State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2132

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nicholas Alphonzo Harris,
Appellant.

Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-6922

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max B. Kittel, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the revocation of his probation, arguing that the district court
abused its discretion in finding that appellant violated a condition of his probation because
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it made clearly erroneous factual findings based on hearsay and on evidence that had been
suppressed in a separate case. Because we see no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
In April 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Nicholas Alphonzo
Harris with third -degree burglary and possession of burglary tools. In October 2 021,
appellant, whose criminal-history score was 12, pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary in
exchange for a 60 -month career -offender stayed prison sentence and five years of
probation. Probation-violation reports were filed in May 2022, July 2023, and October
2023.
On January 11, 2025, T.G., a manager of the Billy Sushi restaurant, found that the
restaurant’s safe had been stolen. He called the restaurant’s owner (the owner), and an
online report of the theft was sent to the police. On January 16, 2025, appellant received a
summons for a probation-violation hearing. A violation report was filed on the break-in at
Billy Sushi alleging that appellant failed to remain law abiding by entering a building
without consent and with intent to steal or commit a felony or gross misdemeanor. After a
hearing on the violation, appellant was charged with one count of third -degree burglary
(the new burglary) . A probation-violation order for appellant’s detention was filed on
February 19, 2025.
Appellant moved to suppress evidence obtained via the search warrants that had
been executed in the investigation of the new burglary. His trial on the new burglary was
scheduled for July 8, 2025, but on the day of trial, the state dismissed the complaint without
prejudice because the owner, a key witness for the state, was unavailable and the district
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court suppressed certain video evidence based on its determination that a search warrant
did not establish the requisite nexus between the burglary at Bil ly Sushi and appellant’s
residence. On July 16, 2025, appellant asserted a speedy seven-day demand for resolution
of the probation violation and agreed to a hearing on July 29, 2025. At the hearing, the
district court admitted hearsay testimony from Officer F. and received 23 exhibits. On
August 1, 2025, the state filed a brief arguing that the district court should consider the
video evidence that the court had suppressed in the new burglary case . At a contested -
violation hearing on August 5, 2025, the district court admitted the evidence that had been
suppressed.
On September 2 2, 2025, a fter the parties had filed memoranda on the issue of
whether the evidence was sufficient to find a probation violation for failure to remain law-
abiding, the district court concluded that the state had proved there w as a probation
violation. The district court revoked appellant’s probation, reduced appellant’s sentence
to 40 months in prison, and executed the sentence, with credit for 339 days.
Appellant challenges the probation revocation, arguing that the district court erred
in admitting (1) the hearsay evidence from Officer F. and (2) the video evidence that had
been suppressed in the new burglary case.
DECISION
District courts in probation -revocation matters have broad discretion, and the
decision to revoke will be reversed only for a clear abuse of that discretion. State v.
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005). This court gives great deference to
evidentiary rulings made during a probation-revocation hearing and will not reverse absent
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an abuse of that discretion. State v. Nowacki, 880 N.W.2d 396, 398-99 (Minn. App. 2016).
The clear-and-convincing evidence standard is met when the truth of the fact to be proven
is highly probable. State v. Hoskins, 943 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Minn. App. 2020).
1. Hearsay Evidence
The district court found:
There was good cause to allow Officer [F.] to provide
hearsay testimony regarding the victim’s report about the
burglary. The victim business owner was out of the country
for an extended time and thus unable to appear for the
probation violation hearing. A continuance was not viable
because [appellant] was (and is) being held in custody pending
resolution of the violation [, having demanded a speedy
revocation hearing]. Moreover, the testimony was limited to
the victim’s original report to police that his safe containing
roughly $20,000 had been stolen from his business and that he
had video surveillance to provide officers. The victim was not
an eyewitness to the crime and did not provide any statement
that directly identified or incriminated [appellant]. He reported
the crime to officers for the purpose of seeking help —not to
convict any particular person at trial —and his report has
inherent indicia of trustworthiness.
There was good cause to allow Officer [F.] to provide
hearsay testimony of other officers’ investigative efforts and
to lay the foundation for certain exhibits consisting of
materials gathered by other officers. According to the State,
the other officers involved were not available on short notice
for the evidentiary hearing. Officer [F.]’s testimony, for the
most part, consisted of presenting items of evidence that she
and other officers had gathered during the investigation, such
as bank records, surveillance videos, vehicle tracking data,
and telephone records. Officer [F.] gathered or was involved
in gathering much of this information herself, but in some
cases the material was gathered by another officer. This was
mostly foundational testimony that could have been provided
by the original officers. Officer [F.] was subject to cross
examination regarding all of the investigative efforts. The
[c]ourt found Officer [F.] credible. With the exception of
exhibits 40 -41 [maps purporting to show the location of
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appellant’s cell phone, which the [c]ourt did not consider
because they lacked foundation] there is sufficient evidence to
conclude the exhibits the State offered through her —which
consisted primarily of video evidence and records she or other
officers gathered following the burglary —are what they
purport to be.

