In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Matthew Steven Zarbinski

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0228

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Matthew Steven Zarbinski.

Filed August 17, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-PR-24-462

Samuel V. Johnson, Johnson Brothers Law, PLLP, Chisago City, Minnesota (for appellant
Matthew Steven Zarbinski)

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Ellen LaVigne, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka,
Minnesota (for respondent Anoka County)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Appellant challenges an order indeterminately committing him as a sexually
dangerous person (SDP) and sexually psychopathic personality (SPP), arguing that the
district court (1) erred in determining that he is highly likely to reoffend and is dangerous
to others and (2) improperly relied on hearsay and uncharged conduct without adequately
assessing the reliability of that evidence. We affirm.

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FACTS
Respondent Anoka County 1 petitioned for civil commitment of appellant Matthew
Steven Zarbinski as an SDP and SPP. In the petition, the county alleged that Zarbinski had
engaged in several incidents of sexual misconduct spanning about 18 years and that,
although he had attempted sex-offender treatment, he had violated the terms of his
probation several times.
The matter proceeded to a hearing in August 2025. The district court heard
testimony from multiple witnesses, including : four victims of harmful sexual conduct;
Zarbinski; a Ramsey County probation officer; a forensic case manager with Anoka County
Adult Mental Health; the assistant director of community corrections for Anoka County ;
and two court-appointed experts. In addition, the district court received several exhibits in
evidence.
As mentioned above, the record includes evidence of four incidents of harmful
sexual conduct by Zarbinski: a 2003 sexual assault of 15-year-old E.R.K. that resulted in a
conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct; an uncharged 2013 incident of sexual
conduct with a vulnerable adult, A.M.B.; an uncharged 2014 sexual assault of 17-year-old
H.M.S.; and a 2017 sexual assault of 14-year -old S.L.J. that resulted in a conviction of
third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Below, we summarize the evidence of the four
incidents of harmful sexual conduct, as well as other facts the district court discussed in its
order indeterminately committing Zarbinski as an SDP and SPP.

1 Respondent identifies itself as “Anoka County” in its appellate brief. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 143.01.

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2003 Third-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct Involving E.R.K.
In 2003, Zarbinski was 27 years old and E.R.K. was 15. Zarbinski admittedly knew
E.R.K. was 15 and misinformed her that he was 20 because he did not want her to “reject
their friendship.” After engaging in “grooming behaviors,” Zarbinski assaulted E.R.K. and
was ultimately convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Because of his conviction, a district court placed Zarbinski on supervised probation
for five years, with conditions that he serve 90 days of local confinement, begin outpatient
sex offender treatment, and register as a sex offender for ten years. Zarbinski also signed a
statement of understanding that he was prohibited from contacting E.R.K. by an order for
protection. He nonetheless later attempted contact with E.R.K. after seeing her at a bus
stop. In 2004, Zarbinski was convicted of a felony for violating the order for protection.
Between July 2003 and December 2004, while Zarbinski was on probation for the
2003 third- degree-criminal-sexual-conduct conviction involving E.R.K., he was in a
relationship with a 17- year-old female, M.E. This relationship violated the terms of his
probation. Zarbinski was readmitted to sex offender treatment, attended the program for
about three years followed by a year of aftercare, and completed treatment in August 2007.
2013 Uncharged Sexual Conduct with A.M.B.
In September 2013, Zarbinski was 38 years old and engaged in sexual conduct with
A.M.B., a vulnerable adult female. The Ramsey County Attorney’s Office cited
insufficient evidence in declining to bring criminal charges against Zarbinski based on the
incident.

