In the Matter of the Welfare of: T. L. L., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0045

In the Matter of the Welfare of: T. L. L., Child.

Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-JV-25-1281

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Laura G. Heinrich, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant T.L.L.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Natalie Schiferl, Assistant County
Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Rasmusson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Approximately one month before his seventeenth birthday, T.L.L. was arrested for
possessing 61 grams of methamphetamine. The state filed a juvenile-delinquency petition,
charging T.L.L. with a first-degree controlled substance crime. The state also moved to
certify T.L.L. for prosecution as an adult. The juvenile court granted the motion. We
conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by certifying T.L.L. for
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prosecution as an adult. We also conclude that T.L.L.’s court-appointed attorney did not
provide him with constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
The delinquency petition alleges the following facts, which we assume to be true
for purposes of the state’s certification motion.
In September 2025, a state trooper saw a vehicle brake suddenly and turn without
properly signaling near Motley in Morrison County. After the vehicle was stopped, the
trooper noticed that the front-seat passenger, later identified as T.L.L., was slumped over
in his seat with white powder residue on his clothing, which caused the trooper to become
concerned for his welfare. While the trooper was standing next to the vehicle, he saw
T.L.L. reach toward his left side, which caused the trooper to believe that he might be
armed. T.L.L. initially refused the trooper’s multiple commands to exit the vehicle. When
T.L.L. did exit the vehicle, he resisted the trooper’s attempt to conduct a protective search.
After T.L.L. was subdued, the trooper conducted a search of T.L.L’s person, which
revealed a bag containing 61 grams of methamphetamine.
The following day, the state filed a delinquency petition charging T.L.L. with first-
degree controlled substance crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1)
(Supp. 2025), and obstruction of legal process, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.50,
subd. 1(2) (2024). One week later, the state moved to certify T.L.L. for prosecution as an
adult on count 1, the drug charge. After a pre-trial hearing in early October 2025, the
juvenile court ordered a certification study and a psychological evaluation, which were
completed in early November 2025.
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The certification-study report, which was prepared by a county corrections agent,
summarized T.L.L.’s prior record, placement history, family history, education,
employment, and other personal attributes. The certification -study report analyzed the
statutory public-safety factors and recommended an extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ)
designation. The psychological-examination report, which was prepared by a licensed
psychologist who had done a clinical interview of T.L.L., also summarized T.L.L.’s
background, evaluated the statutory public- safety factors, and recommended that the
juvenile court order EJJ.
In late November 2025, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the state’ s
certification motion. The certification-study report and the psychological-evaluation report
were admitted into evidence. The parties did not present any additional evidence. T.L.L.’s
attorney argued that EJJ was appropriate because T.L.L. had not been charged with a
violent offense, his prior record included only relatively minor offenses, he had not
demonstrated a history of failing programming, and the programming available in EJJ
would address his chemical-dependency and trauma-therapy needs. The state argued that
certification was appropriate because T.L.L.’s offense had a serious impact on the
community, had elements of sophistication, and lacked mitigating factors. The state also
argued that T.L.L’s criminal record demonstrates an escalation in offense severity and that
he has shown an unwillingness to participate in programming. In December 2025, the
juvenile court filed a 15-page order in which it granted the state’s certification motion.
T.L.L. appeals.

