State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0104

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mykell Steffon Burton,
Appellant.

Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-19-8414

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Carl E. Erickson, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Connolly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that
the district court (1) considered a probation violation outside the scope of this court’s
2
remand order, (2) violated his right to a speedy probation-revocation hearing, and (3) failed
to analyze fully the third Austin1 factor. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2021, appellant Mykell Steffon Burton pleaded guilty to first-degree
aggravated robbery and first-degree burglary. In January 2022, the district court sentenced
Burton to 136 months in prison but stayed execution of the sentence and placed Burton on
supervised probation for five years. The probationary conditions required Burton to:
(1) remain law-abiding; (2) complete an anger-management program; and (3) abstain from
alcohol and mood-altering chemicals and submit to testing to verify compliance.
In February 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged Burton with two counts
of criminal sexual conduct. That same month, a probation agent submitted a violation
report alleging that Burton had violated the three probationary conditions. The district
court put the probation-violation matter “on hold” until the criminal- sexual-conduct case
was resolved.
In March 2024, Burton pleaded guilty to an amended charge of fifth-degree criminal
sexual conduct. That same month, a probation-revocation hearing was held. At the
hearing, Burton stated that he would admit to the violations of failing to complete anger
management and failing to abstain from mood -altering chemicals, but would not admit to
the failure-to-remain-law-abiding allegation. Burton stated that he intended to withdraw
his plea in the criminal-sexual-conduct case . The state replied that, in the interest of

1 State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 1980).
3
judicial economy, it would strike the failure-to-remain-law-abiding violation. The district
court agreed and stated that it would strike that allegation. Burton admitted to the
remaining two violations. The district court revoked Burton’s probation and executed his
sentence.
In May 2024, Burton appealed his criminal- sexual-conduct conviction. He later
appealed the revocation of his probation.
In February 2025, this court reversed and remanded the district court’s
probation-revocation order, concluding that the presiding judge made comments that called
into question the judge’s impartiality, which disqualified the judge from presiding over the
matter. State v. Burton, No. A24-0932, 2025 WL 586228, at *4 (Minn. App. Feb. 20, 2025)
(order op. (Burton I )). This court “reverse [d] the district court’s decision to revoke
Burton’s probation and remand[ed] for a new probation revocation hearing before a
different district court judge as assigned by the chief judge.” Id.
Thereafter, for various reasons, the new probation -revocation hearing was
rescheduled several times. During this time, this court affirmed Burton’s criminal-sexual-
conduct conviction. State v. Burton, No. A24-0870 (Minn. App. May 5, 2025) (Burton II),
rev. denied (Minn. July 30, 2025).
The new probation-revocation hearing was held in October 2025. The parties and
the district court agreed that the hearing would involve all three of the 2023
probation-violation allegations.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court revoked Burton’s probation. The
district court found that Burton had multiple tampered-with, missed, and positive drug tests
4
and had been convicted of criminal sexual conduct. Based on these findings, the district
court determined that Burton had violated the conditions of his probation to abstain from
mood-altering chemicals and remain law-abiding. The district court expressed that
Burton’s continual positive drug tests since 2022 were concerning and that the new
conviction, “just one year” after the court had placed Burton on probation for serious
charges, was significant. The district court determined that these “violations were
intentional or inexcusable,” that “[t]he need for confinement outweighs the policy favoring
probation,” that confinement was appropriate to protect the public —“most demonstrated
by the new charge being [an] offense date within a year of [Burton’s] . . . sentence[] on the
original charge”—and that “anything less than a revocation would significantly discount
the seriousness of the violations themselves.”
This appeal followed.
DECISION
Scope of Probation Violations Considered
Burton claims that the district court exceeded the scope of this court’s remand order
by considering the alleged probation violation of failing to remain law-abiding. Burton
argues that, because the district court exceeded the scope of remand instructions in
Burton I, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider this allegation. We review
Burton’s claim on the merits.2