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A.M.B. testified during the underlying commitment hearing. The district court
found that “it was immediately apparent that she was vulnerable” and that her account of
the sexual conduct was “credible,” “persuasive,” and “consistent” with other evidence.
This included a guardianship order concerning A.M.B., which states that she was
diagnosed with cerebral palsy and had a full -scale intelligence quotient (IQ) of 47. The
district court also heard testimony from A.M.B.’s friend, B.E.M., who was in a relationship
with Zarbinski at the time he engaged in sexual conduct with A.M.B. According to B.E.M.,
her relationship with Zarbinski had been sexual, she had an intellectual disability, and
Zarbinski knew that she was disabled because she had told him. Based on B.E.M.’s
testimony, the district court found that “it was immediately apparent that she was
vulnerable.”
In addition, the district court also heard testimony from Zarbinski about the 2013
incident involving A.M.B. but did not credit his version of the events. Zarbinski claimed
that he did not know that A.M.B. and B.E.M. were vulnerable. The district court found his
failure to recognize A.M.B. and B.E.M.’s “vulnerability is concerning and indicates a lack
of judgment regarding [with] who[m] he engages in sexual relations.” In short, the district
court determined that there is clear and convincing evidence that Zarbinski engaged in
sexual conduct with A.M.B. in 2013.
2014 Uncharged Sexual Assault of H.M.S.
In March 2014, Zarbinski sexually assaulted a 17-year -old girl, H.M.S. Similar to
its handling of the 2013 sexual conduct involving A.M.B., the Ramsey County Attorney’s

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Office cited insufficient evidence in declining to bring criminal charges against Zarbinski
based on the 2014 incident concerning H.M.S.
During the underlying commitment hearing, H.M.S. testified that Zarbinski took her
to a hotel, held her down, and sexually penetrated her without her consent, despite her
request that he stop. The district court found H.M.S.’s account “credible and persuasive.”
And the district court determined that there is clear and convincing evidence that this
assault occurred.2
2017 Third-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct Involving S.L.J.
In 2017, when Zarbinski was between 41 and 42 years old, he engaged in sexual
contact with 14-year-old S.L.J.
Text messages between Zarbinski and S.L.J. show that Zarbinski knew that S.L.J.
was a minor and was emotionally vulnerable, that he told her he would marry her if the law
allowed, and that he knew that she had been harming herself and had been sexually
assaulted twice in the year before. As a result of his actions, Zarbinski was convicted of
third-degree criminal sexual conduct in May 2022 and sentenced to 70 months’
imprisonment, with lifetime conditional release.

2 The district court also found that, when Zarbinski sexually assaulted H.M.S. in 2014, he
had been in a sexual relationship with H.M.S.’s 16-year-old friend, K.A., who also testified
at the commitment hearing. Notwithstanding Zarbinski’s testimony denying that he and
K.A. had been in a sexual relationship, the district court found K.A. credible. Although the
district court did not expressly consider Zarbinski’s sexual relationship with K.A. to be an
incident of harmful sexual conduct, the court addressed this behavior in discussing
Zarbinski’s “inappropriate sexual relationships with minors.”

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Other Conduct
Zarbinski was convicted of “felony prostitution—engage 16- to 17-year -old” in
2019 and “misdemeanor prostitution—engage with person over 18” in 2021.
The terms of Zarbinski’s probation for the felony prostitution offense required that
he complete a second sex offender treatment program, that he have no contact with minor
females, and that his probation officer supervise and authorize his internet access. 3 Still,
Zarbinski violated the terms of his probation by having contact with minor females several
times, including an occasion in which he took a 15-year -old girl and her friends to a sex
shop. After being referred to a third sex-offender-treatment program in 2021, Zarbinski
was discharged in 2022 after he again violated his probationary terms.
Alternatives to Commitment and Expert Opinions
During the underlying commitment hearing, the forensic case manager with Anoka
County Adult Mental Health testified that Zarbinski had already received treatment in
“robust outpatient programs.” She explained that some of the available programs would
not accept a person who had been dismissed from sex offender treatment and that others
would be similar to the programs he had previously participated in before violating the
terms of his probation. And she stated that none of the programs would provide security or
monitoring.

3 During the underlying commitment hearing, the district court heard testimony from the
Ramsey County probation officer who was assigned to supervise Zarbinski from 2019 to
2022. The probation officer testified about her regular contact with Zarbinski and h er
extensive efforts to monitor his internet-capable devices.

