In Re the Custody of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2130

In Re the Custody of:

Djilorian D. Baker, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Diona Marie Hargrett,
Respondent.

Filed July 27, 2026
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-FA-16-4021

Thomas R. Braun, Restovich Braun & Associates, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kenneth R. White, Law Office of Kenneth R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Rasmusson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
The father of a four-year-old child filed a motion to modify a prior order in which
the district court had denied him parenting time. At a hearing on the motion, the district
court took the matter under advisement but left the evidentiary record open for 15 days
2
because the child’s mother wished to introduce a letter from the child’s therapist, which
was expected to include the therapist’s recommendation concerning whether parenting
time would be beneficial to the child. After the mother filed the letter, the district court
denied the father’s motion. We conclude that the district court did not err by admitting and
relying on the therapist’s letter and did not err in its consideration of the relevant best-
interests factors. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
D’Jilorian Baker1 and Diona Marie Hargrett are the parents of a child born in
October 2013. In August 2017, the district court awarded the parties joint legal custody,
joint physical custody, and equal amounts of parenting time.
In 2018, Hargrett petitioned the district court, on behalf of the child, for an order for
protection (OFP) against Baker. She alleged that Baker had sexually abused the child. In
May 2018, t he district court in that case granted the petition and issued an OFP that
prohibited Baker, for a period of six months, from having any contact with the child, except
“as deemed appropriate by” the county’s social-services department, a therapist, or the
district court. The district court awarded Hargrett temporary sole legal custody and
temporary sole physical custody of the child and awarded Baker parenting time “as deemed

