State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0241

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

James Riley Vernon Porter,
Respondent.

Filed August 3, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-24-1087

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Angella M. Erickson, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for appellant)

Andrew C. Wilson, Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross , Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this sentencing appeal, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion
by granting respondent a downward durational departure from the presumptive guidelines
sentence for several offenses to which respondent pleaded guilty. We reverse and remand
2
for imposition of a sentence within the presumptive sentencing range under the guidelines
for offenses four through nine because the record does not support that respondent’s
conduct was less serious than the typical offense.
FACTS
In November 2024, appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent James Riley
Vernon Porter with four counts of disseminating a pornographic work involving a minor
under the age of 14 in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 617.247, subdivision 3(b)(3)
(2022), and five counts of possessing a pornographic work involving a minor under the age
of 14 in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 617.247, subdivision 4(b)(3) (2022).
1
According to the statement of probable cause, the Chaska Police Department received a
Cyber Tipline report from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children that
Porter was sending videos and images of suspected child- sexual-abuse material via an
online messaging account. Each of the videos or images depicted a different child victim.
During a warranted search of Porter’s home, police found images and videos of child-
sexual-abuse material and evidence that Porter was trading and manufacturing these
materials. The complaint alleged that the offenses of possession and dissemination were
committed between 2023 and 2024.

1 In 2025, the legislature amended the statute and changed “pornographic work” to “child
sexual abuse material.” Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 2, 4 (Supp. 2025).
3
Pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, Porter agreed to enter a straight plea 2 to
all counts. The agreement indicated that Porter would argue for a departure at sentencing.
During the plea hearing, Porter pleaded guilty and provided a factual basis for each of the
nine counts alleged in the complaint. Porter admitted that he received and disseminated
images or videos of child-sexual-abuse material on four occasions in 2023 and 2024, as
reflected in counts one, four, five, and six of the complaint. And he further admitted that
he possessed child-sexual-abuse material on five occasions in 2024, as reflected in counts
two, three, seven, eight, and nine. Porter admitted that each image or video involved a
different child victim, and that the material was classified as sexual conduct or sexual abuse
involving minors under the age of 14. The district court found that Porter provided an
adequate factual basis for each of the nine counts, accepted his plea, and adjudicated him
guilty of each offense. The district court also ordered probation to prepare a presentence
investigation report (PSI).
Prior to sentencing, Porter moved for a downward dispositional departure or, in the
alternative, a downward durational departure. Porter sought a downward dispositional
departure to a probationary sentence, arguing he was particularly amenable to probation
and treatment. Alternatively, Porter moved for a downward durational departure on the
ground that his conduct was less serious than the typical offense and based on his remorse.

2 “A ‘straight plea’ is a guilty plea to the offense as charged with no agreement with the
state regarding sentencing.” Mason v. State, 16 N.W.3d 828, 831 n.2 (Minn. App. 2025),
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 23, 2025).
4
Probation completed the PSI and filed it with the district court prior to sentencing.3
The PSI outlined the presumptive guidelines sentence for each offense. Probation
recommended that the district court impose the presumptive sentence for each of the nine
counts under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court denied Porter’s motion for a downward
dispositional departure and granted in part his motion for a downward durational departure.
The district court imposed the presumptive prison sentence under the sentencing guidelines
for the first three counts, calculating Porter’s criminal-history score for each sentence using
the Hernandizing method.4 But the district court granted Porter’s request for a downward
durational departure from the presumptive sentence on counts four through nine as follows:
Count four (dissemination): 90-month commitment (presumptive 153 months)
Count five (dissemination): 90-month commitment (presumptive 180 months)

3 Some documents in the record are not accessible to the public. See Minn. R. Pub. Access
to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4, subd. 1(f)(1). But “[w]e are not precluded ‘from mentioning the
contents’ of confidential or sealed documents when the information is ‘relevant to the
particular issues or legal argument being addressed in the proceeding.’” Cook v. Trimble,
22 N.W.3d 196, 201 n.1 (Minn. App. 2025) (quoting Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud.
Branch 4, subd. 4), rev. granted (Minn. Aug. 12, 2025). We also are not “constrained from
disclosing information contained in the publicly filed briefs.” Id. Any reference to
confidential documents herein is based on the parties’ publicly filed briefs, other public
records, or is relevant to our determination of the issues on appeal.

