State of Minnesota v. Da’Monte Si’Quan Lewis-Meghie

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0129

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Da’Monte Si’Quan Lewis-Meghie,
Appellant.

Filed October 5, 2026
Affirmed
Rasmusson, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-25-285

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Angella Erickson, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Greg Scanlan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Rasmusson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RASMUSSON, Judge
In this appeal from final judgment raising a sentencing issue, appellant argues that
the prosecutor engaged in plain-error misconduct at the sentencing hearing and that the
district court abused its discretion by imposing a guidelines sentence. We affirm.

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FACTS
In March 2025, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Da’Monte
Si’Quan Lewis-Meghie with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation
of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1a(e) (2024).1 The complaint alleged
that Lewis, then 18 years old, sexually abused his three-year-old sister while she was in his
care. The state filed notice of its intent to seek an aggravated sentencing departure.
The parties came to an agreement whereby Lewis would plead guilty, the state
would withdraw its request for an aggravated sentence, and Lewis would be free to seek a
downward durational or dispositional departure. The district court accepted Lewis’s plea,
and he subsequently filed a motion for a downward dispositional departure.
Lewis appeared and argued for a downward dispositional departure at the sentencing
hearing. The state opposed the departure request, and several of the prosecutor’s
responsive arguments are at issue in this appeal. In response to defense counsel’s
statements that Lewis would have been in juvenile court had the offense happened nine
months earlier, the prosecutor stated that Lewis “would have been in the exact same
position that he’s in right now” because the offense involves presumptive certification as
an adult. In requesting a prison sentence, the prosecutor added that imprisonment has a
deterrent effect and that it would “send a message to [Lewis] and any future offender and
the community.” Additionally, the prosecutor alleged that Lewis, who remained in jail
during the pendency of the case, did not attempt to identify or enroll in any treatment

1 For subsequent references, we refer to appellant as “Lewis” based on his naming
preference.

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programs. The prosecutor further stated that Lewis had “pedophilic attraction” to
prepubescent children, that Lewis failed to recognize the significant role he played in the
victim’s life as her brother, that his family did not provide adequate prosocial support, and
that the offense would permanently affect the victim “for the rest of her life.” Lewis did
not object to these statements at the sentencing hearing.
The district court denied the departure motion and imposed the presumptive
sentence of 144 months in prison. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.B (2024). In doing so,
the district court explained that it must impose a sentence within the guidelines range
absent factors that would justify a departure and that, after carefully reviewing all
submissions, it did “not find substantial nor compelling reasons to depart.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. Even assuming without deciding that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct,
the state proved that the statements did not affect Lewis’s substantial rights.

Lewis argues that the prosecutor’s comments at the sentencing hearing constitute
plain-error prosecutorial misconduct affecting his substantial rights. Because Lewis did
not object to these comments at the sentencing hearing, we apply “the modified plain-error
test.” State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Minn. 2023). Under this test, Lewis “has
the burden to demonstrate that the misconduct constitutes (1) error, (2) that was plain.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “For an error to be plain, the issue must have been clear or obvious.”
Id. at 250 (quotations omitted). “Usually this is shown if the error contravenes case law, a

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rule, or a standard of conduct,” or “contravenes a principle that is conclusively resolved at
the time of appeal.” Id. (quotations omitted).
If Lewis is successful, “the burden then shifts to the State to demonstrate that the
error did not affect [his] substantial rights.” Id. at 248 (quotation omitted). To meet this
burden, the state must show that it is not reasonably likely that the misconduct significantly
affected the district court’s sentencing decision. Cf. id. at 248, 251-55 (addressing whether
misconduct significantly affected the jury’s verdict). “If these three prongs are satisfied,
the court then assesses whether the error should be addressed to ensure fairness and the
integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 248 (quotation omitted).
Lewis argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in several ways. The state
responds that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct, and that even if they did, Lewis
was not prejudiced because “there is nothing in the record to suggest the sentencing court’s
decision was a result” of the offending arguments.
For the purpose of this analysis, we assume without deciding that the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct. But, for the following reasons, we agree that the alleged
misconduct did not affect Lewis’s substantial rights. See Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 248. The
record does not show that any alleged misconduct affected the district court’s sentencing
decision. As discussed below, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Lewis. The district court sentenced Lewis to a guidelines sentence, which is “presumed to
be appropriate.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2025). Furthermore, the district court did
not state that it relied on any of the allegedly erroneous arguments made by the prosecutor
in sentencing Lewis. The district court concluded that it did “not find substantial nor

