Charles Calvin Lockhart v. State of Minnesota

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2143

Charles Calvin Lockhart, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Beane, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-8335

Charles Calvin Lockhart, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth Scoggin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BEANE, Judge
Appellant Charles Calvin Lockhart challenges the district court’s order summarily
denying his petition for postconviction relief. Lockhart, who is no longer represented by
counsel, argues that he received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel.

2
Lockhart also contends that respondent State of Minnesota did not disclose exculpatory
evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged Lockhart with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
and a jury found him guilty on both counts. The district court convicted Lockhart on the
first count and sentenced him to 172 months’ imprisonment. Lockhart filed a direct appeal
from the judgment of conviction, and we affirmed. State v. Lockhart, No. A22-0094, 2023
WL 1098182 (Minn. App. Jan. 30, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2023). Lockhart, who
at the time was represented by appellate counsel, raised one issue in his principal brief :
whether “his constitutional rights were violated because his jury venire did not represent a
fair cross-section of the community.” Id. at *1. We affirmed, concluding that while
Lockhart established the first two elements of his fair -cross-section claim, he failed to
establish the third. Id. at *6. The supreme court denied review.
Lockhart then petitioned for postconviction relief. He subsequently filed two
additional documents he described as “amended” petitions for postconviction relief. In his
petitions, he asserted that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because
his appellate counsel raised a fair -cross-section claim rather than other , more meritorious
arguments related to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
1

1 Lockhart also asserted that he was erroneously convicted of two counts arising from a
single behavioral incident. Lockhart has not raised this issue on appeal, so he has
abandoned it. McKenzie v. State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 746 n.1 (Minn. 1998).

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The district court denied Lockhart’s petition without an evidentiary hearing,
concluding that Lockhart’s claims were Knaffla-barred because the issue of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel was “either raised at trial or reviewed by the Court of Appeals
on Petitioner’s direct appeal” and that the claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel were a “repackag[ed]” version of those claims.
Lockhart appeals.
DECISION
Lockhart argues that the district court erred by summarily denying his
postconviction petition. We review a summary denial of a postconviction petition for an
abuse of discretion. Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Minn. 2021). A district court
abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.
Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010). But “we review the merits of any
underlying ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo.” Berry v. State, 33 N.W.3d
683, 693 (Minn. 2026).
Under the postconviction statute, a defendant may petition the district court for
postconviction relief “to vacate and set aside the judgment . . . or make other disposition
as may be appropriate.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2024). Unless the petition and record
“conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief,” the district court must set an
evidentiary hearing on the petition. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024); see also Chavez-
Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 671 (Minn. 2020) (“A district court need not hold an
evidentiary hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, even if true, are legally
insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief.”).

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I.
We first address Lockhart’s argument that he received ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. The district court concluded that the issues raised in Lockhart’s petition
were Knaffla-barred because the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was
merely a “repackag[ed]” version of ineffective-assistance-of- trial-counsel claims.
“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known
but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”
State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1
(codifying the same rule for “grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal”). But
a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is “properly raised in a first
postconviction petition, because the petitioner could not have known of such a claim at the
time of direct appeal.” Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 370-71 (Minn. 2016). Thus,
Lockhart’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims are not barred by Knaffla,
and we consider them on their merits. See Onyelobi v. State, 932 N.W.2d 272, 280 (Minn.
2019).
A.
Lockhart first contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for raising an issue on
direct appeal that has never succeeded. Claims that appellate counsel was ineffective are
subject to the two-prong Strickland test. Berry, 33 N.W.3d at 693 (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish Strickland ’s first prong (the
performance prong), a petitioner must show that “counsel’s performance was deficient
when judged against an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (quotation omitted).

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Appellate counsel need not raise every possible issue to satisfy the performance prong.
Zornes, 880 N.W.2d at 371. Instead, counsel may focus on the “most meritorious”
arguments, omitting claims unlikely to succeed. Id. “[W]e employ a strong presumption
that appellate counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment in selecting which issues
to raise.” Berry, 33 N.W.3d at 693-94 (quotation omitted).
The petitioner must also demonstrate prejudice (the prejudice prong): “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 373 (Minn. 2020) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In other words, “a defendant must show that counsel’s errors
actually had an adverse effect.” Leake v. State, 767 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009) (quotation
omitted). We may analyze the prongs in either order and may “dispose of a claim on one
prong without considering the other.” Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372 (quotation omitted).
With that background in mind, we consider Lockhart’s claim that he received
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Lockhart argues that appellate counsel provided
ineffective assistance for raising an issue on appeal—a fair-cross-section challenge—that
has “been successful zero percent of the time.” On the performance prong, the fact that an
issue has never or rarely been successful does not, by itself, render counsel’s decision to
raise it objectively unreasonable. See Berry, 33 N.W.3d at 693 (stating that appellate
counsel “only has a duty to bring the most meritorious claims on appeal” (quotation
omitted)). Even if Lockhart is correct that fair-cross-section challenges have not succeeded
in Minnesota, we cannot conclude that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient
solely on that basis.

