In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Thomas Hurl Bolter.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0050

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Thomas Hurl Bolter.

Filed July 20, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Pennington County District Court
File No. 57-PR-09-1313

Thomas Bolter, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Nathan Haase, Pennington County Attorney, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for respondent
Pennington County Department of Human Services)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Larson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion under Minn. R. Civ.
P. 60.02 for relief from his indeterminate civil commitment. Relying on the supreme
court’s decision In re Civil Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711 (Minn. 2024), appellant
argues that (1) he is entitled to relief under Rule 60.02(d) because Benson recognizes a
preexisting right to self-representation in civil-commitment proceedings, and the district
2
court violated this right by appointing counsel for appellant’s initial commitment
proceedings, thereby violating appellant’s due-process rights; and (2) he is entitled to relief
under Rule 60.02(e) because Benson constitutes a change in relevant decisional law.
Because appellant did not object to the appointment of counsel, request to waive counsel,
or otherwise seek to represent himself during his initial commitment proceedings, he has
not established that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60.02(d) or (e), and we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2009, respondent Pennington County Department of Human Services
(the county) filed a petition to commit appellant Thomas Hurl Bolter as a sexually
dangerous person (SDP) and as a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP). On the same day,
the district court appointed an attorney to represent Bolter.
At a July 2010 hearing, the parties submitted a written stipulation to the district court
that provided that Bolter would agree to indeterminate commitment under the SDP
designation and, in turn, the county would dismiss the portion of the petition seeking
Bolter’s commitment under the SPP designation. Bolter testified regarding the written
stipulation and his agreement to be indeterminately committed. On the same day, with the
agreement of the parties, the district court filed an interim order indeterminately
committing Bolter as an SDP.
Several weeks later, with the assistance of his court- appointed attorney, Bolter
moved to withdraw his agreement to the stipulation for indeterminate commitment. In
October 2010, following a hearing, the district court filed a n order for Bolter’s
indeterminate commitment as an SDP that reiterated its conclusions of law in the interim
3
order and included factual findings to support the conclusions. In December 2010, the
district court denied Bolter’s motion to withdraw his stipulation. In May 2011, we affirmed
the October 2010 commitment order. In re Civ. Commitment of Bolter, No. A10-1947
(Minn. App. May 3, 2011).
Almost 15 years later, in February 2025, Bolter filed a pro se motion pursuant to
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 seeking to vacate the indeterminate commitment order. Relying on
the supreme court’s decision In re Civil Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711 (Minn.
2024), Bolter argued that (1) he is entitled to relief under Rule 60.02(d) because he was
denied his right to self-representation during his initial civil -commitment proceedings,
thereby violating his due-process rights and rendering the 2010 commitment order “void”;
and (2) he is entitled to relief under Rule 60.02(e) because Benson represents a change in
decisional law that renders it inequitable for the 2010 commitment order to have
prospective effect.
After a hearing, the district court denied Bolter’s Rule 60.02 motion. The district
court reasoned that Bolter had not “cited to any facts or other evidence in the record which
establishes he requested or otherwise sought to represent himself nor has he shown he was
improperly denied the ability to represent himself” at his initial commitment proceedings.
Accordingly, the district court reasoned that Bolter had not established that his due-process
rights were violated and that Benson “did not change the operative facts, relevant decisional
law, or applicable statutory law” related to Bolter’s commitment proceedings. Therefore,
it concluded Bolter did not establish he was entitled to relief under Rule 60.02.
Bolter appeals.
4
DECISION
Bolter argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by denying his R ule
60.02 motion for relief from the district court’s order and judgment of his indeterminate
civil commitment.
Rule 60.02 provides that a district court may relieve a party from a judgment or
order if the “judgment is void” or if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(d), (e). Pursuant to Rule 60.02(d), an
order or judgment is void “if the issuing court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter,
lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties through a failure of service that has not been
waived, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.” Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat.
Res., 594 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. App. 1999), aff’d, 612 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2000).
Under Rule 60.02(e), a district court must “determine whether changed circumstances exist
and, if so, whether they render it inequitable for the judgment to have prospective
application.” City of Barnum v. Sabri , 657 N.W.2d 201, 207 (Minn. App. 2003). This
“must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. Changed circumstances may exist if
there has been a change in “the relevant decisional law.” Id. at 205 n.3 (quotation omitted).
The movant bears the burden of proof in a Rule 60.02 proceeding. Id. at 205.
We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion.
In re Civ. Commitment of Johnson, 931 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 17, 2019). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact
that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is
against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn.
5
2022) (quotation omitted). We review questions of law, including the interpretation of
caselaw and whether a person’s due-process rights have been violated, de novo. See In re
Civ. Commitment of Poole, 921 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.
15, 2019) (stating that the construction of rules and statutes, and associated caselaw, is
addressed de novo); Bendorf v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 727 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Minn. 2007)
(stating that whether appellant was deprived of his right to procedural due process is a
constitutional question that we review de novo).
Bolter argues that Benson entitles him to relief under Rule 60.02(d) and (e). First,
he argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60.02(d) from a “void” judgment because
he “suffered a violation of due process when he was deprived of his statutory and common
law right to represent himself” during his initial commitment proceedings.1 He asserts that
“the Benson court recognized a pre-existing right to self -representation in civil
commitment proceedings,” and that he was “ deprived of an adequate opportunity to be
heard” when the district court appointed counsel for his initial commitment proceedings,
in the sense that he “was deprived of his right to present his own defense” and make his
“own defense personally.”2 Second, Bolter argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule

1 Bolter maintains that relief under rule 60.02(d) is not limited to jurisdictional or due-
process issues. But the analysis in Bolter’s appellate brief relates entirely to his claimed
due-process violation, and he does not explain how the commitment order is otherwise
“void.” We therefore decline to consider this argument. See Fannie Mae v. Heather
Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 811 N.W.2d 596, 600 n.2 (Minn. 2012) (“Summary arguments
made without citation to legal support are waived.”).