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DECISION
T.L.L. raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the juvenile court erred
by granting the state’s motion to certify him for prosecution as an adult. Second, he argues
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
I. Certification Motion
T.L.L. argues that, for two reasons, the juvenile court erred by certifying him for
prosecution as an adult.
Juvenile defendants accused of criminal conduct are tried in the juvenile division of
the district court. Minn. Stat. § 260B.101, subd. 1 (2024). If a juvenile is found to be
delinquent, the juvenile court may order any of a variety of dispositions, along with
“written findings of fact to support the disposition ordered” and to explain “why the best
interests of the child are served by the disposition ordered” and “what alternative
dispositions were considered.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(a), 1(b) (2024).
If a juvenile is charged with a felony offense, the case may be designat ed an EJJ
proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260B.130 , subd. 1 (2024). “In an EJJ prosecution, upon a
finding of guilt or entry of a guilty plea the juvenile is given both an adult criminal sentence
and a juvenile disposition.” In re Welfare of D.M.D., Jr., 607 N.W.2d 432 , 434 (Minn.
2000). “The adult sentence is stayed on the condition that the juvenile does not violate the
terms of the disposition or commit a new offense.” Id. “EJJ designation extends the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction until the juvenile reaches 21 years of age, as opposed to the
usual limit of 19 years.” Id.
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A juvenile defendant who is 14 years old or older and is charged with a felony
offense also may be certified for prosecution as an adult in district court. Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.125, subd. 1 (2024). If the alleged offense would result in a presumptive
commitment to prison for an adult, and if the juvenile defendant was 16 or 17 years of age
at the time of the alleged offense, adult certification is presumed. Id., subd. 3.
“In presumptive-certification proceedings, the state bears the burden of showing that
(1) the juvenile was 16 or 17 years old, and (2) the alleged offense carries a presumptive
prison sentence or that it is a felony offense involving a firearm.” In re Welfare of P.C.T.,
823 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). If the state
satisfies its initial burden, and if there is probable cause to support the allegations, the
burden shifts to the juvenile defendant to prove “by clear and convincing evidence that
retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.125, subd. 3; see also Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 1. If the juvenile
defendant satisfies that burden of proof, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the case
as an EJJ case until the juvenile defendant ’s 21st birthday. Minn. Stat. §§ 260B.125,
subd. 8(b), 260B.130, subd. 1(1) (2024); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 19.01, subd. 2; In re
Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Minn. 2014). But if the juvenile defendant does not
satisfy his burden of proof, “the court shall certify the proceeding.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.125, subd. 3.
In determining whether public safety is served by certification, a juvenile court must
consider the following six public-safety factors:
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(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;

(2) the culpability of the child in committing the
alleged offense, including the level of the child’s participation
in planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of
any mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing
Guidelines;

(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;

(4) the child’s programming history, including the
child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;