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The assistant director of community corrections for Anoka County testified about
how Zarbinski would be supervised if he were not committed. The assistant director
explained that, based on his review of records from Ramsey County probation, authorities
had used most of the tools available but had been unable to keep Zarbinski from contacting
minors.
The district court received reports and heard testimony from two court-appointed
examiners, Dr. C. and Dr. D. Both examiners opined that Zarbinski met the criteria for
commitment as an SDP and SPP.
After the hearing, the district court issued an order civilly committing Zarbinski on
both grounds. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Zarbinski challenges the order indeterminately committing him as an SDP and SPP,
contending that the district court (1) erred in determining that he is highly likely to reoffend
and is dangerous to others and (2) improperly relied on hearsay and uncharged conduct
without adequately assessing the reliability of that evidence. We address each argument
below.

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I. The district court did not err in determining that Zarbinski is highly likely to
reoffend and is dangerous to others.

Zarbinski maintains (A) that “[t]he record is devoid of clear and convincing
evidence that . . . Zarbinski is highly likely to reoffend or is dangerous to others” and
(B) that the district court conflated the Linehan factors.4 These arguments are unavailing.
A. There is clear and convincing evidence in the record supporting the
district court’s determination that Zarbinski meets the criteria for
commitment as an SDP and SPP.

A person may be civilly committed as an SDP or SPP, or both, if the county proves
that the statutory commitment criteria are met by clear and convincing evidence. Minn.
Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3 (2024). An SDP is a person who “(1) has engaged in a course of
harmful sexual conduct . . . ; (2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental
disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual
conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a) (2024). And an SPP is a person who has
such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of
behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or
failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a
combination of any of these conditions, which render the
person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to
sexual matters, if the person has evidenced, by a habitual

4 See In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994) (directing the district court to
consider these factors: “(a) the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
education, etc.); (b) the person’s history of violent behavior (paying particular attention to
recency, severity, and frequency of violent acts); (c) the base rate statistics for violent
behavior among individuals of this person’s background (e.g., data showing the rate at
which rapists recidivate, the correlation between age and criminal sexual activity, etc.);
(d) the sources of stress in the environment (cognitive and affective factors which indicate
that the person may be predisposed to cope with stress in a violent or nonviolent manner);
(e) the similarity of the present or future context to those contexts in which the person has
used violence in the past; and (f) the person’s record with respect to sex therapy
programs”).

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course of misconduct in sexual matters, an utter lack of power
to control the person’ s sexual impulses and, as a result, is
dangerous to other persons.

Id., subd. 15 (2024).
If a district court determines that clear and convincing evidence supports
commitment as an SDP, SPP, or both,
the court shall commit the person to a secure treatment facility
unless the person establishes by clear and convincing evidence
that a less restrictive treatment program is available, is willing
to accept the [person] under commitment, and is consistent
with the person’s treatment needs and the requirements of
public safety.

Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3.
“We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, considering the
record in the light most favorable to the findings of fact.” In re Civ. Commitment of Breault,
942 N.W.2d 368, 378 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted). An appellate court “will not
conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, [the court is] . . . left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted). A
district court’s “findings are clearly erroneous when they are manifestly contrary to the
weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Appellate courts do not “reconcile conflicting evidence” or “reweigh
the evidence as if trying the matter de novo.” Id. at 222, 223 n.4 (quotation omitted). “When
the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the
record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.”

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Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). And when a factual finding is clearly erroneous but does not
detract from the district court’s ultimate determination, appellate courts apply a harmless-
error analysis under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 61, which requires courts to
“disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.” See In re Civ. Commitment of Poole, 921 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. App. 2018)
(applying a harmless-error analysis to the Commitment Appeal Panel’s decision to consider
certain evidence), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 2019). Whether the evidence meets the
statutory requirements for commitment is a question of law that we review de novo. In re
Civ. Commitment of Crosby, 824 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 27, 2013).
The district court found that Zarbinski is “highly likely to engage in harmful sexual
conduct in the future” and “meets the criteria” for commitment as an SDP. In making those
findings, the district court relied “particularly on Dr. C[.] and Dr. D[.]’s reports,” their
testimony at trial, and the court’s finding about “the greater weight of the six Linehan
factors.” The district court determined that Zarbinski’s “present disorder or dysfunction
does not allow him to adequately control his sexual impulses.” More specifically, the
district court credited Dr. C.’s opinion that Zarbinski’s “disorders have impeded his ability
to control his sexual impulses.” In deciding that Zarbinski is “highly likely to sexually
reoffend,” the district court favorably referenced Dr. D.’s opinion and Zarbinski’s scores
on the Static- 99R and VRS-SO risk assessments, as well as Zarbinski’s “disorders and
dysfunctions.” And the district court thoroughly discussed the statutory elements for
commitment as an SDP and the record supporting its determinations as to each element.

