State of Minnesota v. Julie Louise Myhre-Schnell

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0214

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Julie Louise Myhre-Schnell,
Respondent.

Filed August 31, 2026
Affirmed
Beane, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-24-5497

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Michael M. Hayek, Elisabeth M. Johnson,
Kaitlyn A. Stamson, Assistant County Attorneys, Shakopee, Minnesota (for appellant)

James H. Gempeler, North Star Criminal Defense, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Beane, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BEANE, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the sentence imposed for respondent Julie
Louise Myhre-Schnell’s conviction of attempted first-degree premeditated murder. The
state argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting a downward durational

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departure because the court failed to explain its reasoning and because Myhre-Schnell’s
conduct was not significantly less serious than the typical attempted first -degree
premeditated murder. Seeing no basis to conclude that the district court’s sentencing
decision constituted an abuse of its broad discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged Myhre-Schnell with attempted first- degree premeditated murder
by amended complaint, which contains the following allegations. On December 3, 2023,
Myhre-Schnell went to the group home where her vulnerable-adult son (son) lived and
tried to kill son by putting a “slurry” of water and crushed up Lorazepam pills from her
own prescription into son’s feeding bag. The next day, son was taken to the hospital and
was diagnosed with acute hypoxemic respiratory failure, but he eventually recovered.
Myhre-Schnell later admitted to family members and police that she had tried to kill son.
She told police that, at the time, she thought to herself, “Am I doing this? Am I doing this?
I can’t believe I’m doing this.” But she also said that she “completely regretted he
survived.” Several months later, Myhre-Schnell sent a text message to son acknowledging
what she had done and saying she had hoped he would “go to sleep forever.”
The state filed notice of its intent to seek an aggravated sentence. It later agreed not
to pursue an aggravated sentence in exchange for Myhre-Schnell pleading guilty to the
charged offense.1

1 The record does not contain a transcript of the guilty-plea hearing.

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Myhre-Schnell moved for a downward dispositional sentencing departure,2 arguing
that she is particularly amenable to probation and mental- health treatment, she has
expressed remorse and taken responsibility, son “acquiesce[s]” to a probationary sentence,
and she “lacked substantial capacity for judgment” at the time of the offense. In support of
her motion, Myhre-Schnell submitted a confidential sentencing memorandum that detailed
various aspects of her life and relationship with son, including son’s significant medical
needs and Myhre-Schnell’s active involvement in his care for the past 30 years. The
memorandum said that she experienced “caregiver burnout.” Myhre-Schnell also
submitted 20 letters of support from friends and family and a video of roughly seven
minutes with statements from friends and family. And she highlighted the presentence-
investigation report, which detailed various aspects of Myhre -Schnell’s life and
relationship with son but also recommended a prison sentence of 180 months—the middle
of the presumptive range under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that it had received Myhre-
Schnell’s guilty plea and had prepared for sentencing by review ing the presentence-
investigation report, the victim impact statement, and Myhre-Schnell’s motion and
supporting materials. The district court then heard arguments from the parties. In arguing
the motion for a downward dispositional departure, defense counsel highlighted the various

2 The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe presumptive sentences for felony
offenses and define two types of sentencing departures: dispositional and durational. A
downward dispositional departure involves a deviation from a presumptive prison sentence
to a probationary sentence based on the defendant’s characteristics, while a downward
durational departure involves a reduction in the length of the sentence based on the
seriousness of the offense. State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016).

