Brett Cournoyer, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0117

Brett Cournoyer,
Appellant,

vs.

Darren Troy Lang, et al.,
Respondents,

Whitetail Properties Real Estate, LLC, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed July 13, 2026
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Big Stone County District Court
File No. 06-CV-24-186

Ross N. Tentinger, Michelle K. Olsen, Joseph C. Tourand, Tentinger Law Office, P.A.,
Apple Valley, Minnesota (for appellant)

Jason G. Lina, Fluegel, Anderson, McLaughlin & Brutlag, C htd., Morris, Minnesota (for
respondents Darren and Amy Lang)

Suzanne L. Jones, Nicole J. Frethem, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents Whitetail Properties and Gregory Graczyk)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant land-purchaser challenges the district court’s summary dismissal of his
lawsuit against respondents: the sellers, the real estate agent , and the real estate broker.
We affirm.
FACTS
This dispute stems from the sale of approximately 136 acres of real property on
which Kelgoose Lake is located. The undisputed facts1 show that respondents Darren Troy
Lang (Darren) and his wife A my Lang purchased parcels from four different landowners
with the goal of owning all the land surrounding the lake. We refer to the combined parcels
as the “property.” The Langs had the property surveyed in 2004 and 2005.
In February 2022, the Langs met with respondent Gregory Graczyk, a real estate
agent and “land specialist” with respondent Whitetail Properties, a real estate broker, and
listed the property for sale with Whitetail. Darren described the property to Graczyk as
“owning a private lake.”
Whitetail’s listing for the property stated:
It’s not every day [that] you receive a phone call from a
seller stating that they are considering selling their “private
lake.” Needless to say, I get excited about every potential
listing but I couldn’t find out more details about this one fast

1 “The district court’s function on a motion for summary judgment is not to decide issues
of fact, but solely to determine whether genuine factual issues exist.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ ,
566 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Minn. 1997). Although the district court’s order for summary
judgment contains a “Findings of Fact” section, appellant does not assert that the district
court engaged in impermissible fact finding. We therefore understand the district court’s
“Findings of Fact” to be a recitation of the relevant undisputed facts.
3
enough! Further conversations about the property then reveal
that it is not only a private lake but so much more which we’ll
get into all the details that make this property a true one -of-a-
kind opportunity in the western part of the state.

Before I continue, there will be pictures updated to the
site as spring progresses, the snow and ice begin to melt and
the masses of waterfowl return to the area. However, if you
haven’t done so already, you owe it to yourself to play the
property video f irst and foremost and then take a look at the
aerial photos. Also, click on the “view full screen” link for the
interactive map of this property in the upper left corner of the
opening page. These alone give you a great idea of all the
features the property offers.

In September 2022, Graczyk mentioned the listing to appellant Brett Cournoyer.
Graczyk told Cournoyer that Darren purchased the land “from several farmers around the
area to make sure he secured it as a private lake, so only he owned it ,” and Graczyk
represented to Cournoyer that Cournoyer “would have exclusive access to the lake.”
Graczyk emailed Cournoyer information about the property, including a link to the Langs’
website for waterfowl outfitting, links to videos of the property, a link to an interactive map
of the property, and a link to the property listing on Whitetail’s website.
The listing on Whitetail’s website described the property as a “Private Western MN
Lake And Waterfowl Mecca” and listed the acreage as 136.45 acres +/ -. The listing
included a geographic -information-system (GIS) map of the property. The map showed
an aerial photograph of the property with a yellow line representing the property’s
approximate boundary. While most of Kelgoose Lake is shown within the yellow line, the
upper tip of the lake’s shoreline is outside the yellow line. In sum, the GIS map showed
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that a portion of Kelgoose Lake’s shoreline was outside of the property and on abutting
property that was not owned by the Langs.
The listing included a disclaimer stating that the information provided was “deemed
reliable” but “not warranted” ; that “ any measurements including but not limited to,
acreage, square footage, frontage, and mapping boundary lines shared herein ha [ve] not
been independently verified and [are] for purposes of marketing only”; and that “[i]f exact
measurements, access to property, or access to utilities is a concern, the property should be
independently measured or investigated by the prospective buyer.”
In September 2022, Graczyk emailed Cournoyer a copy of the surveys from 2004
and 2005 , as well as a disclosure statement. Graczyk also emailed Cournoyer a draft
purchase agreement and a buyer agreement. Later in September, after brief negotiations,
Cournoyer and the Langs executed a purchase agreement for the property. The agreement
granted Cournoyer “permission to view property and fish the lake on Oct. 1, 2022 [,]
between 10am and 2pm.” In October 2022, Cournoyer and the Langs closed on the sale of
the property.
In August 2023, Cournoyer and his son were on land near Kelgoose Lake. The
owner of a neighboring property, Wayne Huselid ,2 confronted them about being on his
property. Cournoyer responded that he had purchased the property from the Langs.
Huselid said that the land they were on was his, that he owned the land right up to the lake,

