In the Matter of: Melissa Lopez v. Dakota County Community Development Agency

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0114

In the Matter of:

Melissa Lopez,
Relator,

vs.

Dakota County Community Development Agency,
Respondent.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Rasmusson, Judge

Dakota County Community Development Agency

Lisa Hollingsworth, Thomas Mueller, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc.,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)

Mary G. Dobbins, Landrum Dobbins LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rasmusson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RASMUSSON, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator argues that the termination of her housing benefits
is in violation of several statutes, unsupported by substantial evidence, and arbitrary and
capricious. Because relator forfeited her statutory arguments, substantial evidence
supports the decision, and the decision is not arbitrary or capricious, we affirm.

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FACTS
In July 2024, relator Melissa Lopez and her three minor children moved into a
Section 8 Project-Based Voucher housing unit in Apple Valley. This unit is owned by
respondent Dakota County Community Development Agency (CDA). The CDA
administers Lopez’s Section 8 assistance.
Lopez acknowledged her tenancy obligations as a voucher-program participant in a
signed document. Pertinent here, Lopez ’s obligations included that she must provide the
CDA with true and complete information , the unit must be her only residence, and only
approved occupants may reside in the unit. Further, the CDA advised Lopez that a guest
cannot stay in the unit for more than 15 days during a 12-month period.
Prior to moving into the unit, Lopez informed the CDA that she was pregnant and
anticipated needing assistance from her mother after giving birth. Lopez received approval
for her mother to stay at the unit until October 1, 2024.
In April 2025, the CDA began investigating Lopez for violating program rules by
living at two residences and allowing her mother to live at the unit . The investigation
resulted in a report completed in August 2025. The report cited the following evidence
that Lopez had two residences: an application for a name change relating to Lopez’s
children in which Lopez listed their address as being in Champlin ; a child-support order
listing Lopez’s address as being in Champlin; an affidavit of service stating that Lopez was
served in Champlin; and a phone call in which Lopez stated that she splits her time between
a Champlin and Apple Valley residence. Regarding the allegation that Lopez’s mother
lived at the unit, the report noted several calls for law -enforcement assistance at the unit

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with Lopez’s mother being the only adult present. Lopez’s mother stated to a responding
officer that the children are living with her at the unit and that she has a delegation of
parental authority (DOPA) to care for them.
On September 24, 2025, the CDA informed Lopez that it was terminating her
benefits based on her misrepresentation, living at two residences, and having an unreported
adult living at the unit. The termination of benefits was originally due to take effect on
October 31. Lopez requested an informal hearing. The record suggests that the CDA
stayed termination of Lopez’s benefits while she pursued internal appeals.
Relevant to the issues on appeal, the record indicates that Lopez has an order for
protection against her ex-husband. Prior to the termination of Lopez’s benefits, the CDA
granted her emergency request under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) to
transfer to a new unit. While the termination proceedings were pending, the CDA approved
a subsequent VAWA emergency transfer request in November 2025.
On November 17, Lopez appeared at a hearing on the termination of her benefits.
Afterwards, a hearing officer issued a written order affirming the termination of Lopez’s
benefits. The CDA denied Lopez’s request for reconsideration.
Lopez appeals.
DECISION
This appeal concerns the Section 8 voucher program. T he program authorizes the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to enter into
agreements with local public-housing agencies (PHAs), which in turn allow the PHAs to
make assistance payments on behalf of program participants to owners of eligible

4
residences. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b) (2018). Federal regulations govern the administration of
the program. Pertinent here, participant families “must supply any information that the
PHA or HUD determines is necessary in the administration of the program,” including
information requested “for use in a regularly scheduled reexamination or interim
reexamination of family income and composition.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b)(1)-(2) (2026).
This information “must be true and complete.” Id. (b)(4) (2026). Additionally, “[t]he unit
must be the family’s only residence.” Id. (h)(1) (2026). Relatedly, a PHA must approve
the “composition of the assisted family residing in the unit,” the family “must request PHA
approval to add any other family member as an occupant of the unit,” and “[n]o other
person . . . may reside in the unit.” Id. (h)(2) (2026). A PHA may terminate assistance if
the family violates any of the obligations under section 982.551. 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.552(c)(1)(i) (2026).
We turn to the standards of review. A PHA, like the CDA, acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity when it receives evidence, hears testimony, and makes a decision. C arter v.
Olmsted Cnty. Hous. & Redev elopment Auth., 574 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 1998).
We will uphold a PHA’s quasi-judicial decision unless it is “unconstitutional, outside the
agency’s jurisdiction, procedurally defective, based on an erroneous legal theory,
unsupported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary and capricious.” Wilhite v. Scott Cnty.
Hous. & Redev elopment Auth., 759 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation
omitted). We evaluate the findings to determine whether they support the decision but do
not “retry the facts or make credibility determinations.” Senior v. City of Edina , 547
N.W.2d 411, 416 (Minn. App. 1996). We will uphold a quasi -judicial decision if the

