Daniel Quinones v. Saint Paul College

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0028

Daniel Quinones,
Appellant,

vs.

Saint Paul College,
Respondent.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-25-14570

Daniel Quinones, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Adrienne Kaufman, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
This appeal arises from appellant student’s lawsuit against respondent school for
declining to accommodate appellant’s disability by assigning only male teachers to his
classes and by seating only male students next to him. Appellant argues that the district
court abused its discretion in denying his motion for default judgment and erred in

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dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We
affirm.
FACTS
Consistent with applicable law, 1 the following factual summary stems from the
allegations set forth in appellant Daniel Quinones’s complaint, which this court accepts as
true and construes in the light most favorable to Quinones, who was the nonmoving party
before the district court.
In 2025, Quinones was enrolled as a student with respondent Saint Paul College.
When he registered for classes, Quinones requested an accommodation based on
“documented medical and psychological conditions.” Based on “specific medical needs
[that] are supported by documentation,” Quinones’s request “included the assignment of
male instructors and male paraprofessionals, as well as being seated near male students
during class.” In May, the college denied Quinones’s request, explaining that it “could not
accommodate requests based on the gender of staff members.” Quinones later met with
one of the college’s deans to discuss the denial of his request. The dean told Quinones that
his request was “‘unreasonable’ and stated that fulfilling [it] would conflict with the
college’s commitment to preparing students for the future” and “constitute discrimination
against female staff.”

1 See Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2021) (explaining
that, in reviewing a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss under Minn. R.
Civ. P. 12.02, appellate courts “must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and
construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” (quotation omitted)).

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On July 16, Quinones served a summons and complaint on the college. Although
the complaint does not contain enumerated causes of action, it alleges that the college
violated “the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),” “Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act,” “Minnesota Statute[s] [section] 121A.031” (“the Minnesota Safe and
Supportive Schools Act”), “Minnesota Statute[s] [section] 609.05,” “Minnesota Statute[s]
[section] 609.495,” “Title IX,” “federal disability law, civil rights protections, and the
college’s own non-discrimination and anti-retaliation policies.” The complaint also lists
the following demands for relief: (1) that Quinones receive “$50,000 for discrimination
and emotional distress”; (2) that “all [his] accommodations . . . be honored so that [he] can
attend school”; and (3) that certain administrators of the college, including the dean, “be
held accountable for negligent supervision.”
On August 7, Quinones filed the complaint in the district court. That same day, the
college filed and served a motion to dismiss the complaint under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.02(e), asserting that Quinones had failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Quinones later requested default judgment in his favor by filing an
affidavit asserting that “[t]he time allowed by law and specified in the summons for [the
college] to answer the complaint has elapsed[,]” “[n]o answer or other pleading was
received by or served upon [Quinones], . . . [the college] did not otherwise defend[,]” and
that, as a result, the college “is in default.” The affidavit also avers that, because of the
college’s purported default, Quinones is due $50,000 in damages, plus interest and $322 in
court fees. The college subsequently moved to enlarge the time to respond to the complaint.

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After a hearing on October 31, the district court filed an order granting the college’s
motion to dismiss Quinones’s complaint with prejudice, on which the court entered
judgment for the college. In an attached memorandum, the district court detailed its
analysis of the college’s motion to enlarge time, which the court implicitly granted, and
Quinones’s request for default judgment, which the court expressly denied. Addressing
Quinones’s accommodation, retaliation, and negligent-supervision claims, including that
the college “violated a litany of statutes by refusing to provide him exclusively male
instructors[] [and] male paraprofessionals, and [by declining to] rearrange his class seating
charts to only be next to males,” the district court determined that there “is no possibility
for any evidence to support the relief he demands.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court acted within its discretion in expressly denying Quinones’s
request for default judgment and implicitly granting the college’s motion to
enlarge time.

Quinones asserts that the district court abused its discretion because it “failed to rule
on [his] motion for default judgment after [the college] filed its motion to dismiss late.”
Contending that “[t]he district court did not address [his default] motion before granting
dismissal,” Quinones claims that “[t]his constitutes procedural error and deprived [him]
adjudication of procedural rights.” The college counters that the “district court properly
denied Quinones’s motion for default judgment and excused [its] one-day delay in filing
the motion to dismiss.” We agree with the college.

