County of Hennepin v. Jill Kline Rochford, Ross Edgar Trooien

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0321

County of Hennepin,
Respondent,

vs.
Jill Kline Rochford,
Appellant,

Ross Edgar Trooien,
Respondent.

Filed September 28, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-FA-21-727

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Charles S. Weber, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Jill Kline Rochford, Hopkins, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Ross Edgar Trooien, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
This is an appeal from a child-support magistrate’s order granting in part and
denying in part appellant-mother’s motion s for review and to correct alleged clerical

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mistakes in an earlier order by the magistrate. Mother argues that the magistrate: (1) abused
her discretion in declining to modify child support retroactively to account for a lump-sum
disability payment that respondent-father received; (2) erred by relying on “unverified”
record evidence and by inadequately considering the relevant statutory factors in
determining that father’s income had substantially changed; (3) abused her discretion in
adopting an arrears determination based on inconsistent and incomplete financial
information; and (4) erred by precluding mother from submitting new information. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jill Kline Rochford (mother) and respondent Ross Edgar Trooien (father)
share one minor child. In September 2022, the district court ordered that father pay
temporary child support. The district court modified this obligation in November 2024 (the
November 2024 order).
In May 2025, the district court awarded mother sole physical custody of the child,
granted parenting time to father, and ordered father to pay child support. At the time, father
was unemployed but had a potential gross-monthly income of $10,500 based on his prior
employment. In June, father filed a notice of motion and motion to modify child support,
seeking to lower his obligation. Mother filed a responsive motion three days before a
hearing on father’s modification motion, which was scheduled before a child-support
magistrate in early September. The magistrate determined that mother’s responsive motion
was not timely under Minnesota General Rule of Practice 372.04, subdivision 2, because
mother did not file it at least seven days before the September hearing.

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At the September hearing, the child-support magistrate heard testimony from father
and mother. Father testified about a change to his employment and salary. He explained
that he had transitioned from a full-time salaried position that he had held for six months
to contracting with counties, from which he received a flat fee of $4,500 per contract as
income for his work. Father also reported that he had received a $37,000 lump-sum
disability payment in May 2025, which related to lost wages he had incurred in 2024.
Without objection from the parties, the magistrate questioned the child-support specialist—
who was not under oath—about the arrears father owed. The child-support spec ialist
responded that father owed arrears to mother of $6,804.01.
The magistrate extended the close of the record until September 12 so that the parties
could provide verification of their incomes since June. Father timely filed several
documents, including items showing that he performed contract work for a flat fee of
$4,500 per contract and that he had entered into three such contracts since the end of May.
In mid-September, the child-support magistrate filed an order modifying father’s child-
support obligation (the September 2025 order). The September 2025 order reflects the
amounts that the child- support specialist provided the magistrate about the arrears father
owed to mother. Mother later filed motions for review and to correct alleged clerical
mistakes in the September 2025 order. In December, the magistrate filed an order granting
mother’s request to amend two paragraphs and denying mother’s remaining requests,
including her request that she be allowed to submit new information or be granted an
additional hearing.
Mother appeals.

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DECISION
In challenging the child-support magistrate’s decision to deny her motions for
review and to correct alleged clerical mistakes in the September 2025 order, mother
contends that the magistrate: (1) abused her discretion in declining to modify child support
retroactively to account for the lump-sum disability payment that father received; (2) erred
by relying on “unverified” record evidence and by inadequately considering the relevant
statutory factors in determining that father’s income had substantially changed; (3) abused
her discretion in adopting an arrears determination based on inconsistent and incomplete
financial information; and (4) erred by precluding mother from submitting new
information. As explained below, we conclude that mother’s contentions do not present a
basis for reversal.1
“Appellate courts review a district court’s child-support- modification decision for
[an] abuse of discretion.” Grogg v. Rech, 968 N.W.2d 45, 53 (Minn. App. 2021) (citing
Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013)). And we review determinations of
past child support for an abuse of discretion. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 166
(Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000). On appeal from a child-support
magistrate’s order that has not been reviewed by a district court, appellate courts use the
same abuse-of-discretion standard to review issues as they apply when such an order is
issued by the district court. Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 348 (Minn. 2002) (stating that
the supreme court had “never addressed” the question of the appropriate standard of review

1 Father and the county did not file appellate briefs. Consistent with Minnesota Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure 142.03, we determine this case on the merits.