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Based on our careful review of the evidence, we are not left with a definite and firm
conviction that the district court has committed a mistake. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221.
The record supports the district court’s determination that Zarbinski meets the criteria for
commitment an SDP.
The district court also found by clear and convincing evidence that Zarbinski meets
the criteria for commitment as an SPP, as defined by Minnesota Statutes section 253D.02,
subdivision 15. In making that determination, the district court relied on the opinions of
both examiners that Zarbinski met the four statutory requirements: (1) emotional
instability; (2) impulsiveness of behavior; (3) lack of customary standards of good
judgment; and (4) failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts. See Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.02, subd. 15. The district court properly analyzed these statutory requirements and
detailed the factual support for its determination that Zarbinski satisfies the criteria for
commitment as an SPP. On this record, we discern no error in the district court’s decision.
We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that appellant is highly
likely to reoffend and dangerous to others because there is clear and convincing evidence
in the record supporting the court’s determination that he meets the criteria for commitment
as an SDP and SPP. The district court correctly identified the statutory criteria for its
decision. It also made detailed findings of fact identifying clear and convincing evidence
that each criterion is met. Those findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly,
we conclude that the district court’s factual findings support its order indeterminately
committing Zarbinski as an SDP and SPP.

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B. The district court’s findings on the Linehan factors are sufficient.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has instructed district courts to consider the Linehan
factors in evaluating the likelihood of future harmful sexual conduct. Linehan, 518 N.W.2d
at 614. As noted above, those factors include:
(a) the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
education, etc.); (b) the person’s history of violent behavior
(paying particular attention to recency, severity, and frequency
of violent acts); (c) the base rate statistics for violent behavior
among individuals of this person’s background (e.g., data
showing the rate at which rapists recidivate, the correlation
between age and criminal sexual activity, etc.); (d) the sources
of stress in the environment (cognitive and affective factors
which indicate that the person may be predisposed to cope with
stress in a violent or nonviolent manner); (e) the similarity of
the present or future context to those contexts in which the
person has used violence in the past; and (f) the person’s record
with respect to sex therapy programs.

Id.
The word “likely” requires “clear and convincing evidence that the person is ‘highly
likely’ to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.” In re Civ. Commitment of Ince, 847
N.W.2d 13, 22 (Minn. 2014). And “‘highly likely’ cannot be defined by a numeric value.”
Id. at 21. Appellate courts defer to the district court’s weighing of evidence relevant to
whether an individual is highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct. See id. at 23–
24 (acknowledging that, in making a commitment decision, district courts undertake a
“difficult task often requiring consideration of a voluminous and complex record followed
by a careful balancing of all the relevant facts” and concluding that district courts are in
“the best position to determine the weight to be attributed to each factor” (quotation
omitted)).