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compelling reasons to depart” and that this conclusion was based on its consideration of
“the Trog factors . . . argument of counsel, [and] the record.” This shows that the district
court properly considered the relevant sentencing information in rendering its decision.
Finally, Lewis cites no binding caselaw, and we are aware of none, in which this
court has reversed the district court’s imposition of a guideline s sentence based on
prosecutorial misconduct at a sentencing hearing. “Although district court judges are not
immune from emotional appeals,” the risk of prejudice is limited given their familiarity
with applicable legal standards. Cf. State v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted) (addressing prejudice with respect to the admission of evidence in a
bench trial); State v. Burrell, 772 N.W.2d 459, 467 (Minn. 2009) (explaining that, at a court
trial, “[t]he risk of unfair prejudice to [a defendant] is reduced because there is
comparatively less risk that the district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons,
would use [prejudicial] evidence for an improper purpose or have his sense of reason
overcome by emotion.”). Because judges are familiar with the law and are less susceptible
than juries to improper suggestions, it is unlikely that the prosecutor’s remarks, even if they
were improper, had any effect on the district court’s sentence.
We conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the district court would
have imposed a different sentence absent the prosecutor’s statements. Thus, the state has
met its burden of proving that Lewis’s substantial rights were not affected by those
statements.

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II. The district court acted within its discretion by denying Lewis’s departure
motion.

Lewis also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a downward
dispositional departure, arguing that he is particularly amenable to probation, the district
court misunderstood its ability to depart, and the district court improperly conside red the
victim’s vulnerability.
A downward dispositional departure “places the offender in a different setting than
that called for by the presumptive guidelines sentence,” such as a stay of execution of a
sentence. State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). A district court’s decision
to depart from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines must be supported by “identifiable,
substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Id. (quoting Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2012)). The district court may, in its discretion, grant a
downward dispositional departure if it finds that the defendant is particularly amenable to
probation. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009). Factors relevant
to this determination include “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his
cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” State v.
Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (the Trog factors).
We review a district court’s denial of a downward-dispositional-departure motion
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Beganovic , 974 N.W.2d 278, 286 (Minn. App. 2022),
aff’d, 991 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2023). One way in which a district court abuses its
discretion is by misapplying the law. State v. Hoskins, 943 N.W.2d 203, 211 (Minn. App.
2020). We will affirm a district court’s exercise of discretion, as long as the record shows

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that the district court “carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented
before making a determination.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011)
(quotation omitted). Appellate courts “generally will not interfere with a [district] court’s
decision to impose a term within the presumptive sentence range,” State v. Kangbateh, 868
N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 2015), and will reverse a district court’s refusal to depart only in a
“rare case,” State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
Lewis first argues that the Trog factors demonstrate that he is particularly amenable
to probation. This argument lacks merit because a district court is not required to depart
even if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation. See Olson, 765 N.W.2d at
664-65. Lewis additionally suggests that the district court failed to fully consider the Trog
factors. A district court is not, however, required to explain its decision to impose a
guidelines sentence, provided that the district court “carefully evaluated all the testimony
and information presented before making a determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378
N.W.2d 77, 80- 81 (Minn. App. 1985). In this case, the district court reviewed the
submissions prior to the sentencing hearing, and, after hearing arguments, recessed to
consider the matter before proceeding with sentencing. Prior to imposing the sentence, the
district court stated that it had “carefully considered the [departure] motion, including the
submissions and the argument of counsel.”
Lewis also points to Taylor v. State in arguing that it was improper to consider the
victim’s vulnerability in imposing the sentence. 670 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2003).
However, Taylor merely held that it is impermissible to consider the victim’s vulnerability
as to age when imposing an upward departure when the offense statute takes the victim’s

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age into account. Id. at 589-90. Although Lewis acknowledges this aspect of Taylor’s
holding, he nonetheless contends that, “[i]f vulnerability cannot be used to justify an
upward departure for the charge at hand, it cannot be used to justify denying a downward
departure.” This argument is misguided because it is materially different to use offense
elements (e.g., age) to impose an upward departure than it is to consider these elements in
imposing a guidelines sentence for that offense. Caselaw prohibits the former but not the
latter. Compare Taylor, N.W.2d at 589-90, with State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 313 (Minn.
2014). For example, in Soto, the supreme court considered the forcible nature of the
assault—an element of the offense—when it concluded that the district court abused its
discretion by departing from the guidelines sentence. 855 N.W.2d at 313.
Because the district court properly considered whether departure was appropriate,
we conclude that it acted within its discretion by denying Lewis’s request for a downward
dispositional departure.2
Affirmed.

2 Lewis gives passing reference to Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 3(1)-(2)
(2024), which allows a district court, in certain circumstances, to stay the imposition or
execution of a sentence for an offense under section 609.342, subd ivision 1a(g) (2024).
Lewis did not present this argument to the district court, and so it is therefore forfeited.
See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (explaining that a party generally
forfeits arguments by failing to raise them in district court). And, in any event, this
provision is inapplicable because Lewis was not convicted under subdivision 1a(g) of
section 609.342; he was convicted under subdivision 1a(e).