State of Minnesota v. Trevon James Mattson

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0109

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Trevon James Mattson,
Respondent.

Filed August 17, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge
Dissenting, Smith, J., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-25-21080

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and

Smith, J., Judge. ∗

SYLLABUS

The word “violation” as used in the felony-enhancement provision of Minnesota

Statutes section 609.4751, subdivision 3 (2024), includes a failure to comply with the

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

requirements of the statute. The word “violation” in section 609.4751, subdivision 3, is

not limited to a formal adjudication of guilt.

OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

This pretrial appeal concerns the felony-enhancement provision of Minnesota

Statutes section 609.4751 (2024), which makes it a crime to impersonate a peace officer.

Under the felony-enhancement provision, a person is guilty of a felony if the person

“violates [the statute] within five years of a previous violation.” Minn. Stat. § 609.4751,

subd. 3.

Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s dismissal of a felony

peace-officer-impersonation charge under section 609.4751, subdivision 3, against

respondent Trevon James Mattson for lack of probable cause based on an erroneous

interpretation of the word “violation,” as used in the subdivision. The district court

interpreted the word “violation” in section 609.4751, subdivision 3, to require a “conviction

or adjudication” and dismissed the felony charge against Mattson because the state had not

established “a prior conviction or adjudication.” Relying on a statutory definition of the

word “violate,” the state argues that the word “violation,” as used in section 609.4751,

subdivision 3, unambiguously means conduct that “fails to comply with” the law. Mattson

responds that the district court correctly construed the word “violation” to mean an

adjudication of guilt. We conclude that the word “violation” as used in the

felony-enhancement provision of section 609.4751 unambiguously includes conduct that

fails to comply with the impersonation statute and is not limited to a formal adjudication

2

of guilt. Applying that definition, we further conclude that the district court erred when it

dismissed the felony charge of impersonating a peace officer against Mattson under section

609.4751 for lack of probable cause. We therefore reverse the dismissal of the felony

charge and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

The following facts are drawn from the district court’s order dismissing the felony

charge for lack of probable cause, supplemented by exhibits received by the district court,

as necessary to address the issues on appeal.

In July 2025, law enforcement received a report that an unmarked sport utility

vehicle (SUV) on Interstate 94 was using multicolored lights to maneuver through traffic

and was attempting to pull drivers over. The reporting party told dispatch that he believed

he was being pulled over by the SUV, but he did not believe the driver of the SUV was a

police officer.

An officer from the Rogers Police Department responded to the report. The officer

saw the SUV, a Chevrolet Tahoe, driving on Interstate 94 and observed the SUV was

equipped with a lightbar, spotlight, push bumper, and emergency lights. The SUV bore no

logo or insignia and lacked the “Police” license plate typically affixed to law-enforcement

vehicles.

The officer conducted a traffic stop of the SUV and approached the driver. The

driver, Mattson, was wearing a vest equipped with, among other items, a taser, handcuffs,

and a body-worn camera. The officer also noticed that the vehicle was set up like a police

squad car. The interior of the SUV had a laptop, a forward-facing camera, light and siren

3

box, and a dog kennel. Mattson told the officer that he worked for Active Watch Protection

Agency (AWPA), that he was driving to his friend’s house, and that he did not activate his

lights or siren on the interstate. The officer observed an AWPA insignia on a uniform shirt

in Mattson’s SUV that resembled a patch worn by law enforcement.

The officer then contacted the reporting party, who told the officer that the SUV

accelerated behind the reporting party’s vehicle at a high rate of speed and then activated

its emergency lights and siren. The reporting party started to pull over, but the SUV then

passed him. The reporting party noted that, when he was pulling over, he observed the

SUV driver was using a laptop and talking on a radio. He also observed that the SUV did

not have a law-enforcement license plate or police markings. The reporting party “called

911 because he felt like something was wrong.”

