This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2146

MJ aka Elissa Wall,
Respondent,

vs.

Warren Jeffs,
Defendant,

Seth Jeffs, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed June 22, 2026
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Cook County District Court
File No. 16-CV-23-132

Tyson Smith, Richard T. Furlong III, Smith Law, PLLC, Grand Marais, Minnesota (for respondent)

William D. Paul, William D. Paul Law Office, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Beane, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.[*]

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[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SCHMIDT, Judge

Appellants challenge the district court's order denying their motions for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, for a new trial. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondent MJ aka Elissa Wall was born and raised in the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS). In 2007, Wall sued Warren Jeffs,[1] the leader of the church, in Utah state court. After years of litigation, the Utah district court entered a $10,025,000 judgment against Warren and in favor of Wall on October 5, 2017.

In 2015, appellant Seth Jeffs, Warren's brother, established appellant Emerald Industries, LLC. In 2018, Seth registered Emerald Industries in Minnesota and Emerald Industries bought property in Cook County, Minnesota.

In 2023, Emerald Industries advertised the property for sale. A few months later, Wall sued Warren,[2] Seth, and Emerald Industries. Wall alleged that Warren had conveyed funds to Emerald Industries through Seth to purchase the property, with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud Wall in violation of section 513.44 of the Minnesota Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (MUVTA). Minn. Stat. § 513.44 (2024). Wall also alleged that Emerald Industries violated Minnesota Statutes section 570.02 (2024) by advertising the property

[1] Warren Jeffs and his brother, Seth Jeffs, are both parties to this lawsuit. We refer to them by their first names for clarity.

[2] Warren, who is serving a life sentence in Texas for separate criminal matters, acknowledged service of the summons and complaint, but did not file an answer. The district court later entered default judgment against Warren.

for sale "with the intent to convert the Property back to money to further hinder, delay, and defraud their creditors, including [Wall.]"

Seth and Emerald Industries moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion because a jury needed to resolve genuine issues of material fact. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Wall.

Seth and Emerald Industries moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. The district court denied the motions and entered judgment.

Seth and Emerald Industries appeal.

DECISION

Appellants argue that the district court erred when it denied their motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. We address each challenge in turn.

I. The district court's order denying appellants' motion for summary judgment is outside the scope of our review on appeal.

Appellants challenged the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment. At oral argument, counsel for appellants acknowledged that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on an appeal from judgment entered after a jury verdict. *See Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp.*, 766 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn. 2009) (holding that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not within the scope of review on an appeal from judgment entered after a jury verdict). We appreciate counsel's candor to the court and do not consider the issue further.

II. The district court did not err in denying appellants' posttrial motion for judgment as a matter of law or their motion for a new trial.

Appellants argue the district court erred when it denied their motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. We review a district court's denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, *Vermillion State Bank v. Tennis Sanitation, LLC*, 969 N.W.2d 610, 618 (Minn. 2022), and denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion, *Christie v. Est. of Christie*, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018).

Seth and Emerald Industries raise numerous appellate arguments, including that: (A) Minnesota lacks personal jurisdiction over Seth; (B) Wall's claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations; and (C) Wall's fraudulent-conveyance claim was not pleaded with specificity. Appellants also argue the district court abused its discretion by: (D) allowing Wall to change the theory of her case; (E) not conforming the special verdict form to Wall's theory of the case; (F) not allowing Seth and Emerald Industries to submit a copy of Wall's complaint as an exhibit; and (G) allowing Wall to present evidence of damages that was not disclosed during discovery.[3] We address each argument in turn.

[3] After providing a list of reasons why appellants believe a new trial is required, they note that these are "just a few examples of erroneous rulings made during the trial, any one of which entitles [them] to a new trial." But we do not presume error on appeal and will not speculate as to what other supposedly erroneous rulings might exist in the record that could require a new trial. *Loth v. Loth*, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (holding appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error before we may reverse for a new trial); *see also Christie*, 911 N.W.2d at 837-38 n.4 (citation omitted) (stating that arguments without analysis or citation to legal authority are forfeited). We, therefore, decline to address any generalized assertions of error. Instead, we consider only those arguments that appellants have supported with legal reasoning and authority.

A. The district court had personal jurisdiction over Seth.

Seth argues he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over him as an out-of-state resident and because any fraudulent conveyances occurred while he was in a different state. We are not persuaded.

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident if the nonresident has an interest in real property within the state, transacts business in the state, commits an act in the state that causes injury or damage, or commits an act outside the state that causes injury or damage in the state. Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1 (2024). We review issues of personal jurisdiction de novo. *In re Civ. Commitment of Nielsen*, 863 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Minn. App. 2015) (citation omitted), *rev. denied* (Minn. Apr. 14, 2015).

The record demonstrates that Seth registered Emerald Industries in Minnesota six months after Wall obtained a judgment against Warren. Seth then transacted business in Minnesota, through Emerald Industries, by purchasing the subject property in Minnesota. Seth's own testimony corroborated these facts. Seth admitted that he moved to Minnesota to find work, worked in Minnesota as a contractor, and continued to use Emerald Industries to conduct business in Minnesota. These admissions, alone, grant the district court personal jurisdiction over Seth. Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(2).