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for a magistrate’s decision that had not been reviewed by a district court but nonetheless
applying the abuse-of- discretion standard and observing that “the court of appeals [had]
applied the abuse of discretion standard and [that] the parties [had] agree[d] that it [was]
the appropriate standard of review”). A magistrate “abuses [their] discretion by making
findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a
decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d
502, 506 (Minn. 2022); accord Grogg, 968 N.W.2d at 53.
“Statutory construction is a matter of law, which this court reviews de novo.”
Branch v. Branch, 632 N.W.2d 261, 263 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing Brookfield Trade Ctr.,
Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 1998)). “A court’s determination
of income must be based in fact and will stand unless clearly erroneous.” Newstrand v.
Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
Dec. 15, 2015). And similar decisions, such as “whether a parent is voluntarily
unemployed[,] . . . [are likewise] finding[s] of fact, which appellate courts review for clear
error.” Id. (quotation omitted).
A child-support magistrate’s factual “findings are clearly erroneous when they are
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted). “In applying the clear-error standard, [appellate courts] view the
evidence in a light favorable to the findings.” Id. Appellate courts “will not conclude that
a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, [they] are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quotations omitted); accord

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Newstrand, 869 N.W.2d at 685. “In sum, the role of an appellate court is not to weigh,
reweigh, or inherently reweigh the evidence when applying a clear- error review; that task
is best suited to, and therefore is reserved for, the factfinder.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223
(citing In re Civ. Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 24 (Minn. 2014) (stating that a
factfinder is in the best position to “weigh the evidence and assess credibility”); In re
Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995) (affording “due regard” to the factfinder’s
opportunity to “judge the credibility of the witnesses”)).
With these legal standards in mind, we address each of mother’s arguments below.
I. The child-support magistrate acted within her discretion in declining to modify
child support retroactively to account for the lump-sum disability payment
that father received.

Mother asserts that the child-support magistrate misapplied Lenz v. Wergin, 408
N.W.2d 873 (Minn. App. 1987), and that the magistrate “erred by excluding $37,000 of
father’s income from child-support calculations.” Put differently, she maintains that the
magistrate “created an irreconcilable inconsistency by attributing father’s $37,000 in
income to 2024 while the November . . . 2024 order determined father had $0 income for
that same period based on the representation that he was unpaid.”
Under Minnesota law, “[a] modification of support . . . may be made retroactive.”
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(f) (2024) (emphasis added); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.44,
subd. 15 (2024) (stating that “‘[m]ay’ is permissive”). “A modification of support is
generally retroactive to the date the moving party served notice of the motion on the
responding party.” Bormann v. Bormann, 644 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. App. 2002) (citing

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Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(d) (Supp. 2001)).2 When no exceptions to that general rule
apply, and when nothing suggests that a child-support magistrate has exercised their
discretion to make a modification effective on another date, any modification to the child-
support award is retroactive to the notice-of-motion-service date. See id. at 482–83.
In Lenz, the child-support obligor received a lump-sum worker’s- compensation-
permanent-disability settlement, and the district court applied that settlement to the year
the obligor received it for purposes of determining income. 408 N.W.2d at 877. We
concluded that the district court “erred in determining . . . [the obligor’s] income” because,
when the court “allocated the entire settlement to the year of receipt, . . . [it gave] a false
impression of [the obligor’s] income [for that year].” Id. On remand, we instructed the
district court to apply the obligor’s “lump-sum payment made to her for diminution of her
earning capacity . . . over the years from the date of injury (1981) until her obligation to
support the child ceases on his eighteenth birthday (1994), a 13–year period.” Id.
Here, father testified that he had received the $37,000 lump-sum disability payment
in May 2025, which related to lost wages he had incurred in 2024. The child- support
magistrate determined that this payment “was not relevant to determining the father’s
current income as it was received before June 2025, the date of service of father’s motion,
and was not a recurring current income source for the father.” The magistrate further
reasoned that the lump-sum payment “was to reimburse the father for his past wage loss in

2 The substance of what was Minnesota Statutes section 518.64 (Supp. 2001) has since
been moved to section 518A.39 (2024). See generally Leifur v. Leifur, 820 N.W.2d 40, 42
n.2 (Minn. App. 2012) (observing that the child-support statutes were “renumbered” in
2005).