The state charged Mattson with four counts of impersonating a peace officer under

Minnesota Statutes section 609.4751, including one felony count for violating section

609.4751, subdivision 3, “within five years of a previous violation” of the statute. The

state predicated the felony enhancement on Mattson’s prior conduct in August 2024 of

allegedly impersonating a peace officer—conduct for which charges were pending in

Hennepin County when the state filed its complaint in this matter. The state also referenced

pending charges in Dakota County for operating a security vehicle of a prohibited color or

with its identity not displayed.

4

Mattson moved to dismiss the felony count for lack of probable cause. 1 Mattson

argued that the felony-enhancement provision’s operative language—“within five years of

a previous violation”—requires proof of a prior adjudication of guilt for impersonating a

peace officer within five years for the enhancement to apply. Mattson further contended

that the complaint did not allege a prior adjudication of guilt and therefore the felony charge

lacked probable cause. The state countered that the phrase “within five years of a previous

violation” in section 609.4751 did not require proof of a prior adjudication of guilt but

instead is satisfied by proof of a previous failure to comply with the statute within the last

five years. In support of its position, the state relied on the definition of “violate” in section

645.44, subdivision 17 (2024), as including “failure to comply with.” In its legal

memorandum, the state also incorporated by reference three police reports that the district

court had received as exhibits at an omnibus hearing in the matter. Those included, in

relevant part, the July 2025 report from the Rogers Police Department—the basis for the

charges in the current complaint; an August 2024 report from the Minnesota State Patrol

detailing allegations that Mattson impersonated a peace officer in Minneapolis on Interstate

35W—the basis for charges pending in Hennepin County; and a December 2024 report

from the Mendota Heights Police Department setting forth the basis for charges pending in

Dakota County.

The district court dismissed the felony peace-officer-impersonation charge against

Mattson for lack of probable cause. In reaching its decision, the district court interpreted

1
Mattson also sought to dismiss the felony count on constitutional grounds. The
constitutional argument is not at issue on appeal.

5

the language “within five years of a previous violation” in the felony-enhancement

provision in Mattson’s favor, concluding that a “previous violation” requires a “conviction

or adjudication.” The district court relied primarily on the definition of “[s]econd or

subsequent violation or offense” in section 609.02, subdivision 11 (2024), to support its

conclusion. The district court then concluded that the felony-impersonation charge against

Mattson lacked probable cause because the state had not established Mattson had “a prior

conviction or adjudication.” 2

The state appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the state show that pretrial dismissal of the felony-impersonation charge had a
critical impact on the state’s case?

II. Did the district court err by dismissing the felony-enhanced charge against Mattson
for lack of probable cause based on an erroneous interpretation of the word
“violation,” as used in Minnesota Statutes section 609.4751, subdivision 3?

ANALYSIS

The state advances two main arguments in this pretrial appeal. The state argues first

that it is entitled to appellate review because the district court’s dismissal of the felony

peace-officer-impersonation charge critically impacted its case against Mattson. The state

argues second that the district court erred in its interpretation of the word “violation” in the

2
The supreme court has instructed that courts look to the “official judgment of conviction
in the district court file as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally
adjudicated.” Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted).
We understand the district court’s use of the words “conviction or adjudication” as
synonymous with the formal adjudication of guilt entered by the court after a guilty plea
or verdict of guilty.

6

felony-enhancement provision of Minnesota Statutes section 609.4751, subdivision 3, and

consequently erred when it dismissed the felony-enhanced charge based on this

interpretation. We are persuaded by the state’s arguments.

I. The state has demonstrated a critical impact.

We first consider the state’s threshold argument that it is entitled to appellate review

of the pretrial dismissal of the felony peace-officer-impersonation charge against Mattson.

The state may appeal a pretrial dismissal order for lack of probable cause if the dismissal

is based on a question of law, provided that the state establishes that the alleged error,

unless reversed, will have a critical impact on its ability to prosecute its case. Minn. R.

