In the Matter of: Jill Marie Duchscherer On Behalf of Minor Child(ren) v. Jonathan Alexander Doringcott

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2119

In the Matter of:

Jill Marie Duchscherer On Behalf of Minor Child(ren), petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Jonathan Alexander Doringcott,
Appellant.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-DA-FA-25-4066

Jonathan J. Fogel, Fogel Family Law, PA, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jonathan Alexander Doringcott, Spanish Fork, Utah (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Beane, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy, M., Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s grant of an order for protection (OFP), appellant
Jonathan Alexander Doringcott (father) argues that the district court relied upon
inadmissible hearsay and, when that evidence is removed, the record is insufficient to
support the granting of the OFP. We affirm.

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FACTS
Father and respondent Jill Marie Duchscherer (mother) were previously in a
relationship and have a ten-year-old son. Mother and father shared joint legal custody of
the child while mother maintained sole physical custody.
Following child’s visit with father in Utah, the child’s speech impediment—which
had been resolved after successful therapy—abruptly and severely returned. Child told his
mother that he was terrified of father, claiming that father hit him. Child also alleged that
father forced him to endure “pain training,” where father threw balls or toys at child while
saying, “You deserve to feel the pain I’m feeling.”
Following this conversation, mother had child resume counseling. During these
sessions, child disclosed to his therapist that father struck him on multiple occasions. Child
also expressed fear and anxiety at the prospect of seeing his father over the summer.
Prompted by these disclosures, the therapist filed a report of suspected child abuse and
worked with child to finalize a safety plan, including identifying safe individuals, locations,
and coping strategies in the event child visited father in Utah over the summer.
Mother petitioned for an OFP. The district court issued an emergency ex parte OFP
and granted mother temporary sole legal and physical custody. At the subsequent hearing,
father denied the allegations. The district court then scheduled an evidentiary hearing and
appointed a guardian ad litem to investigate the allegations.
The guardian ad litem’s short investigation included a review of various documents
and interviews with father, mother, child, a Hennepin County Child Protective Services
investigator, and the therapist. After completing the investigation, the guardian ad litem

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issued a report that determined there was no evidence the child was in an unsafe
environment with father and recommended resolving the issues in family therapy. The
guardian ad litem acknowledged the allegations of abuse but simultaneously noted father’s
allegation that therapist and mother were friends. The guardian ad litem expressed concern
that the therapist made no mention of the child’s diagnosed Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD) or his medication regimen.
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court heard testimony from mother, father,
and father’s sister. The guardian ad litem testified consistent with the investigation report
but discounted the report’s note about child’s therapist and mother being friends. The
child’s therapist testified that she had previously treated child and resumed counseling after
child’s visit with father in Utah. The therapist explained that she was aware of the child’s
ADHD diagnosis but did not mention it in the interview with the guardian ad litem because
she was not currently treating the child’s ADHD. The therapist testified that she provided
her clinical notes— which were admitted into evidence— to the guardian ad litem during
the investigation, which included information about the child’s diagnosis, medication, and
allegations of abuse. The therapist testified about statements child made during therapy as
well as the therapist’s own observations of child during the sessions.
Following the hearing, the district court issued the OFP. The court found that the
therapist was a highly credible third -party witness, noting that she provided the most
compelling testimony. Relying heavily on the therapist’s testimony, the district court
found that it was more likely than not that father had committed domestic abuse.
Father appeals.

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DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s issuance of the OFP, which we review for an
abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018). We
view the record “in the light most favorable to the district court’ s findings, and we will
reverse those findings only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.” Pechovnik v. Pechovnik , 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009)
(quotation omitted). We will not reconcile conflicting evidence or decide issues of witness
credibility. Aljubailah ex rel. A. M. J. v. James, 903 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. App. 2017).
I. The district court did not rely upon inadmissible hearsay.

Father argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting and relying upon
inadmissible hearsay evidence. We disagree.
The Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply to domestic-abuse hearings. Olson ex rel.
A.C.O. v. Olson, 892 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. App. 2017). Hearsay evidence is
inadmissible unless it meets an exception under the rules of evidence or “by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court or by the Legislature.” Minn. R. Evid. 802. “‘Hearsay’
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c).
Father challenges the admission of the therapist’s entire testimony. But some of the
therapist’s testimony recounted her own observations. For example, the therapist testified
about the child’s stutter returning when he talked about the possibility of seeing his dad
again in the summer. Such testimony is not hearsay.

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Father is correct, however, that much of the evidence admitted through the
therapist’s testimony—including the therapist’s clinical notes and her testimony about
statements child made during therapy —constituted hearsay. The district court correctly
identified the evidence as hearsay. The district court then admitted the evidence under the
medical-diagnosis and business-record exceptions. See Minn. R. Evid. 803(4), (6). Father
argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence under the hearsay
exceptions. See Holt v. State, 772 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Minn. 2009) (reviewing district
court’s determination whether a statement met the foundational requirements of a hearsay
exception for an abuse of discretion). We are not persuaded.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court admitting, under the
medical-diagnosis exception, the therapist’s testimony regarding statements that child
made during therapy. See Minn. R. Evid. 803(4). Mother testified that she had child
resume therapy to help child process the stressors related to his relationship with father
after child’s visit in Utah. After a few sessions, the therapist formed a treatment plan that
included developing coping strategies and identifying safe individuals and locations.
Because the therapy was for medical treatment purposes, the therapist’s testimony about
statements that child made during therapy falls squarely within rule 803(4).
State v. Lonergan, 505 N.W.2d 349, 355 (Minn. App. 1993) (affirming admission, under
medical-diagnosis exception, of therapist testimony recounting statements made during
therapy), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993).
We likewise discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s admission of the
clinic notes under the business-record exception. See Minn. R. Evid. 803(6). The notes

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meet the rule’s requirements as having been prepared contemporaneously with the therapy
sessions—as is standard practice for mental health professionals —and kept in the normal
course of business. Id. Such evidence falls squarely within rule 803(6). See , e.g., In re
Welfare of R.T., 364 N.W.2d 884, 886 (Minn. App. 1985) (affirming admission of social
worker and psychologist reports under business-record exception).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting, and relying upon, the
therapist’s testimony and the therapist’s clinic notes.
II. The evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s grant of the OFP.

Father argues that—after the therapist’s testimony and clinic notes are removed
from the record —the evidence does not support the district court’s decision to grant the
OFP. But we affirmed the district court’s admission of the therapist’s testimony and clinic
notes; thus, this evidence must be included in our analysis.
Father contends that the district court improperly credited the therapist’s testimony
that recounted unverified statements made by child over the guardian ad litem’s evidence
detailing the investigation and recommendation that the matter be resolved through family
therapy. But we do not reconcile conflicting evidence, reweigh evidence, or decide
whether a witness’s testimony was credible. Aljubailah, 903 N.W.2d at 643. We are also
not persuaded by father’s argument about the lack of physical evidence. See Pechovnik,
765 N.W.2d at 99-100 (affirming OFP supported only by testimonial evidence). With the
therapist’s testimony in the record—and viewing that record “in the light most favorable
to the district court’s findings,” we affirm the grant of the OFP. Id. at 99.
Affirmed.