2 The state argues that, because Burton did not object to the district court’s consideration
of all three allegations, this issue was forfeited. Burton argues that, because the district
court lacked subject- matter jurisdiction, the argument is not forfeited. Because our
consideration of the argument on its merits does not affect our decision to affirm, we do
5
“Minnesota’s district courts are courts of general jurisdiction that . . . have the power
to hear all types of civil and criminal cases.” State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 301
(Minn. 2015). “Subject-matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear the type of
dispute at issue and to grant the type of relief sought.” Seehus v. Bor-Son Const., Inc.,
783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010) (emphasis added). “Subject- matter jurisdiction is a
question of law that we review de novo.” Daniel v. City of Minneapolis, 923 N.W.2d 637,
644 (Minn. 2019).
Remand orders may be “general” or “limited.” State v. Thompson, 942 N.W.2d 350,
354 (Minn. 2020). “Limited remands explicitly outline the issues . . . and create a narrow
framework within which the district court must operate. General remands . . . give district
courts authority to address all matters as long as remaining consistent with the remand.”
Id. at 353 (quotation omitted). Whether our remand in Burton I was general or limited is
reviewed de novo. Id. at 354. A district court’s determination of the scope of remand
instructions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. “A [district] court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Nyonteh, 24 N.W.3d 271, 282 (Minn. 2025) (quotation
omitted).
Applying these principles, we conclude that the district court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over the probation-violation allegation. This court’s remand order required “a
new probation-revocation hearing before a different district court judge.” Burton I,

not reach the forfeiture issue and assume without deciding that the argument is not
forfeited.
6
2025 WL 586228, at * 4. The remand order did not limit the allegations to be addressed,
nor did it create a narrow framework within which the district court must operate. As such,
it was a general remand. The district court determined that, because the remand required
an entirely new hearing, voiding the previous hearing and any decisions that had occurred
within that hearing, it could consider all three of the 2023 probation-violation allegations.
All parties agreed to this interpretation. The district court neither erred nor abused its
discretion by considering the failure- to-remain-law-abiding allegation at the new
probation-revocation hearing.
Speedy Probation-Revocation Hearing
Burton next argues that the district court violated his due-process rights by failing
to provide a speedy probation-revocation hearing. Due-process claims not raised at a
probation-revocation hearing are waived. See Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 252 (“Since the
appellant did not raise [the due-process] issue at the revocation hearing, the issue is
waived.”). Because the record reflects that Burton neither asserted a due-process right to
a speedy probation-revocation hearing on remand nor objected to or argued that his right
to due process was violated because of the delay in holding the new hearing, he has
forfeited the right to raise the claim now.
Interest in Rehabilitation and Avoiding Confinement
Lastly, Burton argues that the district court erred by revoking probation without
adequately considering whether the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring
rehabilitation. Minnesota appellate courts review whether a district court made the
required findings to revoke probation de novo. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605
7
(Minn. 2005). But a district court’s determination that “there is sufficient evidence to
revoke probation” is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
To revoke probation, a district court must find that (1) the defendant violated a
probationary condition, (2) the violation was “intentional or inexcusable,” and (3) the
“need for confinement outweighs policies favoring probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250.
In evaluating the third factor, a district court should consider the following subfactors:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.

Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted). “Only one Modtland subfactor is
necessary to support revocation.” State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023),
rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023).
Burton asserts that the district court merely recited the third Austin factor “without
conducting a meaningful weighing of the interest of confinement against the interests of
. . . probation.” Further, Burton argues that the district court analyzed only the need for
confinement and skipped considering the policies favoring probation. We disagree.
In reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court conducted a proper,
thorough, and substantive analysis. The district court made specific findings regarding
Burton’s multiple tampered-with, missing, and positive drug tests and his new offense
occurring “just one year” after the court placed him on probation. The district court then
determined that these facts established that confinement was necessary to protect the public
8
from further criminal activity and that failing to revoke probation would “significantly
discount the seriousness of the violations themselves.” This shows that the district court
properly considered whether probation was effective and whether confinement outweighed
the policies favoring probation. See id. at 321 (rejecting a challenge to the district court’s
findings on the third Austin factor because the court’s detailed factual findings implicitly
demonstrated that probation had not been an effective or reliable deterrent to further
criminal activity). As such, the district court conducted a proper and substantive analysis
of the third Austin factor.
Affirmed.