State Complaint Decision 25-257C on behalf of T.I.E. from South Washington County 0833-01

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0112

State Complaint Decision 25-257C on behalf of
T.I.E. from South Washington County 0833-01.

Filed August 17, 2026
Appeal dismissed
Segal, Judge*

Minnesota Department of Education
File No. 25-257C

Michael J. Waldspurger, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
relator Independent School District No. 833, South Washington County Schools)

Ruben Chapa, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent S.E.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Martha J. Casserly, Adrienne L. Kaufman, Assistant
Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Department of
Education)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Segal, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Judge
Relator school district challenges respondent department’s decision that relator
violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482
(2024), by proposing to unilaterally change a student’s educational placement setting, over

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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the parents’ objection, for the remainder of the student’s expulsion period. Because the
parties subsequently reached an agreement on a placement and the period for the expulsion
has expired, we conclude that there is no longer a live case or controversy to resolve. We
therefore dismiss relator’s appeal as moot.
FACTS
The following summary of the relevant facts and procedural background is taken
from the administrative record accompanying the decision of respondent Minnesota
Department of Education. In the fall of 2024, the student was enrolled for his junior year
at a high school in relator Independent School District No. 833, South Washington County
Schools. The student had previously been home schooled. The student qualified for
special education services under IDEA and an individualized education plan (IEP) 1 was
developed for the student that was agreed to by his parents.
In March 2025, the student’s mother alerted district staff that the student may have
brought a knife to school. After the student arrived at school, staff escorted him to the
office and asked him whether he had a knife. He admitted that he did, and staff located a
knife in the student’s backpack. The district then suspended the student for six days,
pending further proceedings. That same day, the student’s parents withdrew him from the
district.

1 An IEP is an individualized plan for providing special education and related services
under IDEA and Minnesota statutes, to ensure that children with disabilities receive a free
appropriate public education. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14), 1412(a)(1), 1414(d)(1)(a); Minn.
Stat. § 125A.08, subd. 1(b)(1) (2024).

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Despite the parent’s withdrawal of the student from the district, the district
scheduled a meeting with the student’s IEP team 2 to determine whether the student’s
conduct was a manifestation of the student’s disability.3 Under IDEA and state law, when
a child with a disability has committed a violation of school rules that might result in a
change of the student’s educational placement, the IEP team (including the child’s parents)
must meet to determine whether the child’s violation of the rules resulted from a
manifestation of the child’s disability. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E); Minn. Stat.
§ 121A.43 (2024). A rule violation is a manifestation of the student’s disability if the
behavior was caused by or had a direct and substantial relationship to the child’s disability
or was a direct result of the local education agency’s failure to implement the child’s IEP.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E). IDEA further allows that for conduct that qualifies as a
“special circumstance,” such as bringing a weapon to school, the district “may remove a
student to an interim alternative educational setting for not more than 45 school days,”
regardless of whether the conduct was a manifestation of the student’s disability. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(k)(1)(G).
The student’s parents attended the manifestation-determination meeting. The
school staff at the meeting determined that the student’s action of bringing the knife to
school was not a manifestation of his disability. The parents disagreed with school staff at

2 An IEP team is the group responsible for creating a special-education plan for a child with
disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3). An IEP team must include the student’s parents, the
student’s teachers, and a district representative. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).

3 The district explained that it proceeded to schedule the meeting in case the parents
changed their minds and sought to reenroll the student in the district.

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the IEP meeting but ultimately signed a prior written notice 4 agreeing with the district’s
determination.
Following the manifestation determination, the parents decided to reenroll the
student in the district. The student’s IEP team then determined that it would be appropriate
to place the student in an interim alternative educational setting , pending expulsion
proceedings. The team decided that the student would receive five hours per week of home
instruction to be delivered virtually or in person at the public library, based on the family’s
preference and availability, with transportation to be provided by the district. The parents
agreed in writing to the interim alternative educational setting.
The district notified the parents that the district intended to expel the student from
his high school for a period of 12 months. The parents waived their right to an expulsion
hearing and the district school board voted to expel the student from April 1, 2025, through
March 31, 2026. An IEP team meeting, which the student’s mother attended, was then
held in May 2025, to discuss an educational placement for the remainder of the 12-month
expulsion period, among other topics. After the IEP team meeting, the district sent a prior
written notice to the parents proposing to “amend [the s tudent’s IEP] to change the
student’s educational placement from his home-based setting to a special education
program at Northeast Metro Intermediate School District 916,” beginning in the fall of the

4 IDEA requires local educational agencies to provide parents with a “prior written notice”
whenever an agency “(A) proposes to initiate or change[] or (B) refuses to initiate or
change[] the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the
provision of a free appropriate public education to the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).

