In Re the Marriage of: Kushal Rai v. SamJhana Rai

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0049

In Re the Marriage of:

Kushal Rai, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

SamJhana Rai,
Appellant.

Filed August 24, 2026
Remanded
Reyes, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-FA-23-1723

Kushal Rai, Grand Forks, North Dakota (self-represented respondent)

SamJhana Rai, West Fargo, North Dakota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant-mother argues that Minnesota (1) no longer has exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction over a child-custody proceeding and (2) is an inconvenient forum based on
Minnesota’s version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

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(UCCJEA), Minn. Stat. §§ 518D.101-.317 (2024). We do not address the inconvenient-
forum issue and remand for findings on the issue of exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.
FACTS
In a March 2024 judgment and decree (J&D), a Minnesota state district court
dissolved the marriage of appellant-mother SamJhana Rai and respondent-father Kushal
Rai. The parties shared one child, of whom the J&D granted joint legal custody to the
parties and sole physical custody to mother. The J&D also ordered a parenting-time
schedule. The district court determined that it had jurisdiction at that time because mother
and child were Minnesota residents for at least 180 days upon commencement of
dissolution proceedings.
After several months of litigating custody and parenting time, the parties stipulated
to an adjusted parenting-time schedule. In July 2025, the district court entered an amended
J&D incorporating the parties’ stipulated agreement.
Two weeks later, mother filed a motion requesting that the district court “[d]ecline
jurisdiction over this custody matter” because (1) “Minnesota no longer has exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction” under Minnesota Statutes section 518D.202 “and/or”
(2) “Minnesota is now an inconvenient forum” under Minnesota Statutes section
518D.207. At a hearing on the motion, neither party addressed exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction under Minnesota Statutes section 518D.202.
In December 2025, the district court filed an order denying mother’s motion. It
rejected mother’s inconvenient-forum argument under section 518D.207 and did not
address exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 518D.202.

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This appeal follows.1
DECISION
Mother challenges the district court’s denial of her motion, arguing that Minnesota
no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child-custody proceedings and
that Minnesota is an inconvenient forum. Because we conclude that remand is necessary
for the district court to address whether it has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, we do not
address the inconvenient-forum issue.2
“Whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists presents a question of law, which we
review de novo.” In re Welfare of Child. of D.M.T.-R., 802 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Minn. App.
2011). Parties cannot “confer subject[-]matter jurisdiction to [a] district court either by
waiver or consent.” Schroeder v. Schroeder , 658 N.W.2d 909, 912 (Minn. App. 2003).
The issue of subject- matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, see Seehus v. Bor-Son
Constr., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010), and a district court must dismiss an
action “whenever it appears” that it does not have “jurisdiction of the subject matter,”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.08(c).

1 Because father did not file a brief, this court ordered that this appeal shall be determined
on the merits as provided in Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 142.03.
2 An inconvenient-forum analysis is unnecessary if a district court lacks jurisdiction over a
case. See Paulownia Plantations de Panama Corp. v. Rajamannan, 793 N.W.2d 128, 133
(Minn. 2009) (“The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a district court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties discretion to decline jurisdiction over a
cause of action when another forum would be more convenient . . . .” (emphasis added));
see also Black’s Law Dictionary 912 (12th ed. 2024) (cross-referencing “forum non
conveniens” for definition of “inconvenient forum”).

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This court has held that, pursuant to section 518D.202(a), “the district court that
makes an initial child -custody determination has continuing, exclusive subject- matter
jurisdiction over the child-custody proceedings.” D.M.T.-R., 802 N.W.2d at 763 (citing
Minn. Stat. § 518D.202(a) (2010)). Two events can end that jurisdiction:
(1) a court of this state determines that the child, the
child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not have
a significant connection with this state and that substantial
evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the
child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(2) a court of this state or a court of another state
determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person
acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.

Minn. Stat. § 518D.202(a) (2024) (emphasis added). After the occurrence of either event,
the district court that made the initial custody determination “may modify that
determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial [custody] determination under
section 518D.201.” Minn. Stat. § 518D.202(b) (emphasis added).
“The UCCJEA provides four bases for a Minnesota court to have jurisdiction to
make an initial child-custody determination.” Cook v. Arimitsu, 907 N.W.2d 233, 238
(Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018). One basis requires in part that
Minnesota is then or was the child’s home state within six months of the commencement
of the proceeding, Minn. Stat. § 518D.201(a)(1), and the other three bases require that other
states do not have jurisdiction, could not have jurisdiction, or declined to exercise
jurisdiction, see id. (a)(2)-(4).
Mother contends that the district court lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over
the custody proceedings because the parties and child do not have a significant connection

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with Minnesota, see Minn. Stat. § 518D.202(a)(1), relevant substantial evidence is not
located in Minnesota, see id., and the parties and child do not reside in Minnesota, see id.
(a)(2). Mother does not address whether the district court could nonetheless exercise
jurisdiction under section 518D.202(b).
The district court order lacks sufficient factual findings relevant to the issue of
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, making appellate review of the issue inappropriate. Cf.
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 436 N.W.2d 99, 105-06 (Minn. 1989) (declining to decide whether
Minnesota had jurisdiction in child-custody case because “generally it is inappropriate for
an appellate court to comb the record and to make credibility assessments to ascertain”
existence of jurisdiction). Remand is therefore warranted for the district court to consider
in the first instance whether Minnesota has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section
518D.202. Cf. id. at 106 (remanding to district court to make findings establishing
existence of jurisdiction); Biscoe v. Biscoe, 443 N.W.2d 221, 22 4 (Minn. App. 1989)
(same).
3
Remanded.

3 Schmidt and Biscoe discuss now-repealed statutes that were modeled after the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), the predecessor to the UCCJEA. See 1999 Minn.
Laws ch. 74, arts. 1-3, at 200-17 (repealing statutes modeled after UCCJEA predecessor
and enacting statutes modeled after UCCJEA); D.M.T.-R., 802 N.W.2d at 763 (identifying
UCCJA as predecessor to UCCJEA).