Austin Frederick Hoover v. Turf Tye Spicer, Custom Fabricating & Repair, Inc.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0054

Austin Frederick Hoover,
Appellant,

vs.

Turf Tye Spicer,
Defendant,

Custom Fabricating & Repair, Inc.,
Respondent.

Filed September 28, 2026
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-23-1818

Thomas R. Braun, Restovich Braun & Associates, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

David P. Bunde, Richard D. Snyder, Thomas Wheeler, Fredrikson & Byron, P .A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Austin Frederick Hoover challenges the district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment in favor of respondent Custom Fabricating & Repair Inc. (Custom
Fabricating) on his negligent-supervision claim. Because Hoover failed to raise any
genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment, we affirm.

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FACTS
The following facts are derived from the summary-judgment record, viewed in the
light most favorable to Hoover as the nonmoving party. See Windcliff Ass’n, Inc. v.
Breyfogle, 988 N.W.2d 911, 916 (Minn. 2023).
At the time of the events giving rise to this case, Custom Fabricating employed both
Hoover and defendant Turf Tye Spicer. The two men were working on a project in
Zumbrota, Minnesota (the worksite) and, along with other Custom Fabricating employees,
stayed at a hotel approximately 20 miles away from the worksite (the hotel). Custom
Fabricating paid for its employees’ hotel accommodation because staying overnight near
the worksite was necessary to complete the project. However, employees were not required
to stay at any specific hotel and could request alternate lodging arrangements through
Custom Fabricating.
On August 24, 2021, after work hours, Hoover and other employees gathered in the
hotel parking lot to grill food and drink alcoholic beverages. By 10:30 p.m., Hoover had
consumed at least a dozen alcoholic beverages. Around that time, Hoover “jok[ed]” that
Spicer was in a “relationship” with his cousin. When Spicer overheard the joke, he became
upset and confronted Hoover. Spicer then punched Hoover, causing Hoover to fall
backwards and strike his head (the assault). Hoover suffered a traumatic brain injury due
to the assault.
1

1 Spicer was later criminally prosecuted, pleaded guilty, and was convicted of third-degree
assault.

3
The following day, Custom Fabricating began investigating the assault and placed
Spicer on unpaid leave. In a report issued after the investigation, Custom Fabricating
concluded that Spicer had violated several company policies. Shortly thereafter, Custom
Fabricating terminated Spicer’s employment.
In March 2023, Hoover served a civil complaint initiating the present lawsuit against
Spicer and Custom Fabricating. 2 Custom Fabricating moved for summary judgment on
Hoover’s negligent-supervision and negligent-retention claims. Following a hearing, the
district court granted Custom Fabricating’s motion on both claims.
Hoover appeals, challenging only the judgment on the negligent-supervision claim.
DECISION
Hoover argues the district court erred when it granted Custom Fabricating’s motion
for summary judgment on his negligent-supervision claim. We review a district court’s
decision to grant summary judgment de novo. City of Waconia v. Dock, 961 N.W.2d 220,
229 (Minn. 2021). In doing so, “we examine whether there [are] any genuine issues of
material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Kenneh v.
Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Minn. 2020). We view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted and resolve
all doubts and factual inferences in their favor. Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC, 922 N.W.2d

2 Hoover asserted four claims in his complaint: assault, battery, negligent supervision, and
negligent retention. On September 20, 2023, the d istrict court enter ed default judgment
against Spicer on the assault and battery claims.

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185, 190 (Minn. 2019). If “reasonable persons might draw different legal conclusions from
the evidence presented, summary judgment must be denied.” Kenneh, 944 N.W.2d at 228.
Negligent supervision requires a plaintiff to prove “(1) the employee’s conduct was
foreseeable; and (2) the employer failed to exercise ordinary care when supervising the
employee.” C.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., 726 N.W.2d 127,
136 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted). The parties agree that to prove his negligent-
supervision claim, Hoover needed to establish the assault occurred within the scope of
Spicer’s employment.3 See Oslin, 543 N.W.2d at 414. We conclude that this element is
determinative.
“[A]n employee acts within the scope of their employment for purposes of vicarious
liability when the ‘act is related to the duties of the employee’ and ‘occurs within work-
related limits of time and place.’” Sterry v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 986 N.W.2d 715, 722

3 It may be an open question in Minnesota law whether a plaintiff must prove the conduct
occurred within the scope of employment. See 4 Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG 55.25 (2014)
(“[I]t appears to be an open question under Minnesota law whether the theory applies to
actions of an employee that are within the course and scope of the employee’s work.”); see
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 (Am. L. Inst. 1965) (providing that an employer
may be liable for an employee’s conduct outside the scope of employment if the conduct
occurs on the employer’s premises or while using the employer’s chattels and the employer
knows or has reason to know of the ability and necessity to control their employee).
Compare Oslin v. State, 543 N.W.2d 408, 414 (Minn. App. 1996) (concluding the basis for
liability for negligent supervision is whether “the tortious act is committed in the scope of
employment”), with Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc. , 496 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. App. 1993)
(concluding a negligent-supervision claim only arises if there is a “connection to the
employer’s premises or chattels”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 1993). Because the assault
neither occurred on Custom Fabricating’s property or the worksite, nor involved Custom
Fabricating’s chattels, we would affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment even if a plaintiff is not required to prove the conduct occurred within the scope
of employment.

