Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2197
Crocket Properties LP,
Respondent,
vs.
Stausi DuRoss,
Appellant.
Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed
Bond, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-HC-25-9599
Thomas P. Harlan, Christopher W. Bowman, Madigan, Dahl & Harlan, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Stausi Jeff DuRoss, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
In this appeal from an eviction judgment in favor of respondent-landlord, appellant-
tenant argues that the district court erred by: (1) failing to apply statutory provisions
pertaining to the rights of tenant s who have been subjected to domestic abuse,
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(2) misrepresenting a security amount, and (3) violating tenant’s procedural-due-process
rights. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2024, appellant-tenant Stausi Jeff DuRoss signed a month-to-month
lease for an apartment owned by respondent-landlord Crockett Properties, LP.1 On August
12, 2025, landlord notified tenant that her lease was not being renewed and that she must
vacate the premises by October 31, 2025.
On October 24, 2025, tenant sent landlord written notice that tenant was terminating
her lease effective October 31, 2025, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 504B.206 (2024). Under
that statute, a tenant of a residential lease who fears imminent violence after being
subjected to domestic abuse and other enumerated acts may terminate the lease subject to
certain requirements. Minn. Stat. § 504B.206, subd. 1(a). Landlord updated tenant’s file
to reflect that her lease would be terminated pursuant to section 504B.206 on October 31,
2025. On October 29, 2025, tenant requested an extension of her tenancy until November
15, 2025, which landlord denied.
After tenant did not vacate the premises, landlord brought an eviction action on
November 21. Landlord’s complaint alleged that tenant was an unlawful holdover tenant
and sought judgment with an immediate writ of recovery. At a hearing before a referee,
1 Landlord’s brief states that, due to a “drafting error” in district court, it is misidentified
in the caption as “Crocket Properties LP.” The caption of this opinion matches the caption
used in the district court, as required by the rules of appellate procedure. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 143.01.
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tenant argued that she had not been properly served with the notice to vacate. 2 On
December 23, the district court countersigned the referee’s order finding that landlord
proved that it had properly served the notice to vacate and that tenant failed to vacate the
premises. The district court entered judgment for landlord for recovery of the premises.
Tenant appeals.
DECISION
An eviction action “is a summary proceeding through which an occupant may be
removed from possession of real property by the process of law.” Nationwide Hous. Corp.
v. Skoglund, 906 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2018);
see also Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2024). On appeal from an eviction judgment,
we “review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo” but will “uphold the district
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Nationwide Hous. Corp., 906
N.W.2d at 907.
I. The district court did not err in its application of Minn. Stat. § 504B.206.
Tenant argues that the district court committed an error of law by failing to properly
apply Minn. Stat. § 504B.206. “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that
[appellate courts] review de novo.” Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn.
2016).
As relevant here, section 504B.206 provides that a tenant may terminate a
residential lease without penalty if the tenant “fears imminent violence after being
2 The transcript of this hearing is not part of the record on appeal.
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subjected to . . . domestic abuse.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.206, subd. 1(a)(1). To terminate a
lease under this section, a tenant must provide advance written notice to the landlord
“stating the tenant fears imminent violence from a person as indicated in a qualifying
document against the tenant,” and provide “the date on which the lease will terminate.”
Id., subd. 1(b)(1), (3) . “ The tenancy terminates for the tenant who exercises the right
granted under this subdivision, including the right of possession of the premises, on the
date provided in the notice.” Id., subd. 1(c).
In this case, tenant provided written notice to landlord t hat she feared imminent
violence after being subjected to domestic abuse and that her lease would terminate
October 31, 2025. Landlord updated tenant’s file to reflect that her lease would be
terminated pursuant to section 504B.206 on October 31, 2025. Tenant later requested an
extension until November 15. Landlord denied tenant’s extension request and filed an
eviction action after tenant remained on the premises beyond November 15.
