In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: L. J. W. and G. M., Parents

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0256

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of:
L. J. W. and G. M., Parents.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Carver County District Court
File Nos. 10-JV-25-177, 10-JV-25-242

L.J.W., Howard Lake, Minnesota (self-represented appellant mother)

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Jennifer L. Christensen, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent Carver County Health and Human Services)

G.R.M., Bell City, Missouri (self-represented respondent father)

Peggy Reimers, Rosemount, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
The district court ordered the involuntary termination of LJW’s parental rights to
her seven-year-old son after a termination trial that LJW failed to attend and at which the
district court received evidence that she consistently exposed the child to amphetamine s
and methamphetamine, failed to visit him during more than a year of out -of-home
placement, actively tried to prevent him from obtaining necessary medical care, and failed
to engage with child -protection workers to develop a case plan to correct her parenting

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deficiencies. We reject as unconvincing LJW’s arguments challenging the termination, and
we affirm.
FACTS
Carver County Health and Human Services social workers responded to a child -
maltreatment report in July 2025 concerning LJW and her seven-year-old son. LJW had
reportedly lost track of the child at a methadone clinic while her boyfriend rambled
incoherently. The county petitioned the district court to deem the child in need of protection
or services (CHIPS) and asked the court ex parte to order the child’s out-of-home
placement. The district court granted the placement request and scheduled an emergency-
protective-care hearing.
LJW failed to appear at the emergency hearing, and the district court scheduled a
hearing on the county’s CHIPS petition. LJW denied the maltreatment allegations in the
CHIPS petition, but she failed to appear for the CHIPS hearing. The district court there
received the county’s documentary and testimonial evidence about the child’s condition,
LJW’s chronic drug use and her refusal to participate in drug screening , and the unsafe
condition of her home. It learned that drug particulate emanated “through the vents in
[LJW’s] apartment building” and that a hair- follicle test of the child confirmed his
substantial exposure to amphetamines and methamphetamine. After a hearing where the
district court allowed LJW to explain her absence, the district court granted the county’s
CHIPS petition , highlighting the child’s exposure to drugs, unresolved health issues,
educational delays, and general neglect. It ordered LJW to cooperate with the county’s case
plan and notified her that she could apply for court-appointed legal counsel.

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The county petitioned to terminate LJW’s parental rights soon after the CHIPS
adjudication, citing five statutory grounds in support. It alleged that LJW had abandoned
the child, neglected him, demonstrated her palpable unfitness to parent, failed to correct
the conditions leading to his out-of-home placement, and neglected him while he was in
foster care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1)-(4), (7) (2024). LJW applied for, and
the district court granted her, a court-appointed attorney to oppose the termination petition.
LJW failed to appear at the scheduled termination trial, purportedly because of
transportation difficulties. The county had provided her a $100 gift card for transportation
costs, but she said that the amount was insufficient . Her attorney stated that LJW
maintained that the county’s maltreatment report contained hearsay and that, therefore, no
evidence proved that she continued to abuse drugs. The attorney reported that “[LJW’s]
wishes are very clear, that she does not want to engage in any settlement discussion ” or
“any case planning or services or reasonable efforts.”
The trial proceeded in LJW’s absence, and the district court received without
objection the county’s documentary and testimonial evidence supporting the termination
petition. The district court learned about the child’s consistent exposure to drugs. It heard
about LJW’s refusal to release medical information about the child’s heart condition
because she believed that a medical emergency would allow her to “get her child back
faster” and to “sue the County.” It heard about the child’s need for significant dental work
and about his pain when eating. It learned that he had not been attending school before his
out-of-home placement and that he had been in foster care for almost 580 days. A case
worker told the court that LJW refused to schedule any case-plan meetings with the county