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In any event, to prevail, Lockhart must also establish the prejudice prong, but he has
failed to do so. Lockhart does not argue that the outcome of his direct appeal would have
been different, and the mere fact that appellate counsel raised an “allegedly meritless
issue[] does not mean that the result of [ the] appeal would have been different had his
counsel not raised the issue[].” Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 545 n.11 (Minn. 2023).
This aspect of Lockhart’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim therefore fails.
B.
We next consider Lockhart’s claim that appellate counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to raise other arguments that he believes have greater merit. Lockhart
contends that appellate counsel should have argued on direct appeal that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to present ostensibly exculpatory DNA evidence, failing to object to
certain evidence and “unauthenticated pictures,” failing to impeach the complainant, and
failing to call an expert to testify. Lockhart also asserts that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to address that he was convicted on two counts on inconsistent
theories and that his sentence was an impermissible “upward departure from the sentencing
guidelines.” “To succeed on a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise
an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the petitioner must first show that his trial
counsel was ineffective, again under the Strickland test.” Berry, 33 N.W.3d at 699
(quotation omitted). “We presume that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable and we
give particular deference to trial strategy.” Schneider v. State, 725 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn.
2007).

7
We are not convinced that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims regarding evidentiary and witness issues.
After thoroughly reviewing Lockhart’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
and the record, we discern no basis to conclude that appellate counsel’s performance was
deficient. Lockhart contests trial counsel’s strategic decisions at trial—whether to present
or object to evidence—which we generally do not second -guess in reviewing ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims. State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 592 (Minn. 2017); see also
State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 506 (Minn. 2013) (“We give trial counsel wide latitude to
determine the best strategy for the client.”). Because trial strategy includes “[w]hat
evidence to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to object,” it was
reasonable for appellate counsel to conclude that these issues were unlikely to prevail
because they relate to unreviewable trial strategy. See State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138
(Minn. 2009). But again, even if we were persuaded that appellate counsel’s performance
was deficient, Lockhart has not made any plausible argument that the outcome of his direct
appeal would have been different absent such purportedly deficient performance.
Lockhart’s arguments about the verdict and his sentence fare no better . Lockhart
seems to suggest both that appellate counsel should have included trial counsel’s failure to
object to these issues as additional reasons why trial counsel was ineffective and that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these issues as independent grounds
for reversal. Either way, these arguments do not warrant postconviction relief. Lockhart
did not raise the inconsistent-verdicts argument in his postconviction petition in the district

8
court, so it is not properly before us on appeal. 2 See Azure v. State, 700 N.W.2d 443, 447
(Minn. 2005). He also has not explained why he believes the jury’s verdict is inconsistent,
and no inconsistency is apparent from our review of the record. As to his sentence, Lockhart
contends he was sentenced to “an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines,” when
in fact, he was given a sentence at the top of the presumptive sentencing range. Appellate
counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to raise a sentencing argument that is
based on an inaccurate premise. See Dobbins v. State, 788 N.W.2d 719, 730 (Minn. 2010)
(observing that “appellate counsel’s representation is not ineffective because counsel fails
to raise a meritless claim”).
Ultimately, Lockhart has not pointed to anything in trial counsel’s performance that
was unreasonable or prejudiced him at trial. After carefully reviewing the record, we also
discern no basis to conclude that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient. And
Lockhart has not made any plausible argument as to how the outcome of his direct appeal
would have been different if not for appellate counsel’s performance. Accordingly,
Lockhart is not entitled to postconviction relief as to his ineffective-assistance-of-
appellate-counsel claims, and the district court did not err by denying his petition without
an evidentiary hearing.

2 Even if Lockhart’s contention in district court that he was improperly convicted of two
offenses arising from a single behavioral incident could fairly be read to have preserved
this argument— which we doubt—the result would be the same. The jury rendered guilty
verdicts on both counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, but Lockhart was convicted
and sentenced on only the first count. And Lockhart has not explained how any element of
one of the counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct of which he was found guilty
negates a necessary element of the other.

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II.
Lockhart next asserts various other issues related to the conduct of the trial.
Lockhart mostly appears to contend that trial counsel was ineffective for not introducing
DNA evidence or evidence about consent, failing to object to testimony from a medical
expert, failing to object to allegedly unauthenticated pictures, and failing to call any
witnesses on Lockhart’s behalf, among other evidentiary issues. But at times, he also seems
to assert that these are standalone justifications for postconviction relief. Lockhart does not
offer any reason why these grounds for relief could not have been decided based on the
trial record. Indeed, Lockhart criticizes appellate counsel for failing to raise these very
issues on direct appeal. Therefore, to the extent Lockhart’s arguments can be read to seek
postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel or substantive trial
errors, separate from appellate counsel’s failure to raise those issues, we conclude that they
are Knaffla-barred because they could have been raised on direct appeal. Torres v. State,
688 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 2004).
III.
Finally, Lockhart requests ostensibly exculpatory evidence that he believes was
withheld by the prosecution and his trial counsel. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). Because he did not raise this issue in his original or amended postconviction
petitions, we do not address it. See Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 1(1) (2024) (stating that
“[a]ll grounds for relief must be stated in the petition or any amendment thereof unless they
could not reasonably have been set forth therein”).
Affirmed.