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decision-maker “furnished any legal and substantial basis for the action taken.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
I. Lopez forfeited her statutory arguments.
Lopez argues that the termination of her benefits violates VAWA, the Fair Housing
Act (FHA), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). As a threshold issue, we first
address whether these arguments are properly before us.
Appellate courts generally do not review arguments made for the first time on
appeal. Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). This principle applies to a
party’s failure to present arguments in quasi -judicial proceedings. See, e.g., In re
Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Minn. 2008) (declining to address zoning issue that “was
not presented to or considered by the Board [of Adjustment]” (citing Thiele , 425 N.W.2d
at 582)). Lopez concedes that she first addressed her statutory arguments in her request for
reconsideration rather than in the initial proceedings. We assume without deciding that it
was proper for Lopez to submit a request for re consideration. A n argument that a party
first made in a request for reconsideration , however, does not suffice to preserve that
argument for appeal. See Superior Shores Lakehome Ass ’n v. Jensen –Re Partners, 792
N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn. App. 2011) (explaining that a party forfeited appellate review of
an argument by first raising it in a request to file a motion for reconsideration).
Lopez counters that she was unable to raise her statutory arguments at the hearing
because she did not know the hearing officer’s decision. We find this argument
unpersuasive because Lopez knew the basis of the CDA’s termination decision prior to the
hearing, which afforded her the opportunity to raise her statutory arguments at the hearing.

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Alternatively, Lopez contends that she raised her statutory arguments under VAWA, FHA,
and MHRA at the hearing by stating her status as a victim of domestic abuse and requesting
to have her mother present at the unit. Although we appreciate the sensitivity of Lopez’s
situation, her general references to topics addressed in the underlying statutes fall short of
affirmatively raising a claim or defense under those statutes.
Because Lopez did not sufficiently preserve her arguments, we decline to address
her statutory arguments on appeal.
II. Substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s decision, and the decision
is not arbitrary or capricious.

Lopez additionally argues that the hearing officer’s decision “was conclusory and
unsupported by substantial evidence.” In making this argument, she challenges the
evidentiary support for certain aspects of the termination, the CDA’s interpretation of the
term “residence,” the hearing officer’s failure to make credibility determinations, and the
hearing officer’s failure to provide a rationale for her decision. We interpret Lopez as
arguing that the hearing officer’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence and
arbitrary and capricious.
A. Substantial Evidence
Lopez first contends that insubstantial evidence supports the determination that her
mother was an unauthorized occupant of the unit. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(2). Pertinent
to this argument is the CDA’s guest policy, which prohibits guests from being in a unit for
more than 15 days in a 12- month period. A guest is “a person temporarily staying in the

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unit with the consent of a tenant or other member of the household who has express or
implied authority to so consent on behalf of the tenant.” 24 C.F.R. § 5.100 (2026).
As stated above, we will reverse a quasi -judicial decision if it is “unsupported by
substantial evidence.” Wilhite, 759 N.W.2d at 255 (quotation omitted). “Substantial
evidence is 1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion; 2) more than a scintilla of evidence; 3) more than some evidence;
4) more than any evidence; and 5) evidence considered in its entirety.” In re Brown , 28
N.W.3d 486, 505 (Minn. App. 2025) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 21,
2026). Under this standard, we will not disturb an agency’s decision if “it has adequately
explained how it derived its conclusion and that conclusion is reasonable in the basis of the
record.” In re Application of Enbridge Energy, Ltd. P’ship , for Certificate of Need &
Routing Permit, 964 N.W.2d 173, 189 (Minn. App. 2021) (quotations omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 24, 2021) .
1 So long as an agency engages in reasoned decision -making, an
appellate court “will affirm, even though it may have reached a different conclusion had it
been the factfinder.” Cable Commc’ns Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Commc ’ns P’ship, 356
N.W.2d 658, 669 (Minn. 1984).
In challenging the hearing officer’s decision, Lopez argues that she provided
sufficient evidence to support a determination that her mother did not reside at the unit.
She points to her mother’s lease agreement listing a different address, mail addressed to

1 Although Enbridge conducts review under Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act
(MAPA), we note that the standard of review of quasi-judicial agency decisions under the
common-law standard is identical to that of an agency decision under MAPA. Staeheli v.
City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d 298, 304 n.1 (Minn. App. 2007).