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supporting materials and son’s “acquiescence” to a probationary sentence. Counsel also
emphasized Myhre-Schnell’s decades of caring for son and Myhre-Schnell’s own mental-
health challenges, and asserted that “[h]er actions must be understood within the context
of profound long-term caregiver burnout” because “when the systems around her failed,
she had no choice but to step in.”
The state opposed the motion and requested a sentence of 216 months’
imprisonment, the top of the presumptive sentencing range. The state countered Myhre-
Schnell’s arguments about caregiver burnout by asserting that she was not son’s only
caregiver and asserted that her complaints about systemic failures amount to a “shirking of
responsibility” by blaming others.
Myhre-Schnell also personally addressed the court. She reiterated and expounded
on defense counsel’s arguments about her mental-health challenges and the toll of being
son’s primary caregiver for decades. She also said that, in December 2023, she was
contemplating taking her own life and “couldn’t bear the thought” of son “lingering without
proper care,” so she sought to end his life before ending her own.
In imposing the sentence, the district court noted and discussed the various factors
the parties highlighted but ultimately focused on the seriousness of Myhre-Schnell’s
conduct. The district court explained that, in its experience, a typical attempted murder
involves a shooting in the community in an unsuccessful effort to kill someone, which
implicates public safety. The district court reasoned that, because those factors are absent
here, Myhre-Schnell’s conduct is less serious than is typical of an attempted first-degree

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premeditated murder. On that basis, t he district court sentenced Myhre-Schnell to 36
months’ imprisonment, which is a downward durational departure.
The state appeals.
DECISION
A district court generally must impose the presumptive sentence established in the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Minn. Sent ’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2024). But the district
court has discretion to depart from the presumptive sentencing disposition or duration if
“identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances” support a departure. Id.; see also
State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014). A durational departure looks to the
seriousness of the offense, not the characteristics of the offender. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at
623. A downward durational departure is justified when a “defendant’s conduct was
significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” Id.
at 624 (quotation omitted). We afford district courts “great discretion in the imposition of
sentences.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307 (quotation omitted). A district court abuses its
discretion if its reasons for a sentencing departure are “improper or inadequate.” State v.
Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2017).
The state argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting a downward
durational departure because it offered no explanation for its determination that this offense
is less serious than typical other than to say that the offense did not involve a shooting in
the community. But the determination that Myhre-Schnell’s offense was committed in a
manner that is significantly less serious than typical is a permissible basis for a downward
durational departure. See Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 625-26. The district court explained that

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a typical attempted murder involves shooting a gun in the community, which poses a threat
to public safety. And the district court further explained that, by contrast, Myhre-Schnell
committed attempted first-degree premeditated murder in a manner that did not impact
public safety. Reasonable minds may differ as to the substance of this explanation, but the
district court articulated a permissible basis to depart and the reason for doing so. Given
that, we cannot conclude that the district court’s reasons for its sentencing decision were
improper or inadequate, such that they would constitute an abuse of discretion.
The state also identifies several other factors that it contends are improper or
unsupported bases for a durational departure—Myhre- Schnell’s remorse, her mental-
health challenges, son’s wishes, and concerns about systemic failures related to son’s care.
But although the parties and the district court discussed these factors during the sentencing
hearing, the district court did not rely on them in sentencing Myhre-Schnell. In fact, the
district court expressed skepticism as to whether Myhre-Schnell had truly accepted
responsibility for her conduct and whether her actions were related to her mental-health
concerns. In any event, “a single mitigating factor, standing alone, may justify a downward
durational departure.” Id. at 624-25. Once the district court had articulated a valid basis to
depart—here, the determination that Myhre- Schnell’s conduct was less serious than is
typical of an attempted first-degree premeditated murder—it was not then also required to
expressly reject all the other factors presented by the parties that would not have been a
permissible basis to depart.
Finally, we are not persuaded by the state’s argument that this case cannot be less
serious than typical because other factors, such as son’s particular vulnerability, could have

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supported a finding that this case was more serious than typical rather than less. Son’s
particular vulnerability is a factor on which the state could have relied in seeking an
aggravated sentence, s ee Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b(1) (2024), but the state chose
not to pursue an aggravated sentence in exchange for Myhre-Schnell’s guilty plea.
Moreover, the record reflects that the district court understood and considered son’s
circumstances and nonetheless determined that Myhre-Schnell’s conduct was, overall,
substantially less serious than the typical attempted first-degree premeditated murder. Even
if another district court might have reached a different conclusion, we are not persuaded
that the decision to impose a downward durational departure constituted an abuse of the
district court’s broad discretion. See State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 613 (Minn. 2004)
(stating that the mere possibility “that another district court, in the proper exercise of its
discretion,” might have done differently, is insufficient to show an abuse of discretion).
Affirmed.