Crim. P. 28.04, subds. 1(1), 2(2)(b). Dismissal of a felony charge, even when other charges

remain, has a critical impact on the state’s case. See State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677,

683-84 (Minn. 2009) (stating “an order that dismisses DWI charges, even when other

charges remain, will have a critical impact on the prosecution’s case”). We review de novo

the sufficiency of the state’s claim of critical impact. See id. Here, the state argues, and

Mattson does not dispute, that the district court’s dismissal of the felony peace-officer-

impersonation charge against Mattson had a critical impact on the state’s case because the

most serious charge was dismissed. We agree. This pretrial dismissal based on a question

of law meets the procedural threshold for a critical impact on the state’s ability to prosecute

its case against Mattson.

7

II. The district court erred by dismissing the felony charge of impersonating a
peace officer for lack of probable cause.

We next consider whether the district court erred when it dismissed for lack of

probable cause the felony charge of impersonating a peace officer based on its

interpretation of section 609.4751, subdivision 3—the felony-enhancement provision. The

question before us centers on the meaning of the word “violation” as used in that provision.

The parties offer competing definitions of the word “violation.” The parties’ disagreement

presents an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Morgan,

968 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. 2021).

“The object of all [statutory] interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain

and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024); see also

State v. Oliver, 28 N.W.3d 445, 451 (Minn. 2025) (applying section 645.16 to its

statutory-interpretation analysis). The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine

whether the statute’s language is ambiguous, meaning it is susceptible to more than one

reasonable interpretation as applied to the facts of the case. State v. Letourneau,

23 N.W.3d 386, 391 (Minn. 2025). In determining whether statutory language is

ambiguous, we construe words and phrases “according to rules of grammar and according

to their common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2024). “If a word is

defined in a statute, that definition controls.” Morgan, 968 N.W.2d at 30. “But if no

statutory definition resolves the question, we will look to ordinary meaning or technical

and special usage of words to determine if the statutory language is ambiguous.”

Id. “When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear

8

and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning of the statute.” State v. Caldwell,

803 N.W.2d 373, 382 (Minn. 2011).

“To determine the plain meaning, we look to the text and textual context of the

statute.” Letourneau, 23 N.W.3d at 391. “We read the statute as a whole and favor an

interpretation that gives each word or phrase in a statute a distinct, not an identical,

meaning.” Id. (quotation omitted). Courts “will not supply words that the [l]egislature

either purposely omitted or inadvertently left out.” Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 382.

A. The Meaning of the Word “Violation”

With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of section 609.4751. We

begin with the statute’s plain language because it is the “best guide to the [l]egislature’s

intent.” State v. Latino, 15 N.W.3d 654, 659 (Minn. 2025). Section 609.4751 makes it a

crime to impersonate a peace officer. Minn. Stat. § 609.4751. The offense can be a

misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony. Id. The statute provides in relevant part:

Subdivision 1. Misdemeanor. Whoever falsely impersonates
a peace officer with intent to mislead another into believing
that the impersonator is actually an officer is guilty of a
misdemeanor.

Subd. 2. Gross misdemeanor. Whoever violates subdivision
1 while committing any of the following acts is guilty of a
gross misdemeanor:
....
Subd. 3. Felony. Whoever violates this section within five
years of a previous violation of this section is guilty of a
felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than
$4,000, or both.

Id.

9

The question before us centers on subdivision 3, the felony-enhancement provision,

and the meaning of the word “violation,” as used in the phrase “violates this section within

five years of a previous violation.” Id., subd. 3. The state argues that the word “violation”

refers to any conduct that fails to comply with section 609.4751, subdivision 1, which is

the underlying substantive provision making it a crime to falsely impersonate a peace

officer. Mattson responds that the district court correctly concluded that the term

“violation” as used in section 609.4751, subdivision 3, means an adjudication of guilt. 3

Section 609.4751 does not itself define the word “violation,” or its root word

“violate,” both of which are used in the felony-enhancement provision of section 609.4751.

But, as the state notes, the legislature defined “violate” in section 645.44 to “include[]

failure to comply with.” Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 17; see also Morgan, 968 N.W.2d at

30 (stating that section 645.44, subdivision 17, “defines ‘violate’ as ‘failure to comply

with’”). 4 And, importantly, the legislature specified that the definition of “violate” in

section 645.44 applies “in Minnesota Statutes . . . unless another intention clearly appears.”

Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subds. 1, 17 (2024). Given this directive from the legislature, we

conclude that the term “violation” as used in section 609.4751, subdivision 3, must be

interpreted in a manner consistent with the definition of “violate” in section 645.44,

3
At oral argument, Mattson also raised a due-process argument for the first time.
Because the argument was not briefed, we decline to address it. State v. Thompson,
886 N.W.2d 224, 234 n.8 (Minn. 2016) (concluding that an issue raised for the first time
at oral argument was waived).
4
The Morgan court applied the version of section 645.44, subdivision 17, effective in 2020,
but its language remains unchanged in the 2024 version here.

10

subdivision 17, “unless another intention clearly appears.” Id.; see Morgan, 968 N.W.2d

at 30 (interpreting the word “violation” in Minnesota Statutes section 152.025,

subdivision 4(a) (2020), with reference to the definition of the root word “violate” in

section 645.44, subdivision 17 (2020)).

We now turn to that question. Mattson does not expressly argue that the legislature

clearly intended the term “violation” as used in section 609.4751, subdivision 3, to have a

different meaning than that provided by section 645.44, subdivision 17. Instead, Mattson

argues that the legislature intended the term “violation” in section 609.4751 to be

interpreted by reference to the definition of “[s]econd or subsequent violation” in

Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 11. Section 609.02, subdivision 11

provides that “[s]econd or subsequent violation . . . means that prior to the commission of

the violation . . . , the actor has been adjudicated guilty of a specified similar violation or

offense.” (Emphasis added.) Relying on the phrase “adjudicated guilty” in the definition

of “[s]econd or subsequent violation,” Mattson contends that the term “violation” in section

609.4751 means an adjudication of guilt.

We are not persuaded. The phrase “second or subsequent violation” is a defined

term of art that is used in the statutory language of specific criminal statutes, but not in

section 609.4751. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 609.891, subd. 2(b) (2024) (enhancing a “second

or subsequent . . . violation” for unauthorized computer access to a felony); Minn. Stat.

§ 617.247, subd. 7 (2024) (requiring “a mental examination” of a person convicted of “a

second or subsequent violation” of possession of child sexual abuse material “within 15

years of the prior conviction”); Minn. Stat. § 624.7142, subd. 6 (2024) (enhancing “a

11

second or subsequent violation” of carrying a pistol while under the influence to a gross

misdemeanor). In section 609.4751, the legislature used different language. The

legislature provided that the felony enhancement for the offense of impersonating a peace

officer applies when a person “violates [section 609.4751] within five years of a previous

violation of this section.” Minn. Stat. § 609.4751, subd. 3 (emphasis added). We presume

that distinctions in statutory language are intentional and that the legislature knows how to

draft language to effectuate its intent. See Nichols v. State, 858 N.W.2d 773, 777-78

(Minn. 2015); see also Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 382 (stating appellate courts do not add

language to a statute that the legislature omitted). 5 Because the legislature did not specify

that felony enhancement for impersonating a peace officer applies to a “second or

subsequent violation,” we conclude that the definition of “[s]econd or subsequent

violation” does not provide a clear intention by the legislature to limit the meaning of the

word “violation” in section 609.4751, subdivision 3, to an adjudication of guilt.

This conclusion is reinforced by a comparison of the felony-enhancement language

in section 609.4751, subdivision 3, to the felony-enhancement language of several other

criminal statutes. Those statutes expressly require a previous conviction or adjudication of

delinquency as the predicate for felony enhancement, whereas section 609.4751 does not. 6

5
As the state points out, “[i]f anything, the ‘second or subsequent violation’ definition in
section 609.02, subd. 11[,] appears to be a subset of the broader ‘violate’ definition in
section 645.44, subd. 17. That [is] because a ‘prior’ adjudication of guilt is one way to
establish that a person has failed to comply with a law.”
6
We also observe that the legislature does not require a conviction or adjudication for all
charge-enhancement provisions. For example, Minnesota Statutes section 169A.24
(2024), the first-degree impaired-driving statute, provides for felony enhancement if a

12

For example, Minnesota Statutes section 609.3451 (2024), the fifth-degree criminal-

sexual-conduct statute, provides for an enhancement to a felony if the person violates that

statute and has a “previous conviction for” violating enumerated code sections. Minn. Stat.

