Daniel Petsinger DBA Radio Link Internet v. City of Ellendale, a Minnesota Political Subdivision, and in ther Personal and Individual Capacities, et al., City Attorney Mark Rahrick

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2198

Daniel Petsinger DBA Radio Link Internet,
Appellant,

vs.

City of Ellendale, a Minnesota Political Subdivision, and
in ther Personal and Individual Capacities, et al.,
Respondents,

City Attorney Mark Rahrick,
Respondent.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CV-25-1316

Daniel Petsinger, Ellendale, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Jason J. Kuboushek, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondents City of
Ellendale, Scott Groth, Jon Asplund, Joel Meyer, Scott Swanson, Charles Berg, and Steve
Engel)

Ken D. Schueler, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent Mark
Rahrick)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bentley, Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Daniel Petsinger commenced this action against the City of Ellendale and seven city
officials to challenge the city’s non-renewal of a lease and its denial of Petsinger’s
application for a right- of-way permit. The district court granted the defendants’ motions
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, reasoning that
Petsinger’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The district court also denied
Petsinger’s motion for a default judgment and imposed sanctions on him. We conclude
that the district court (1) did not err by denying Petsinger’s motion for a default judgment,
(2) erred by dismissing some of Petsinger’s claims on res judicata grounds, and (3) erred
by imposing sanctions on Petsinger without a motion for sanctions or an order giving notice
that the court would consider sanctions on its own initiative. Therefore, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Petsinger is a resident of the city of Ellendale. In recent years, he has had a series
of conflicts with the city.
By way of background, conflict arose in 2024 when Petsinger erected a tower on
his property and mounted videocameras on top of it. After the city informed Petsinger that
the tower was not a permitted use in his zoning district, he removed it. Soon thereafter,
however, Petsinger erected a small three- wheeled trailer with a telescoping pole
approximately 30 feet high with videocameras on top. The city demanded that Petsinger

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remove the trailer for the same reason it had required him to remove the tower. Petsinger
refused to do so.
In October 2024, the city commenced a lawsuit against Petsinger to enforce its
zoning code. Petsinger responded by asserting counterclaims against the city. Both the
city and Petsinger filed motions for summary judgment. In May 2025, the district court
granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, denied Petsinger’s motion for summary
judgment, and entered judgment for the city. This court affirmed. City of Ellendale v.
Petsinger, No. A25-0937, 2026 WL 981147 (Minn. App. Apr. 13, 2026).
Meanwhile, Petsinger operated a telecommunications business. For approximately
15 years, he had leased space on a city-owned water tower, where he mounted equipment
that provided internet service to customers. In November 2024, while the city’s zoning-
enforcement lawsuit was pending in the district court, and when Petsinger’s water-tower
lease was due to expire, the city council voted not to renew the lease.
In April 2025, Petsinger applied for a right-of-way permit so that he could relocate
his telecommunications equipment from the water tower to his residential property. On
June 12, 2025, the city council denied the application.
On July 31, 2025, Petsinger commenced this action against the city and seven city
officials: the mayor, four members of the city council, the city clerk, and the city attorney,
Mark Rahrick. Petsinger’s complaint asserted 22 claims.
One day later, an attorney representing Rahrick sent Petsinger a letter stating that,
if Petsinger did not withdraw his claims against Rahrick within 21 days, Rahrick would
move for sanctions pursuant to rule 11 of the rules of civil procedure and section 549.211

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of the Minnesota Statutes. With the letter, Rahrick served a motion for sanctions on
Petsinger.
On the same date, August 4, 2025, an attorney representing the city and five other
city officials served and filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. On August 11, 2025, Rahrick, who was and is separately represented,
also served and filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim up on which relief can
be granted. On August 19, 2025, Petsinger filed an amended complaint, which asserts only
ten claims. On September 10, 2025, Rahrick served and filed an answer to Petsinger’s
original complaint. On September 26, 2025, Petsinger moved for default judgment against
all defendants on the ground that none had served an answer to his amended complaint.
In early October 2025, the district court conducted a motion hearing. In November
2025, the district court filed an order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss, ordering
the imposition of sanctions on Petsinger, and denying “[a]ll other motions.” In January
2026, the district court filed an order requiring Petsinger to pay Rahrick $8,672 and the
city $715 for their respective attorney fees, costs, expenses, and disbursements. Petsinger
appeals. We construe his pro se brief to make three arguments.
DECISION
I. Petsinger’s Motion for Default Judgment
Petsinger argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for default
judgment.
A district court may enter default judgment against a defendant who “has failed to
plead or otherwise defend within the time allowed therefor.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. A