1The caption of this opinion matches the caption used in the district court, as
required by the rules of appellate procedure. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01. But both
captions incorrectly identify appellant as “Djilorian D. Baker.” In his own briefs,
appellant’s first name is spelled “D’Jilorian.” Accordingly, we use that spelling in the body
of this opinion.
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appropriate by Social Services, with the input of [the child’s therapist], as laid out in an
agreed upon safety plan.”
Approximately one week later, Hargrett filed a motion to modify custody. She
requested permanent sole legal custody and permanent sole physical custody of the child.
Approximately one month after Hargrett’s motion, Baker filed his own motion to modify
custody, requesting permanent sole legal custody and permanent sole physical custody. In
August 2018, the district court filed an order stating that Hargrett had alleged a prima facie
case of endangerment sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing and that, until that
hearing, Hargrett would continue to have temporary sole legal custody and temporary sole
physical custody. See Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) (2024).
In March 2022, the district court issued a n order stating that Baker had not
established a prima facie case of endangerment, that no evidentiary hearing would be held
on his motion, and that his motion was denied. Later that month, the district court held an
evidentiary hearing on Hargrett’s motion. In October 2022, the district court filed a 29-
page order in which it granted Hargrett’s motion, awarded her permanent sole legal custody
and permanent sole physical custody, and denied Baker any parenting time. On Baker’s
appeal, this court affirmed. See Baker v. Hargrett, No. A22-1735, 2023 WL 8369956, at
*3 (Minn. App. Dec. 4, 2023).
In June 2025, Baker filed a motion to modify parenting time. He requested one hour
of supervised parenting time each week. Hargrett did not file a written response to the
motion. In July 2025, the district court held a motion hearing, at which Hargrett appeared
on a self-represented basis. She informed the district court that she wished to submit a
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letter from the child’s therapist and had requested a letter but had not yet received it because
of the therapist’s schedule. The district court responded by stating that it either could
continue the hearing or could hear arguments and keep the record open to allow Hargrett
to submit a letter from the therapist. Baker’s attorney argued that Hargrett was “in default”
because she had not filed a timely written response to his motion, and he urged the district
court to not allow any submissions by her. The district court decided to keep the record
open for 15 days, stating “I want an update from the therapist.”
Hargrett filed the letter with the district court three days later. The therapist stated
that the child “does not wish to have a relationship with [Baker] at this time” and
recommended that the child not be “required to have a relationship with [Baker] at this
time.” The therapist alternatively recommended that, if the district court were to grant
parenting time, it should be supervised.
In October 2025, the district court denied Baker’s motion to modify parenting time.
In its findings of fact, the district court recited evidence that had been introduced at the
March 2022 evidentiary hearing and discussed in the district court’s October 2022 order.
In its conclusions of law, the district court reasoned that Baker’s request for supervised
parenting time “is not in the best interest of the child” because “even the minimal
supervised parenting time being requested” would adversely affect “the child’s physical or
emotional health or impair the child’ s emotional development.” The district court also
reasoned that Baker “does not acknowledge that he sexually abused the child and has not
undertaken any rehabilitative actions to support his ability to safely care for the child.” In
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addition, the district court noted that the child’s therapist “does not recommend the child
be required to have a relationship with her father at this time.” Baker appeals.
DECISION
Baker argues that, for two reasons, the district court erred by denying his motion to
modify parenting time.
I. Therapist’s Letter
Baker first argues that the district court erred by admitting and relying on the
therapist’s letter on the ground that it is not sworn and, thus, is inadmissible.
In response, Hargrett argues that Baker’s argument has been forfeited because he
did not object on this basis in the district court. Hargrett is correct. Baker was aware at
the June 2025 hearing that Hargrett would file a letter written by the child’s therapist, but
he did not object at that time to the unsworn nature of the letter. If he had done so, the
district court might have continued the hearing. Similarly, Baker did not object to the
unsworn nature of the letter after it was filed. If he had done so, the district court could
have considered Baker’s objection and any counter-arguments and determined whether the
letter is admissible. But in the absence of an objection, the district court was not given an
opportunity to consider the issue that Baker raises for the first time on appeal.
Consequently, Baker’s first argument is forfeited. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,
582 (Minn. 1988).
In his reply brief, Baker contends that he did object to the introduction of the letter.
He refers to his argument in the district court that Hargrett was “in default” because she
had not filed a written response to his motion and, for that reason, should not be allowed
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to offer any evidence. See Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 303.03(a)(3), (a)(3)(ii) (requiring non -
moving party to file written response, including “[r]elevant affidavits and exhibits,” seven
days before hearing). In the district court, Baker relied on a rule that provides, “If
responsive documents are not properly served and filed, the court may deem the initial
motion unopposed and may issue an order without hearing. ” Minn. Gen. R.
Prac. 303.03(b). The district court overruled Baker’s objection by allowing Hargrett to
submit a letter after the hearing. On appeal, Baker does not challenge that decision, perhaps
because, as indicated by the word “may,” a district court has discretion to excuse a party’s
non-compliance with rule 303.03. See Benassi v. Back & Neck Pain Clinic, Inc., 629
N.W.2d 475, 483 (Minn. App. 2001) (reasoning that district court did not abuse its
discretion by ruling on respondent’s motion “despite appellant’s late filings”), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 11, 2001). Instead, Baker challenges the admissibility of the therapist’s letter
on a different legal basis: that it is unsworn. But that argument required a different
objection in the district court. If Baker had wanted the district court to exclude the
therapist’s letter on the ground that it is unsworn, he was required to specifically object on
that basis. See Minn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (providing that party must “stat[e] the specific
ground of objection”).
Thus, the district court did not err by admitting and relying on the letter written by
the child’s therapist.
II. Best Interests
Baker also argues that the district court erred by denying his motion without an
adequate analysis of the child’s best interests. He asks this court to reverse and remand for
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further findings and analysis of all best-interests factors. As a general matter, this court
applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s ruling on a motion to
modify parenting time. Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn. App. 2017). A
district court may abuse its discretion by, among other things, “ misapplying the law.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
The applicable statute provides, in relevant part, “If modification would serve the
best interests of the child, the court shall modify the decision-making provisions of a
parenting plan or an order granting or denying parenting time . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 5(b) (2024). Baker refers to the 12 best-interests factors in Minnesota Statutes
section 518.17, subdivision 1(a) (2024), and appears to argue that the district court was
required to analyze each of those 12 factors. In response, Hargrett contends that the district
court was required to consider only the relevant best-interests factors.
Hargrett is correct that a district court need not consider and expressly analyze every
best-interests factor in section 518.17, subdivision 1(a), when ruling on a motion to modify
parenting time. Rather, a district court must consider the best-interests factors in section
518.17, subdivision 1(a), only to the extent that they are relevant. See Christensen v.
Healey, 913 N.W.2d 437, 440-41 (Minn. 2018) (stating that, in motion filed under section
518.175, subdivision 5(b), “best-interests-of-the-child standard requires consideration of
factors such as” two of twelve factors in section 518.17, subdivision 1(a) (emphasis
added)). This interpretation of Christensen is supported by the supreme court’s opinion in
Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 2018). The Hansen case concerned a motion
under a different subdivision of section 518.175, which allows a modification of parenting
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time for the purpose of “provid[ing] child care while the other parent is working.” Id. at
597; see also Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8 (2024). The supreme court reasoned in Hansen
that “nothing in the text of Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8, requires the district court to
make specific and detailed findings on the best-interest factors” in section 518.17,
subdivision 1(a), and that “the Legislature did not intend to require detailed findings on
each and every best-interests factor when a court decides a request to modify parenting
time” under subdivision 8. Id. at 598. The supreme court concluded that a district court is
required merely “to consider only the relevant best- interest factors.” Id. at 597, 599.
Likewise, nothing in subdivision 5(b) of section 518.175 requires a district court to make
detailed findings on each and every one of the 12 best-interests factors in section 518.17,
subdivision 1(a), when ruling on a motion to modify parenting time. Accordingly, we
interpret section 518.175, subdivision 5(b), to require a district court to consider only the
relevant best-interests factors.
Our review of the October 2025 order reveals that the district court considered the
relevant best-interests factors. The district court specifically found that Baker’s requested
parenting time “is not in the best interest of the child.” In making that finding, the district
court stated that supervised parenting time would adversely affect “the child’s physical or
emotional health or impair the child ’s emotional development.” That statement reflects
consideration of the first statutory factor, “a child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual,
and other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the child’s needs and
development,” as well as the second statutory factor, “any special medical, mental health,
developmental disability, or educational needs that the child may have that may require
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special parenting arrangements or access to recommended services.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1), (2). The district court also stated that Baker “does not
acknowledge that he sexually abused the child and has not undertaken any rehabilitative
actions to support his ability to safely care for the child.” Th at statement reflects
consideration of the fourth statutory factor, “whether domestic abuse . . . has occurred in
the parents’ or either parent’s household or relationship; the nature and context of the
domestic abuse; and the implications of the domestic abuse for parenting and for the child’s
safety, well- being, and developmental needs .” See id., subd. 1(a)(4). In addition, the
district court stated that the child’s therapist did not recommend giving Baker a right to
parenting time, based in part on the child’s wishes. That statement reflects consideration
of the above- mentioned factors as well as the third statutory factor, “the reasonable
preference of the child.” See id., subd. 1(a)(1)-(4).
Thus, the district court adequately analyzed the child’s best interests by considering
the relevant best-interests factors.
Affirmed.