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(Minn. App. 2023) (quoting Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d
905, 910 (Minn. 1999)), aff’d, 8 N.W.3d 224 (Minn. 2024). Generally, whether an
employee was acting within the scope of their employment is a question of fact, but “when
the evidence is conclusive on all the elements or there is no evidence to support a necessary
element, there is no fact issue, and the scope of employment is determined as a matter of
law.” Reetz v. City of Saint Paul, 956 N.W.2d 238, 247 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
Hoover argues a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the assault
occurred “within work-related limits of time and place.” To support this argument, Hoover
first relies on Yunker. There, an employee shot and killed a coworker in the coworker’s
driveway after having threatened and harass ed the coworker both at work and at the
coworker’s home. Yunker, 496 N.W.2d at 421. Next of kin brought a negligent-
supervision claim against the employer. Id. We concluded that “negligent supervision is
not a viable theory of recovery because [the employee] was neither on [company] premises
nor using [company] chattels when he shot [the coworker].” Id. at 422. Hoover concedes
that, like the assault in Yunker, the assault alleged here neither took place on the worksite
nor involved company chattels. But Hoover argues the assault was “within work-related
limits of time and space” because Custom Fabricating paid for the lodging where the
assault occurred— making it company “premises.” We are not persuaded.
This case is akin to Leaon v. Washington County. 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986).
There, the appellant brought several claims against his employer under the doctrine of
respondeat superior based upon a coworker’s conduct at a party organized and attended
“almost exclusively” by the appellant’s coworkers. Id. at 869. The appellant argued that

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the party was “like an office party sponsored and supervised by an employer,” but the
supreme court rejected this argument, stating:
there is no evidence suggesting the party was sponsored or
supervised by [the employer]. The party was not held at the
employer’s place of business, nor during normal working
hours, nor did the employer furnish any of the refreshments.
This was simply a private party by and for people who knew
each other at work. An employer is not legally responsible for
what his employees choose to do socially when off-duty.

Id. at 874.
Similarly, in Oslin, appellant-employees appealed after the district court granted
summary judgment on their negligent-supervision claim against their employer. 543
N.W.2d at 411-13. There, “staff attended a Christmas party after work at a local saloon,”
during which a supervisor for the employer made unwanted sexual advances toward the
appellant-employees. Id. at 411. We acknowledged that the appellant-employees
“produced evidence that [the staff] . . . believed the Christmas party was an extension of
the workplace.” Id. at 413. However, citing Leaon, we concluded the supervisor’s conduct
did not occur “within work-related limits of time and place,” reasoning:
the Christmas party was not sponsored or supervised by the
[employer]. The party was not held on the [employer’s]
premises, but was held at a saloon, after the employees finished
work. There is no evidence that the [employer] furnished any
refreshments or contributed to the party in any other manner.
The fact that the party was discussed at work and that notices
were put up in the staff lounge was not sufficient to make the
party a work-sponsored event, as appellants claim.

Id. at 414.

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Hoover contends that because he was required to stay at a hotel, Yunker, Leaon, and
Oslin are distinguishable. But the record indicates that Hoover could have stayed at a
different hotel. And nothing in the record shows that Hoover was required to socialize
with his coworkers in a manner that makes this case distinguishable from our precedent.
Like in Leaon and Oslin, there is no evidence that Custom Fabricating sponsored or
supervised the parking-lot gathering in any manner. Further, as in Yunker, it is undisputed
that the assault occurred outside work hours and did not involve any Custom Fabricating-
owned property.
Hoover also argues the district court erred when it concluded there was no issue of
material fact on whether the assault occurred “within work-related limits of time and place”
because Custom Fabricating “admitted” during its independent investigation that the
assault occurred within Spicer’s employment.4 We, again, are not persuaded. Hoover cites
no caselaw to support his contention that statements made during a company investigation
or employee discipline amount to an admission that an act occurred “within work-related
limits of time and place.” On the contrary, prior appellate decisions suggest the opposite.
See Schaefer v. Cargill Kitchen Sols., Inc., No. A16-0154, 2016 WL 6570240, at *2 (Minn.
App. Nov. 7, 2016) (concluding that appellant presented no evidence that the incident was
related to the employee’s duties, even when the company terminated the employee

4 Hoover also claims an interrogatory answer that Custom Fabricating provided to its
insurer stating, “a reasonable jury could find that the allegations in the Hoover complaint
constitute bodily injury . . . aris[ing] out of and in the course of [Hoover’s] employment, ”
amounted to an admission that the assault occurred “within work-related limits time and
place.” But this statement was plainly a characterization of Hoover’s complaint, not
Custom Fabricating’s description of what actually occurred.

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“pursuant to [the company’s] policy handbook”);5 see also Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp.,
Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 584 (Minn. 2008) (concluding, in the context of foreseeability,
“[t]he fact that an employer proactively adopts . . . a policy is insufficient, in and of itself,
to create a genuine issue of material fact” with respect to foreseeability for the scope-of-
employment analysis).
For these reasons, we conclude the district court correctly granted summary
judgment on Hoover’s negligent-supervision claim.
Affirmed.

5 We may cite nonprecedential opinions as persuasive authority. See Minn. R. Civ.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).