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“A [district] court’s action permitting a party to serve or file a pleading after
expiration of a time limit is discretionary and will not be reversed unless the discretion has
been abused.” Coller v. Guardian Angels Roman Cath. Church of Chaska, 294 N.W.2d
712, 715 (Minn. 1980); accord Lake Superior Ctr. Auth. v. Hammel, Green & Abrahamson,
Inc., 715 N.W.2d 458, 471 (Minn. App. 2006) (“The district court’s extension of a time
limit under [Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure] 6.02 is discretionary and will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 23, 2006).
“If [a rule 6.02] motion is made after time expires, . . . the [district] court may
enlarge the time limit ‘where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.’” Lake
Superior Ctr. Auth., 715 N.W.2d at 470 (quoting Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.02). “Excusable neglect
is a basis for relief for clients when they suffer from the negligence of their attorneys . . . .”
Firkus v. Harms , 914 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. App. 2018). “To establish excusable
neglect, there are four required elements: (1) there is a reasonable defense on the merits;
(2) there is a reasonable excuse for the failure to file; (3) the party acted with due diligence
after notice; and (4) no substantial prejudice results to other parties.” Id. Similarly,
denial of a motion for a default judgment is proper when four
requirements are met: defendant has a reasonable defense on
the merits; defendant has a reasonable excuse for his failure to
answer; defendant acted with due diligence after notice of the
entry of judgment; and no substantial prejudice will result to
other parties.

Coller, 294 N.W.2d at 715.
Contrary to Quinones’s argument, the district court explained in the memorandum
attached to its order granting the college’s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice

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that it expressly denied Quinones’s request for default judgment and implicitly granted the
college’s motion to enlarge time. The district court stated that “Quinones[’s] request for
default judgment is denied” after determining that the college had “a valid defense on the
merits, a reasonable excuse for failure to act, ha[d] shown due diligence, and [had] shown
that a one-day delay in filing the motion to dismiss
[ 2] did not result in any prejudice against
Quinones.”
More specifically, the district court ruled that the college had a valid defense on the
merits based on its decision to dismiss Quinones’s complaint. The district court determined
that the college had a reasonable excuse for failing to file within the required period
because the college’s counsel “admit[ted] that the delay in filing was because internal
correspondence indicated Quinones [had] served his complaint on July 17, 2025, not July
16, 2025.” Because “[c]ounsel discovered the error upon reading the opposition briefing
for the motion to dismiss on October 17, 2025 and filed the motion for enlargement on
October 24, 2025,” the district court decided that the college “show[ed] due diligence in
remedying the error.” Lastly, the district court ruled that “Quinones suffered no prejudice,
let alone substantial prejudice, in a one-day delay.” Given that the district court’s
determinations are reasonably supported by the record and consistent with applicable law,
we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision. See Coller, 294 N.W.2d
at 715.

2 The college served its motion to dismiss on August 7, 2025, one day after the expiration
of the 21- day period that ran from Quinones’s service of the complaint on July 16. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.01.

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We therefore conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in expressly
denying Quinones’s request for default judgment and implicitly granting the college’s
motion to enlarge time.
II. The district court did not err in granting the college’s motion to dismiss
Quinones’s complaint with prejudice.

Quinones maintains that the district court “erred by dismissing [his] disability
discrimination claims under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) despite allegations satisfying the
statutory elements of the [ADA] (42 U.S.C. § 12132), the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C.
§ 794),[ 3] and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ([MHRA,] Minn. Stat. § 363A.11).” He
also contends that dismissal was erroneous because his “accommodation request [was]
based on disability, not gender,” and “the district court misapplied the private right of
action” that he claims he has against the college under, among other things, Minnesota
Statutes section 363A.33 (2024)—a provision of the MHRA. The college responds that
“[t]he district court correctly dismissed Quinones’s reasonable accommodation claim

3 Quinones also argues that he has “ a private enforcement mechanism ” under “29 U.S.C.
§ 794a(a)(2).” We decline to address this argument because Quinones did not present a
claim based on “29 U.S.C. § 794” in the complaint and the district court therefore did not
discuss its consideration of that statute in the order granting the college’s motion to dismiss
with prejudice. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (explaining that
“[a] reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented [to] and considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before
it[,] . . . [n]or may a party obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below
but under a different theory” (quotation and citations omitted)). But we would still affirm
for the same reasons expressed below even if we were to address this issue because “section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, . . . codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000), and its
implementing regulations have been interpreted to encompass reasonable accommodations
provisions that are substantively identical to those in the ADA.” Hinneberg v. Big Stone
Cnty. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 706 N.W.2d 220, 226 n.5 (Minn. 2005).