2 Huselid sold a portion of his land to the Langs in 2004 which became part of the property
in this litigation.
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and that his property line was underwater—in other words, his real property extended into
the lake.
In September 2023, Cournoyer obtained a survey of the property showing that most
of Kelgoose Lake was within his property’s boundary, but that portions of the lake were
outside the property’s boundary.
Cournoyer sued respondents, asserting seven claims: (1) fraudulent
misrepresentation (all respondents); (2) negligent misrepresentation (all respondents); (3)
sellers’ failure to disclose under Minn. Stat. § 513.55 (2024) (the Langs); (4) breach of
contract (the Langs); (5), negligence (Graczyk and Whitetail); (6) negligence per se
(Graczyk and Whitetail); and (7) consumer fraud (all respondents).
Graczyk and Whitetail moved for summary judgment, as did the Langs. The district
court order ed summary judgment for respondents and subsequently entered judgment
dismissing all of Cournoyer’s claims.
Cournoyer appeals.
DECISION
The district court must grant summary judgment if the moving party shows “there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and the moving party is “entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. We review a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo. Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2014).
In doing so, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom
summary judgment was granted to determine whether there are any genuine is sues of
material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the law.” Id. Summary
6
judgment is inappropriate if reasonable people can draw different conclusions from the
evidence presented. DLH, Inc., 566 N.W.2d at 69.
The moving party must support the assertion that there is no genuine issue of
material fact by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that
the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine issue for trial.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03(a). In response, “[t]he nonmoving party must do more than rest on
averments or denials of the adverse party ’s pleading.” Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football
Club, LLC , 705 N.W.2d 746, 754 (Minn. 2005). The nonmoving party m ust identify
specific facts that establish the existence of a triable issue of fact. Papenhausen v. Schoen,
268 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 1978).
Cournoyer challenges the summary dismissal of his fraudulent -misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and contract claims.3 We address each claim in
turn.
I.
A fraudulent-misrepresentation claim has five elements:
(1) [that] there was a false representation by a party of a past
or existing material fact susceptible of knowledge; (2) made
with knowledge of the falsity of the representation or made as
of the party’s own knowledge without knowing whether it was
true or false; (3) with the intention to induce another to act in
reliance thereon; (4) that the representation caused the other
party to act in reliance thereon; and (5) that the party suffered
pecuniary damage as a result of the reliance.

3 Cournoyer does not challenge the district court’s summary dismissal of his consumer
fraud, failure-to-disclose, and negligence-per-se claims.
7
TCI Bus. Capital, Inc. v. Five Star Am. Die Casting, LLC , 890 N.W.2d 423, 43 2 (Minn.
App. 2017) (quotation omitted).
An essential element in any fraudulent -misrepresentation claim is not only that the
plaintiff relied on the representation, but that the reliance was reasonable under the
circumstances. See Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. , 736 N.W.2d 313, 321
(Minn. 2007) . “Reliance in fraud cases is generally evaluated in the context of the
aggrieved party ’s intelligence, experience, and opportunity to investigate the facts at
issue.” Valspar Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord’s, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359, 369 (Minn. 2009). The
applicable law is summarized as follows:
Whether a party’s reliance is reasonable is ordinarily a
fact question for the jury unless the record reflects a complete
failure of proof. Accordingly, to survive a motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must come forward with some
facts supporting a conclusio n of reasonable reliance. . . . [A]
party can reasonably rely on a representation unless the falsity
of the representation is known or obvious to the listener. The
listener is not under an obligation to conduct an investigation
and thus may rely on the representation so long as it is not
known by the listener to be false and is not obviously false.