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2025-2026 school year.5 The parents objected to the proposed placement, but the district
responded that it had the right to unilaterally make the placement decision during the
expulsion period.
Shortly after receiving the district’s response, the student’s mother filed a state
administrative complaint with the department alleging, in relevant part, that the district
violated the student’s education rights. Specifically, she argued, among other claims, that
the district violated federal law by (1) unilaterally changing the student’s educational
setting for the remainder of the expulsion period without parental consent, and
(2) precluding parents from meaningful participation in the IEP process. A conciliation
conference between the district and the parents was held in October 2025, which led to an
agreement between the parties that the student would be placed in a transition program that
focused on post-secondary education, employment, and independent living for the
remainder of the expulsion period.
The department completed its investigation and issued its decision in November
2025. As relevant here, the department found that the district had violated IDEA and state
law by unilaterally changing the student’s placement for the remainder of the expulsion
period over the objection of the parents and by failing to “include” a parent “in the IEP
team determination of the interim alternative educational setting for the remainder of the
Student’s term of expulsion.” It reasoned that, under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(G), the

5 The prior written notice identified the school as a “Setting 4 placement” and explained
that such a placement “offers intensive support, specialized instruction, and consistent peer
engagement opportunities—critical components for adequate progress on [the student’s]
IEP goals and objectives that are not feasible within a home-based setting.”

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district had the right to unilaterally remove the student from school and place him in an
interim alternative educational setting for up to 45 school days based on the seriousness of
the student’s conduct in bringing a weapon to school, but that any subsequent change in
placement required parental consent, or if the parents objected, an opportunity for due-
process proceedings. The department found that “[r]ather than use the administrative
remedies available to it, the District unilaterally and in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2),
notified [mother] that it was placing the Student in a special school.” As the corrective
action, the department ordered district staff to attend training on “the legal framework of
school discipline,” which the department provided in February 2026 without charge to the
district.
The district appealed the department’s decision by a petition for a writ of certiorari.
DECISION
The district asserts a number of issues on appeal, including arguments that the
department’s decision is unsupported by evidence in the record because the student’s
mother was included in the IEP meeting at which the placement at intermediate district 916
was discussed, and that it is affected by an error of law because the district had the right to
change the student’s placement for the remainder of the expulsion period without parental
consent or a due-process hearing. The district also challenges the decision on procedural
grounds, arguing that it is arbitrary and capricious because the department’s investigation
was not adequate, balanced, or meaningful, the decision was not issued in a timely manner,
and it amounts to impermissible rulemaking.

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The department, in addition to defending its decision, asserts that this appeal is moot
because the parties reached an agreement in October 2025 on a placement for the remainder
of the expulsion period. The department contends that, because the expulsion period ended
in March 2026, there is no longer any relief that can be provided by the courts.
Minnesota courts may only resolve justiciable cases and controversies. See
Winkowski v. Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d 302, 308 n.7 (Minn. 2023). A justiciable
controversy presents “ a genuine conflict in the tangible interests of opposing litigants.”
Izaak Walton League of Am. Endowment, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 252 N.W.2d 852,
854 (Minn. 1977). The controversy, however, must continue to exist throughout the
litigation, including on appeal. See Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Minn.
2015). “An appeal should be dismissed as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer
necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible.” Id. at 5. The issue of
mootness presents a question of law subject to de novo review. See id. at 4.
The district does not challenge the department’s mootness assertion but argues that
the appeal falls within two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) that the issue is capable
of repetition but is likely to evade review, see Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d at 308; and (2) is
“functionally justiciable and presents an important question of statewide significance that
should be decided immediately,” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 6 (quotations omitted). We address
each exception below.
A. Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review
We address first the district’s argument that its appeal comes within the capable-of-
repetition-yet-likely-to-evade-review exception to the mootness doctrine. This exception