(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and

(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Id., subd. 4. A juvenile court must give greater weight to the first and third factors. Id. If
“a juvenile court orders certification, it is not required to specifically address each of the
six statutory factors in its written order” but must demonstrate that it “carefully considered
its decision.” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 37 (quotation omitted).
A juvenile court “has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify a case for
adult prosecution.” P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 681 (quotation omitted). This court applies a
clear-error standard of review to a juvenile court’s findings of fact concerning the six
public-safety factors. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 34-35. We apply an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review to a juvenile court’ s balancing of the factors and its ultimate decision
on a certification motion. In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 710-11 (Minn. 2008);
In re Welfare of U.S., 612 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Minn. App. 2000).
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A.
T.L.L. argues that the juvenile court erred by disregarding the certification study
and the psychological evaluation.
A juvenile court “may order social, psychiatric, or psychological studies concerning
the child who is the subject of the extended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding.” Minn. R.
Juv. Delinq. P. 19.03, subd. 1. “If study reports include a recommendation on the court’s
actions, the report shall address each of the public safety considerations” specified in the
statute. Id., subd. 2. A juvenile court is not required to follow the recommendation s of
such social, psychiatric, or psychological studies. See In re Welfare of K.A.P., 550 N.W.2d
9 (Minn. App. 1996) , rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1996) (affirming certification even
though psychological evaluation recommended against certification).
T.L.L.’s argument is based on the juvenile court’s comment during the hearing that
the certification-study report inappropriately compared juvenile and EJJ dispositions rather
than EJJ and adult dispositions. As T.L.L. acknowledges, the certification-study report
compared juvenile and EJJ dispositions when discussing the sixth statutory factor,
dispositional options. At the hearing, the juvenile court asked counsel to confirm that the
outcome of the certification motion would determine whether T.L.L., if found guilty, would
have an EJJ disposition or an adult disposition, and both attorneys agreed. The record of
the hearing indicates that the juvenile court engaged with both the certification-study report
and the psychological-evaluation report, even though the juvenile court ultimately
disagreed with the recommendations. In making findings of fact, the juvenile court drew
heavily from the certification-study report and the psychological-evaluation report when
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describing T.L.L.’s background. The juvenile court also relied on the certification-study
report and the psychological-evaluation report when analyzing the six public-safety
factors.
Thus, the juvenile court did not disregard the certification study or the psychological
evaluation.
B.
The juvenile court found that each of the six statutory public-safety factors supports
certification. T.L.L. contends that the juvenile court erred with respect to each factor. We
consider each factor in turn.
1. Seriousness of Offense
The juvenile court found that this factor favors certification because T.L.L.’s drug
charge is, by statutory definition, a violent crime. See Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 1(d)
(2024) (defining “violent crime”). The juvenile court also noted that the charge is classified
as a level 8 offense for purposes of the sentencing guidelines. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
4.C. (Supp. 2025). In addition, the juvenile court reasoned, consistent with the certification
study and the psychological evaluation, that “in practical, real-world terms, the harm
caused by the juvenile’s conduct extends far beyond the single identifiable victim typical
in a person crime such as aggravated robbery or first-degree assault” and that “the societal
impact of such conduct is profound, far-reaching, and undeniably serious.” The juvenile
court further found that T.L.L.’s “decision to cross state lines and travel a significant
distance to the largest city in Minnesota to purchase methamphetamine for resale in a much
smaller and rural community in North Dakota is especially troubling and demonstrates a
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heightened level of sophistication, as well as a disregard for the safety and well- being of
others.”
T.L.L. contends that the juvenile court erred on the ground that the alleged offense,
possessing a controlled substance, is “less serious” than the typical case for which juvenile
defendants are certified as adults. He asserts that a review of caselaw shows that only a
small percentage of certification cases involve drug-related charges. He does not cite any
caselaw for the proposition that a drug-related crime is, as a matter of law, not serious
enough to satisfy the first statutory factor. One of the opinions he cites recognizes that
“certification is not limited to violent crimes” and “applies to any felony-level offense. ”
See In re Welfare of R.D.M., III, 825 N.W.2d 394, 400 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 16, 2013). The juvenile court’s finding is supported by the certification-study
report and the psychological-evaluation report, which noted the sophistication and
planning necessary to procure and distribute controlled substances as well as the impact of
drug sales on a community. The juvenile court did not clearly err by finding that the
seriousness of the offense favors certification.
2. Culpability
The juvenile court found that this factor favors certification because T.L.L. “acted
of his own free will in obtaining the methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it” and
arranged for another person to drive him from North Dakota to Minneapolis.
T.L.L. contends that the juvenile court erred by not recognizing certain mitigating
factors, namely, the fact that his parents used drugs and his own frequent use of drugs. The
juvenile court considered T.L.L.’s argument but recognized that “ the existence of any
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mitigating factors when determining the culpability of a child . . . for purposes of
certification, is limited to the level of the child’s participation in planning and carrying out
the offense and the mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines, which are
set forth in Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a. ” See In re Welfare of H.B., 986 N.W.2d 158,
160 (Minn. 2022). The juvenile court reviewed the mitigating factors in the sentencing
guidelines and found that none apply. On appeal, T.L.L. identifies a mitigating factor in
the sentencing guidelines that may apply to a person who is particularly amenable to
probation because he is chemically dependent and “has been accepted by, and can respond
to, a treatment program.” See Minn. Sent’g. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(8) (Supp. 2025). But
T.L.L. does not contend that he has been accepted into such a program; he contends merely
that he would be eligible for a treatment program in the future. The juvenile court did not
clearly err by not finding a mitigating factor but instead finding that T.L.L.’s culpability
favors certification.
3. Prior Record of Delinquency
The juvenile court found that this factor favors certification because T.L.L. recently
had been adjudicated delinquent for driving under the influence of a controlled substance
and possession of methamphetamine and was on probation when he engaged in the alleged
conduct. The juvenile court recognized that T.L.L.’s record “is relatively limited and
generally lower-level compared to that of some other seventeen-year-old children in the
juvenile justice system.” But the juvenile court also noted that T.L.L. had been charged
with shoplifting bullets, which gave the juvenile court concerns that he may have “access
to a firearm” and may be seeking a drug-dealer lifestyle.
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T.L.L. contends that the juvenile court erred by “extrapolating” a fact that is not in
the record, namely, that T.L.L. has access to a firearm. But the juvenile court did not find
that T.L.L. actually possessed a firearm; the juvenile court merely noted its concern that
the allegation of shoplifting bullets “rais[es ] questions” about whether he has access to a
firearm. A prior record of delinquency may support adult certification if it demonstrates
“escalating criminal behavior that presents a threat to public safety.” R.D.M., III, 825
N.W.2d at 400. In several ways, T.L.L.’ s record tends to demonstrate such behavior.
Between 2021 and 2023, he had only two juvenile charges: criminal mischief and refusal
to halt. In 2025, he accrued six additional charges (not including the charge in this case):
driving under the influence, driving after suspension, possession of methamphetamine,
possession of marijuana, and two shoplifting charges. The juvenile court did not clearly
err by finding that T.L.L.’s prior record favors certification.
4. Programming History

