State of Minnesota v. James Robert Conway

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0311

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Robert Conway,
Appellant.

Filed September 21, 2026
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Olmstead County District Court
File Nos. 55-CR-19-8515, 55-CR-21-7156

Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael T. Walters, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant James Robert Conway appeals from the district court’s order revoking
probation on two underlying convictions for fifth-degree assault and felony domestic
assault. We affirm.

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FACTS
In 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged Conway with one count of fifth-
degree assault, and a jury found him guilty of the offense following trial. The district court
stayed imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for five years.
In 2021, the state charged Conway with one count of felony domestic assault, and a
jury found him guilty of the offense following trial. The district court sentenced Conway
to 24 months in prison, stayed execution of the sentence, and placed him on probation for
five years. Because of this conviction, the county filed a probation-violation report in
Conway’s 2020 case. After Conway admitted to the violation, the district court vacated
the stay of imposition, imposed a sentence of 21 months in prison, stayed execution of the
sentence, and continued Conway’s probation under the same terms.
In October 2025, the county filed a probation-violation report in Conway’s 2020
and 2021 cases, alleging that Conway: (1) engaged in assaultive behavior; (2) failed to
remain law abiding; and (3) possessed a firearm. These violations were based on two new
complaints: one alleging charges of malicious punishment of a child and fifth-degree
assault; and the other alleging charges of firearm/ammunition possession, second -degree
assault, fifth-degree assault, and damage to property.
In November 2025, Conway pleaded guilty to the charges of fifth-degree assault
(gross misdemeanor) and second-degree assault (felony).
At Conway’s request, the district court held a contested probation revocation
hearing. At the hearing, Conway testified about the incidents from the two 2025
complaints. Based on his testimony, the district court determined that Conway violated

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the terms of his probation by hitting his daughter with a stick. The district court took
judicial notice of the guilty pleas and found that Conway failed to remain law abiding. The
district court found that Conway had a “very assaultive history,” yet “received two
downward departures for very violent behavior.” The court detailed the first and second
assault-related offenses, then found that Conway’s assaultive behavior escalated towards
his daughter when he hit her with a stick in front of others. The district court noted that
Conway had completed “significant programming” in April 2025, before he assaulted his
daughter in September 2025. The court found that confinement of Conway was necessary
to protect the public and not revoking his probation would “unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violation . . . because [Conway was] on a downward [dispositional]
departure” when the new assaultive behavior occurred. The district court revoked
Conway’s probation in his 2020 case and his 2021 case and executed the sentences.
Conway appeals.
DECISION
Conway argues the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. A
district court has “broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke
probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.”
State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980).
To revoke probation, a district court must “1) designate the specific condition or
conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and
3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Id. at 250.
Conway challenges only the district court’s analysis of the third Austin factor.

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When applying the third Austin factor, a district court must consider whether
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further
criminal activity by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need
of correctional treatment which can most effectively be
provided if he is confined; or (iii) it would unduly depreciate
the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.

State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 606-07 (Minn. 2005). “Only one Modtland subfactor
is necessary to support revocation.” State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn.
App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Sep. 27, 2023).
District courts cannot simply recite the three subfactors and offer “general,
non-specific reasons for revocation.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608. Rather, district courts
must “create thorough, fact-specific records” and “seek to convey their substantive reasons
for revocation and the evidence relied upon.” Id. This process ensures that district courts
“balance the probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his
rehabilitation and the public safety.” Id. at 607 (quotation omitted). We review de novo
whether the district court made the required Austin findings. Id. at 605.
Here, when assessing the third Austin factor, the district court determined that two
of the Modtland subfactors were satisfied: that confinement was necessary to protect the
public from further criminal activity, and that it would unduly depreciate the seriousness
of the violation if Conway’s probations were not revoked. The district court reasoned that
Conway was on probation when he received the second departure for assaultive behavior,
that Conway was provided with significant programming which ended in April 2025, and
then he engaged in new assaultive behavior towards his daughter in September 2025. The
district court also determined that revocation was necessary because of Conway’s “very

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assaultive history”; the fact that he received two prior downward dispositional departures;
his prior assaultive history resulted in head injuries to two separate individuals; and that
his assaultive behavior escalated towards his daughter.
Conway argues that the district court’s findings are perfunctory and that the court
failed to consider his positive performance on probation, completion of programming, and
employment. Conway also argues that the district court failed to address the second
Modtland subfactor and revoked probation without explaining why treatment or other
programming was not possible if probation was not revoked. We are not persuaded.
The district court needed to find that one Modtland subfactor was satisfied in order
to revoke Conway’s probation. Smith, 994 N.W.2d at 320. This requirement was satisfied
because the district court relied on the first and third Modtland subfactors in its
probation-revocation decision. The district court did recognize Conway’s successful
completion of programming in April 2025, but also found that Conway’s assaultive
behavior “escalated” towards his daughter a few months after he completed programming.
Accordingly, the district court appropriately addressed the Modtland subfactors.
In addition, the district court found that the third Austin factor favored revocation
because the record demonstrated Conway’s violence was escalating despite prior
downward dispositional departures and the opportunity for rehabilitation. The district
court detailed the escalating assaultive behaviors in the three assault incidents. The district
court’s decision to revoke Conway’s probation is well-supported by the record and does
not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.