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applies when two elements are satisfied: “ there is a reasonable expectation that a
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again and the duration of the
challenged action is too short to be fully litigated.” Snell v. Walz, 985 N.W.2d 277, 287
(Minn. 2023) (quoting Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5). Both elements must be established for the
exception to apply. Id.
The district argues that “nothing prevents this student from repeating his actions and
facing the exact same discipline again” prior to graduation. The district also asserts that
the duration of expulsion proceedings is too short to be fully litigated before the expulsion
period expires.
Here, the student was over halfway through his junior year of high school when the
district expelled him for 12 months. His expulsion ended in March of this year and,
presumably, the student may well have completed his senior year by the date this opinion
is released. Given this short time frame, we are not persuaded that it is reasonable to expect
that the student would engage in conduct warranting a second expulsion. See id. (stating
that appellate courts “will not conclude that a claim is justiciable based on mere
speculation”); see also Quinn v. LMC NE Minneapolis Holdings, LLC, 985 N.W.2d 571,
574 (Minn. 2023) (holding that capable-of-repetition exception did not apply, even though
it is “conceivable” that the same party could engage again in the same conduct, because
such a recurrence “is not reasonably likely”). In addition, we are not persuaded that it is
likely that the same circumstances would arise where the parents have agreed to the initial
45-day interim alternative educational setting, but there is disagreement over the alternative
placement for the remainder of the expulsion period.

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Because the district has failed to demonstrate a “reasonable expectation” that the
student would be subject to the same action again, we need not address the district’s
argument on the second element, and we conclude that this exception is not applicable.
B. Important Question of Statewide Significance
The exception for questions of statewide significance also has two elements. First,
the case must be “functionally justiciable” and, second, it must “present[] an important
question of statewide significance that should be decided immediately.” Dean, 868
N.W.2d at 6 (quotations omitted). “A case is functionally justiciable if the record contains
the raw material (including effective presentation of both sides of the issues raised)
traditionally associated with effective judicial decision-making.” Id. (quotation omitted).
And issues of statewide importance must be of such significance or urgency to require
“immediate resolution.” Snell, 985 N.W.2d at 286-87. Appellate courts “apply this
exception narrowly.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 6.
The district argues that this case is both functionally justiciable and presents an
important, urgent issue of statewide significance because it impacts all public school
districts. We agree that the case is functionally justiciable. There is a complete record,
and the issues are fully briefed by both sides.
As to the urgency-and-importance issue, the district maintains that the department’s
decision requires districts to return expelled students to their school if a parent objects to
an alternative placement thereby potentially endangering others at the school . Without
expressing an opinion on whether the department’s decision was correct, we disagree that
the decision required the district to return the student to the high school from which he was

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expelled. In the decision, the department concluded that the district erred by seeking to
unilaterally change the student’s placement after the 45-day interim placement and that the
responsibility for initiating dispute-resolution processes was on the district, not the parents.
The decision also provided that, while the dispute was being resolved, that the student was
to remain in his “then-current educational placement.”6 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.533 (2024). According to the record, the student’s “then -current educational
placement” was the home-schooling placement, not the high school from which he was
expelled. We thus are not persuaded by the district’s argument that the import of the
decision is to require school districts to return students to school s from which they have
been expelled. Consequently, the district’s urgency argument is unsupported, and we
conclude that this case does not satisfy the requirements for the statewide-significance
exception.

6 The decision quoted the following explanation by the United States Department of
Education relating to disputed educational placements during the time period of a
disciplinary action:

[I]f a child’s parents oppose a proposed change in placement at
the end of a 45-day interim educational placement, during the
pendency of the proceeding to challenge the change in
placement, the child remains in the interim alternative
educational setting pending the decision of the hearing officer
or until the expiration of the time period for the disciplinary
action, whichever occurs first, unless the parent and the public
agency agree otherwise.

71 Fed. Reg. 46726 (Aug. 14, 2006).

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Because the parties reached agreement on an alternative educational placement for
the duration of the expulsion and the period of expulsion has now expired, this case no
longer presents a live case or controversy, and we dismiss this appeal as moot.
Appeal dismissed.