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In In re Civ. Commitment of Spicer, we concluded that a “district court’s order d[id]
not make sufficiently particular findings of fact on the key issues,” because the order
merely stated that the court considered the Linehan factors without explaining the evidence
it “found to be most persuasive or least persuasive.” 853 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn. App.
2014). And the Minnesota Supreme Court has instructed district courts to
“comprehensively consider all relevant, reliable evidenc e.” Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 25. In
Ince, the supreme court reversed and remanded an order committing a person as an SDP
because the supreme court could not “discern from the [district] court’s findings and
conclusions the extent to which the [district] court considered itself constrained by the
Linehan factors once it addressed the actuarial assessment evidence.” Id. at 24. In
particular, the district court had “simply reviewed the Linehan factors after accepting [an
expert’s] opinion on the actuarial evidence, but without indicating the significance of any
of those factors.” Id.
We are not convinced that the same defects that resulted in reversals in Spicer and
Ince occurred in this case. Here, the district court found “the greater weight of the six
Linehan factors weigh in favor of [Zarbinski] being highly likely to engage in harmful
sexual conduct in the future.” The district court broadly identified the evidence that it relied
on in making that finding—i.e., the opinions of the examiners, the trial testimony, and the
admitted evidence. While we are mindful that the district court’s ultimate determination
about the Linehan factors is somewhat summary in nature, the court’s specific and detailed
credibility findings about the two experts, as well as its particular identification of the

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aspects of the experts’ testimony and opinions on which the court relied, distinguish the
record before us from that of Spicer and Ince.
Put differently, despite the district court’s summary of the experts’ opinions in a
manner that could suggest adoption in toto, the court cited the evidence, testimony, and
expert opinions about each Linehan factor that it considered, and the court meaningfully
tied those facts to its conclusions of law. We also observe that there is no dispute between
the two experts that Zarbinski meets the criteria for commitment as an SDP and SPP.
The district court appropriately weighed the record relevant to the Linehan factors,
as well as independently considered the actuarial assessment evidence, without risking
factor repetition. We therefore conclude that the district court’s findings on the Linehan
factors are sufficient.
II. The district court properly assessed the reliability of the evidence.

Zarbinski asserts that the district court (A) “improperly relied on present-day
observations of vulnerability,” (B) “made incorrect statements in the findings of facts,” and
(C) “improperly relied on uncharged conduct.” These arguments do not merit reversal.
A. The district court did not clearly err in finding that A.M.B. and B.E.M.
were vulnerable.

Zarbinski contends that the district court erred by finding that A.M.B. and B.E.M.
were vulnerable. He contends that the district court inappropriately relied on A.M.B.’s and
B.E.M.’s demeanors during their testimony because there is a 12 -year temporal gap
between the underlying commitment hearing and the relevant incidents of harmful sexual
conduct.

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We acknowledge the district court’s reasoning that it was able to assess A.M.B. and
B.E.M. when they testified at the hearing and found it “immediately apparent” that they
were vulnerable. But the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s
findings, also establishes that A.M.B. and B.E.M. had intractable disabilities when
Zarbinski engaged in harmful sexual conduct with them.
As to A.M.B., the district court considered both her testimony and a 2005
guardianship order providing that she “was diagnosed with cerebral palsy” and “ha[d] a
full scale IQ of 47.” Moreover, a 2013 police report references A.M.B.’s disability, stating
that A.M.B. “ha[d] a ‘mild case’ of cerebral palsy.” And the report notes that A.M.B.’s
father “indicated [that A.M.B.] tends to minimize the level of her disability.”
B.E.M. testified that she had disabilities when she was in a relationship with
Zarbinski, including “mild retardation,” “general anxiety,” and “depression.” She
explained that, based on these disabilities, she receives 20 hours per week of in-home
services. B.E.M. stated that Zarbinski knew she was disabled because she told him.
The district court’s findings that A.M.B. and B.E.M. were vulnerable are reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole, including A.M.B.’s testimony, the 2005
guardianship order, the 2013 police reports, and B.E.M.’s testimony.
Because the district court’s findings that A.M.B. and B.E.M. were vulnerable are
not manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence and are reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in this regard.
See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221.

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B. The statements that Zarbinski challenges on appeal are either harmless
or not clearly erroneous.