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defendant may assert certain defenses by motion instead of an answer, Minn. R. Civ. P.
12.02, including the defense that a complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). A defendant has not failed to “otherwise defend” if
the defendant has filed a motion to dismiss. See B lack v. Rimmer, 700 N.W.2d 521, 526
(Minn. App. 2005), rev. dismissed (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005).
In this case, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12.02(e) within 21
days of being served with the original complaint. Petsinger argues that the defendants were
in default because they did not answer or otherwise defend against the claims asserted in
his amended complaint. If “a complaint is amended after answer, the defendant is not
bound to answer” the amended complaint separately, in which event “his original answer
stands as his answer to the amended complaint.” U nited States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Falk, 7 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Minn. 1943). A defendant who chooses not to serve and file an
answer to an amended complaint is not in default, except as to new allegations in the
amended complaint. Ermentraut v. American Fire Ins. Co., 65 N.W. 270, 270 (Minn.
1895).
Petsinger’s amended complaint asserts fewer claims than his original complaint and
does not appear to assert any claims or allege any facts that were not included in the original
complaint. Petsinger’s amended complaint expressly states that amendments were made
“to clarify and add specificity to Plaintiff’s claims” and “to provide the Court with a more
definite statement of the claims.” Accordingly, for purposes of rule 55.01, the defendants
did not “fail[] to plead or otherwise defend” against the claims in Petsinger’s amended
complaint and, thus, were not in default. Furthermore, in these circumstances, a district

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court does not abuse its discretion by considering a motion to dismiss that was filed before
an amended complaint that does not assert new claims. See M artin v. Mid-America
Festivals Corp., No. A23-0421, 2023 WL 8539854, at *5 (Minn. App. Dec. 11, 2023); see
also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (providing that nonprecedential opinions are
“not binding authority” but “may be cited as persuasive authority”).
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Petsinger’ s motion for default
judgment.
II. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
Petsinger also argues that the district court erred by granting the defendants’
motions to dismiss on res judicata grounds.
A district court may grant a motion to dismiss if a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). “A claim is sufficient against
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if it is possible on any evidence which might
be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” Walsh v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014). In considering a motion to dismiss
pursuant to rule 12.02(e), a district court must “consider only the facts alleged in the
complaint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party.” Finn v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W.2d 638, 653 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted). This court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court’s
grant of a motion to dismiss. Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 606.
The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, prevents a party from
asserting a claim after the conclusion of a prior action if “(1) the earlier claim involved the

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same set of factual circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties or their
privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; (4) the estopped party had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the matter.” Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 840
(Minn. 2004). The doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent lawsuit only if all four
requirements are satisfied. Id. The bar applies both to claims that were “actually litigated”
in the previous action and to claims that “could have been litigated.” Brown-Wilbert, Inc.
v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 220 (Minn. 2007). This court applies a de novo
standard of review to a district court ’s determination that the requirements of the res
judicata doctrine are satisfied. Schober v. Commissioner of Revenue, 853 N.W.2d 102,
111 (Minn. 2013).
Petsinger’s amended complaint asserts ten claims. The district court concluded that
eight of Petsinger’s claims (in counts 1-5 and 8-10) are barred by res judicata because they
previously were litigated, or could have been litigated, in the first lawsuit between the
parties. The district court also concluded that the two remaining claims (in counts 6 and 7)
fail to state a claim for relief on the merits. Petsinger does not challenge the district court’s
dismissal of counts 6 and 7.
Petsinger challenges the district court’s application of res judicata , arguing that
none of the requirements of the doctrine are satisfied. Petsinger’s challenge to the first
requirement has merit. The first requirement of res judicata is that “the earlier claim
involved the same set of factual circumstances.” Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840. In the
res judicata context, a “claim or cause of action” is understood to mean “a group of
operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing.” Id. (quotation omitted). An

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earlier claim and a present claim are the same if “ the same evidence will sustain both
actions.” Id. at 840-41 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, “a plaintiff may not split his
cause of action and bring successive suits involving the same set of factual circumstances.”
Id. at 840 (quotation omitted).
To determine whether the first requirement of res judicata is satisfied, we must
determine whether Petsinger’s amended complaint includes claims that are based on a set
of factual circumstances or a group of operative facts that were litigated in the first lawsuit.
The city commenced the first lawsuit in October 2024, after Petsinger refused to remove
the trailer and pole from his property. If Petsinger were pursuing a claim in this lawsuit
based on that zoning dispute, the first requirement of res judicata plainly would be
satisfied. But it appears that none of Petsinger’s claims in the present lawsuit are based on
the zoning dispute that was litigated in the prior lawsuit.
Some of Petsinger’s claims in his amended complaint in this lawsuit (in counts 1, 5,
8, 9, and 10) are based, in whole or in part, on the city’s non-renewal of Petsinger’s water-
tower lease. Petsinger alleges in this case that the city council voted not to renew his water-
tower lease on November 14, 2024. That date is two weeks after Petsinger served and filed
his counterclaims in the first lawsuit. The district court reasoned that Petsinger could have
challenged the non-renewal of the water-tower lease by amending his counterclaims in the
first lawsuit. But that reasoning is contrary to caselaw. For purposes of the first
requirement of res judicata, a party is not barred from litigating facts that occurred after
the party served and filed its pleading in a prior lawsuit because a party may, but is not
required to, supplement a pleading. See Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 231,