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and scheduled only one visit with her son but did not attend the visit . And witnesses
testified that LJW refused to accept county services for treatment, to establish a child-safety
plan, or to comply with her own case plan toward reunifying with the child.
The district court ordered the termination of LJW’s parental rights. She appeals.
DECISION
LJW advances two challenges on appeal. She argues that the district court
improperly relied on hearsay to grant the county’s CHIPS petition and that the record does
not support the district court’s determination that she is palpably unfit to parent. The
arguments fail.
LJW unpersuasively contends that the county’s maltreatment report that the district
court received into evidence and relied on contained hearsay that should not have supported
the CHIPS determination. She refers here to statements of methadone-clinic staff, which
led to the county’s investigation, which led to the county’s CHIPS petition, which led to
the CHIPS adjudication and, ultimately, to the termination trial and the termination itself.
The argument is groundless for many reasons. We offer two. First, it is untimely. A parent
may appeal from the district court’s final order that affects her substantial rights relating to
her child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 23.02, subd. 1. But she must notice her appeal within 20
days. Id., subd. 2; see also In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d 346, 360 (Minn.
App. 2024) (refusing to consider a father’s collateral challenge to a CHIPS petition through
a termination-of-parental-rights appeal). The district court adjudicated the CHIPS petition
on August 28, 2025, transferring the child’s physical and legal custody to the county for
foster-care placement and substantially affecting LJW’s parental rights. But LJW did not

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appeal the adjudication within 20 days of the order’s entry. And second, even if it were
timely, the argument lacks apparent facial merit. The district court may admit reliable
hearsay at an emergency-protective-care hearing. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 42.06. And the
reliability of the maltreatment was established by contemporary evidence of LJW ’s
treatment of the child. The hearsay challenge is unavailing.
LJW also unconvincingly argues that we should reverse because the evidence does
not support the district court’s determination that she is palpably unfit to parent. This
argument is particularly unconvincing because we may affirm the district court termination
decision on any of the statutory grounds it relied on, In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) , and palpable unfitness is only one of the four grounds
underlying the district court’s termination order. Because the district court based the
termination not only on LJW ’s palpable unfitness but also on her having “substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship” (Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2)),
“failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement” (Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4)), and “[neglected] the child . . . in foster care” (Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(7)), we would not reverse the termination decision even if we agreed that it
erroneously concluded that she is palpably unfit to parent.
We add that LJW ’s argument challenging the palpable -unfitness determination
lacks substantive force. She specifically contends that the district court found her palpably
unfit to parent based “solely” on her history of substance use rather than on any recent drug
screening that might demonstrate a pattern of conduct rendering her unable to care for the

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child. Palpable unfitness is demonstrated by a “consistent pattern of specific conduct before
the child” or “specific conditions” directly bearing on the parent-child relationship. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(3). It is true that proof of substance use by itself is insufficient
to establish palpable unfitness, as an agency seeking termination must also prove that the
pattern of substance use, including use at the time of the termination hearing, affects her
parenting behavior. In re Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 662– 63 (Minn. 2008). But the
record includes ample evidence that LJW has been using drugs affecting the child since at
least 2023, when the child’s hair follicles first tested positive for methamphetamine and
fentanyl exposure. And h e tested positive for methamphetamine again at the initiation of
the CHIPS case in July 2025. The record also shows the causal effect of LJW’s substance
use on the child’s well-being, including his lack of dental care, infrequent checkups on his
heart condition, and sketchy school attendance. LJW’s ongoing refusal to submit to drug
testing during the county’s pretermination involvement also undermines her contention that
the county failed to prove that she was using drugs at the time of the termination trial. Her
absence from the critical hearings in this case prevented the district court from hearing
directly from her and observing her in person as it regards her implication on appeal about
her sobriety. The district court did not erroneously rely on evidence of her past substance
use to prove a present pattern of use or its destructive impact on the child.
LJW tepidly argues too that the county did not extend reasonable efforts to reunify
her with the child. A statutory-termination ground must be accompanied by a finding that
the county engaged in reasonable efforts to reunite the parent with her child. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h) (2024). These reasonable efforts include, among others, that the county’s

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services to the child and family are “available and accessible.” Id. (h)(6). The record defeats
LJW’s challenge. The county social workers testified that they provided LJW with home
visits, weekly emails for case -plan meetings, and encouragement for face -to-face visits
with the child. LJW accepted none of these offers. They also testified that LJW refused to
accept county services for substance-use or mental-health treatment, to establish a child-
safety plan, and to comply with her own case plan for reunification. She also failed to
appear at the most critical court hearings and expressed her clear intent to avoid “any
settlement discussion ” and “ any case planning or services or reasonable efforts ” for
reunification. We have no difficulty concluding that the county extended, and LJW simply
declined, reasonable efforts toward parent-child reunification.
Affirmed.