Ivy Rose Miller v. The Emily Program, P.C.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0235

Ivy Rose Miller,
Appellant,

vs.

The Emily Program, P.C.,
Respondent.

Filed August 31, 2026
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-25-3904

Peter J. Kestner, Mary E. Eliasen, Penn, Kestner & McEwen, PLLC, Inver Grove Heights,
Minnesota; and

Dylan R. Larson, McEwen & Kestner, PLLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota; and

Darrin M. Walker (pro hac vice), Darrin M. Walker, P.C., Kingwood, Texas (for appellant)

Debra L. Weiss, Melissa Dosick Riethof, Meagher + Geer, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Segal,

Judge.∗

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BENTLEY, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s order granting respondent’s motion to

dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens, arguing that the district court abused its

discretion by misapplying the forum-non-conveniens test, relying on clearly erroneous

facts, and failing to order forum-non-conveniens discovery. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondent The Emily Program, P.C., (TEP) provides in-patient and residential

treatment for individuals with eating disorders. While appellant Ivy Rose Miller was

participating in a residential treatment program at a TEP facility in Columbus, Ohio, in

2024, she was sexually abused by a behavioral health technician, Amanda Stetzer.1 Miller

served TEP with a summons, complaint, and jury-trial demand in April 2025, asserting

vicarious liability and negligence. She then filed the complaint in district court in Ramsey

County, Minnesota.

Miller’s complaint alleged that TEP is a “professional corporation incorporated

under the laws of the state of Minnesota, with its principal place of business and executive

offices located [in] . . . St. Paul[.]” TEP states on its website that clients participating in

residential treatment have “around-the-clock care and supervision.” TEP “provides its

patients with paperwork outlining ‘Client Rights’ . . . [that] include the right to . . . [b]e

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Stetzer was convicted of offenses relating to these allegations and was sentenced to four
years in prison.

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free from maltreatment, abuse or neglect[.]” The paperwork also provides that TEP

“therapists have a ‘Duty to Warn,’” and that TEP enforces “a policy prohibiting its

employees from communicating with patients via email or text message,” and “a

prohibition against bringing various items into the facility, including illegal drugs.” TEP

“sets, establishes, oversees, and administers the corporate policies, procedures and

decisions for safety, treatment, employee hiring, employee training, employee oversight

and supervision, and all other facets of the operations of [TEP], including its residential

treatment facilities such as the Columbus treatment facility.”

Miller alleged that, while she was at the Columbus facility, “Stetzer engaged in

various behaviors for the purpose of enticing, coercing or soliciting [Miller] to engage in

sexual activity with Stetzer.” For example, Stetzer “engaged in unpermitted sexual activity

with [Miller],” “allow[ed] [Miller] to use her personal cell phone during prohibited times,”

and “suppl[ied] [Miller] with vape pens and marijuana[.]” Stetzer also sent Miller

“unsolicited, distressing and sexually explicit text messages, emails, and other direct

messages harassing [Miller] about her treatment.” TEP allegedly had notice of this activity

because the facility was equipped with surveillance cameras in common areas and outside

private rooms, Stetzer previously had been caught violating the facility’s rules and

procedures, and other patients or staff had observed Stetzer’s conduct with Miller and

reported it to management.

With respect to the vicarious liability count, Miller alleged that “[g]rooming,

unpermitted sexual activity, sexual abuse and abuse of power by employees and staff

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members toward patients, are well-known and foreseeable hazards in the in-patient,

residential mental health treatment setting.” With respect to the negligence count, Miller

alleged that TEP “was aware, or should have been aware, that Stetzer was unfit to perform

the duties of a [behavioral health technician]” and that TEP failed in multiple ways to

prevent Miller from experiencing abuse including failing to “warn” or “protect” Miller

from Stetzer and “[f]ailing to control Stetzer.”