§ 609.3451, subd. 3(b)(2) (emphasis added). Likewise, Minnesota Statutes section

609.224 (2024), the fifth-degree assault statute, provides for an enhancement to a felony if

the person violates that statute “within ten years of . . . two or more previous qualified

domestic violence-related offense convictions or adjudications of delinquency” against the

same person. Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 4(a) (emphasis added). And Minnesota Statutes

section 617.23 (2024), the indecent-exposure statute, makes it a felony if the person

violates that statute “after having been previously convicted of or adjudicated delinquent

for violating” certain related statutory provisions. Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 3(1)

(emphasis added). In each of these statutes, 7 the legislature specifically required a previous

“conviction” or “adjudication of delinquency” to enhance the offense to a felony. But the

person is either convicted of one of the enumerated felonies or commits a “violation within
ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents.” Minn.
Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1. A “[q]ualified prior impaired driving incident” means, among
other things, any loss of the person’s license related to impaired driving. Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.03, subd. 22 (2024).
7
In at least three other criminal statutes, the legislature explicitly requires a prior conviction
or adjudication of delinquency for felony enhancement. See Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd.
4 (2024) (making harassment a felony if the person violates the statute within ten years of
a “previous qualified . . . conviction or adjudication of delinquency”); Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1) (2024) (making a protective-order violation a felony if a person
has two or more “previous qualified . . . offense convictions” within the past ten years);
Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(g)(1) (2024) (making a privacy-interference offense a felony
if a person violates the statute after a “previous conviction” for interference with privacy
or section 609.749).

13

legislature did not include a similar requirement in the felony-enhancement provision of

section 609.4751 for impersonating a peace officer. See Minn. Stat. § 609.4751, subd. 3.

Instead, the legislature required a previous “violation” of the section within five years. Id.

The absence of the words “conviction” and “adjudication of delinquency” in section

609.4751 is significant. If the legislature had intended to require a previous conviction or

adjudication of delinquency as the predicate for felony enhancement, it would have done

so expressly. It did not. See id. Because the legislature chose to not require a previous

“conviction” or “adjudication of delinquency” as the predicate event for felony

enhancement under section 609.4751 but instead required a previous “violation,” we can

conclude only that the legislature did not intend to limit the felony-enhancement provision

solely to circumstances where the person has a previous adjudication of guilt as argued by

Mattson. See In re Hildebrandt, 701 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. App. 2005) (“[W]e presume

the legislature’s choice of words indicate its intent.”); see also State v. Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5,

17 (Minn. 2011) (courts “will not read into a statute a requirement that the [l]egislature by

its plain language has left out”). To limit section 609.4751, subdivision 3, in this manner

would add words to the statute, which we cannot and will not do.

The supreme court’s decision in Morgan also reinforces the conclusion that the

legislature did not intend the word “violation” as used in section 609.4751 to mean

conviction or adjudication. In Morgan, the supreme court considered the language of

Minnesota Statutes section 152.025, subdivision 4(a). That provision states a person

convicted of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance “who has not been

previously convicted of a violation of [chapter 152] or a similar offense in another

14

jurisdiction,” and meets other requirements, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Minn. Stat.

§ 152.025, subd. 4(a) (emphasis added). When interpreting the meaning of this phrase, the

supreme court recognized that the word “convicted” and its nominalized form “conviction”

have a different meaning than the word “violate” and its nominalized form “violation.”

Morgan, 968 N.W.2d at 30-31. As the supreme court noted, “conviction” is defined in

section 609.02, subdivision 5, as a guilty verdict or guilty plea that is “accepted and

recorded.” Id. at 30 (citing Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5 (2020)). And section 645.44,

subdivision 17, “defines ‘violate’ as ‘failure to comply with.’” Id. (citing Minn. Stat.

