 423.02–.03 (2025). Both because the question of whether
the Grzesiks hold a prescriptive easement over Outlot C is beyond the scope of their
mandamus petition and because the question is irrelevant to the disposition of the petition,
the district court did not err by not addressing whether they hold the alleged easement.
II
The district court correctly concluded that the Grzesiks’ access to their property by
the driveway to 64th Street was prohibited by zoning ordinance. We review the district
court’s application of the law de novo. Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781 N.W.2d 578, 581
(Minn. 2010). We see no error in the district court’s application of the Pine Springs Zoning
Code to the circumstances here, and the Grzesiks do not identify any. By its plain terms,
the ordinance clearly prohibits the Grzesiks’ access: “ Access to any residential dwelling
via private easement shall be prohibited.” Pine Springs, Minn., Zoning Code § 423.03. The
Grzesiks’ parcel undisputedly includes a residential dwelling, and its connection to 64th
Street is at the end of the alleged private easement over Outlot C. Under the ordinance, the
access at issue therefore “shall be prohibited.” The district court’s corresponding legal
conclusion is unassailable.
III
The Grzesiks argue that the city’s act of preventing them from accessing 64th Street
deprived them of a different property right, specifically, the right of reasonably convenient
access to a public street that abuts their property. We infer that they essentially argue that
the city may not “ achieve by zoning ordinance that which can be done only by eminent
domain,” SLS P’ship v. City of Apple Valley, 511 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Minn. 1994), because

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a municipality’s right-of-access infringement can constitute a taking. Johnson v. City of
Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Minn. 1978). The implied argument fails.
The argument fails because the Grzesiks hold no right of access to 64th Street. It is
true that “property owners have a right of reasonably convenient and suitable access to a
public street or highway which abuts their property.” Id. at 605 (quotation omitted). But in
a takings action, “ [o]wners of property that does not abut the roadway have no claim to
damages merely because the roadway design leaves them with an inconvenient or
circuitous transportation route.” Oliver v. State by Comm’r of Transp., 760 N.W.2d 912,
916 (Minn. App. 2009) (emphasis added), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 29, 2009) and appeal
dismissed (Minn. Nov. 16, 2009) . The Grzesiks hold no fee interest in the property that
abuts 64th Street where their alleged easement terminates. And they therefore cannot assert
the right described in Johnson as “property owners” seeking access to 64th Street.
We are not persuaded against this conclusion by the Grzesiks’ attempt to
recharacterize themselves as abutting property owners by asserting that their alleged
prescriptive easement over Outlot C makes them an “owner” of abutting property entitling
them to the right of access based on abutment to the street. The Grzesiks rely on Oliver for
this notion, but the reliance is misplaced. We specifically declined to address that argument
in Oliver, resolving the dispute on other grounds. Id. Aside from relying on Oliver, the
Grzesiks offer no rationale for us to consider whether holding a mere easement to traverse
a private lot affords the dominant estate the right of access to a public road that abuts the
servient estate. There being only the assertion, but no reasoned or legally sup ported

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argument, as to why the law extends in the manner the Grzesiks promote, we consider the
assertion no further.
We add that the Grzesiks’ property does have access to Ideal Avenue, the public
roadway that abuts their parcel. After rejecting the Grzesiks’ claim of right of access to
64th Street, the district court found that their parcel’s access to Ideal Avenue is reasonably
convenient:
Petitioners have no legal right to access 64th Street as the Street
does not abut their Property. Ideal is the official street address
of the Property because it is the public roadway that the
Property abuts and fronts upon. Furthermore, Petitioners
provided no evidence that the Ideal access was impassible at
any time due to flooding and/or adverse weather conditions.
Petitioners have not been “denied a right of access” by the City.
No legal “right” exists regarding a secondary driveway created
and maintained in contravention of the City Zoning Code.

The existence of reasonably convenient access to an abutting roadway is a question of fact.
Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at 607. We have no basis to revisit that fact finding, but we observe
that reasonable access is not considered infringed upon by inconvenience unless the
inconvenience renders access “nearly impossible.” County of Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498
N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 1993). That the Grzesiks’
access to Ideal Avenue is at most d ifficult renders any claim to the lack of convenient
access unconvincing on appeal.
The Grzesiks allude to other, facially unpersuasive a rguments. They charge that
Pine Springs “ has no authority to interfere with [their] property right of access to 64th
Street . . . . ” Here they seem to argue that they had acquired a prescriptive easement not
only to the driveway over Outlot C but also to use the 64th Street access point adverse to