TEP moved to dismiss the complaint on forum-non-conveniens grounds in June

2025. Miller filed a memorandum opposing TEP’s motion to dismiss and attached five

exhibits, including client paperwork from TEP, a certificate of authority issued to TEP by

the Minnesota Secretary of State, and paperwork authorizing TEP to conduct business in

Ohio. Miller alternatively asked the district court to stay the motion to dismiss and allow

the parties to conduct forum-non-conveniens discovery. In response, TEP filed a

memorandum and an exhibit consisting of a copy of its license to operate a residential

facility in Ohio.

Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The district

court applied the forum-non-conveniens test articulated in Paulownia Plantations de

Panama Corp. v. Rajamannan, 793 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 2009). It found that Ohio was an

available and adequate alternative forum and then weighed the four private-interest factors

and the five public-interest factors to determine whether to defer to Miller’s choice of

forum or dismiss the complaint. It found that all factors weighed in favor of dismissal

except for one, which was neutral. In the last paragraph of its conclusions of law, the district

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court stated that it “agree[d] that [Miller] should not be given deference and have the case

continue in Minnesota because Ohio[] . . . imposes a damages cap on non-economic

damages.” It determined that “[t]his contradicts with the public interest against forum

shopping” and stated that the lack of a damage cap in Minnesota “seems to be the only

reason why [Miller] chose Minnesota as the forum, which is not encouraged.” The district

court did not address Miller’s request for discovery.

Miller appeals.

DECISION

“The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a district court with jurisdiction over

the subject matter and the parties discretion to decline jurisdiction over a cause of action

when another forum would be more convenient for the parties, the witnesses, and the

court.” Paulownia, 793 N.W.2d at 133. Appellate courts give “substantial deference” to a

district court’s determination of forum non conveniens, and that determination is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. Id. “A district court abuses its discretion in the context of forum

non conveniens when the court makes an erroneous legal conclusion or a clearly erroneous

factual conclusion.” Id.

“The first step in a forum non conveniens analysis is for the district court to establish

the existence of an available and adequate alternative forum.” Id. “A forum is ‘available’

when the foreign court has jurisdiction over the case and the parties.” Id. at 134.

“‘Adequacy’ encompasses whether the party has an effective remedy in the alternative

forum.” Id.

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The second step “requires the court to weigh the private and public interest factors

of both forums.” Id. at 137. “[T]here is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the

plaintiff’s choice of forum, which may be overcome only when the private and public

interest factors clearly point towards trial in the alternative forum.” Piper Aircraft Co. v.

Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981). The defendant bears the burden to rebut the presumption

in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum. See Bergquist v. Medtronic, Inc., 379 N.W.2d

508, 511 (Minn. 1986).

The private factors relevant to the forum-non-conveniens analysis are:

(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(2) availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; (3) possibility of view of premises, if view would
be appropriate to the action; and (4) all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.

Paulownia, 793 N.W.2d at 137 (quotations omitted).

The public interest factors are:

(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home; (3) the interest in having the
trial of a diversity case in a forum that is familiar with the law
that must govern the action; (4) the avoidance of unnecessary
problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign
law; and (5) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an
unrelated forum with jury duty.

Id. (quotation omitted).

With that framing in mind, we turn to Miller’s arguments.

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I

Miller contends that the district court misapplied the forum-non-conveniens test and

therefore abused its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss. She argues that the district

court did not apply the presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum and

improperly considered forum shopping as a factor in its analysis. In support of these

arguments, she points to the district court’s conclusion stating, “This Court agrees that

[Miller] should not be given deference and have the case continue here in Minnesota

because Ohio’s statute imposes a damages cap on non-economic damages. . . . This

contradicts with the public interest against forum shopping.”