The juvenile court found that this factor favors certification based on evidence that
T.L.L. had “refused to participate in counseling in the past” and was unwilling to
participate in services. Specifically, the juvenile court noted that T.L.L. “had the chance
to address his chemical dependency issues by attending inpatient treatment that was set up
for him” but “instead chose to continue engaging in criminal behavior and absconded from
the services that were made available to him to improve his life.”
T.L.L. contends that the juvenile court improperly considered his failure to attend
school, maintain employment, and obtain a driver’s license on the ground that such conduct
has “nothing to do with programming history.” But this court has relied on similar facts in
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concluding that the fourth factor supports certification. See P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 683
(reasoning that juvenile had “hardly darkened the doorstep of a school or participated in
online schooling in more than a year”). More importantly, the fourth factor considers “a
juvenile’s programing history and whether the juvenile demonstrated a willingness to
participate.” H.B., 986 N.W.2d at 175 (emphasis added). “Rejection of prior treatment
efforts indicates a juvenile’s unwillingness to submit to programming in a meaningful
way.” U.S., 612 N.W.2d at 296. T.L.L. emphasizes that he has “not participated in any
programming,” but he also acknowledges that he failed to start a chemical-dependency
program. The juvenile court reasonably relied on T.L.L.’s demonstrated unwillingness to
participate in programming as a negative aspect of his programming history. See H.B., 986
N.W.2d at 175-176 (reasoning that juvenile’s programming history includes unwillingness
to engage in treatment, running from treatment facilities, and accruing new felony
offenses). The juvenile court did not clearly err by finding that T.L.L.’s programming
history favors certification.
5. Adequacy of Punishment or Programming in Juvenile System

The juvenile court found that this factor favors certification because it “was not
provided with any specific information on what programming the juvenile would receive
with EJJ” and, thus, was not “convinced that there is something better for the juvenile
related to chemical dependency treatment if he remains in juvenile court.”
T.L.L. contends that the juvenile court discounted the conclusions of the
certification-study report and the psychological-evaluation report that programming
available through EJJ would be appropriate for T.L.L. But T.L.L. does not specifically
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describe the treatment that would be available with an EJJ disposition. Both the
certification-study report and the psychological-evaluation report appear to compare a
regular juvenile disposition with an EJJ disposition and reason that EJJ would be preferable
to a regular juvenile disposition because it would give T.L.L. more time for programming.
The juvenile court raised this issue at the hearing, but neither party provided clarification.
Accordingly, the juvenile court concluded that T.L.L. had not met his burden of showing
that EJJ would be better than certification. The juvenile court did not clearly err by finding
that uncertainty concerning programming in the juvenile system favors certification.
6. Dispositional Options Available
The juvenile court acknowledged that this factor presented a close call. But the
juvenile court found that T.L.L. either would receive an EJJ disposition and be placed on
probation until age 21 or would be certified as an adult with a presumptive commitment of
65 months, which would allow him to complete supervised release at age 22. The juvenile
court reasoned that, with an EJJ disposition, there is no certainty that public safety would
be addressed while T.L.L. is on probation. T.L.L. contends that the juvenile court did not
fully consider the possibility of revoking EJJ and executing his adult sentence. There is no
reason to believe that the juvenile court was not fully aware of that possibility or the time
until the expiration of T.L.L.’s sentence under either option. The juvenile court did not
clearly err by finding that the dispositional options available favor certification.
If a juvenile does not rebut the presumption of certification, the juvenile court “shall
certify the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3. In this case, the juvenile court
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concluded that T.L.L. did not rebut the presumption that adult certification would serve
public safety. In summing up and balancing the factors, the juvenile court stated:
The juvenile committed a serious offense, bore a high degree
of culpability in doing so, and previously had an opportunity
to participate in programming from which he absconded.
Public safety cannot be adequately addressed through juvenile
programming in this case, and the dispositional options
available under adult certification most appropriately protect
public safety.