Hoyt, 736 N.W.2d at 320-21 (citations omitted).
For the reasons that follow, Cournoyer’s reliance on respondents’ alleged
representations that the lake was “private” and that he would have exclusive access was
not reasonable as a matter of law.
First, a party cannot reasonably rely on a representation if “ the falsity of the
representation is known or obvious to the listener.” Id. at 321. The GIS map in the listing
materials showed the approximate boundar y of the lake and that the upper tip of the lake
8
exceeded the property’s boundary. In short, it was obvious that another property abutted
the lake’s shoreline.
Second, “[r]eliance in fraud cases is generally evaluated in the context of the
aggrieved party ’s intelligence, experience, and opportunity to investigate the facts at
issue.” Valspar, 764 N.W.2d at 369. Cournoyer is a business owner. He owns hunting
property, has sold hunting property in the past, and estimated that he had been involved in
ten to fifteen real estate transactions in the past. And Cournoyer was repeatedly cautioned
to independently verify the property’s boundary. For example, t he listing stated that the
boundary line had not been independently verified and that “ the property should be
independently measured or investigated by the prospective buyer.”
Third, the undisputed facts of this case are very similar to those in Corazalla v. Quie,
in which the supreme court held that the “ [p]urchaser of real property advertised as
including a ‘private’ lake did not present sufficient evidence to defeat sellers ’ motion for
summary judgment in purchaser ’s action to recover damages for alleged fraud and
negligent disclosure.” 478 N.W.2d 197, 198 (Minn. 1991).
The sellers in Corazalla acquired a rural residential property in 1982. Id.
Documentary evidence disclosed that the property was “a tract of approximately 55 acres
of pasture, woods, and marsh and includes considerable shoreline of a 7 -acre lake.” Id.
The property was advertised for sale as a “perfect wildlife sanctuary, with all types of water
fowl, songbirds and deer” and a “PRIV ATE 7 acre lake.” Id. (quotations omitted). But a
parcel of land owned by another individual abutted the lake. Id.
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The Corazalla buyer entered into a purchase agreement with the sellers in 1986, and
then he visually inspected the property on two occasions. Id. After closing, he discovered
that the lake was not located exclusively within the boundary of the property. Id. Instead,
the lake was partially located on neighboring land and, therefore, accessible to the
neighboring landowner. Id. The buyer sued the sellers for fraud and negligent disclosure,
“predicated on [the] claim that [the buyer] entered into the agreement based on alleged
written and oral misrepresentations that the lake was ‘private’ ( i.e., contained entirely
within the boundaries of the purchased property).” Id.
The sellers moved for summary judgment asserting that the buyer “conducted
several visual inspections of the property prior to closing, that the fence line separating the
subject parcel from the neighboring land is readily apparent and that the legal description,
maps and photographs of public record clearly locate the north boundary line crossing the
lake near its bay.” Id. The district court granted the motion. Id. This court reversed in a
split decision. Id.
The supreme court reinstated summary judgment for the sellers, concluding that
they
properly sustained their burden of demonstrating that no
genuine issues of material fact existed for trial based
on . . . evidence of public record, readily available for
inspection by a purchaser of real property, which clearly
discloses the fact that two parcels of land abut the lake.
[Buyer’s] allegations neither dispute those documentary facts
nor demonstrate that he may be entitled to relief from his own
obligations with regard to the purchase.

Id. at 198-99.

10
Corazalla indicates that a buyer does not reasonably rely on an allegedly false
representation if readily available information show s that the representation is obviously
false. See Hoyt, 736 N.W.2d at 320-21 (“The listener is not under an obligation to conduct
an investigation and thus may rely on the representation so long as it is not known by the
listener to be false and is not obviously false.”).
Again, the GIS map that was made available to Cournoyer put him on notice that
the lake boundary exceeded the property’s boundary at the upper tip and that, therefore, the
lake was not entirely encompassed within the property’s boundary. Yet, Cournoyer did not
obtain his own survey prior to closing or take other steps to verify the property’s actual
boundary or the private -lake claim. Like the purchaser in Corazalla, Cournoyer had
relevant information but failed to verify the advertised claims to confirm the nature and
extent of the property he purchased. Cournoyer’s reliance on respondents’ representations
that the lake was private —that is, inaccessible by anyone other than the owner —was
unreasonable. No reasonable person could draw a different conclusion from this evidence.
See DLH, Inc., 566 N.W.2d at 69 (indicating that s ummary judgment is inappropriate if
reasonable people could draw different conclusions from the evidence).
Because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the reasonable-reliance
element of the fraudulent -misrepresentation claim, the district court properly granted
summary judgment to respondents on that claim.
II.
To establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that
the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) that the defendant supplied false
11
information to the plaintiff; (3) that the plaintiff justifiably relied on that information; and
(4) that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in communicating the information.
Williams v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Minn. 2012). Justifiable reliance is typically a
fact question for a jury, and only “becomes a question of law if there is no evidence
supporting a contrary conclusion.” Greuling v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. , 690
N.W.2d 757, 760 (Minn. App. 2005).
Negligent misrepresentation requires “justifiable” as opposed to “reasonable”
reliance. A familiar secondary source explains:
[U]nder Minnesota Supreme Court jurisprudence, it would be
difficult to argue that there is any meaningful distinction
between “justified reliance” and “reasonable reliance.” Thus,
for most intents and purposes, the concepts of “ justifiable
reliance” and “reasonable reliance” are fungible, if not
synonymous. . . . It would appear, therefore, that the
Minnesota Supreme Court makes no distinction between the
two concepts of “reasonable reliance” and “ justifiable
reliance.”