Tenant maintains that the eviction judgment must be reversed because the district
court failed to apply the mandatory provisions of section 504B.206. We disagree. While
a landlord may not commence an eviction action against a tenant who has elected to
terminate a lease pursuant to the protections of section 504B.206, nothing in that statute
“should be construed to prohibit an eviction action . . . where a tenant has provided the
written notice under section 504B.206 . . . but failed to vacate on or before the date
provided in that notice. ” Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 1(b) (2024). Even assuming the
statute permits tenant’s requested extension of the termination date from October 31 to
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November 15, 3 landlord did not initiate eviction proceedings until after tenant failed to
vacate the premises by November 15. Tenant has therefore failed to establish that the
district court erred in its application of Minn. Stat. § 504B.206.
II. We do not consider tenant’s argument concerning the security amount.
Tenant argues that the district court abused its discretion by issuing the writ of
recovery after it allegedly “misrepresented” the amount of security she was required to
deposit as a condition of staying the district court proceedings pending appeal. See Minn.
Stat. § 504B.371, subd. 1 (2024) (providing that when the district court enters an eviction
judgment against a party, and that party appeals, “all further proceedings in the case are
stayed”).
This argument is not properly before us. To challenge the “form and amount” of a
bond or other security, a party must first seek relief in district court pursuant to Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 108.02. That rule provides that a party seeking review of a district court’s
decision regarding a stay pending appeal must do so by filing a motion with this court
under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 127. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.02, subd. 6 (“On a motion
under Rule 127, [this court] may review the [district] court’s determinations as to whether
a stay is appropriate, the terms of any stay, and the form and amount of security pending
appeal.”). Here, the district court ordered that the writ of recovery be temporarily stayed
pending tenant’s appeal, provided that tenant deposit security by January 5, 2026. Tenant
filed a motion in the district court challenging the security amount, which the district court
3 We observe that there is no mechanism within section 504B.206 allowing a tenant to
request an “extension” of the date provided by tenant on which the lease will terminate.
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denied. At the same time, tenant filed a motion in this court, arguing that she could not
pay the security. In an order, this court concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in setting the security amount and denied tenant’s motion. Because tenant has
already sought—and has been denied—relief through the proper procedural mechanism,
we do not address any arguments concerning the amount of security.
III. Tenant was not deprived of procedural due process.
Tenant argues that she was deprived of due process because the eviction was
unlawful, conducted under undisclosed procedural requirements, and subject to
“accelerated enforcement.”
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to due process
of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. “Whether the government
has violated a person ’s procedural due process rights is a question of law that [appellate
courts] review de novo.” Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012).
Appellate courts “conduct a two-step analysis to determine whether the government has
violated an individual’s procedural due process rights.” Id. First, we “identify whether the
government has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest.”
Id. If an individual has been deprived of a protected interest, “the second step requires us
to determine whether the procedures followed by the government were constitutionally
sufficient.” Id. (quotation omitted). Procedural due process requires that a person have
notice and “an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
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Assuming without deciding that tenant properly preserved the procedural-due-
process arguments she raises on appeal and that she was deprived of a protected property
interest, our review of the record satisfies us that the eviction proceedings were
constitutionally sufficient. An eviction proceeding is a “summary” procedure, Nationwide
Hous. Corp., 906 N.W.2d at 907, intended to “quickly determine the present right to
possession of [the] premises,” Univ. Cmty. Prop., Inc., v. Norton, 246 N.W.2d 858, 860
(Minn. 1976). Once the district court issues an eviction summons, a hearing must be
scheduled within 14 days. Minn. Stat. § 504B.321, subd. 1(c) (2024).
Here, landlord initiated eviction proceedings on November 21, the district court
issued the eviction summons on December 9, and a hearing was set for December 23. The
district court found that tenant was properly served with the eviction -action complaint, a
finding tenant does not challenge on appeal. Tenant appeared at the December 23 hearing
and asserted various defenses to eviction. Tenant cites no legal authority in support of her
claim that she was deprived of procedural due process. And other than alluding to her
arguments about section 504B.206 and the security amount, tenant does not explain, and
the record does not reveal, how this eviction proceeding was “accelerated” in a manner that
violated tenant’s due-process rights. See Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co.,
187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (stating that an assignment of error based on “mere
assertion” and not supported by argument or authority is forfeited unless prejudicial error
is obvious on mere inspection). Because tenant had sufficient notice and “an opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” Sawh, 823 N.W.2d at 632
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(quotation omitted), tenant is not entitled to reversal based on her contention that she was
deprived of her right to procedural due process.
Affirmed.