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under [Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure] 12.02(e) because his requested accommodation
was unlawful and therefore unreasonable.” According to the college, “Quinones’s theory
fails because the accommodation he sought —agreeing to provide him exclusively male
professors and paraprofessionals, as well as seating by only male students—would require
the college to violate anti-discrimination laws by deciding staffing and student seating on
the basis of sex[,]” which the college argues “is per se unreasonable,” regardless of any
additional facts Quinones might develop. The college’s argument is persuasive.
Appellate courts “review de novo whether a complaint has stated a claim
sufficiently to survive a motion to dismiss.” State of Minn. Off. of Att’y Gen. v. Madison
Equities, Inc., 29 N.W.3d 700, 706 (Minn. 2026) (quotation omitted). As noted above,
appellate courts must “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Halva, 953 N.W.2d at 500
(quotation omitted). While “absolute specificity in pleading is not necessary,” courts will
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim “if it appears to a certainty that no facts,
which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting
the relief demanded.” Id. at 500–01 (quotations omitted).
“[T]itle II of the ADA . . . prohibits public entities from discriminating in the
provision of services, programs, or activities on the basis of a person’s disability.”
Hinneberg, 706 N.W.2d at 226 (footnote omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000)). A
plaintiff may “prove discrimination under the ADA” by establishing a “refusal to
reasonably accommodate.” Id. at 225. “In order to prevail on a reasonable accommodations
claim, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the accommodation [they] seek[]

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is reasonable on its face.” Id. at 226. “The burden is on the plaintiff to show that [their]
requested accommodation is (1) linked to [their] disability-related needs, (2) necessary to
afford [them] an equal opportunity to enjoy [public] benefits and (3) possible to
implement.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Another way to formulate this test is by focusing on
three key elements: necessity, equal opportunity, and reasonableness.” Id. “If the plaintiff
satisfies these requirements, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate undue
hardship in the particular circumstances.” Id.
Quinones does not challenge the district court’s determinations that his complaint
adequately alleges that his requested accommodation is both linked to his disability-related
needs4 and necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to enjoy public education. See id.
He instead focuses his contentions on the district court’s decision as to the third prong —
reasonableness. See id.
On that score, we conclude that the district court correctly reasoned that it was
impossible for the college to implement Quinones’s accommodation request because doing
so “would violate both the federal Civil Rights Act and the [MHRA].” Indeed, under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, employers may not “limit, segregate, or classify [their]
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [their]
status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)

4 We reject Quinones’s argument that the district court erroneously mischaracterized his
accommodation request as one stemming from gender instead of disability. This is because
the district court’s analysis appropriately accepts as true Quinones’s allegations as to the
link between his accommodation request and his stated disability-related needs.

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(2018). The MHRA similarly precludes employers from “discriminat[ing] against a person
with respect to . . . terms, . . . conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment” on the
basis of sex or gender identity. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2(3) (2024).
Although Title VII and the MHRA provide exceptions to these prohibitions, the
facts alleged in the complaint—taken as true and construed in Quinones’s favor—are
insufficient to support a viable reasonable -accommodation claim. Title VII permits
classifications “where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e) (2018). And the MHRA mentions in each relevant subdivision that
classification is prohibited “[e]xcept when based on a bona fide occupational
qualification.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subds. 2–6 (2024).
“In interpreting the MHRA . . . [Minnesota appellate courts] will usually follow the
lead of the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of federal anti-discrimination
statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .” Huisenga v. Opus Corp.,
494 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Minn. 1992). The Supreme Court has instructed that, to constitute
a bona fide occupational qualification, “permissible distinctions based on sex must relate
to ability to perform the duties of the job.” Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991).
Because the sex or gender identity of instructors and paraprofessionals does not relate to
their ability to perform their duties in teaching classes at the college, they are not
permissible distinctions that constitute a bona fide occupational qualification that can serve
as exceptions to Title VII and the MHRA. We therefore discern no error in the district

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court’s determination that it was impossible for the college to implement Quinones’s
requested accommodation because it would contravene Title VII and the MHRA.
Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting the college’s
motion to dismiss Quinones’s complaint with prejudice.
Affirmed.