David Francis Chamberlain v. State of Minnesota

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0099

David Francis Chamberlain, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed October 5, 2026
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-11260

David Francis Chamberlain, Rush City, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order denying postconviction relief, appellant
argues that the district court erred by concluding, without an evidentiary hearing, that his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims were Knaffla-barred.1 We affirm.
FACTS
In 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant David Francis
Chamberlain with first -degree arson of a dwelling in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.561,
subd. 1 (2020), for setting fire to the Minneapolis home of D.S., L.S., and K.J. Three
months later, D.S. passed away from the injuries he suffered in the fire. The state then
amended the criminal complaint to add a charge of second-degree unintentional murder in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2020). A six-day jury trial was held in
July 2022, at which the following evidence was introduced.2
On June 10, 2021, L.S. left the house to go to the store and called K.J. to tell him
that he saw Chamberlain walking towards the house. K.J. then heard Chamberlain’s voice
outside the house asking if D.S. or L.S. were home. When K.J. opened the door, he saw
that a chair on the back porch was on fire and Chamberlain was gone. K.J. attempted to

1 The Knaffla bar is a procedural rule that “bars all claims that the appellant should have
known at the time of direct appeal.” Buggs v. State, 734 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Minn. 2007)
(quotations omitted); see also State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976).

2 Chamberlain directly appealed his conviction in January 2023. This is his first
postconviction appeal.

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move the chair off the porch, but it quickly was engulfed in flames. As L.S. returned from
the store, he saw the fire and went inside the house to get D.S., who was asleep upstairs.
By the time L.S. woke D.S. up, the room was hot and they could not get back down
the stairs. L.S. broke a window, and the two jumped from the second-story window into
the backyard. L.S. sustained burns to his face, arms, and left leg, and his shoe melted onto
his left foot.
D.S.’s burns were severe and covered 70% of his body, including his airway and
corneas. Due to the extent of his injuries, D.S. arrived at the hospital in critical condition
and his prognosis for survival was very poor. He was placed in a medically induced coma
and died three months later.
Multiple witnesses testified to ongoing conflict between Chamberlain and the
residents of the house in the days preceding the fire. Chamberlain also had a dispute with
the house’s landlord, who did not want Chamberlain at the house. Two witnesses testified
that, a few days before the fire, the landlord asked Chamberlain to leave the property, and
Chamberlain threatened to “burn this motherf-cker down.”
Members from the Minneapolis Police Department’s arson unit, the Minneapolis
Fire Department, and the State Fire Marshal determined that the fire was intentional.
Chamberlain’s expert, Dr. Gregory Gorbett, who is a fire and explosion investigator,
testified that other causes, like a tripped circuit breaker and “vintage wiring” from a light
fixture, were not adequately ruled out as potential causes of the fire. Dr. Gorbett also
testified that the state’s experts did not follow the proper scientific method to determine
the cause of the fire.

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The jury found Chamberlain guilty of unintentional murder and arson. The district
court convicted Chamberlain of second-degree unintentional murder and sentenced him to
360 months’ imprisonment.3
On direct appeal, Chamberlain argued that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct
during cross-examination and closing arguments and that the district court erred by denying
his objection to the state’s peremptory challenge during jury selection. State v.
Chamberlain, No. A23-0155, 2024 WL 687750, at *2, *4 (Minn. App. Feb. 14, 2024), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 2024). In the opinion, we summarized the expert testimony offered
by both Chamberlain and the state. Id. at *5-6.
On July 7, 2025, Chamberlain filed a self-represented petition for postconviction
relief with the district court. He argued that he had received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel because his counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard when
his counsel failed to move to exclude the state’s evidence of arson. In support of that
argument, Chamberlain attached Dr. Gorbett’s report to his petition, contending that the
report put his counsel on notice that the state’s experts’ testimony was inadmissible based
on their failure to follow proper scientific methods.
The district court determined that Chamberlain’s claim was Knaffla-barred because,
although he did not make the argument on direct appeal, it was known to him, given that
he made the same arguments in a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause prior to trial,
he was aware of the content of cross-examination of the experts at trial, and he had brought

3 Chamberlain’s sentence reflects an upward departure from the presumptive sentence due
to the presence of aggravating factors.