20A4 Brent A. Olson, Minnesota Practice § 34.39 (2023-24 ed. 2023). Consistent with
that observation, the Corazalla court affirmed summary judgment for the property seller s
on claims of both fraudulent and negligent disclosure without distinguishing between
reasonable reliance and justifiable reliance. 478 N.W.2d at 198-99.
Our reasonable-reliance analysis from section I of this opinion therefore applies
equally to Cournoyer’s negligent-misrepresentation claim. Thus, we conclude that under
Corazalla, Cournoyer’s reliance on respondent s’ representations that the lake was
private—that is, inaccessible by anyone other than the property’s owner—was not
12
justifiable. No reasonable person could draw a different conclusion from this evidence.
See DLH, Inc. , 566 N.W.2d at 69. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding the justifiable -reliance element of the negligent -misrepresentation claim, the
district court properly granted summary judgment to respondents on that claim.
III.
“Negligence is generally defined as the failure to exercise such care as persons of
ordinary prudence usually exercise under such circumstances.” Domagala v. Rolland, 805
N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). A negligence claim has four elements:
“(1) the existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) that the
breach of the duty of care was a proximate cause of the injury.” Id. “The existence of a
duty of care is a question of law that we review de novo. ” Id. “Summary judgment is
appropriate when the record lacks proof of any of the four elements of a prima facie case
of negligence.” Ironwood Springs Christian Ranch, Inc. v. Walk to Emmaus, 801 N.W.2d
193, 197 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Cournoyer alleged in his complaint that Graczyk and Whitetail had a duty to take
reasonable steps to verify the accuracy of their representation that Kelgoose Lake was a
private lake before marketing it as such.
Cournoyer does not cite precedential authority indicating that a real estate agent has
such a duty. We noted the lack of such authority in a nonprecedential opinion, Sinclair v.
Lysne, and found “no law” that compelled the seller’s real-estate agent “to undertake the
obligation to investigate on [ the buyer’s] behalf.” No. CX-90-2128, 1991 WL 85263, at
*2 (Minn. App. May 28, 1991) . The issue in that case centered on whether the seller’s
13
agent “had a duty to make an independent investigation of the acreage” of the subject
property. Id. We explained:
The acreage claim was brought under theories of
negligent misrepresentation and negligence. The issue centers
on whether [the real estate agent ] had a duty to make an
independent investigation of the acreage. We find no law
which compels [the real estate agent ] to undertake the
obligation to investigate on [the buyer’s] behalf. [The real
estate agent] properly relied upon the owner’s representation
and two appraisals of the property.

Additionally, [the buyer] was directly told by [the
owner] that there were 27 acres. [The buyer], however, need
not have relied upon either [the owner] or [the real estate
agent], as he could have telephoned the county and easily
obtained the correct acreage.

