Kaylee Anne Vartanian OBO Elena Jo Vartanian-Dixon v. Hillary Anne Laska

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0222

Kaylee Anne Vartanian OBO Elena Jo Vartanian-Dixon,
Respondent,

vs.

Hillary Anne Laska,
Appellant

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-25-5245

Kaylee Anne Vartanian, Byron, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Hillary Anne Laska, Byron, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Larson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Self-represented appellant Hillary Anne Laska challenges the district court’s
decision to grant respondent Kaylee Anne Vartanian’s petition for a harassment restraining
order (HRO) for herself and her minor child. We affirm.

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FACTS
Laska and Vartanian are neighbors who share a fence. In July 2025, Vartanian
petitioned the district court for an HRO to protect herself and her minor child from Laska.
Vartanian alleged that Laska repeatedly “followed, monitored, or pursued” Vartanian and
her minor child, made “uninvited visits” along the property line, and “made harassing
phone calls or sent harassing text messages.” Vartanian also alleged that Laska placed
cameras on her property that recorded Vartanian and her family while in their own
backyard. Vartanian stated that Laska’s conduct “frightened” her and affected her family’s
“safety, security[,] or privacy.”
A hearing was held before a referee. On October 28, 2025, the referee issued an
HRO in Vartanian’s favor, listing Vartanian and her minor child as protected persons.1 The
next day, the sheriff’s office served Laska with notice of the filing and the order granting
the HRO. On November 4, 2025, Laska filed a request for review, alleging the referee
misapplied the law and “improperly categorized lawful, police-directed documentation” as
harassment. Laska also asked the district court to dissolve the HRO due to an “improved
relationship” between the parties with “[g] ood-faith efforts and peaceful conduct.” S he
further claimed that the referee improperly included the minor child as a protected person
in the HRO.
After additional motion practice, the district court scheduled a hearing for December
29, 2025. At that hearing, the district court verbally denied Laska’s requests. More motion

1 Under Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2024), “ When a referee presides at the
hearing on the petition, the [HRO] becomes effective upon the referee’s signature.”

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practice ensued and, ultimately, the district court filed a written order to memorialize its
December 29, 2025 decision.
Laska appeals.
DECISION
Laska appeals from the district court’s decision to approve the issuance of the HRO.
We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See Borth v. Borth, 970
N.W.2d 699, 701 (Minn. App. 2022). “A district court abuses its discretion if it makes
findings of fact that are not supported by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the
matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We give “due regard” to credibility determinations and will not disturb factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App.
2008); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
An HRO may be issued if “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3). In the
context of this case, “harassment” means “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts,
words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial
adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship
between the actor and the intended target.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1) (2024);
see also Harris ex rel. Banks v. Gellerman, 954 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. App. 2021)
(holding that “harassment requires multiple incidents of adverse and unwanted contact”
(emphasis omitted)). “Harassment” requires “both objectively unreasonable conduct or
intent” from the harasser and “an objectively reasonable belief” from the harassed person.

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Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2006). An HRO decision must be based “on testimony and documents properly admitted.”
Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29,
2004). From her brief, we discern that Laska raises two arguments, which we address in
turn.2
First, Laska argues that the district court abused its discretion when it approved the
HRO because the referee made inadequate findings. The HRO statute creates no
requirement regarding the level of specificity required for the findings of fact, see Minn.
Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5 (2024), but there must be sufficient findings to allow for
meaningful appellate review, see Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.3
Generally, Laska criticizes the referee’s issuance of the HRO on the basis that it
does not identify dates, incidents, or exhibit numbers to support the findings. But the
referee listed five circumstances that constituted harassment toward Vartanian and her
minor child. And the exhibits submitted into the record support the referee’s findings that
these incidents occurred.

2 To the extent Laska raises other arguments, we decline to reach them on the basis that
they are inadequately briefed. See State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers,
Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed
question).
3 To the extent Laska challenges the district court’s decision to deny her motion for
amended findings on the basis that it failed to consider new evidence, Laska did not file a
motion to reopen the record and, therefore, the new evidence was not properly before the
district court. See Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. App. 2006) (“A motion
to amend findings must be based on the files, exhibits, and minutes of the court, not on
evidence that is not a part of the record.”), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2006).

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More specifically, Laska contends there were inadequate findings regarding her
intent. For support, Laska cites Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761. But Peterson is
distinguishable. Peterson involved a record that was “devoid of evidence” supporting an
objectively reasonable belief that Peterson had engaged in harassing conduct. Id. at 766.
Unlike Peterson, here there is ample evidence supporting the finding that Laska’s conduct
was “intimidating and interfere[d] with [Vartanian’s] and her family’s sense of security
and safety in their own backyard.” Notably , the record supports the explicit findings that
Laska placed security cameras on her property to monitor Vartanian and her family in their
own backyard despite “other home-security options that would not substantially interfere
with [Vartanian’s] sense of security or privacy.” And the referee explicitly found Laska’s
testimony regarding the reason she installed the security cameras not credible. On this
record, there are sufficient findings to enable appellate review.
Second, Laska argues that the district court improperly approved the referee’s
decision to include the minor child in the HRO. Laska claims the findings supporting an
HRO must be “tethered to the record” and that the record does not contain “child-specific
conduct” to support the minor child’s inclusion in the HRO. We are not persuaded.
Our persuasive, nonprecedential opinion in Grittner v. Buhr is instructive on this
point. No. A19-1991, 2020 WL 5359394, at *1 (Minn. App. Sept. 8, 2020); see also Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). In Grittner, we affirmed a district court’s decision to
grant an HRO for an entire family. Id. at *4. We observed that the alleged conduct was
targeted at the entire household, not just the adults, and therefore concluded the record was
sufficient to sustain an HRO that included the children. Id. This case, like Grittner,

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involves conduct that targeted the entire family. In particular, t he district court relied on
the security-camera placement to watch the backyard where Vartanian’s minor child played
to support its decision. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decision to include the minor child as a protected person in the HRO.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.