Susan Thompson v. Paul Schnell, Commissioner, Department of Corrections, et al

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2219

Susan Thompson,
Appellant,

vs.

Paul Schnell, Commissioner, Department of Corrections, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed October 12, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-24-7971

Kevin C. Riach, The Law Firm of Kevin C. Riach, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Rasmusson, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant has registered as a predatory offender since August 2010, following her
conviction for fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. In 2024, appellant sued respondents,

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for state and federal substantive and procedural
due-process violations based on the lifetime predatory-offender registration requirement
set out in Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d) (2024). This appeal challenges the district
court’s dismissal of her complaint under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e) as
barred by the statute of limitations. Because the district court correctly determined that the
six-year limitations period expired before appellant commenced suit, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the factual allegations in the complaint along with
undisputed facts and relevant procedural history.
In 2010, appellant Susan Thompson pleaded guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct. During the plea hearing, Thompson acknowledged that she “knew her husband
wanted to confront” a man with whom she had been having an affair. Thompson agreed
that she had “enticed [the man] to come to her home so that her husband could confront
him and hold him against his will to intimidate him,” and she admitted to “engag[ing] in
sexual contact with [the man] while her husband was holding [the man] against his will.”
The district court sentenced Thompson to 90 months in prison, stayed for ten years, and
imposed two years of electronic home monitoring. Thompson successfully completed her
probation and was discharged in July 2020.
Based on her 2010 conviction, Thompson was required to register as a predatory
offender for life under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d)(3). It is undisputed that Thompson

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registered as a predatory offender for the first time on August 3, 2010.1 Thompson satisfied
the registration requirements “annually since her conviction.”
In December 2024, Thompson sued respondents Paul Schnell, in his official
capacity as the commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections, and Drew
Evans, in his official capacity as the superintendent of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA).2
Thompson’s complaint alleges that “Minnesota provides no internal review or other
administrative or statutory mechanism by which a registered predatory offender can
challenge the duration or necessity of ongoing predatory offender registration.” And it
alleges that, “[a]bsent some review mechanism,” the “lifetime registration statute does not
comport with the due process protections of the Minnesota and United States
Constitutions.” The complaint also alleges that the predatory- offender registration
requirement has prevented Thompson from “seeking employment, further education, and

1 Thompson’s complaint alleges that “she learned shortly after pleading guilty that she
would be subject to a lifetime registration” requirement under the statute. Her complaint
also alleges that she was “shocked” to learn of the lifetime registration requirement and
that her trial counsel told her at the plea hearing that her registration requirement “would
run only ten years, concurrent with her term of probation.”
The record shows that, in 2023, Thompson moved to withdraw her guilty plea on
the grounds that it was invalid because she was unaware of the lifetime registration
requirement when she pleaded guilty. The district court treated Thompson’s motion as a
request for postconviction relief and denied it as time- barred. Thompson’s request for
postconviction relief is not before us.

2 Respondents argue that the department of corrections has “no authority over
[Thompson’s] statutory registration requirement or the administration of it.” Because we
affirm the district court’s order dismissing Thompson’s complaint on other grounds, we
need not address this argument.

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financial services” and from “leaving her spousal relationship, which is characterized by
emotional abuse and control.”
Thompson’s complaint seeks a declaratory judgment under the Minnesota Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act, Minn. Stat. § 555.01-.16 (2024), that the lifetime registration
requirement violates the procedural and substantive due-process guarantees of the
Minnesota and United States constitutions. The complaint also seeks an injunction under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) barring respondents from requiring Thompson to comply with the
registration requirement.
Respondents moved to dismiss Thompson’s complaint on statute-of-limitations
grounds and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After the hearing,
the district court’s order granted respondents’ motion because it concluded that
Thompson’s claims are time-barred. The district court’s written analysis determined that
Thompson’s complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating “a continuing violation of her
constitutional rights,” rejected Thompson’s analysis of recent Minnesota Supreme Court
caselaw, and disagreed that the “pure defense” exception applied to her claims.
Thompson appeals.
DECISION
Appellate courts “review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”
Werlich v. Schnell, 958 N.W.2d 354, 363 (Minn. 2021). “[A] motion to dismiss should be
granted only when it is clear from the stated allegations in the complaint that the statute of
limitations has run.” Hansen v. U. S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 934 N.W.2d 319, 326 (Minn. 2019).
“[A] pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could

