Thomas J. Styczinski v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., Department of Employment and Economic Development

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0169

Thomas J. Styczinski,
Relator,

vs.

Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed October 5, 2026
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 52268986-2

Erick G. Kaardal, Elizabeth A. Nielsen, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for relator)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Rebecca Wittmer, Melannie Markham, Katrina Gulstad, Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent
department)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Bond,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that he was
ineligible to establish a second unemployment-benefit account or withdraw his first benefit
account after the initial benefit year ended. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Thomas J. Styczinski worked as a vice president of cybersecurity for Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., from 2002 until August 23, 2024, when he was laid off. Styczinski
applied for unemployment benefits with respondent Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED) and established an unemployment-
benefit account that was effective September 1, 2024 (the 2024 benefit account). Because
Styczinski received 46 weeks of severance pay from Wells Fargo, he was ineligible to
receive unemployment benefits until July 2025.
On July 14, 2025, Styczinski submitted a request for unemployment benefits
through DEED’s website. In doing so, he was prompted to either reactivate the 2024
benefit account, from which he had not yet received any benefit payments, or withdraw
that account and establish a second benefit account. Styczinski opted to reactivate the 2024
benefit account. Styczinski received unemployment benefit payments until the 2024
benefit account expired on August 30, 2025.
The next day, Styczinski applied for a second benefit account (the 2025 benefit
account). On September 2, DEED issued a determination of benefit account effective
August 31, 2025. Styczinski received benefit payments on the 2025 benefit account for

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four weeks. On October 9, DEED issued an amended determination of benefit account,
informing Styczinski that he did not qualify for the 2025 benefit account because he had
not earned at least $3,700 in wages since opening the 2024 benefit account.
Styczinski appealed DEED’s amended determination, and a ULJ held an evidentiary
hearing in October 2025. At the hearing, Styczinski testified that he made a mistake when
he reactivated the 2024 benefit account instead of establishing a new account and that he
believed his severance payments should qualify as wages for purposes of determining his
eligibility for the 2025 benefit account. He asked that DEED either reinstate the 2025
benefit account or allow him to pay back the benefits he received under the 2024 benefit
account so that he could withdraw that account and proceed under the 2025 benefit account.
The ULJ affirmed DEED’s amended determination of benefit account. The ULJ
found that Styczinski established the 2024 benefit account effective September 1, 2024; he
received benefit payments during the benefit year that ended on August 30, 2025; and he
had not earned sufficient wages by working in covered employment since the initiation of
the 2024 benefit account. Accordingly, the ULJ determined that the amended
determination of benefits was accurate because Styczinski did not meet the statutory
requirements for establishing the 2025 benefit account. The ULJ rejected Styczinski’s
request to withdraw the 2024 benefit account, reasoning that the applicable unemployment-
benefit statutes do not authorize the reimbursement of benefits in order to withdraw a
benefit account.

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Styczinski requested reconsideration, arguing, in part, that DEED exceeded its
statutory authority in amending its determination. The ULJ affirmed the decision on
reconsideration.
This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
Styczinski challenges the ULJ’s decision that he was ineligible to establish the 2025
benefit account and unable to withdraw the 2024 benefit account. An appellate court may
reverse or modify a ULJ’s decision “if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have
been prejudiced ” because, as relevant here, the ULJ’s decision exceeded its statutory
authority, was affected by an error of law, or was unsupported by substantial evidence.
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(2), (4), (5) (2024). We view the ULJ’s factual findings
in the light most favorable to the decision and will not disturb those findings unless they
are unsupported by substantial evidence. Fay v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev., 860 N.W.2d
385, 387 (Minn. App. 2015). Whether an employee is eligible to receive unemployment
benefits is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Hayes v. K -Mart Corp.,
665 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2003).
Upon an application for unemployment benefits, DEED makes a “determination of
benefit account,” which establishes the applicant’s unemployment-benefit account and the
amount of benefits available to the applicant. Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 1(b) (2024 ). A
“benefit year” is the period of 52 calendar weeks beginning the date a benefit account is
established. Minn. Stat. § 268.035, subd. 6 (2024). Once a benefit account is established,
it may be withdrawn only if “(1) the applicant has not been paid any unemployment

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benefits on that benefit account; and (2) a new application for unemployment benefits is
filed and a new benefit account is established at the time of the withdrawal.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.07, subd. 3b(c) (2024). To establish a second benefit account following the
expiration of a benefit year on a prior benefit account, the applicant must have “performed
actual work in subsequent covered employment” and been paid a statutory minimum
amount of “wages in one or more completed calendar quarters” after the effective date of
the prior benefit account.
1 Id., subd. 2(b) (2024). An applicant “may not establish a second
benefit account as a result of one loss of employment.” Id. Eligibility for unemployment
benefits requires compliance with the law; there is no equitable or common-law entitlement
to benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.069, subd. 3 (2024).
I. Styczinski has not established that his substantial rights may have been
prejudiced because DEED allegedly exceeded its statutory authority.