§ 645.44, subd. 17 (2020)). The supreme court’s analysis in Morgan confirms that the

terms “conviction” and “violation” are not synonymous. See id.

For these reasons, we discern no clear intention by the legislature to define the word

“violation” in section 609.4751, subdivision 3, to mean “adjudication of guilt” as argued

by Mattson. The plain language of section 609.4751 includes no such limitation.

Consequently, we conclude that the word “violation” as used in the phrase “within five

years of a previous violation of this section” in section 609.4751, subdivision 3,

unambiguously includes a “failure to comply with”—the meaning given to it by the

legislature in section 645.44, subdivision 17. Because the legislature’s intent is clear from

the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, we interpret section 609.4751,

subdivision 3, according to its plain meaning. State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 284-85

(Minn. 2015). In sum, we hold that the word “violation” as used in the felony-enhancement

provision of Minnesota Statutes section 609.4751, subdivision 3, includes a failure to

15

comply with the requirements of the statute and is not limited to a formal adjudication of

guilt.

B. Probable Cause Determination

Having decided the statutory-interpretation question, we next consider whether the

district court erred when it dismissed the felony count of impersonating a peace officer for

lack of probable cause based on its interpretation of the word “violation” in section

609.4751. “Probable cause for a charge exists where facts submitted to the district court

show a reasonable probability that the person committed the crime.” Letourneau,

23 N.W.3d at 396. Appellate courts “review factual findings underlying a probable cause

determination using the clear error standard, but review the district court’s application

of the legal standard of probable cause to those facts de novo.” State v. Lopez,

778 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010).

As discussed, section 609.4751 makes it a crime to “falsely impersonate[] a peace

officer with intent to mislead another into believing that the impersonator is actually an

officer.” Minn. Stat. § 609.4751, subd. 1. And “[w]hoever violates this section within five

years of a previous violation of this section is guilty of a felony.” Id., subd. 3. As noted

above, the district court interpreted the phrase “within five years of a previous violation”

as requiring “a prior conviction or adjudication” within five years of the current charge.

Based on this interpretation of the felony-enhancement provision and because the state did

not establish that Mattson had “a prior conviction or adjudication” under section 609.4751,

the district court dismissed the felony-impersonation charge against Mattson.

16

We conclude that the district court erred by dismissing the felony charge because its

decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of the word “violation” in section

609.4751, subdivision 3. As explained above, a “violation” includes a “failure to comply

with” the statute and the felony-enhancement provision does not require a prior

adjudication of guilt.

Applying this definition of “violation,” we conclude that the totality of the facts

alleged in the complaint along with the state’s evidence presented at an omnibus hearing

established probable cause for the charge of felony impersonation of a peace officer. In

the complaint, the state alleged that Mattson violated section 609.4751 in July 2025 by

driving an SUV equipped with multi-colored lights, maneuvering the SUV through traffic,

and seemingly attempting to pull other drivers over. The complaint also alleged that

Mattson violated this same statute within five years of the current charge based on pending

charges in Hennepin County for impersonating a peace officer and charges for similar

conduct in Dakota County.

The state supported the allegations that Mattson impersonated a peace officer in

2025 and previously in 2024 with law-enforcement reports from those incidents. The

law-enforcement report for the 2025 incident describes the details set forth above. The

August 2024 report provides that a state trooper stopped Mattson for impersonating a peace

officer after observing him: operate a vehicle that appeared to be an unmarked police

vehicle, shining a spotlight at a passenger car, mimicking that car’s lane changes, and

acting as if he was preparing to conduct a traffic stop.