2 Bolter summarily asserts that “[t]he minimum process due one facing an indeterminate
(and more-often -than-not lifetime) civil commitment is certainly more than merely
providing ‘notice of the civil commitment petition’ and ‘an opportunity to be heard in the
6
60.02(e) because Benson constitutes a significant change of circumstances that renders the
prospective application of his 2010 commitment order inequitable.3 We disagree.
In Benson, the supreme court held that Minn. Stat. § 253D.20 (2022) “establishes a
waivable right to counsel and therefore does not preclude civilly committed people from
representing themselves in commitment proceedings.” 12 N.W.3d at 721. The appellant
in Benson asserted his right to self-representation at the hearing that gave rise to the
appeal—a petition for rehearing before the Commitment Appeal Panel (CAP) held after
the Special Review Board recommended that his petition for reduction in custody be
denied. Id. at 714. Before the hearing, the appellant filed a motion seeking an order
allowing him to participate in his defense and stating that he would “prefer[] to proceed
pro se if at all possible.” Id.
The district court in this matter correctly reasoned that Benson does not entitle
Bolter to relief under Rule 60.02(d) or (e) because Bolter never asserted his right to self-
representation in the commitment proceedings—a fact that Bolter does not dispute. Unlike
Benson, in which the appellant asserted his right to self-representation by filing a motion

underlying commitment proceeding.’” Bolter does not explain what additional process is
required or how the commitment order is accordingly “void.” We therefore decline to
consider this argument. See Fannie Mae, 811 N.W.2d at 600 n.2 (“Summary arguments
made without citation to legal support are waived.”).

3 Bolter suggests that Minnesota courts have rejected similar arguments from civilly
committed persons following Benson because courts “struggle with the fact that relief from
an order could ever be warranted years, or even decades, after said order was entered.” But
the district court did not consider the length of time since the 2010 commitment order was
filed in denying Bolter relief under Rule 60.02(e), and neither do we.

7
seeking to cross-examine witnesses and participate in his defense, the record does not
indicate that Bolter expressed his desire to represent himself at any point during the
commitment proceedings. See id. Bolter is therefore not entitled to relief under Benson
because he never asserted his right to self -representation in his initial commitment
proceedings.
Because Bolter has not submitted evidence that he asserted a right to self-
representation during his initial commitment proceedings, he cannot establish that the
district court violated his right to due process—even if his due -process rights were
understood to include a right to self-representation—and thus he has not established that
he is entitled to relief under Rule 60.02(d). And because Bolter relies exclusively on
Benson to argue that the prospective effect of the 2010 commitment order is no longer
equitable, he has thus not established that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60.02(e).
Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bolter’s
Rule 60.02 motion for relief.
To persuade us otherwise, we understand Bolter to argue that the district court erred
as a matter of law by denying relief under Rule 60.02 based on his failure to assert a right
to self-representation in his initial commitment proceedings, because doing so is “clearly
contrary to precedential caselaw relating to the issue of forfeiture.” The authorities Bolter
relies upon in support of this argument are inapposite, as they relate to a party’s forfeiture
of claims or arguments on appeal that were not raised in previous proceedings. 4 Bolter is

4 We note that while Bolter suggests “precedential caselaw” precludes the denial of Rule
60.02 relief based on Bolter’s failure to assert a right to self-representation at his initial
8
not precluded from seeking relief under Rule 60.02 because he forfeited his arguments
relating to his right to self-representation at his initial commitment proceedings . Rather,
the absence of any request from Bolter to represent himself is dispositive in this matter
because Bolter bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60.02 .
And because there is no basis for the requested relief under Benson, we discern no abuse
of discretion by the district court.5
In sum, the district court correctly applied Benson based on the undisputed finding
that Bolter did not request to waive counsel or otherwise seek to represent himself during
his initial commitment proceedings, and it did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
Bolter has not established he is entitled to relief under Rule 60.02(d) or (e).
Affirmed.

commitment proceedings, he cites to numerous nonbinding decisions from this court and
various other courts. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (stating that
nonprecedential opinions may only be cited as persuasive authority) ; Laliberte v. Dollar
Tree, Inc., 987 N.W.2d 590, 594 n.4 (Minn. App. 2023) (noting that federal court opinions
“do not bind us” but may be considered for their persuasive value).

5 Bolter also argues that this court wrongly decided In re Civ il Commitment of Urbanek,
30 N.W.3d 797 (Minn. App. 2025), vacated mem., No. A25-0808, 2026 WL 858492
(Minn. Mar. 25, 2026). Because the supreme court recently vacated Urbanek, we do not
consider it in reaching our decision.