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her mother that listed a different address, and testimony that her mother was only present
at the unit during the day. Even if this information supports a determination that Lopez’s
mother did not reside in Lopez’s unit, it is reasonable for the hearing officer to have come
to a different conclusion. Notably, the record includes many police reports regarding calls
to the unit at which Lopez’s mother was the only adult present. In one of these reports,
dated outside the period during which Lopez’s mother had permission to stay at the unit,
Lopez’s mother was described as stating that she lived there with the children.
2 The
hearing officer additionally noted that the signatures on Lopez’s mother’s purported lease
are undated and there is no rent charge listed on the lease. From these facts, it is reasonable
for the hearing officer to have determined that Lopez’s mother was living at the unit
without authorization. We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports this aspect
of the hearing officer’s decision.
B. Arbitrary and Capricious
Lopez last argues that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to
make findings of fact or credibility determinations.
A quasi-judicial decision is arbitrary and capricious
if the agency relied on factors which the legislature had not
intended it to consider, if it entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, if it offered an explanation for
the decision that runs counter to the evidence, or if the decision

2 Lopez relies on Basco v. Machin in arguing that hearsay evidence cannot be the sole basis
for terminating assistance. 514 F.3d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 2008). In addition to being
nonbinding, see Daniel v. City of Minneapolis , 923 N.W.2d 637, 645 n.6 (Minn. 2019)
(stating that a federal circuit court decision “do [es] not bind our court”), Basco is
distinguishable because it merely holds that hearsay evidence must be accompanied by
sufficient guarantees of reliability and probative value. 514 F.3d at 1183.

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is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.

Minn. Transitions Charter Sch. v. Comm’r of Minn. Dep’t of Educ., 844 N.W.2d 223, 235
(Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 2014). Put differently,
a decision is arbitrary and capricious if it represents the agency’s “will and not its
judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). But “[i]f there is room for two opinions on a matter,
[an agency’s] decision is not arbitrary and capricious, even though the court may believe
that an erroneous conclusion was reached.” In re Rev. of 2005 Ann. Automatic Adjustment
of Charges for All Elec. & Gas Utils., 768 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn. 2009).
In support of her argument, Lopez contends that the hearing officer failed to make
credibility determinations to justify disregard ing certain testimony , such as testimony
about a DOPA that requires Lopez’s mother to be frequently present at the unit. In making
this argument, Lopez relies on Carter , 574 N.W.2d at 729-30. Under Carter, “[i]n order
to facilitate appellate review, an administrative agency must state the facts and conclusions
essential to its decision with clarity and completeness.” 574 N.W.2d at 729.
The hearing officer’s decision does not suffer from the same infirmities as in Carter.
In Carter, we held that a hearing officer made insufficient findings by failing to mention
testimony or evidence that does not support the decision or give an explanation as to why
he chose to disregard this information. Id. at 730. Regarding the allegation that Lopez’s
mother was an unauthorized occupant, the hearing officer noted that Lopez provided a
purported lease regarding Lopez’s mother’s tenancy at a different location. The hearing
officer explained, however, that she did not find this explanation credible because the

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signatures on the lease were not dated, the lease did not list rent charged, and Lopez’s
mother expressed hesitancy when asked for documentation of her residence. Implicit in
the hearing officer’s explanation is that the officer did not find Lopez and her mother’s
explanations credible when weighed against the evidence that the CDA submitted.
Because the hearing officer provided an adequate explanation for her decision and this
decision is reasonable, the decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious.3
Affirmed.

3 Lopez raises several arguments with respect to the determination that she violated the
single-residence requirement. A PHA may terminate assistance based on the violation of
any obligation under section 24 C.F.R. § 982.551 (2026), such as the requirement that only
approved people live in the residence. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i); see also 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.551(h)(2) (addressing the approval requirement). Because we affirm the hearing
officer’s determination that Lopez violated this approval requirement, we decline to
address Lopez’s arguments regarding the single-residence requirement.