Michael Nikiforakis v. Twin Cities Motorcycles, LLC, Department of Employment and Economic Development

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0209

Michael Nikiforakis,
Relator,

vs.

Twin Cities Motorcycles, LLC,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 52122199-3

Michael Nikiforakis, Apple Valley, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

Twin Cities Motorcycles, LLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma (respondent employer)

Rebecca Wittmer, Keri A. Phillips, Katrina Gulstad, Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent
department)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Frisch , Chief Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
The Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development denied
Michael Nikiforakis ’s application for unemployment benefits after he quit his sales -
associate position with an income amount that exceeded the maximum he could receive
without facing a reduction in his Social Security disability benefits. An unemployment-law
judge affirmed the department’s denial after finding that Nikiforakis voluntarily quit his
employment without good reason caused by his employer. We affirm in this certiorari
appeal because substantial evidence supports that finding.
FACTS
Relator Michael Nikiforakis worked briefly as a parts-department sales associate at
Twin Cities Motorcycle s LLC (TCM) from May 2025 to August 2025, quit, and
unsuccessfully applied to the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development (DEED) for unemployment benefits. Nikiforakis appealed DEED’s denial of
benefits to an unemployment-law judge (ULJ), who conducted a hearing and made findings
of fact that we summarize here.
Nikiforakis began work at TCM intending to suppress the amount of his pay,
informing TCM that he wanted to avoid exceeding the income cap established for him by
federal Social Security. Exceeding that cap would result in a penalty or reduce his Social
Security disability benefits. To accommodate his income-limitation objective, TCM agreed
to pay Nikiforakis a $16 hourly wage rather than pay him by commission and to schedule
him to work no more than 24 hours weekly. The TCM parts sales manager informed him

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that TCM followed a pay structure with two monthly pay periods, from the first to the
fifteenth and from the sixteenth to the end of the month. The manager also provided
Nikiforakis with an employee handbook similarly explaining the structure.
Nikiforakis worked 46.37 hours in the first July 2025 pay period and 62.40 hours in
the second, resulting in a gross income of $1,740.32 for the month. Nikiforakis sent his
manager a text message on August 4 saying that his July income exceeded his cap of
“$1,550 monthly,” and he sent a letter two days later, resigning. The letter declared that
when he was hired he had “ made it clear that [he] could not earn beyond a certain dollar
amount a month which [he] stated to be $1,500 gross.” The letter also announced that his
last day would be August 20. TCM discharged Nikiforakis effective August 14.
The ULJ concluded that Nikiforakis was entitled to no unemployment benefits
except any amount he accrued between August 14 and August 20. The ULJ rested this
conclusion on the findings that Nikiforakis quit his employment as of August 20, that TCM
had scheduled him to work no more than the number of hours weekly that Nikiforakis
requested when he began his employment, and that he did not quit because of a good reason
caused by TCM.
Nikiforakis unsuccessfully ask ed the ULJ to reconsider the decision, and he now
appeals to this court by certiorari.
DECISION
Nikiforakis bases his appeal on three unavailing arguments. He argues first that the
ULJ’s credibility findings are not supported by substantial evidence. He argues second that

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he quit because of a good reason caused by TCM. And he argues third that federal law
compels reversing. We address each argument.
Nikiforakis appears to argue that the ULJ based the decision denying unemployment
benefits on erroneous credibility findings about the details of his initial pay agreement with
TCM. We may reverse a ULJ’s decision if, among other grounds, it is not supported by
substantial evidence. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5) (2024). The ULJ must set forth
the reasons for crediting witness testimony if that testimony significantly affected the
outcome. Id., subd. 1a(a) (2024). The ULJ made the findings summarized above based on
the documentary and testimonial evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. The ULJ
expressly found the testimony of a TCM employee credible, and Nikiforakis’s testimony
not credible, specifically as it regarded the details of the parties’ initial discussions and
agreement about the hours TCM would schedule Nikiforakis. We afford great deference to
the ULJ’s credibility findings and sustain them if the evidence supports them. Skarhus v.
Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006). The ULJ explained in detail why
the TCM witness’s testimony was credible and why Nikiforakis’s testimony was only
partially credible. Among other things, the TCM witness’s relevant testimony was
corroborated by documentary evidence, including timecards, while Nikiforakis’s testimony
conflicted with it. We are satisfied that the record supports the ULJ’s credibility findings.
We are also not persuaded to reverse by Nikiforakis’s argument that he quit because
of a good reason caused by TCM. An applicant is not disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits for having quit employment if he quit for a good reason caused by
his employer. Minn. Stat. § 268. 095, subd. 1(1) (2024). We review de novo whether his

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reason was a good one caused by his employer . Krantz v. Loxtercamp Transp., Inc., 410
N.W.2d 24, 26 (Minn. App. 1987) . He contends that TCM caused him to quit by not
performing its obligations under their employment agreement. An employer’s breach of an
employment agreement may satisfy the good -reason requirement. See Werner v. Med.
Pros. LLC, 782 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010).
The terms of an employment agreement may include oral promises if these promises
conform to the principles of contract formation. See Hayes v. K-Mart Corp., 665 N.W.2d
550, 553 (Minn. App. 2003). But the ULJ found that TCM’s description of its agreement
with Nikiforakis was accurate, and that Nikiforakis’s was not. Because TCM did not breach
the terms of their agreement, Nikiforakis cannot prevail based on the alleged breach.
Nikiforakis appears to argue that his appeal should succeed because federal Social
Security law preempts state unemployment law. He maintains that because the salary cap
on his receipt of disability benefits was established by federal law, the ULJ violated the
United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause by declining his request for unemployment
benefits under state law. The argument needs little discussion. The Supremacy Clause
provides that federal law prevails over conflicting state law. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The
ULJ determined that Nikiforakis quit employment to avoid facing any reduction in his
disability benefits. By quitting, Nikiforakis averted any conflict between his alleged
entitlement to unemployment benefits under state law and his entitlement to disability
benefits under federal law. These circumstances do not raise any Supremacy Clause
concern.
Affirmed.