On appeal, Seth asserts that Wall's evidence against him consisted of fraudulent transfers that occurred outside of Minnesota and that the property at issue had nothing to do with those transfers. But the evidence established that Wall has a judgment for more than ten million dollars against Warren and has been unable to collect "a dime." Wall proved that Warren funneled money to Seth and Emerald Industries to avoid paying that judgment. Seth's own testimony established that money controlled by Warren was sent to Emerald Industries "on a regular basis." The evidence also established that Emerald Industries used funds received from Warren to purchase the subject property in Minnesota. Thus, the district court did not err in exercising personal jurisdiction over Seth.

B. Wall's claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Appellants argue that the district court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law because Wall's fraudulent-conveyance claim is barred by the statute of limitations. We review a district court's application of a statute of limitations de novo. *Sipe v. STS Mfg., Inc.*, 834 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013).

Minnesota imposes a six-year statute of limitations on actions that seek "relief on the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud." Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (2024). "[A]ctual-fraud claims [under MUVTA] are subject to the limitations period applicable to actions 'for relief on the ground of fraud.'" *Finn v. All. Bank*, 860 N.W.2d 638, 657 (Minn. 2015). Thus, Wall's fraudulent-conveyance claim, brought under MUVTA, is subject to a six-year statute of limitations.

Here, Wall obtained judgment against Warren in October 2017. She brought her lawsuit in August 2023. The MUVTA claims were timely brought.[4]

[4] Appellants contend that Wall could have filed her fraudulent-conveyance claim before she obtained a judgment against Warren in 2017. Appellants did not raise this argument to the district court and we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. *See Thiele v. Sitch*, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (citation omitted). The argument also runs contrary to the requirement that a plaintiff be a creditor before filing a MUVTA claim. Minn. Stat. § 513.44(a)(1); *Finn v. All. Bank*, 860 N.W.2d at 644.

C. Wall did not need to plead her MUVTA claim with particularity.

Appellants argue they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Wall did not plead her fraudulent-conveyance claim with specificity. We disagree.

Appellants correctly note that a common-law fraud claim requires the circumstances constituting fraud to be stated "with particularity." Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.02. A claim under MUVTA is not, however, a common-law fraud claim. Instead, a statutory MUVTA claim required Wall to allege: (1) she is a creditor; (2) a transfer of assets was made by the debtor; and (3) the transfer was done with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud her as a creditor. Minn. Stat. § 513.44. Wall's complaint met these requirements.

Wall alleged that she is a creditor due to her 2017 judgment against Warren. The complaint identified appellants' 2018 purchase of the property as the fraudulent transaction that transferred Warren's assets. The complaint also alleged that the conveyance of funds to purchase the property was made with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud her.

The district court did not err in denying appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law because Wall's complaint sufficiently alleged a MUVTA claim.

D. Wall did not change her theory after trial began.

Appellants argue that the district court impermissibly allowed Wall to change her theory of the case during trial. We are not persuaded.

Wall's theory consisted of establishing that Warren directed funds to Seth and Emerald Industries to avoid paying Wall on her ten-million-dollar judgment against Warren. The evidence appellants cite as so-called changes of theory are, in fact, consistent with Wall's complaint and her theory of the case throughout the trial.[5] We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of appellants' motion for a new trial.

E. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to admit a copy of Wall's complaint into evidence.

Appellants argue the district court abused its discretion by refusing to admit a copy of Wall's complaint into evidence.[6] "We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion[.]" *Doe 136 v. Liebsch*, 872 N. W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015).

The district court decided that the jury would not have a copy of the complaint during deliberations. There are circumstances under which the pleadings in a case may be provided to the jury. *See, e.g.*, *Kelly v. Ellefson*, 712 N.W.2d 759, 767 (Minn. 2006); *In re Perry*, 494 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1992). But those circumstances did not exist here.

Seth and Emerald Industries did not assert that they offered a copy of the complaint for impeachment purposes. Nor did appellants articulate why they should have been permitted to admit a copy of the complaint under the narrow circumstances in which the supreme court has held it is acceptable to do so. *See Kelly*, 712 N.W.2d at 767 (noting circumstances in which a complaint could be admitted into evidence). Based on the record before us, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision.

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[5] Because we conclude that Wall did not change her theory of the case during trial, we also reject appellants' argument that the district court abused its discretion by not including additional questions on the special verdict form.

[6] During trial, the complaint was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 113. Before the jury began its deliberations, the district court determined that the jury would not have the pleadings, including the complaint, during deliberations.

Additionally, as the district court determined, any error in preventing the jury from reviewing the complaint during deliberations was harmless. *McBee v. Team Industries, Inc.*, 26 N.W.3d 847, 857 (2025) (articulating the harmless-error standard for the exclusion of evidence); Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring courts to disregard harmless error). Appellants read the complaint into the record during their cross-examination of Wall. The jury was aware of the contents of the complaint and any possible error was harmless.

F. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new-trial motion because the damages evidence was disclosed during discovery.

Appellants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Wall "never claimed that her damages w[ere] equal to the value of . . . benefits Seth [] and his family received from the . . . storehouse from 2005 through 2026." We review new trial arguments regarding discovery violations de novo. *State v. Palubicki*, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489 (Minn. 2005). A new trial is not required to remedy a discovery violation unless there is a reasonable probability that the evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial. *State v. Clobes*, 422 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1988).

Appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law before the district court, asserted that Wall, "in her discovery responses[,] claimed that her damages w[ere] equal to the value of goods and food and other benefits Seth [] and his family received from the . . . storehouse from 2005 through 2026." Appellants' own motion revealed that the damages evidence was disclosed in discovery. The district court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion for a new trial.

Affirmed.