4 The district court Hernandized the sentences for Porter’s first three offenses, increasing
his criminal- history score upon the imposition of each subsequent sentence. See
State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478, 479 (Minn. 1981). Under this method, district courts
use each of the defendant’s convictions, provided that the convictions are not part of the
same behavioral incident, to incorporate an offender’s criminal-history score for multiple
felony convictions sentenced on the same day. See id.; see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.B.1.e (2022).
5
Count six (dissemination): 90-month commitment (presumptive 180 months)
Count seven (possession): 90-month commitment (presumptive 120 months)
Count eight (possession): 90-month commitment (presumptive 120 months)
Count nine (possession): 90-month commitment (presumptive 120 months)

The district court explained that it durationally departed downward on counts four
through nine
because of the cumulative effects of the multiple counts and
the Hernandizing, as it’s called, of those counts, each sentence
increases the criminal history score here. If this court were to
blindly follow the guidelines, by the ninth count, the
cumulative criminal history score of the guidelines would
require a sentence of 15 years. The court believes that sentence
unduly exaggerates the offenses and unduly exaggerates the
criminality of those offenses before the court, making
subsequent counts unduly onerous.

The district court further ruled that all nine sentences were to run concurrently.
The state appeals.
DECISION
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive
guidelines sentence for an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 588
(Minn. 2003). The district court abuses its discretion when the “reasons for departure are
improper or inadequate.” State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2009) (quotation
omitted). “If the reasons given are improper or inadequate and there is insufficient
evidence of record to justify the departure, the departure will be reversed.” State v. Geller,
665 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).
6
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (202 2). A presumptive sentence is considered
“appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and offense severity
characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (202 2). The sentencing guidelines
prescribe “a sentence or range of sentences that is presumed to be appropriate.”
State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). The district court
“must pronounce a sentence within the applicable range unless there exist identifiable,
substantial, and compelling circumstances” distinguishing the case and overcoming the
presumption in favor of the guidelines sentence. Id. (quotation omitted); see also
State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016) (noting that the “guidelines seek to
maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing of felony
crimes” (quotation omitted omitted)). If a district court departs from the sentencing
guidelines, it must state its reasons for doing so in writing or on the record. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.1.c (2022).
A downward durational departure is a sentence that is shorter in length than the
presumptive sentence. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. “Durational departures may be
justified by offense-related reasons only.” State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 533
(Minn. 2017). “[T]o support a downward durational departure, the reason [given by the
district court] must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was significantly less serious
than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.” Id. at 535
(emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
7
We review de novo whether the district court’s stated reason for departure is proper.
Dillon v. State, 781 N.W.2d 588, 595 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20,
2010). Additionally, “[t]he interpretation of a statute and the sentencing guidelines are
questions of law that we review de novo.” State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 520
(Minn. 2009) (concluding that the standard of review as to whether the district court
properly calculated the defendant’s criminal- history score under Hernandez is de novo).
Generally, the remedy for an unsupported durational departure is to remand for
resentencing within the presumptive range. Geller, 665 N.W.2d at 517.
Here, the state argues that the district court abused its discretion by departing
downward durationally on counts four through nine because the district court made no
findings that the conduct involved in those offenses was significantly less serious than that
typically involved in the commission of the offenses at issue—possession and
dissemination of child- sexual-abuse material. In response, Porter argues that the district
court’s factual findings are adequate to support its departure decision. We agree with the
state.
Without findings that a defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that
typically involved in the commission of the offense, there are no substantial and compelling
circumstances to support a downward durational departure. See Rund, 896 N.W.2d at 533,
535. Here, the record reflects that the district court failed to make the required findings.
In granting a downward durational departure for counts four through nine, the district court
did not identify any circumstances that made Porter’s conduct underlying the charges of
8
possession and dissemination of child-sexual-abuse material in counts four through nine
less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offenses.
Instead of considering the conduct underlying each of these offenses , the district
court considered the impact of Hernandizing the sentences. The Hernandizing method is
a process by which “a district court sentencing a defendant on the same day for multiple
convictions based on multiple offenses that were not part of a single behavioral incident or
course of conduct can increase the defendant’s criminal-history score incrementally as each
successive sentence is imposed.” State v. Longo, 909 N.W.2d 599, 611 (Minn. App. 2018)
(citing Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d at 481); see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.10, 2.B.1.e
(2022). Under this process, the district court calculates the criminal-history score by
accounting for the previous conviction when sentencing on subsequent convictions. Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.10, 2.B.1.e.
The district court explained that it departed downward durationally from the
sentencing guidelines for counts four through nine “based on what the court consider[ed]
to be the onerous and unfair exaggeration of the criminality of the sentence [for counts four
through nine], if the guidelines were to be strictly adhered to.” The district court noted
that the effect of Hernandizing consistent with the guidelines would increase the
criminal-history score for counts four through nine. The district court explained that if it
“were to blindly follow the guidelines, by the ninth count, the cumulative criminal history
score of the guidelines would require a sentence of 15 years.” The district court
emphasized that it did not intend to minimize “the seriousness of the underlying offenses,
but rather [it] believe[d] justice [was] properly served by th[e] departure.” In other words,
9
according to the district court, “to impose the sentence as set forth by the guidelines would
exaggerate the criminality of those subsequent offenses.” The district court gave no further
reasoning for its departure, nor did it disclose the reasons for the departure in writing. 5
Porter cites to no authority—nor are we aware of any —that permits a district court
to grant a downward durational departure solely based on the district court’s disagreement
with the impact of Hernandizing in a particular case or the district court’s disagreement
with the sentencing guidelines. Rather, the sentencing guidelines provide: “Multiple
offenses sentenced at the same time before the same court must be sentenced in the order
in which they occurred.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1.e. And the district court was
required under the sentencing guidelines and Hernandez to increase Porter’s
criminal-history score before sentencing the next offense. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.10;
Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d at 479. Consequently, because the district court’s disagreement
with the impact of Hernandizing on Porter does not support a downward durational
departure and the district court did not make any findings that Porter’s conduct for offenses
four through nine was significantly less serious than that typically involved in the
commission of the offenses, we conclude the district court abused its discretion by
durationally departing downward on counts four through nine.