Id.
Nonprecedential opinions of this court are not binding, but they “may be cited as
persuasive authority.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Sinclair is persuasive for
three reasons. First, the issue and facts are similar to those in this case, supporting a similar
outcome. Second, that case and the authority offered by the parties indicate there is no
precedent suggesting that a seller’s real estate agent has an independent duty to investigate
information provided by the seller. And third, Sinclair is consistent with Corazalla, which
recognizes a buyer’s obligation to verify advertised claims that are readily observable to
be false. See Corazalla, 478 N.W.2d at 198-99 (reinstating summary judgment, noting that
the buyer “conducted several visual inspections of the property prior to closing, that the
fence line separating the subject parcel from the neighboring land is readily apparent and
14
that the legal description, maps and photographs of public record clearly locate the north
boundary line crossing the lake near its bay”).
Cournoyer asserts that the facts here are distinguishable from those in Sinclair
because “the record shows that Kelgoose Lake was either depicted within the boundaries
of the property in the surveys recorded with the county or was shown via images generated
and altered by respondents depicting the approximate boundary in relation to Ke lgoose
Lake.” But the GIS map provided with the marketing materials indicated that the lake
exceeded the property ’s boundary at the upper tip, and Cournoyer was encouraged to
conduct his own survey to determine the precise boundar y of the lake prior to purchasing
the property . Like the buyer in Sinclair, Cournoyer could have ascertained correct
information regarding the relevant issue—the property’s boundary in relation to the lake’s
boundary.
Cournoyer also asserts that Raach v. Haverly supports his negligence claim. 269
N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1978). In Raach, a real estate agent told a buyer that a property
“consisted of 107 acres, with a half -mile of lakeshore .” 269 N.W.2d at 879. The buyer
later learned that the property “ was only about 60 acres and had closer to one -fourth than
one-half mile of shoreline.” Id. A jury found that the real estate agent had made fraudulent
misrepresentations. Id. at 880. The supreme court concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict. Id. But because Raach involved a fraudulent -
misrepresentation claim and not a negligence claim, the opinion does not address whether
a real estate agent has a duty to investigate his seller -client’s representations regarding a
property before listing the property for sale.
15
Because Graczyk and Whitetail had no duty to independently investigate the
property’s boundary in relation to the lake’s boundary or to otherwise verify the accuracy
of the “private-lake” claim, there is a complete lack of evidence regarding the duty element
of Cournoyer’s negligence claim , and the district court properly granted summary
judgment to Graczyk and Whitetail on that claim. See Ironwood Springs, 801 N.W.2d at
197.
IV.
A breach of contract claim has three elements: “(1) formation of a contract; (2)
performance by plaintiff of any conditions precedent to his right to demand performance
by the defendant; and (3) breach of the contract by defendant.” Park Nicollet Clinic v.
Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 2011). “A breach of contract is a failure, without
legal excuse, to perform any promise that forms the whole or part of the contract. ” Lyon
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ill. Paper & Copier Co., 848 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 2014). A breach
of contract claim requires that the promise at issue be part of the parties ’ bargain. Id. We
review de novo whether a contract is unambiguous. Bank Midwest, Minn., Iowa, N.A. v.
Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 2004). If a contract is unambiguous, we may apply
the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. Id.
The contract in this case is the purchase agreement for the property. Cournoyer
asserted in his complaint that “[t]he Langs falsely represented in connection with the
Purchase Agreement that the Property Cournoyer purchased consisted of approximately
136.45 acres of land when in fact the Property consisted of significantly less acrea ge.”
16
Cournoyer therefore claimed that “[t]he Langs have breached the terms of the contract by
failing to convey the 136.45 acres as agreed.”
The purchase agreement stated that the property “consists of approximately 136.45
acres” with “approx. acreage based on county tax statement acres.” Cournoyer concedes
that the agreement listed the approximate acreage and that “[t]his acreage estimate was
based on the county tax records available in September 2022.” In sum, there is no genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether the Langs breached the contract by failing to
convey the acreage promised in the purchase agreement.
Cournoyer argues that the Langs breached the contract by failing to convey a private
lake. But t hat is not the claim that Cournoyer raised in his complaint , and a party is
generally bound by his pleadings. Roberge v. Cambridge Coop. Creamery Co., 67 N.W.2d
400, 403 ( Minn. 1954). Regardless, that claim is unavailing. The plain language of the
purchase agreement neither promises conveyance of a private or exclusive lake nor
guarantees that the lake on the property is entirely contained within the 136.45 a cres to be
conveyed. Indeed, Cournoyer conceded as much at oral argument before this court.
Any attempt by Cournoyer to introduce parol evidence regarding promises made by
the Langs that are not contained in the contract is unavailing. “Whether an agreement is
completely integrated and therefore not subject to variance by parol evidence is an issue of
law.” Borgersen v. Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. , 729 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Minn. App. 2007).
Parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract’s terms when the contract
is incomplete or ambiguous . Flynn v. Sawyer , 272 N.W.2d 904, 907 -08 (Minn. 1978).
Here, the contract expressly stated that the buyer, Cournoyer, was not relying on any oral
17
representations regarding the condition of the property and that the purchase agreement
constituted the parties’ entire agreement. We discern no ambiguity in the relevant contract
terms.
Because the purchase agreement is unambiguous and contained no promise to
convey a private lake, Cournoyer has not shown a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the occurrence of a breach. The district court therefore properly granted summary
judgment to the Langs on the contract claim.
Affirmed.