State of Minnesota v. Nathaniel Aaron Zeon

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-2221

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nathaniel Aaron Zeon,
Appellant.

Filed August 17, 2026
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-24-7841

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julia Q. Brady, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Following his sentencing for first-degree assault, appellant challenges the district
court’s denial of his motion for a downward dispositional departure. We affirm.

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FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Nathaniel Aaron Zeon with first-
degree assault for inflicting great bodily harm in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.221, subdivision 1 (2024). The parties entered into a plea agreement in which
appellant would plead guilty as charged but argue for a dispositional departure at
sentencing. The state later noted that it “does not oppose a conditional release . . . to
treatment pending sentencing.”
The district court held a plea hearing at which appellant admitted to the following
facts underlying the charge, which were also supported by surveillance video. Early one
morning, appellant and victim were passengers in a vehicle that arrived at a gas station.
Appellant and victim exited the vehicle and “got in a fight.” Victim was “very intoxicated”
and “ended up down on the ground” while appellant was still standing. Appellant then
“stomped on [victim’s] head repeatedly.” Victim lost consciousness, had “almost all of his
teeth” knocked out, and suffered facial injuries requiring plastic surgery.
After these admissions , the district court stated that it would (1) wait to accept
appellant’s plea pending review of a presentence investigation report (PSI) and
(2) conditionally release appellant to inpatient treatment with a particular treatment center
“for co-occurring mental illness and chemical dependency” pending sentencing. The
conditions of his release required appellant to “comply with [the] requirements and
recommendations of the treatment facility” and prohibited him from “leav[ing] treatment
without prior authorization by the Court.”

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Appellant entered inpatient treatment in May 2025, when he was 19 years old. A
counselor from the treatment center told appellant’s probation officer that he “participates
in all aspects of treatment progress, engages with peers through positive feedback[,] and
address[es] his concerns during group and individual sessions.” During an interview with
the probation officer, appellant acknowledged the influence of alcohol and drugs on his
behavior and expressed interest in “address[ing] his mental health” through treatment. The
probation officer completed the PSI in June 2025 and recommended sentencing appellant
“pursuant to the presumptive guideline sentence” of 86 months in prison . Although
appellant “provided negative drug testing results to date,” the PSI noted “the seriousness
of the offense” and explained that “there does not appear to be substantial information to
support a dispositional departure.”
Appellant completed inpatient treatment at the treatment center and then
transitioned into outpatient treatment but failed to attend some of the outpatient treatment
sessions. In July 2025, the treatment center deemed appellant to have “absconded for poor
attendance.”
Appellant moved for a downward dispositional departure and requested
probationary release to a different treatment center for outpatient treatment. The district
court held a sentencing hearing during which both parties presented arguments on the
motion and appellant provided an oral statement. The district court ultimately accepted
appellant’s guilty plea, adjudicated him guilty of first-degree assault, denied his departure
motion, and imposed a presumptive guidelines sentence of 86 months in prison with 190
days credited for time served.

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This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a downward dispositional departure. He further challenges the district court’s
(1) statement that probation would involve “the exact same kinds of conditions and
treatment” as conditional release; (2) failure to consider his “immaturity” during treatment;
and (3) focus on his amenability to treatment.
A district court has broad discretion in sentencing decisions. State v. Soto, 855
N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). A district court “abuses its discretion when its decision
is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.”
State v. Glover, 4 N.W.3d 124, 134 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide “presumptive sentences for felony
offenses according to the severity level of the offense . . . and [the] offender’s criminal
history score.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.15 (2024). A guidelines sentence is presumed
appropriate. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2024). “ We will affirm the imposition of a
presumptive guidelines sentence when the record shows that the sentencing court carefully
evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a determination.”
State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
A district court may depart from a presumptive guidelines sentence if “identifiable,
substantial, and compelling circumstances ” support the departure. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.1. However, even if the record reflects factors that could support a

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departure, the district court has broad discretion not to depart. See, e.g., State v. Walker,
913 N.W.2d 463, 468-69 (Minn. App. 2018).
When evaluating a motion for a downward dispositional departure, a district court
considers whether the defendant is “particularly amenable to individualized treatment in a
probationary setting.” State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Minn. 1981). A district court
may consider the Trog factors in making this determination, which include the defendant’s
age, prior record, remorse, cooperation, attitude while in court, and support of friends and
family. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). When denying a dispositional
departure, the district court need not discuss every Trog factor, State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d
251, 254 (Minn. App. 2011), or explain its reasoning for the denial on the record, Johnson,
831 N.W.2d at 926.
After hearing arguments from each part y’s counsel and an oral statement from
appellant, the district court acknowledged that “this is an incredibly difficult case” and
whether to depart is “not an easy choice.” It discussed the Trog factors and recognized that
several weighed in favor of a departure but then explained that it could not “get over” the
fact that appellant “made a decision to walk away from” treatment while on conditional
release. The district court further explained: “And given the seriousness of the underlying
crime, when weighing all of those factors together, I find he is not particularly amenable
to treatment or to probation here.”
Appellant’s primary argument is that the district court abused its discretion when
denying his departure motion because “ substantial and compelling circumstances existed
and show that [he] is particularly amenable to probation.” But even if some factors favored

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departure, the district court did not need to depart. See Walker, 913 N.W.2d at 468-69.
When denying a departure motion, a district court only needs to “carefully evaluate[] all
the testimony and information presented before making a determination.” Johnson, 831
N.W.2d at 925.
Appellant makes three additional assertions. We address the first two together
before turning to the third. Appellant first contends that the district court erred by stating
that his requested probationary treatment center would involve the “exact same kinds of
conditions and treatment” as his conditional-release treatment center. Appellant next
contends that the district court erred by “fail[ing] to consider how [his] immaturity played
into his failure to complete outpatient treatment.” But because appellant presents no
caselaw or legal argument to support either of these assertions of error, he forfeits them.
See State v. Bellazan, 18 N.W.3d 385, 402 (Minn. App. 2025) (“[A]n assignment of error
based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s
brief is [forfeited] and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious
on mere inspection.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 2025). We discern
no prejudicial error and therefore decline to consider his arguments about the different
treatment centers and his immaturity during treatment. See id.
Lastly, appellant contends that the district court “confuse[d] amenability to
probation with amenability to treatment,” and erroneously focused only on his amenability
to treatment. But the record reflects that the district court found that appellant “is not
particularly amenable to treatment or to probation.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover,

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appellant conceded that he needed treatment and specifically argued at sentencing that he
was particularly amenable to treatment.
The district court carefully considered the factors weighing in favor of and against
departure. See Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925. It did not misapply the law or rely on
erroneous facts or logic. See Glover, 4 N.W.3d at 134. This is therefore not the “rare case”
justifying reversal of a presumptive guidelines sentence imposed by the district court. State
v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981); see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.D.301
(2024) (noting that factors justifying departures will only occur in “small number of
cases”).
We acknowledge the positive steps that appellant has taken since his offense,
including completing inpatient treatment, taking responsibility for his actions, and
developing a plan to start his own business. But applying our deferential standard of
review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a
presumptive guidelines sentence.
Affirmed.