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the city itself. But the argument falls to the well-settled premise that prescriptive easements
cannot be acquired on public land. See Minn. Stat. § 541.01 (2024); Fischer v. City of Sauk
Rapids, 325 N.W.2d 816, 818–19 (Minn. 1982) (applying the statutory limitation on
adverse possession of public lands in Minnesota to municipalities); Heuer v. C ounty of
Aitkin, 645 N.W.2d 753, 757–58 (Minn. App. 2002) (applying the same statutory limitation
to prescriptive easements). The Grzesiks have no easement of use of the contested access
point.
Nor is the city estopped from enforcing its zoning code by virtue of its failure to
aggressively enforce it sooner against either the Grzesiks or the prior owners. A plaintiff
asserting estoppel against the government to prevent its enforcing of its zoning code must
show, among other things , “some degree of malfeasance” beyond “simple inadvertence,
mistake, or imperfect conduct.” City of N. Oaks v. Sarpal, 797 N.W.2d 18, 25 (Minn. 2011)
(quotation omitted). A city may not be estopped from enforcing an ordinance even if the
result is “harsh” and “ the property owner relied to his detriment on prior city action.”
Mohler v. City of St. Louis Park , 643 N.W.2d 623, 638 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 2002). The district court did not find the city’s tepid
enforcement (or nonenforcement) of the restriction to have resulted from any malfeasance,
and we see no record evidence supporting such a finding.
We also reject the Grzesiks’ contention that the district court erred in concluding
that “the driveway claimed by the Petitioners cannot legally exist because it violates the
[Winmar Estates] declaration of protective covenants .” The contention mischaracterizes
the district court’s ruling. The district court did not base its decision on the Winmar Estates’

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covenants. The rationale the district court provides for its decision in its conclusions of law
is the city’s authority to enforce its zoning code.
IV
The Grzesiks question the city’s authority to either enforce or implement the zoning
ordinances applied here—the ordinance that requires a Pine Springs permit for access onto
a city road (Pine Springs, Minn., Zoning Code § 423.02) and the ordinance we have
discussed, which prohibits “[a]ccess to any residential dwelling via private easement” (Pine
Springs, Minn., Zoning Code § 423.03). The Grzesiks contend that Pine Springs could not
regulate their access because their parcel sits in the City of Grant and “[o] nly the City of
Grant can determine how many driveways the Petitioners have the right to use in accessing
their home. ” They add that “[t]he City of Pine Springs has no authority to prohibit a
residential dwelling located in the City of Grant from using a private easement as means
of access.” These arguments do not contest a city’s authority to regulate land use within its
borders. And that authority is what applies here, as the challenged Pine Springs ordinances
regulate only access points, like the 64th Street access point at the end of the driveway on
Outlot C, that are undisputedly within the jurisdiction of Pine Springs.
The Grzesiks also maintain more broadly that the city lacked statutory authority to
enact any zoning ordinance that regulates driveway access to a public street. The operative
statute provides otherwise:
For the purpose of promoting the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare, a municipality may by ordinance
regulate on the earth ’s surface, in the air space above the
surface, and in subsurface areas, the location, height, width,
bulk, type of foundation, number of stories, size of buildings

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and other structures, the percentage of lot which may be
occupied, the size of yards and other open spaces, the density
and distribution of population, the uses of buildings and
structures for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public
activities, or o ther purposes, and the uses of land for trade,
industry, residence, recreation, agriculture, forestry, soil
conservation, water supply conservation, conservation of
shorelands . . . flood control or other purposes, and may
establish standards and procedures regulating such uses.
Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 1 (2024). We review questions of statutory interpretation de
novo. Johnson v. Cook County, 786 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Minn. 2010). The statute’s breadth
is obvious. The authority to regulate driveway access is contemplated in the expansive
statutory language allowing municipal regulation on “the uses of land for . . . residence,
recreation . . . or other purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 1. The Grzesiks’ statutory-
authority argument fails.
The Grzesiks also assert that state traffic law preempts the city’s zoning ordinance,
citing State v. Kuhlman, which provides that “s tate law preempts the field of traffic law
except for that which is expressly permitted by state statute.” 729 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Minn.
2007). We doubt that the city’s challenged ordinance regulating access points onto public
roads from nonabutting private property is a “traffic law” preempted by statute as discussed
in Kuhlman. See id.; Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at 607–08 (discussing public-roadway access
restrictions as a power exercised by local authority). But we need not address the argument
on the merits. Arguments raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief are not
properly before us. State v. Stockwell, 770 N.W.2d 533, 541 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied
(Minn. Oct. 28, 2009) . The Grzesiks first mention preemption in their reply brief. We
consider the argument no further.

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V
The Grzesiks contend too that the city’s ordinance and its enforcement action are
arbitrary and capricious. They base th is contention only on the property -right arguments
already discussed. We independently review whether a zoning decision was reasonable or
instead arbitrary and capricious without deference to the district court. Mendota Golf, LLP
v. City of Mendota Heights , 708 N.W.2d 162, 179– 80 (Minn. 2006). We narrowly review
the city’s zoning decision under a rational-basis standard, and we will uphold the decision
“unless the party challenging that decision establishes that the decision is unsupported by
any rational basis related to promoting the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”
Id. at 180 (quotation omitted). The city’s ordinance and its enforcement decision survive
under this standard. The Grzesiks articulate no challenge to the decision that would render
it “unsupported by any rational basis.” Id. Pine Springs maintains that the ordinance serves
its objective to foster safety, coordinate land use, and prevent neighborhood conflicts , and
its enforcement action was motivated at least partly by public-safety concerns. It elaborated
through counsel at oral argument, offering by example that the ordinance tends to avert
residential legal disputes between parcel owners about alleged prescriptive driveway
easements over private property. And caselaw informs us that municipalities frequently
become involved in, and necessarily incur litigation and management costs arising from,
these sorts of private -easement disputes. The city’s ordinance and its enforcement action
easily pass muster under our rational-basis review.
Affirmed.