5
be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief
demanded.” Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted). “When conducting our review, we consider only the facts alleged in
the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party.” Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010)
(quotation omitted); Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) (allowing a defense by motion for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
The limitations period that applies to Thompson’s claims is six years. See Franklin
v. Evans, 992 N.W.2d 379, 382-83, 385 (Minn. 2023) (affirming dismissal of a complaint
asserting section 1983 and declaratory-judgment claims and applying a six-year limitations
period). The United States Supreme Court has held that “all § 1983 suits must be brought
within a State’s statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.” Nance v. Ward, 142 S. Ct. 2214, 2225 (2022). In Minnesota, a claim “for any other injury to the person or
rights of another” must be brought within six years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (2024).
“Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run on a claim when the cause of
action accrues.” Franklin, 992 N.W.2d at 385 (quotations omitted); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 541.01 (2024) (stating that actions must be commenced within the statutory limitations
period “after the cause of action accrues”). “A cause of action accrues when all of the
elements of the action have occurred, such that the cause of action could be brought and
would survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Franklin, 992 N.W.2d at
385 (quoting Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 2011)).

6
Here, the parties disagree on when the limitations period for Thompson’s claims
began to run— i.e., when her claims accrued—and whether the period was tolled. 3
Thompson argues that her action was commenced within the six-year limitations period
and offers four arguments in support. First, she argues that, due to changed circumstances,
her due-process claims accrued sometime after her initial predatory- offender registration
in 2010. Second, she contends that the statute of limitations is tolled because th e
predatory-offender registration requirement is a continuing violation of her constitutional
rights. Third, Thompson maintains that, under the “pure defense” doctrine, she may invoke
constitutional claims that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. And
fourth, she asserts that the limitations period began in 2020, when the legislature
“materially changed” the predatory-offender registration statutes, and therefore her claims
are timely.4

3 Tolling “stops the running of the statute of limitations” and “lengthens the time for
commencing a civil action in appropriate circumstances.” State of Minn. Off. of Att’y Gen.
v. Madison Equities, Inc., 29 N.W.3d 700, 707 (Minn. 2026).

4 On appeal, Thompson also argues that the predatory-offender registration statute violates
her substantive and procedural due -process rights. The district court did not reach
Thompson’s argument on the merits; nor do we. That said, we observe that we recently
rejected a nearly identical argument in Jefferson v. Evans, a nonprecedential opinion
applying precedential caselaw. No. A23-1622, 2024 WL 2814453, at *2-5 (Minn. App.
June 3, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2024). Nonprecedential opinions may be cited
as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
This court rejected Jefferson’s substantive due-process challenge to the
predatory-offender registration statute. Jefferson, 2024 WL 2814453, at *3. In doing so,
we stated that we “declin[ed] to stray from the binding caselaw that has determined that
the registration requirements satisfy the rational-basis test for a substantive-due -process
claim.” Id. (first citing Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716- 17 (Minn. 1999); then
citing Thibodeaux v. Evans, 926 N.W.2d 602, 606-07 (Minn. App. 2019); and then citing
Bedeau v. Evans, 926 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn. App. 2019)). We also rejected Jefferson’s

7
We address each of Thompson’s arguments in turn.
A. Thompson’s changed-circumstances argument is unavailing.

Thompson argues that her constitutional claims “did not accrue until the statute no
longer bore a ‘rational relation’ to the public purpose sought to be served by her
registration.” She maintains that she “lacked a due process claim at the time of her guilty
plea” and that her “due -process claim arose after the passage of time, at which point her
age and changed circumstances, including successful completion of therapy and lengthy
period of law- abiding conduct, rendered her ongoing registration requirement irrational
under the law and thus unconstitutional.” Thompson’s argument fails for two reasons.
First, Thompson’s accrual argument is inconsistent with Minnesota caselaw. In
Franklin, the supreme court analyzed the accrual of similar section 1983 and
declaratory-judgment claims that challenged the constitutionality of the ten-year
predatory-offender registration requirement set out in Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(a)
(2022). 992 N.W.2d at 384-85. In doing so, the supreme court applied the test for accrual
set out in Hamann—“a cause of action accrues when all of the elements of the action have
occurred, such that the cause of action could be brought and would survive a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Hamann, 808 N.W.2d at 832). The
supreme court determined that, “[f]or Franklin, the act giving rise to these ongoing duties”
under the predatory-offender registration statute “was the BCA’s initial determination that

procedural due-process argument, relying on binding caselaw in which we held that the
registration requirement “imposed ‘only a minimal burden on offenders.’” Id . at *4
(quoting Bedeau, 926 N.W.2d at 432).