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239-40 (Minn. 2007). Furthermore, Petsinger’s water-tower lease was not mentioned in
the district court’s order resolving the parties’ summary-judgment motions in the first
lawsuit. Consequently, the set of factual circumstances relating to the water-tower lease
was not litigated in the first lawsuit. Thus, to the extent that Petsinger seeks to prove his
claims in counts 1, 5, 8, 9, and 10 with evidence relating to the city’s non- renewal of
Petsinger’s water-tower lease, the first requirement of res judicata is not satisfied.
The remainder of Petsinger’s claims are based on the city’s denial of his application
for a right-of-way permit. Petsinger alleges that the city denied the application on June 12,
2025. That date is approximately two weeks after the district court entered judgment in
the first lawsuit. Thus, to the extent that Petsinger seeks to prove any of his claims with
evidence relating to the city’s denial of his application for a right-of -way permit, the first
requirement of res judicata is not satisfied.
Accordingly, the district court erred by granting respondents’ motions to dismiss
Petsinger’s amended complaint on res judicata grounds.
Respondents also have argued that some of Petsinger’s claims fail to state a claim
on the merits, but only in a conclusory manner. Respondents have properly presented only
one argument for affirmance on alternative grounds. Rahrick argues that a claim of
malicious prosecution is viable only if the prior proceeding was terminated in favor of the
party asserting the claim. Rahrick is correct. See Leiendecker v. Asian Women United,
895 N.W.2d 623, 634 (Minn. 2017). Because the first lawsuit was decided in the city’s
favor, Petsinger cannot prevail on his claim of malicious prosecution, which is part of count
3. Petsinger’s claim of abuse of process, which also is part of count 3, is unaffected.

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In sum, we reverse the district court’s order dismissing Petsinger’s amended
complaint in its entirety and remand for further proceedings on the claims in counts 1, 2,
3(b), 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10 to the extent that they are based on either the city’s non-renewal of
Petsinger’s water-tower lease or the city’s denial of Petsinger’s application for a right-of-
way permit.
III. Sanctions
Petsinger also argues that the district court erred by imposing monetary sanctions
on him.
Every pleading, motion, or other document that is filed with a district court shall be
signed by an attorney or a self-represented party. Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.01. A person who
signs such a document impliedly certifies, among other things, that the document “is not
being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation”; that “the claims . . . and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law”; and
that “the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or . . . are likely
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02(a)-(c). Similar obligations are prescribed by statute.
See Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subds. 1, 2 (2024).
A district court may impose sanctions if it determines that rule 11.02 has been
violated. Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03; Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 3. A motion for sanctions
must be “made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific

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conduct alleged to violate Rule 11.02.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(1); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 549.211, subd. 4(a). After a motion for sanctions is served, the motion “shall not be filed
with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion . . . , the
challenged document, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(1); see also Minn. Stat. § 549.211,
subd. 4(a). This 21-day period is known as the safe-harbor period. See In re Estate of
Flatgard, 14 N.W.3d 305, 311 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2025). In
the absence of a motion for sanctions, a district court may impose sanctions on its own
initiative, so long as it previously “enter[ed] an order describing the specific conduct that
appears to violate Rule 11.02 and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause
why it has not violated Rule 11.02 with respect thereto.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(2); see
also Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 4(b).
If a district court finds a violation of rule 11.02, the district court “may . . . impose
an appropriate sanction.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03; Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 3. An
appropriate sanction may include “an order directing payment . . . of some or all of the
reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. ”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(b); see also Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 5(a). This court applies
an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s order for sanctions. Johnson
ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 726 N.W.2d 516, 518 (Minn. App. 2007).
Petsinger contends that the district court erred on the ground that no motion for
sanctions actually was filed. We agree. In fact, Rahrick informed the district court that he
did not file a sanctions motion against Petsinger. In his memorandum in support of his

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motion to dismiss, Rahrick stated: “Rahrick has not at this point in time filed a notice of
motion for sanctions against Petsinger. He did provide Petsinger with the required safe-
harbor notice. There is no motion before the court regarding this issue.” The district court
erroneously stated in its order that Rahrick had moved for sanctions. It is undisputed that
the city also did not move for sanctions.
On appeal, Rahrick contends that the district court properly imposed sanctions on
Petsinger on its own initiative. But, under both the rule and the statute, a district court may
impose sanctions on its own initiative only if the district court previously “enter[ed] an
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate Rule 11.02 and directing an
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated Rule 11.02 with respect
thereto.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(2); see also Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 4(b). In this
case, the district court did not file such an order. Furthermore, neither the district court nor
any defendant mentioned the issue of sanctions at the October 2025 motion hearing. As a
consequence, Petsinger did not have notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue
before sanctions were imposed on him.
Thus, the district court erred by imposing sanctions on Petsinger.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.