Zarbinski maintains that the district court made a series of inaccurate statements in
its findings of fact, including that Zarbinski did not identify a photo of a 12-year -old girl
as G.E.Z., that the court incorrectly stated his age, and that the court inappropriately relied
on Dr. C.’s report as evidence of three prostitution cases.
During the underlying commitment hearing, Zarbinski denied recognizing an image
of a girl as G.E.Z. In its findings of fact, however, the district court inaccurately stated that
Zarbinski “was shown [the] image during his testimony and said that the image was of the
12-year-old girl, G.E. Z.” We conclude that this error is harmless because it does not
contradict the district court’s more salient finding that Zarbinski had an image on his phone
of a partially clothed, prepubescent girl. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 ; see also Poole, 921
N.W.2d at 67.
Although the district court incorrectly stated in its findings of fact that Zarbinski
was 49 years old, the court also correctly wrote in a separate part of its order
indeterminately committing Zarbinski as a n SDP and SPP that he was 50 years old.
Zarbinski urges that this is an important distinction because of lower recidivism rates for
individuals who are over 50 years old. But Dr. D. observed several times that Zarbinski
was 50 years old and based his opinion on Zarbinski’s accurate age. Thus, considering the
district court’s order as a whole, including its adoption of Dr. D.’s opinion, we conclude
that the court appropriately analyzed Zarbinski’s age and that any error is otherwise
harmless. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61; see also Poole, 921 N.W.2d at 67.

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Zarbinski contends that the district court clearly erred by relying on Dr. C.’s report,
asserting that the “report is the only location that states that there are three convictions for
prostitution.” But the record contains a report of Zarbinski’s criminal history, which
documents a misdemeanor prostitution charge in 2000 that Zarbinski acknowledged during
a psychosexual examination. Because there is evidence reasonably supporting the district
court’s finding that Zarbinski was charged with a prostitution offense in 2000, we conclude
that this finding is not clearly erroneous. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221. Moreover, the
district court expressly declined to rely on an aspect of Dr. C.’s report that described a
prostitution conviction in 2000. As a result, we conclude that the district court did not
clearly err in considering this evidence.
For these reasons, we conclude that the statements that Zarbinski challenges on
appeal are either harmless or not clearly erroneous.
C. The district court properly weighed the evidence of Zarbinski’s
uncharged harmful sexual conduct.

Zarbinski argues that the district court “improperly relied on uncharged conduct
without adequate reliability assessment.”
“Incidents establishing a course of harmful sexual conduct need not be recent and
are not limited to those that resulted in a criminal conviction.” In re Civ. Commitment of
Williams, 735 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing In re Civ. Commitment of
Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating that courts may consider conduct
not resulting in a criminal conviction), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002)), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 26, 2007).

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We are not persuaded by Zarbinski’s contention that, because the Ramsey County
Attorney’s Office determined that the evidence could not support criminal charges as to
the 2013 incident of sexual conduct with A.M.B. and the 2014 sexual assault of H.M.S.,
the record before us does not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard. The district
court applied the clear and convincing standard in determining that the four incidents of
harmful sexual conduct had occurred, including the two uncharged incidents involving
A.M.B. and H.M.S.
As for the incident involving A.M.B., the district court received evidence of police
reports, a sexual assault examination, and the letter by the Ramsey County Attorney’s
Office declining to pursue criminal charges. The district court also heard testimony from
A.M.B., B.E.M., and Zarbinski. Weighing this record, the district court found A.M.B.’s
testimony credible, persuasive, and consistent with documentary evidence.
Regarding the incident involving H.M.S., the district court received evidence of
police reports and the letter by the Ramsey County Attorney’s Office declining criminal
charges. The district court also heard testimony from H.M.S., K.A., and Zarbinski. Given
this record, the district court found that H.M.S.’s testimony was credible and persuasive
and that it aligned with documentary evidence.
Zarbinski essentially asks us to reconcile conflicting evidence by reweighing the
record in favor of the letters by the Ramsey County Attorney’s Office declining charges,
as though we were trying the matter de novo. We cannot do so. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
222, 223 n.4. Because the record reasonably supports the findings that Zarbinski challenges

19
on appeal, “it is immaterial that the [declination letters] might also provide a reasonable
basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted).
We therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err because, in
considering the entire evidence, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id. at 221. The district court’s findings are not manifestly contrary
to the weight of the evidence, nor do they lack reasonable support in the record as a whole.
Id. Thus, we conclude that the district court properly weighed the evidence of Zarbinski’s
uncharged harmful sexual conduct.
Affirmed.