8
he must register as a predatory offender.” Id. at 387. Franklin’s constitutional claims
therefore accrued “when he was first required to register as a predatory offender because
all the facts and circumstances of his case existed such that the cause of action could have
been brought and would survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Similar reasoning applies to the accrual of Thompson’s constitutional claims. The
BCA made an “initial determination” when it required Thompson to register in 2010. Id.
Thompson’s complaint alleges no new acts by the BCA after this initial determination.
Thus, Thompson’s constitutional claims accrued when she was first required to register in
2010, and her action commenced more than six years later. See id.
Thompson disagrees, arguing that “indefinite registration with no avenue for review
once the limitations period has passed violates due process. ” Thompson contends that the
supreme court in Franklin left “room” for the constitutional claims she now asserts. The
supreme court acknowledged Franklin’s argument that, “if the statute of limitations does
not apply to extensions of the registration period, the State could extend a person’s
registration indefinitely, and the person would be prohibited from ever challenging the
registration requirements after the limitatio ns period has ended.” Id. at 388-89. The
supreme court added that Franklin “makes no such allegation here.” Id. at 389.
But we are not persuaded that Thompson’s lifetime registration period, along with
her claim that she has “no avenue for review,” support a different accrual date for her
constitutional claims. The district court concluded that there was a “principled difference”
between this case and Franklin because Franklin’s ten-year registration requirement was

9
extended, while Thompson “has always known . . . that registration was a lifetime
obligation.”
We agree with the district court. The test for accrual is “when all of the elements of
the action have occurred.” Id. at 385. For Thompson, all of the elements of her
constitutional challenges to the lifetime predatory-offender registration requirement
occurred when the BCA imposed the requirement in 2010. As the supreme court summed
up in Franklin, “[t]he fact that the limitations period for challenging [Franklin’s] initial
registration has passed, as well as the fact that the continuing registration requirements are
only continuing effects of Franklin’s initial registration, ” support dismissal of the
constitutional claims as untimely. Id. at 389. So too, the limitations period for Thompson
to challenge her lifetime registration requirement has passed and the changed
circumstances she alleges in her complaint are “only continuing effects.” Id.
5
Second, even if we assume that Thompson’s constitutional claims accrued at the
time her circumstances changed, Thompson ’s complaint does not allege any changed
circumstances within six years of commencing this suit. Indeed, her brief to this court does

5 Additionally, Thompson cites no caselaw, and we are aware of none, in which a
constitutional challenge to a statute accrued based on a claimant’s change in circumstances.
Thompson appears to make a good-faith argument for the extension of the law by citing
caselaw from outside this jurisdiction in which appellate courts have concluded that a
person required to register must be afforded the opportunity for review in order to
determine their present level of risk. See Powell v. Keel, 860 S.E.2d 344, 351-52 (S.C.
2021); In re Int. of J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 19 (Pa. 2014); State v. Guidry, 96 P.3d 242, 255 (Haw.
2004). We observe that none of these cases directly involved accrual or the extension of
time to file a claim. And in any event, we are not persuaded to rule in Thompson’s favor
because doing so would be contrary to Minnesota Supreme Court precedent established in
Franklin.

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not identify on what date her claims accrued. The only specific changed circumstance
alleged in Thompson’s complaint is her therapist’s 2013 assessment that Thompson had
“benefitted from psychotherapy and her risk of reoffending is extremely low, if at all.”
Even if we assume this 2013 circumstance marked the accrual of Thompson’s
constitutional claims against respondents, the six-year limitations period nonetheless
expired before Thompson commenced this suit in 2024.
Because Thompson’s changed-circumstances argument is inconsistent with
Minnesota caselaw, and because Thompson fails to allege any changed circumstances
within six years of commencing her 2024 complaint, we conclude that the district court did
not err in concluding that Thompson’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
B. The supreme court rejected Thompson’s continuing-violation argument
in Franklin.

