

*This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).*

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0145**

In the Marriage of:

Jeanne Mary Mohr, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Jesse David Mohr,
Appellant,

County of Rice,
Intervenor.

**Filed August 24, 2026
Reversed
Reyes, Judge**

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-FA-21-273

Britt Ackerman, Ackerman Law, Northfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Dan Irwin, Irwin Law Office, PLC, Dundas, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

REYES, Judge

Appellant-father challenges the district court's order requiring him to obtain "the advance consent and permission" of respondent-mother prior to father filing any motions. We reverse.

FACTS

The action underlying this appeal began in February 2021 as a dissolution proceeding between respondent-mother Jeanne Mary Mohr and appellant-father Jesse David Mohr, who share three minor children. Later in 2021, the district court entered a judgment and decree (J&D) dissolving the parties' marriage, granting them joint legal and joint physical custody, granting child support to mother, and setting a parenting-time schedule. If future disputes arose, the J&D ordered the parties to "exhaust mediation as a remedy before either party may apply to court for relief."

The parties engaged in litigation over the next three years. At one point, mother requested that father pay half of certain costs associated with their children's extracurricular activities, and both parties moved for conduct-based attorney fees based on the request. The district court granted the extracurricular-costs request and denied both parties' attorney-fees requests. On several occasions following this decision, mother requested that the district court find father to be in constructive civil contempt and grant her conduct-based attorney fees. None of these requests resulted in the district court finding father in contempt, but the district court granted mother conduct-based attorney fees in one instance.

In August 2025, father moved for a modification of the parenting-time schedule. Mother filed a responsive motion (“mother’s first motion”) requesting that the district court (1) strike father’s motion for failure to comply with certain rules and court orders; (2) deny father’s motion; and (3) grant mother attorney fees, whether conduct-based or need-based. After an initial hearing, the district court continued the motion hearing to December 2025 and ordered that the parties engage in mediation.

The parties scheduled a remote mediation session for 9:00 a.m. one day in November 2025. Mother and her counsel attended, but father and his counsel did not. At 12:20 p.m. that same day, mother filed a motion (“mother’s second motion”) to (1) strike the December 2025 hearing; (2) grant the attorney-fees request from mother’s first motion; and (3) “issue an Order that [father] may not file any future motions in this case without the advance consent and permission of [mother].” Less than an hour later, at 1:05 p.m., father filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel.

Five days after the scheduled mediation, the district court filed a one-page order granting mother’s second motion: It (1) struck the December 2025 motion hearing “for [father’s] failure to engage in mediation”; (2) awarded mother attorney fees; and (3) ordered that “[father] may not file any future motions in this case without the advance consent and permission of [mother].”

Father appealed, and this court stayed the appeal pending mediation. The mediation office then granted an exemption request, and we dissolved the stay.¹

DECISION

Father challenges the district court's order requiring him to obtain "the advance consent and permission" of mother to file future motions, arguing that "no Minnesota statute, rule, or precedent authorizes" the district court to "delegate[] judicial authority to a private adverse litigant." We agree.

Generally, a district court has the "authority to enforce the Rules of Civil Procedure and to maintain order and decorum in the operation of the court system." *In re Burns*, 542 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. 1996). Appellate courts review the district court's exercise of this authority for an abuse of discretion. *See id.* (concluding that district court's order "constitute[d] a proper exercise of its discretion"). "A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record." *Woolsey v. Woolsey*, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).

We identify two primary defects in the district court's order. First, the district court did not provide any legal citation or authority for its decision to give mother all authority to decide whether father could file any future motions. And we are unaware of any authority allowing the district court to do so. Absent more, conferring on mother the

¹ Because mother did not file an appellate brief, this court ordered that this appeal shall be determined on the merits as provided in Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 142.03.

authority to decide whether to let father seek relief from the court constitutes a misapplication of law and is against logic. *See id.*; *cf. Smigla v. Schnell*, 547 N.W.2d 102, 104-05 (Minn. App. 1996) (noting that, under Minn. R. Civ. P. 77.01, “[t]he district courts shall be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any pleading or other proper paper” and that under Minn. Stat. § 484.08 (1994) “district courts . . . shall be deemed open at all times, except on legal holidays and Sundays” (quotations omitted)).

Second, the district court did not make any findings of fact or describe the reasons supporting its decision to restrict father’s ability to file motions. Instead, the district court merely adopted mother’s request verbatim. Generally, the “wholesale adoption of one party’s” proposed conclusions “raises the question of whether the [district] court independently evaluated each party’s testimony and evidence.” *Bliss v. Bliss*, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), *rev. denied* (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).

The district court has the authority to impose filing restrictions, such as when it imposes sanctions or makes a frivolous-litigant determination. *See* Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03 (sanctions); Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9 (frivolous litigant). But in those situations, the district court still has to provide findings to support its decision. *See* Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(c) (“When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.”); Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(c) (“If the court determines that a party is a frivolous litigant and that security or sanctions are appropriate, it shall state on the record its reasons supporting that determination.”).

Because the district court misapplied the law by delegating its authority to mother to decide whether to allow father to file any motions and adopted mother's proposed conclusion verbatim without making any findings, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion, requiring reversal.²

Reversed.

² Because we reverse on this ground, we need not address father's additional arguments for reversal. See, e.g., *Westby v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety*, 742 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Minn. App. 2007) (declining to address "remaining arguments" after reversing).