We are not persuaded that the language Miller identifies in the district court’s order

establishes an abuse of discretion. “[W]hen characterizing the record, ‘we honor substance

over form’ and ‘magic words’ are not required for an appellate court to conclude that a

district court made a legally appropriate determination, when that determination can be

inferred from the district court’s actions.” In re Peer Rev. Action, 749 N.W.2d 822, 829

(Minn. App. 2008) (in parenthetical) (quoting Buller v. Minn. Lawyers Mut., 648 N.W.2d

704, 708 (Minn. App. 2002)), rev. dismissed (Minn. Aug. 21, 2008). Even though the

district court did not begin its analysis with a statement regarding the presumption in favor

of plaintiff’s choice of forum, the district court applied the law correctly and determined

after weighing the relevant factors that TEP met its burden to rebut the presumption.

In its order, the district court laid out the two-part test from Paulownia and then

applied it. At the first step, which is not at issue on appeal, the district court concluded that

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Ohio is an available and adequate forum. At the second step, the district court found that

the private-interest factors favor dismissal because “all the ‘sources of proof,’” including

witnesses, “are in Ohio”; “it [would] be both costly and difficult [for] these witnesses to

require them to pay to travel from Ohio to Minnesota for trial or for depositions,” and also

difficult to procure the testimony of Stetzer, who is incarcerated; and “the premises is in

Columbus, Ohio, and cost and expense would be reduced if the case is tried in Ohio.”

The district court found that four of the public-interest factors weigh in favor of

dismissal because:

1) Ohio has a local interest in having this controversy decided
in Ohio because the State of Ohio licenses and regulates all
residential facilities; 2) Ohio law should apply in this case
because a party should not benefit from forum shopping;
3) due to the allegations in Ohio, as well as witnesses, [Miller]
and [Stetzer], there is local interest to maintain the case in
Ohio; 4) where all witnesses reside in Ohio, all allegations
occurred in Ohio, and Ohio law applies to this case, Minnesota
jurors should not be burdened with hearing this Ohio case.

The district court found that the court-congestion factor is neutral because “whether the

case is filed in Ramsey County, Hennepin County, or a district in Ohio, there will be

congestion.”

Only then, after determining that all but one factor weighed in favor of dismissal,

the district court stated that Miller “should not be given deference.” We understand that to

mean that the district court determined that the presumption in favor of Miller’s choice of

forum was rebutted. We discern no error in that analysis.

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With respect to the district court’s discussion of forum shopping, Miller

acknowledges that forum shopping is disfavored under Minnesota law but argues that the

district court erred in considering it as part of the forum-non-conveniens analysis. The

district court referenced forum shopping twice in its order. First, when it considered the

conflict-of-laws public-interest factor, the district court found that “Ohio law should

apply . . . because a party should not benefit from forum shopping.” Second, when

weighing the factors in its concluding paragraph, the district court commented that forum

shopping is discouraged.

We are not persuaded that either reference constitutes an abuse of discretion. Miller

has not identified caselaw supporting the position that consideration of forum shopping is

inappropriate in a forum-non-conveniens analysis and we are aware of none. To the

contrary, the public interest factors require the district court to consider conflict-of-laws

issues, and forum shopping is a factor a district court may consider in a conflict-of-laws

inquiry. See Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Minn. 1978) (considering

forum shopping in the context of a conflict-of-laws analysis), aff’d, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).

The district court’s statement that forum shopping is discouraged is an accurate description

of Minnesota law. See Reed v. Univ. of N. Dakota, 543 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn. App.

1996), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 1996) (“Forum shopping is not encouraged in

Minnesota because it frustrates the maintenance of interstate order.”).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s legal analysis.

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II

Miller also argues that the district court made clearly erroneous findings of fact that

minimize the case’s connection to Minnesota. Miller challenges the district court’s findings

that “[a]ll the allegations” and “all potential witnesses” are Ohio-based, and that “[t]here is

no connection to Minnesota, but for the fact that [TEP] is a Minnesota corporation.” She

maintains that these findings are clearly erroneous because the complaint alleges

“corporate-level acts and omissions by [TEP], a Minnesota professional corporation with

its principal place of business and executive offices in St. Paul, Minnesota,” and because

there may be witnesses located in Minnesota.