Thompson argues that the “ongoing unconstitutional application of the
[predatory-offender registration] statute constitutes a continuing violation that tolls the
statute of limitations under Minnesota law .” Thompson maintains that “it is the ongoing
denial of [her] right to seek removal from the registry due to her changing circumstances
that violates her rights.” “The continuing violations doctrine is an equitable doctrine that
can toll the statute of limitations where a pattern of discriminatory conduct constitutes a
sufficiently integrated pattern to form, in effect, a single discriminatory act.” Abel v. Abbott
Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 70 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
In Franklin, the supreme court rejected a continuing-violation argument similar to
Thompson’s. 992 N.W.2d at 386-88. The supreme court stated that the continuing-violation

11
doctrine did not apply to Franklin’s constitutional challenge to the ten-year
predatory-offender registration statute. Id. at 388. The supreme court reasoned that the
ongoing obligations associated with registration that form the basis of Franklin’s complaint
are the “continuing effects of registration that flow from the [statute], not any additional
acts by the BCA.” Id. at 387.
The same reasoning applies to Thompson’s continuing-violation argument. Her
ongoing registration obligation and its collateral consequences are a “continuing effect[]”
that flows from “the BCA’s initial, single determination” requiring Thompson to register.
Id. Thompson’s complaint alleges no “pattern of discriminatory conduct” on the part of the
BCA. Abel, 947 N.W.2d at 70. As explained above, Thompson’s complaint alleges no new
act by the BCA after 2010. Thus, we reject Thompson’s continuing-violation argument.
C. Thompson’s pure-defense argument fails.

Thompson also maintains that her claims are not barred by the statute of limitations
because of the “pure defense” doctrine. She argues that her claims are “essentially
defensive in nature” because “[s]he seeks protections from the obligations of the
registration law as opposed to damages or some other affirmative relief.” Respondents
counter that Thompson “is seeking affirmative relief and is not raising a pure defense.”
“The general rule is that the statute of limitations may be used as a shield, not as a
sword, and that the statute of limitations does not bar a party from raising a pure defense.”
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 458 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn. 1990). Therefore, the pure-defense
doctrine allows a party to assert certain defenses, even when the limitations period for
bringing an affirmative action on the same grounds has expired. See id.

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Respondents are correct that Thompson’s complaint seeks affirmative relief .
Thompson’s complaint states that she is seeking “[a] judgment declaring that Minnesota
Statutes Section 243.166 violates the Minnesota and United States Constitutions,” “[a] n
injunction barring [Respondents] from requiring that [Thompson] register as a predatory
offender or otherwise enforcing Minnesota’s predatory offender registration laws against
[Thompson],” and “[a]n award of such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable
and just.” Because Thompson seeks affirmative relief and is not defending against claims
by respondents, the pure-defense doctrine does not apply.
Even if we accept Thompson’s premise that her claims are “essentially defensive,”
the pure-defense doctrine applies in narrow circumstances and no caselaw has extended
the doctrine to claims analogous to those in Thompson’s complaint.6 Minnesota appellate
courts have applied the pure-defense doctrine in cases involving defenses to a child-support

6 In support of her position, Thompson cites a nonprecedential opinion and an order
opinion. Nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions, however, are not
binding authority, “except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.” Id. In any
event, neither of the opinions helps Thompson’s position. The order opinion cited by
Thompson concluded that the pure-defense doctrine did not apply to save an untimely
claim for affirmative relief. Walker v. City of Afton, No. A24-1760, 2025 WL 1683459, at
*3 (Minn. App. June 11, 2025) (“Because Walker initiated this action and requested a
declaration that he may use the airstrip on his property, his promissory-estoppel claim does
not appear to be a ‘pure defense’ . . . .”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 2025). The
nonprecedential opinion cited by Thompson relates to mortgage foreclosure and is of
limited persuasive value for the reasons stated in this opinion’s discussion of Weavewood,
Inc. v. S & P Home Investments, LLC . Westman v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC,
No. A23-1634, 2024 WL 3648465, at *4 (Minn. App. Aug. 5, 2024) (“Westman’s quiet-
title claim, like the five claims in Weavewood, constitutes a pure defense to a foreclosure
action.”).