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other arguments related to expert testimony on direct appeal. The district court denied
Chamberlain’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing because it
determined that the petition failed to allege facts that, if true, would entitle Chamberlain to
relief.
Chamberlain appeals.
DECISION
Chamberlain argues that, because his ineffective-assistance claim required the
district court to consider evidence outside of the trial record, the district court erred by
concluding, without a hearing, that his claim was Knaffla-barred.4 Appellate courts
“review the [summary] denial of postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo because such claims involve mixed questions of law and
facts.” Ezeka v. State, 16 N.W.3d 768, 78 2 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted). An
evidentiary hearing must be held on a petition for postconviction relief “[u]nless the
petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is
entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). “In determining whether an
evidentiary hearing is required, a . . . court considers the facts alleged in the petition as true
and construes them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” Andersen v. State,
913 N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).

4 When a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be adjudicated on the basis of
the trial record, it must be brought on direct appeal, or it will be Knaffla-barred if raised in
a postconviction petition. Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 2004); Robinson
v. State, 567 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 1997).

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To receive an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective-assistance claim, a petitioner
must allege facts that, if proved by a preponderance of the evidence, show that counsel’s
performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that, “but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 93-94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). We generally decline to review
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims that are based on matters of trial strategy.
Sanchez-Diaz v. State, 758 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. 2008). Whether to request a hearing
challenging the admissibility of evidence or object to the admission of evidence are
strategic decisions. Schneider v. State, 725 N.W.2d 516, 520-21 (Minn. 2007).
Chamberlain asserts that the state’s experts did not follow the proper scientific
method and argues that additional evidence is needed because his trial counsel has not
answered why he did not move to exclude the state’s experts’ testimony and the state’s
experts have not had a chance to respond to a challenge to the testimony’s admissibility.
Chamberlain’s ineffective-assistance claim is grounded in decisions his trial counsel made
that fall within trial strategy.
We further observe that, prior to trial, Chamberlain’s counsel moved to dismiss,
arguing that the state’s expert evidence was insufficient and criticizing the experts’
procedures. In addition, during cross-examination, the state’s experts were questioned
extensively on their investigation procedures, and during Chamberlain’s expert’s
testimony, Dr. Gorbett opined at length that the state’s experts did not follow the proper
scientific method and did not properly exclude other potential causes of the fire. After the

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state rested, Chamberlain’s counsel also moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that
the state’s experts’ testimony established only that they failed to find an alternative cause
for the fire and that the state’s witnesses gave different versions of events. The district
court denied the motion, ruling that a jury could find credible the state’s evidence that the
fire was intentionally set. During closing arguments, both parties focused on whether the
state’s experts were reliable and credible.
Because it is evident from the trial record that Chamberlain’s ineffective-assistance
claim fails because it is based on matters of trial strategy, and because the state’s witnesses
responded extensively to Chamberlain’s arguments regarding the reliability of the state’s
experts, the resolution of Chamberlain’s arguments in his postconviction petition does not
require additional evidence. We agree with the district court that, at the time of his direct
appeal, Chamberlain knew or should have known about the arguments he makes in his
postconviction petition and that, because he did not raise them in his direct appeal, they are
Knaffla-barred.5 Finally, we observe that Chamberlain failed to allege facts that, if proved,
would show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err by dismissing
Chamberlain’s petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.

5 Chamberlain does not argue that either of the two exceptions to the Knaffla bar—novelty
and interests of justice—applies here. See Davis v. State, 880 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn.
2016) (noting the two common-law exceptions to the Knaffla bar).