17

Taken as a whole, the facts alleged in the complaint and described in the

law-enforcement reports show a reasonable probability that Mattson falsely impersonated

a peace officer with intent to mislead another into believing that he was actually an officer

in violation of section 609.4751 both in July 2025 and in August 2024. In other words, the

record establishes probable cause that he violated section 609.4751 “within five years of a

previous violation.” Minn. Stat. § 609.4751, subd. 3. We therefore conclude that the

district court erred when it dismissed the felony charge against Mattson of impersonating

a peace officer under section 609.4751 for lack of probable cause. See id.; see also

Letourneau, 23 N.W.3d at 396 (reviewing the sufficiency of the state’s evidence for

probable cause after resolving a statutory-interpretation issue). 8

DECISION

The word “violation” as used in the felony-enhancement provision of Minnesota

Statutes section 609.4751, subdivision 3, includes a failure to comply with the requirements

of the statute and is not limited to a formal adjudication of guilt. The district court erred

by dismissing the felony charge against Mattson under section 609.4751 based on its

8
We note that for Mattson to be found guilty of the felony-level offense of impersonating
a peace officer under section 609.4751, subdivision 3, the state would be required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt both the current allegation of impersonating a peace officer in
July 2025 and the alleged previous “violation” of section 609.4751 in August 2024.
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, our interpretation of the word “violation” does not
deny a defendant of the presumption of his innocence. Nor does it preclude a defendant
from invoking double-jeopardy if the state brings a felony-enhanced charge based on
conduct for which the defendant was already acquitted.

18

erroneous interpretation of “violation” as used in section 609.4751, subdivision 3. We

therefore reverse and remand to reinstate the felony charge.

Reversed and remanded.

19

SMITH, JOHN, Judge (dissenting)

The majority concludes that the word “violation” as used in the felony-enhancement

provision of the peace-officer impersonation statute encompasses any act that, with or

without adjudication, fails to comply with the statute’s requirements.

Minn. Stat. § 609.4751, subd. 3 (2024). I believe that the majority, amid the narrow focus

of its textual analysis, loses sight of the legislature’s inflexible reliance on convictions or

adjudications as predicate events for offense enhancement and the troubling implications

of its interpretation. I therefore respectfully dissent.

I. The Word “Violation” in the Felony-Enhancement Provision is Ambiguous

The word “violation” in the felony-enhancement provision is susceptible to both

definitions provided by the parties, rendering its meaning ambiguous.

See State v. Plancarte, 20 N.W.3d 30, 37 (Minn. 2025) (stating that when “the statutory

language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, then the statute is

ambiguous”) (quotation omitted). From a practical point of view, if an average person is

asked if they have ever had a traffic violation, what would they say? Would they answer

based on the number of convictions or would they answer based on the times that they

violated the traffic laws? Of course they would reference the convictions because that is

the common understanding of the term violation.

We begin with the relevant text of section 609.4751, subdivision 3, which provides

that “[w]hoever violates this section within five years of a previous violation is guilty of a

felony.” Id. (emphasis added). The state contends that a “violation” refers to any act that

fails to comply with the underlying offense of peace-officer impersonation. The state

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supports its position with the definition of “violate” set forth in Minnesota Statutes section

645.44, subdivision 17 (2024), which the legislature has designated as including the

“failure to comply with” unless “another intention clearly appears.”

Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 1 (2024). Mattson counters that “violation” means a conviction

or adjudication of guilt, relying on the definition of “[s]econd or subsequent violation or

offense” in Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 11 (2024). These competing

definitions frame a statutory-interpretation issue that this court reviews de novo.

State v. Morgan, 968 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. 2021). The principal goal of statutory

interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024).

Courts do so by determining whether the statute is ambiguous, meaning that its language

is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Morgan, 968 N.W.2d at 30. If

the statute defines a word, that definition controls. Id. But in the absence of a statutory

definition, courts discern meaning by reading the statute’s text according to the rules of

grammar and common usage. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2024). The inquiry concludes the

statute is not ambiguous from its plain meaning. Morgan, 968 N.W.2d at 30. But if the

statute remains ambiguous, courts apply canons of construction to resolve it.

State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019).