13
claim, Reynolds, 458 N.W.2d at 105, and to mortgage foreclosure, Weavewood, Inc. v.
S & P Home Invs., LLC , 821 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Minn. 2012).7 The pure-defense doctrine
has been applied only to allow a defense to a claim commenced after the statute of
limitations expired for the defendant’s affirmative claim based on the same legal argument
that supports the defense. For example, in Reynolds, a father was allowed to claim
nonpaternity in a marriage-dissolution and child-support action, even though a declaration
of nonparentage would have been outside the statute of limitations, because the challenge
was “in defense to someone else’s action against him.” Reynolds, 458 N.W.2d at 105
(emphasis added).
Thompson offers no equitable basis for extending the pure-defense doctrine to her
constitutional claims. She is not responding to a claim by the state or respondents. And, as
explained, all of the facts and circumstances of Thompson’s constitutional claims existed
when the BCA initially required her to register as a predatory offender in 2010. Thus,
Thompson could have commenced her complaint and sought affirmative relief within the
six-year statute of limitations, but she did not do so. Thompson is therefore in no position
to invoke the pure-defense doctrine to save her claims.

7 The supreme court endorsed the application of the pure-defense doctrine to
mortgage-foreclosure cases in Weavewood but remanded the question of “whether
Weavewood’s complaint present[ed] any pure defenses.” 821 N.W.2d at 581. On remand,
this court concluded that “a mortgagor’s challenge to the validity of the mortgage or
foreclosure sale presents a pure defense so long as it is asserted to prevent a pending
foreclosure.” Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs., LLC , No. A10-1762, 2013 WL
599125, at *1 (Minn. App. Feb. 19, 2013) (emphasis added).

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Relatedly, Thompson argues that it is against public policy to apply the statute of
limitations to her complaint because she could otherwise make this claim “if she first
violated her registration requirements and was criminally charged.” She contends that “the
Constitution cannot be construed to compel a person to commit a crime to vindicate their
rights.”
We decline to consider whether Thompson may, in some future legal action,
maintain that the predatory-offender registration statute is unconstitutional as a defense to
a charge for violating the statute. Simply put, that claim is not before us. We decide only
that Thompson’s complaint asserts constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Minn.
Stat. § 555.01 and that these claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations because
they accrued in 2010 when the BCA imposed the predatory-offender registration
requirement on Thompson.
D. Thompson’s argument about recent amendments to the
predatory-offender registration statute is forfeited.

Thompson argues that the predatory- offender registration requirement “materially
changed in 2020,” which is within the limitations period, and that therefore, her
2024 complaint was timely commenced. In support of this argument, Thompson cites
Werlich, in which the supreme court discussed the effect of the 2020 amendments on a
due-process challenge to the predatory-offender registration statute. 958 N.W.2d at 362
(stating that “additional consequences of registration” became “more substantial” in 2020).
Thompson suggests that these amendments make her complaint timely because, otherwise,

15
a person subject to lifetime registration “could have their registration requirements changed
with no ability to challenge the constitutionality of the amended statute.”
Thompson’s argument is not grounded in her complaint, which does not describe
the 2020 amendments or challenge the constitutionality of those amendments. Nor does
Thompson’s brief to this court explain how the 2020 amendments support her
constitutional challenges to the registration statute as a whole. Thompson also does not cite
any caselaw recognizing that statutory amendments restart the limitations period for a
constitutional challenge to the statutory provisions that were not amended.
We conclude that this issue is inadequately briefed. Appellate courts may decline to
reach issues that are inadequately briefed. State Dep’t of Lab . & Indus. by the Special
Comp. Fund v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997). And an
assignment of error in a brief based on “mere assertion” and not supported by argument or
authority is forfeited unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection. Schoepke v.
Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).
No error is obvious to us on mere inspection. See id. Both the
2008 predatory-offender registration statute, which was effective at the time of
Thompson’s offense, and the 2020 amendments referenced in Thompson’s brief require a
person convicted of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct to register for life. Compare
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d)(3) (2008) (requiring lifetime registration for persons
convicted of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(c),
among other offenses), with Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d)(3) (2020) (same). Because

16
it is not obvious that the 2020 amendments relate to Thompson’s complaint or to the
accrual of her causes of action, this argument is forfeited.
In sum, Thompson’s constitutional claims asserted in her 2024 complaint accrued
in 2010 when she was first required to register as a predatory offender. Therefore,
Thompson’s claims are untimely and her complaint failed to state a claim on which relief
can be granted.
Affirmed.