Because the juvenile court’s reasoning is consistent with the law and is supported by the
record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by granting the state’s motion to
certify T.L.L. for prosecution as an adult.
II. Assistance of Counsel
T.L.L. also argues that his court-appointed attorney provided him with ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution “entitles a juvenile to the effective assistance of counsel at the certification
hearing.” In re Welfare of J.C.P., Jr., 716 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied
(Minn. Oct. 17, 2006); see also, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966). This right also is reflected in a statute and the rules of
delinquency procedure. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.163, subd. 4 (2024); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq.
P. 3.01.
This court analyzes ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in juvenile-
delinquency cases under the standard that applies in criminal cases, as set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See In re Welfare of L.B., 404 N.W.2d
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341, 345 (Minn. App. 1987). To prevail under Strickland, a defendant “must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694; see also State v. Rhodes,
657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003). Appellate courts apply “ a strong presumption that a
counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986) (quotation omitted). “General assertions
of error without evidentiary support are inadequate to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel.” In re Commitment of Johnson, 931 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Minn. App. 2019) , rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019); see also State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 717 -18 (Minn.
2003). Moreover, a reviewing court generally “will not review attacks on counsel’s trial
strategy.” Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004).
T.L.L. contends that his attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness because he did not point out that certain parts of the certification-study
report and the psychological-evaluation report compared EJJ to adult certification, did not
call the corrections agent as a witness, and did not ask for a continuance of the hearing for
the purpose of subpoenaing the author of the psychological-examination report. He argues
that, if his attorney had done those things, the juvenile court would have denied the state’s
motion for adult certification.
All three of T.L.L.’s contentions concern ma tters of trial strategy. Furthermore,
T.L.L.’s attorney’ s representation did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. At the hearing, he presented arguments to the juvenile court (many of
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which are reiterated on appeal), and he responded to the juvenile court’s questions. The
attorney did not fail to respond to a question concerning the certification-study report and
the psychological-evaluation report and their comparisons of EJJ to adult certification. The
attorney had little need to call the corrections agent as a witness because the juvenile court
asked several questions of the corrections agent on the record. Whether to call the licensed
psychologist who had interviewed T.L.L., like other questions about “which witnesses to
call at trial and what information to present,” are decisions that “lie within the discretion
of trial counsel and will not be second-guessed by appellate courts.” Leake v. State, 737
N.W.2d 531, 536, 539 (Minn. 2007). T.L.L. generally asserts that the outcome would have
been different if his attorney had been more vigorous in presenting evidence and arguments
concerning EJJ, but he does not make any proffer of what the psychologist might have said
on the witness stand. The rules provide for written reports of the certification study and
the psychological evaluation, the admission of which made it unnecessary to call the author
of the psychological-evaluation report. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 19.03. T.L.L. does
not identify any other evidence that the attorney could have offered, either at the November
2025 hearing or after a continuance, that might have changed the juvenile court’s analysis
of the statutory factors. Based on the record before this court, T.L.L. cannot satisfy either
prong of the Strickland test.
Thus, T.L.L. has not shown that his attorney provided him with constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.