The majority resolves the competing definitions of “violation” in the state’s favor,

concluding that Mattson’s reliance on section 609.02, subdivision 11, adds language that

the legislature intentionally omitted from section 609.4751, subdivision 3. Again, section

609.02, subdivision 11, provides that a “[s]econd or subsequent violation” refers to a

person’s adjudication of a specified violation or offense prior to the prosecution of his

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current violation or offense. The majority reasons that the omission of the second-or-

subsequent language from section 609.4751, subdivision 3, is distinguishing. The majority

enumerates offense-enhancement provisions throughout the criminal code that explicitly

apply the second-or-subsequent language to designate convictions or adjudications as

preconditions for enhancement. See e.g., Minn. Stat. § 609.891, subd. 2(b) (2024)

(enhancing a “second or subsequent . . . violation” for unauthorized computer access to a

felony); Minn. Stat. § 609.671, subd. 8(e) (2024) (enhancing the penalty for a person

“convicted for a second or subsequent offense”); Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 4 (2024)

(enhancing “[s]econd or subsequent violations” of harassment offenses to a felony). But

this illustration is self-defeating. These statutes exemplify the legislature’s uniform

designation of convictions or adjudications as predicate events for offense enhancement,

and no other statute in the criminal code permits enhancement based only on an

unadjudicated act.

The majority points to Minnesota Statutes section 169A.24 (2024), the first-degree

impaired-driving statute, for the proposition that the legislature does not always require a

conviction or adjudication for offense enhancement. The impaired-driving statute provides

for felony enhancement if a person, among other things, commits a “violation” within ten

years of the first of three “qualified prior impaired driving incidents.”

Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1). The legislature defines a “[q]ualified prior impaired

driving incident” as any loss of a person’s license related to impaired driving.

Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 22 (2024). But even a person’s loss of license includes some

form of administrative or judicial review for suspension, revocation, cancellation, denial,

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or disqualification. Id., subd. 21 (2024); Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subds. 1, 2 (2024)

(establishing procedures for administrative or judicial review of a license revocation).

Unlike the impaired-driving statute, the majority’s interpretation of “violation” in section

609.4751, subdivision 3, provides no basis for reviewing whether a previous act qualifies

for felony enhancement.

Because the word “violation” is reasonably susceptible to meaning a “[s]econd or

subsequent violation” that is consistent with its use throughout the criminal code, I

conclude that the disputed word is ambiguous.

II. The Unreasonable Consequences of the Majority’s Interpretation

The majority’s interpretation of the word “violation” in section 609.4751,

subdivision 3, to broadly encompass any unadjudicated breach of the statute results in

unreasonable consequences. We resolve ambiguous statutory language by applying

extrinsic canons of construction that include, among others, consideration of a particular

interpretation’s consequences. Minn. Stat. § 645.16(6). We presume that, in examining the

consequences of a particular interpretation, the legislature does not intend an absurd or

unreasonable result. Moore v. Robinson Env’t, 954 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 2021). “We

may interpret the statute in a sensible manner to avoid such results.” Id. (quotation omitted).

The majority’s interpretation invites two results that unreasonably expand the scope of a

person’s criminal liability for peace-officer impersonation.

In the first instance, if a person is charged with an impersonation offense under

section 609.4751, subdivision 3, and acquitted, he still risks exposure to felony

enhancement on a second offense arising from his previous failure to comply with the

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statute. A person bears this same risk in the second instance, where his impersonation of a

peace officer to two different people in incidents minutes apart from one another suffices

for felony enhancement. Most troublingly, the person here is denied his presumption of

innocence until “proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” on account of an unadjudicated

act that enhances his prosecution. State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 249 (Minn. 2023)

(citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)) (other citation omitted). In sum, the

majority’s interpretation of “violation” in section 609.4751, subdivision 3, creates a

dangerously low threshold for enhancing a violative act to a felony offense. Because this

unreasonable result can be mitigated by a sensible interpretation of “violation” that aligns

with the legislature’s standard reliance on convictions or adjudications as preconditions for

enhancement, I conclude that the unreasonable-consequence canon favors Mattson.

For all these reasons, I agree with Mattson that the district court correctly interpreted

the law and properly granted his motion to dismiss the felony-impersonation charge for

lack of probable cause. I would affirm.

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