Based on the evidence, the district court found that, on the morning of the burglary:
(1) appellant was in his residence wearing the same clothes as the suspect was wearing
during the burglary; (2) appellant drove his car to the Billy Sushi restaurant; (3) he went
inside the restaurant, then left, and returned with an accomplice; (4) the accomplice assisted
appellant in carrying a safe out of the restaurant; (5) the suspects arrived and left in
appellant’s car; (6) the car was less than one mile from the Billy Sushi restaurant at 8:46
a.m., 2.5 minutes after departing from the first trip to the restaurant; (7) two days after the
robbery, appellant deposited $5,000 in cash into a bank account ; and (8) the shoes of the
suspect in the surveillance video of the theft matched the shoes appellant was wearing when
arrested.
Appellant argues that “the district court abused its discretion and made clearly
erroneous findings in allowing significant and pervasive hearsay evidence,” but the
“erroneous findings” he claims do not relate to appellant, the crime, or the probation
violation. The findings were that: (1) the owner was still unavailable to testify at the second
contested hearing, (2) there is no record as to why other officers were unavailable, and (3)
there was “short notice” of the hearings.
Appellant relies on State v. Johnson, 679 N.W.2d 169, 17 4 (Minn. App. 2004) for
the proposition that “a hearsay statement must be necessary and reliable for it to be
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admissible without violating the accused’s right of confrontation .” Appellant argues that
“the State offered no proffer or testimony . . . as to why it was ‘necessary’ to have Officer
[F.] testify as opposed to [the owner , T.G.,] or any other police officer .” Appellant
therefore asserts that the “‘necessary’ requirement from Johnson makes [it] clear that at
least some information about why other witnesses could not testify must be present.”
But appellant misreads Johnson, which holds that “ when the defendant has had
ample opportunity to present evidence in a probation revocation proceeding, the rules of
evidence do not preclude hearsay evidence.” Id. After noting that “[o]ther states . . . have
concluded that hearsay evidence can be admitted in probation revocation hearings,”
Johnson cites four cases that reach that conclusion, then states that:
In line with these cases, . . . when the defendant has had ample
opportunity to present evidence in a probation revocation
proceeding, the rules of evidence do not preclude admission of
hearsay evidence such as a letter reporting that defendant
violated the terms of probation. Affording the defendant the
opportunity to present evidence ensures that the defendant can
expose potential flaws in the evidence. The reliability of the
hearsay evidence will be weighed against other evidence and
the risk of relyin g on untrustworthy hearsay evidence will be
greatly minimized.

Id. Thus, the issue is not the admissibility of the hearsay evidence; the issue is rather how
the hearsay evidence compares or contrasts with other evidence, and how much weight
should be given to it.
Moreover, as a practical matter, Officer F. was the only witness available on the
day the probation-revocation hearing had to be held. Appellant, who was in custody, had
invoked a speedy -hearing demand for his probation -violation hearing on July 16, 2025 .
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The hearing had to be scheduled within seven days under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd.
2(4)(b) (providing the seven -day limit for those in custody), and Minn. R. Crim P. 34.01
(providing that Saturdays, Sundays and holidays are excluded when computing a tim e
period of seven or fewer days). Appellant agreed to a July 29, 2025, hearing date to
accommodate his attorneys, and the state had only one witness, Officer F., the lead
investigator of the case, available on that date. The state admitted that, while there were
other witnesses, the matter had been set “in as speedy a manner as we could” with the one
witness who was available that afternoon. The district court fully explained why Officer
F. was presenting all the evidence.
2. Surveillance Videos
In the new burglary prosecution, appellant successfully argued that the two
surveillance videos taken from his residence on the day of the burglary were illegally
obtained because the warrant was deficient in not establishing a nexus between appellant’s
residence and the burglary, and the videos were suppressed.
To admit the videos in the probation -violation hearing, the district court relied on
State v. Martin , 595 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Minn. App. 1999) (concluding that, while the
controlled substance obtained during a police officer’s illegal search of a defendant was
not admissible for the prosecution of the offense of possessing the controlled substance,
that evidence was permissible at the probation revocation hearing, despite the exclusionary
rule), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 1999). “[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter police misconduct.” Martin, 595 N.W.2d at 218.
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[But t]he exclusionary rule may obstruct the probation system
in accomplishing its remedial purpose by (1) preventing the
court from considering relevant evidence in deciding whether
to revoke probation; (2) allowing [parolees] to escape the
consequences o f noncompliance; and (3) making courts
reluctant to place defendants on probation initially, in light of
the possibility that relevant evidence may be unavailable in a
probation revocation proceeding. Because the officer did not
know Martin’s probationary status, the marginal deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule is outweighed by these costs.

Id. at 219; see also State v. Smith, 652 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. App. 2002) (citing Martin
for the proposition that the exclusionary rule “should be used only when its deterrent value
outweighs its social costs”), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 29, 2003).
Appellant argues that Martin is distinguishable because, in that case, the police
officer who searched the defendant illegally did not know the defendant was on probation,
while Officer F. did know that appellant was on probation. But that distinction is irrelevant.
The officer in Martin illegally arrested the defendant for careless driving although he
should have issued a citation. Id. at 215-16. Thus, the cocaine found during the arrest was
suppressed under the exclusionary rule in the prosecution for possession of a controlled
substance, because there had been police misconduct in obtaining it, but it was admitted in
the probation-violation proceeding. Id. at 216. “The exclusionary rule ha[d] already been
applied in the criminal proceeding against Martin, and, presumably, excluding the cocaine
and dismissing the possession charge against Martin has had the intended deterrent effect
on police misconduct.” Id. at 219.
Here, the defect in the search warrant was the result of officers inadvertently
omitting from the search -warrant affidavit relevant information they already had that
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provided a nexus between appellant’s residence and the burglary. The district court
reasoned that:
given that the error on the part of the officers who drafted the
search warrant seems to be an omission of . . . some important
information that they already possessed in the warrant
application, I don’t think there’s a . . . meaningful deterrence
benefit in me suppressing the evidence here in these [probation
violation] proceedings.

Put simply, because the officer misconduct here was minimal, the marginal deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule is outweighed by the costs of preventing the district court from
considering relevant evidence in deciding whether to revoke appellant’s probation,
allowing appellant to escape the consequences of noncompliance, and making courts
reluctant to place defendants on probation initially, in light of the possibility that relevant
evidence may be unavailable in a revocation proceeding. See id.
Affirmed.