Findings of fact “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Minn. R. Civ. P.

52.01. “[F]indings are clearly erroneous when they are manifestly contrary to the weight

of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ.

Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “In

applying the clear-error standard, [appellate courts] view the evidence in a light favorable

to the findings.” Id. “We will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the

entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” Id. (quotations omitted).

Based on our review of the record as a whole, including the complaint and the

additional materials that Miller provided, we conclude that the district court’s findings are

not clearly erroneous. We address each statement that Miller challenges in turn.

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The record supports the district court’s finding that “all the allegations” occurred in

Ohio. The complaint focuses on the alleged abuse that occurred at the Ohio facility and,

although it mentions TEP policies that were in place at the Ohio facility and a general duty

to supervise employees, it does not allege any acts that took place in Minnesota that

contributed to the abuse. Therefore, the district court’s finding that “all” of the allegations

occurred in Ohio is not clearly erroneous.

The record also supports the district court’s finding that “all potential witnesses” are

in Ohio. The complaint names several categories of potential witnesses including

“physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, dieticians, nurses, eating-disorders technicians,

and behavioral health technicians,” and other patients, all based at the facility in Ohio. It

does not identify any corporate decision-makers who may be called as witnesses. Miller

argues on appeal that she did not include those individuals in the complaint because she

did not know the identity or location of relevant corporate decision-makers. This argument

is unavailing because other than Stetzer, Miller did not specifically identify other witnesses

that she intended to call—she named only categories of witnesses (i.e., “physicians,”

“patients”). She could have done the same regarding corporate-level witnesses, but she did

not. Moreover, even if there were corporate-level witnesses with relevant information

regarding corporate level policies, such that “all potential witnesses” was an overstatement,

we conclude that the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous because all of the fact

witnesses are located in Ohio and the events took place in Ohio.

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Finally, because the record does not include allegations or evidence about corporate-

level conduct in Minnesota aside from the fact of TEP’s incorporation, the district court’s

characterization of the case as having “no connection to Minnesota, but for the fact that

[TEP] is a Minnesota corporation incorporated in Minnesota” is supported by the record

and is not clearly erroneous.

III

As a final matter, Miller argues that the district court abused its discretion when it

implicitly denied her request for forum-non-conveniens discovery. We disagree.

“A [district court] has wide discretion to issue discovery orders and, absent clear

abuse of that discretion, normally its order with respect thereto will not be disturbed.”

Underdahl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety (In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety), 735 N.W.2d 706, 711

(Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). In granting the motion to dismiss for forum non

conveniens, we assume the district court reviewed the record and arguments and

determined that additional discovery would not assist its determination. See Behm v. John

Nuveen & Co., 555 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn. App. 1996) (holding the district court did not

abuse its discretion in implicitly denying a motion to supplement the record on a motion to

dismiss for personal jurisdiction after assuming the district court examined the filed

materials). In our review of the record, we are not persuaded that additional discovery

would have changed the district court’s analysis or its conclusion that this case should be

heard in Ohio.

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Miller asserts that, if allowed to conduct discovery, she may have uncovered “the

location of relevant corporate decision-makers,” information about “where hiring, training,

and supervisory policies were formulated and implemented,” and “the location of

electronically stored information or other relevant records.” But even if such evidence were

in Minnesota, Miller does not explain how that information would have affected the district

court’s consideration of the private and public factors. The district court emphasized that

it would be difficult and costly to require the fact witnesses in Ohio to travel to Minnesota

for depositions and trial. The district court did not suggest any concern that requiring

corporate witnesses to travel to Ohio would pose similar challenges, and the rationale for

this implicit distinction between the two classes of potential witnesses is readily apparent.

The district court also found that Ohio has a local interest in the case that is not present in

Minnesota. We are not convinced that the proposed discovery requests would alter that key

aspect of the district court’s forum-non-conveniens analysis.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Miller’s request for forum-

non-conveniens discovery.

Affirmed.

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