5 A district court’s reasons for departure must be stated in the sentencing order or set forth
in a departure report and filed with the Minnesota Sentencing Commission. See Minn.
Stat. § 244.10, subd. 2 (2022) (requiring the district court to provide “written findings of
fact as to the reasons for departure”); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(C); Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.c.
10
In urging us to affirm, Porter argues that the district court implicitly found that his
conduct was “significantly less serious than typical [conduct] in possession [and
dissemination] cases” because the district court stated that Hernandizing and imposing the
presumptive sentences for counts four through nine would artificially make the offenses
“more onerous.” And he notes that the district court discussed at sentencing that crimes
involving child-sexual -abuse material are “serious and heinous,” which shows that the
district court carefully reviewed the entire record before departing. 6 These arguments are
unpersuasive.
The district court stated that imposing the guidelines sentence would “unduly
exaggerate[] the offenses and unduly exaggerate[] the criminality of those offenses” under
Hernandez. But the district court did not make any findings that imposing sentences within
the guidelines range would unfairly exaggerate Porter’s conduct or that his conduct was
significantly less serious than the typical offense. As noted, a downward durational
departure from the guidelines must be based on a finding that the defendant’s conduct was
significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in
question. See Rund, 896 N.W.2d at 535. And it is undisputed that the district court made
no such findings regarding the conduct underlying counts four through nine. Without such
findings, the district court has not articulated a substantial and compelling reason to depart.
See id.

6 Porter also relies on nonprecedential caselaw that does not control our analysis. See Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 136.01(c) (noting that nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority).
11
Further, we discern no circumstances in the record to distinguish this case from the
typical case involving the possession and dissemination of child-sexual-abuse material. If
“the district court gives improper or inadequate reasons for a downward departure, [an
appellate court] may independently examine the record to determine whether alternative
grounds support the departure.” Id. at 532- 33. Based on our independent review, we
conclude that Porter’s conduct underlying counts four through nine was not significantly
less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offenses. At the plea
hearing, on counts four through nine, Porter admitted that he disseminated pornographic
works of young children with adults touching or penetrating the children’s bodies. And,
on counts four through nine, Porter admitted that he possessed images or videos of young
children with adults penetrating the children’s bodies. Nothing about this conduct indicates
that Porter’s conduct was less serious than typical for these offenses. Therefore , based
upon our independent examination of the record, we conclude that there is no basis on
which to affirm the district court’s downward durational departure from the sentencing
guidelines.
In sum, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by granting a
downward durational departure on counts four through nine because it did not find that
Porter’s conduct was significantly less serious than that typically involved in the
commission of the crimes in question. And, based on our independent review, we discern
that the record does not support the downward durational departures. We therefore reverse
12
Porter’s sentences for counts four through nine and remand for imposition of a sentence
within the presumptive sentencing range under the guidelines for each of these counts.
Reversed and remanded.