Styczinski contends that DEED exceeded its statutory authority when it issued the
amended determination of benefit account, arguing that the legislature limited DEED’s
ability to amend a determination of benefit account to circumstances not present in this
case. See Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 1(d) (2024) (providing that DEED “may, at any time
within 24 months from the establishment of a benefit account, reconsider any determination
of benefit account and make an amended determination if the commissioner finds that the
wage credits listed in the determination were incorrect”) . DEED disagrees, maintaining

1 Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 2(a) (2024), provides that “an applicant must have wage
credits of at least 5.3 percent of the state’s average annual wage rounded down to the next
lower $100,” which amounts to $3,700.

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that it may amend any determination of benefit account that has not yet become final
because it possesses the “inherent authority to correct erroneous decisions.”
We are not convinced by DEED’s broad claim that it has inherent authority to
correct any non-final erroneous decision. DEED relies on two sources of authority for
support, both of which appear to be inapposite. First, DEED points to Minn. Stat.
§ 268.101, subd. 4 (2024), but that statute governs determinations of eligibility, not
determinations of benefit accounts. See Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 4 (stating that “unless
an appeal has been filed . . . [DEED] may reconsider a determination of eligibility or
determination of ineligibility that has not become final and issue an amended
determination”).
Second, DEED cites caselaw stating that agencies “have the inherent power to
correct erroneous decisions when the statute does not prohibit such correction.” Rowe v.
Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev., 704 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Minn. App. 2005). In Rowe, this court
considered whether a ULJ had jurisdiction to correct an error in its decision after that
decision became final upon the expiration of the appeal period. Id. at 194. We recognized
“the ULJ’s implied power to correct an erroneous decision arguably exists” during a
relator’s 30-day period to appeal the ULJ’s decision. Id. at 195. Because the relator’s
appeal period had lapsed and the ULJ’s decision had become final, we concluded that the
ULJ “lacked express statutory authority or the inherent power to amend its original
decision.” Id. at 196-97. Because Rowe addresses a ULJ’s ability to sua sponte correct its
own decision before the decision is final, it is not helpful to the question of whether DEED

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has inherent authority to issue an amended determination of benefit account for reasons
other than incorrectly listed wage credits. See Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 1(d).
Nonetheless, even if DEED exceeded its statutory authority, we may only reverse
the ULJ’s decision if Styczinski establishes that his substantial rights may have been
prejudiced. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(2). Styczinski has not met that burden.
As we explained, once a benefit account is established, a second account may be
established in only one of two ways. First, the existing account may be withdrawn and a
new account established, provided that the applicant “has not been paid any unemployment
benefits on th[e] benefit account” to be withdrawn. Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 3b(c).
Second, the applicant may establish a second benefit account after the first benefit account
expires at the end of the benefit year so long as the applicant has “performed actual work
in subsequent covered employment and ha[s] been paid [a qualifying level of] wages in
one or more completed calendar quarters that started after the effective date of the prior
benefit account.” Id., subd. 2(b).
It is undisputed that Styczinski established the 2024 benefit account in September
2024 and received benefits under that account beginning in July 2025 until the benefit year
expired at the end of August 2025. Because Styczinski received benefits under the 2024
benefit account, he is not permitted to withdraw that account. Id., subd. 3b(c). It is also
undisputed that Styczinski experienced only one loss of employment and he did not
perform any work in covered employment after the effective date of the 2024 benefit
account. Id., subd. 2(b). Styczinski is therefore disqualified by statute from establishing
the 2025 benefit account. Thus, even if DEED exceeded its statutory authority by issuing

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the amended determination of benefit account, Styczinski was not entitled to benefits under
the statute. As such, Styczinski cannot show that his substantial rights may have been
prejudiced by the ULJ’s decision that he is ineligible to establish the 2025 benefit account.
II. Styczinski’s additional arguments do not warrant reversal of the ULJ’s
decision.

Styczinski asserts several additional bases for reversal. First, Styczinski argues that
the amended determination of benefit account is “factually incorrect” because it states that
he had not earned more than $3,700 in wages from covered employment since establishing
the 2024 benefit account on September 1, 2024. Styczinski maintains that the amended
determination reflects wage credits in excess of $133,000, the amount of the severance pay
he received from Wells Fargo. We construe this argument as a challenge to the substantial
evidence supporting the ULJ’s factual findings. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5).
The ULJ found that Styczinski was ineligible to establish the 2025 benefit account
because he had not earned more than $3,700 in wages by working in covered employment
since September 1, 2024. This finding is supported by substantial evidence. In order to
establish a second benefit account following the expiration of a benefit year on a prior
benefit account, an applicant must have “performed actual work in subsequent covered
employment” and been “paid wages in one or more completed calendar quarters” after the
effective date of the prior benefit account. Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 2(b). At the
evidentiary hearing, Styczinski testified that he had not worked in covered employment
since being laid off, and consequently, had not earned any wages through “actual work”
since establishing the 2024 benefit account. Therefore, the ULJ’s finding that Styczinski

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had not earned sufficient wages to establish the 2025 benefit account is supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Fay, 860 N.W.2d at 387.
Second, Styczinski argues that the ULJ’s decision violated his constitutional right
to procedural due process because he did not understand that his severance payments would
not be considered “actual work” for the purposes of establishing the 2025 benefit account.
Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 2(b). Due process requires adequate notice and an opportunity
to be heard. Schulte v. Transp. Unlimited, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn. 1984). “To
determine whether an individual’s right to procedural due process has been violated, we
first determine whether a protected liberty or property interest is implicated and then
determine what process is due.” Sweet v. Comm’r of Hum. Servs., 702 N.W.2d 314, 319
(Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2005). Whether the government has
violated an individual’ s procedural-due-process rights is a question of law, which we
consider de novo. Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785 (Minn. 2014).
“Unemployment benefits are an entitlement protected by the constitutional right to
procedural due process.” Godbout v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 827 N.W.2d 799, 802
(Minn. App. 2013). Notice is generally constitutionally adequate if it was “reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” McShane v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 377 N.W.2d 479, 482-83 (Minn. App. 1985) (quotation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 23, 1986). Here, Styczinski received notice of DEED’s amended determination
that he was ineligible to establish the 2025 benefit account because he had not earned
sufficient wages since establishing the 2024 benefit account. He appeared at the

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evidentiary hearing to contest this determination and testified on his behalf. On this record,
we conclude that Styczinski received constitutionally adequate procedural due process.
Third, Styczinski argues that the ULJ should have altered the benefit-year period on
the 2024 benefit account. As discussed, w hen an applicant applies for unemployment
benefits, DEED issues a determination of benefit account, which includes determining a
base period and benefit year. Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 1(b). A “benefit year” is the
period of 52 calendar weeks beginning the date the account is effective. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.035, subd. 6. A benefit account “is effective the date the application for
unemployment benefits was effective.” Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 3b(b) (2024).
Notwithstanding this unambiguous statutory language, Styczinski contends that,
because his severance payments delayed his eligibility for benefits, a new set of 52 calendar
weeks should have begun when he reactivated his 2024 benefit account in July 2025 . But
it is well-established that courts “cannot add language to a statute; rather, [they] must apply
the plain language of the statute as written.” Firefighters Union Loc. 4725 v. City of
Brainerd, 934 N.W.2d 101, 109 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Wenthe,
865 N.W.2d 293, 304 (Minn. 2015) (stating that “courts cannot supply that which the
legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks” (quotation omitted)). Styczinski
does not provide any legal authority, and we are aware of none, allowing a ULJ to alter the
effective start date of a benefit account or extend a benefit year in these circumstances. See
Peoples Nat. Gas Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 369 N.W.2d 530, 534 (Minn. 1985)
(stating that neither agencies nor courts may enlarge an agency’s powers beyond that
contemplated by the legislature). Styczinski’s argument is therefore unavailing.

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Lastly, Styczinski argues the ULJ legally erred by rejecting his proposed remedy to
repay the benefits he received under the 2024 benefit account, urging us to interpret the
law in favor of payment of benefits. The ULJ determined that repayment of unemployment
benefits to allow withdrawal of a benefit account is not an available remedy under the
statute. See Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 3b(c) (providing that an existing benefit account
may be withdrawn in order to establish a new account so long as the applicant “has not
been paid any unemployment benefits on th[e] benefit account” to be withdrawn). We
discern no error of law in the ULJ’s determination.
We are sympathetic to Styczinski’s position, but eligibility for unemployment
benefits is governed by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 268.069, subd. 3 (“There is no equitable
or common law denial or allowance of unemployment benefits.”) ; see also Irvine v.
St. John’s Lutheran Church of Mound, 779 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Minn. App. 2010) (rejecting
relator’s equitable argument challenging a ULJ’s determination that relator could not
establish an unemployment-benefit account and explaining that “no liberal construction of
the statute in favor of its remedial purpose or narrow construction of ineligibility
requirements can allow us to reach the result relator seeks”). We therefore must affirm the
decision of the ULJ.
Affirmed.