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2024” and, relying on Lenz, found that the payment relates only to father’s 2024 income.
See id.
The undisputed facts before us are unlike Lenz , insofar as the lump- sum disability
payment father received is not a worker’s-compensation -permanent-disability settlement
that relates to diminution in earning capacity that would apply through the child’s age of
majority. See id. But like Lenz, it would have been error for the child-support magistrate to
have allocated the entire lump-sum disability payment to 2025—the year father received
it—because that would have given a false impression of father’s 2025 income when the
amount related only to lost wages that he had incurred in 2024. See id. We therefore discern
no abuse of discretion in the magistrate’s application of Lenz in determining that father’s
lump-sum disability payment is properly allocated to his 2024 income.
Moreover, we conclude that the child-support magistrate acted within her discretion
in declining to make the modification retroactive. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(f).
We are not persuaded by mother’s argument that the magistrate abused her discretion by
allocating the lump-sum disability payment to 2024, even though the district court had
already determined in the November 2024 order that father had no income during that
period. Father filed his notice of motion and motion to modify child support in June 2025.
The applicable statute affords the magistrate the discretion to make a retroactive
modification. And the general rule— which applies under these circumstances—is that such
retroactivity would only run to the June 2025 notice-of- motion-service date of father’s
motion. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518A.39, subd. 2(f), 645.44, subd. 15; see also Bormann, 644
N.W.2d at 482–83.

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In short, the child-support magistrate did not make findings of fact that are
unsupported by the evidence, did not misapply the law, and did not deliver a decision that
is against logic and the facts on record. Accordingly, we conclude that the magistrate acted
within her discretion in declining to modify child support retroactively to account for the
lump-sum disability payment that father received. See Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506; see
also Grogg, 968 N.W.2d at 53.
II. The child-support magistrate properly determined that father’s income had
substantially changed based on sufficient record evidence and appropriate
consideration of the relevant statutory factors.

In challenging the child-support magistrate’s determination that father’s income had
substantially changed, mother raises two main arguments.
First, mother contends that the child-support magistrate “erred by relying on
insufficient and unverified evidence in determining father’s income and child support
obligation.” Citing Minnesota Statutes section 518A.28 (2024), mother maintains that the
magistrate could not make that determination without tax returns and wage-replacement
documentation.
The child-support magistrate relied upon testimony and documentary evidence to
determine father’s income. Father testified that he had transitioned from a full-time salaried
position that he had held for six months to contracting with counties, from which he
received a flat fee of $4,500 per contract as income for his work. And he filed several
documents, including material showing that he performed contract work for a flat fee of
$4,500 per contract and that he had entered into three such contracts since the end of May
2025.

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The child-support magistrate reasoned that the documents father filed have
probative value upon which she could reasonably rely, as provided in Minnesota Rule of
General Practice 364.10, subdivision 1. We discern no error in this reasoning. By contrast,
mother’s reliance on Minnesota Statutes section 518A.28, which provides that income
verification may come in the form of “all other documents evidencing earnings or income
as received that provide verification for the financial affidavit ,” is unavailing. This is
because the documents father filed adequately reflect his earnings and income for purposes
of verifying the financial affidavit he submitted with his modification motion. Viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the magistrate’s findings without reweighing the
evidence, we conclude that the findings are not clearly erroneous because they are based
in fact, are not manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence, and are reasonably
supported by the record as a whole. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221; Newstrand, 869
N.W.2d at 685. In other words, we are not “left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation omitted).
Second, mother argues that the child-support magistrate failed to consider the
factors under Minnesota Statutes section 518A.32 (2024), which she asserts “require[]
consideration of employment history, education, job skills, and job availability.” In
particular, mother points to two facts in claiming the magistrate erred: (1) that father has
three houses; and (2) that “a simple search . . . shows over 6 different family law attorney
jobs.” In mother’s view, the child-support magistrate erred in modifying father’s obligation
based on the determination that his gross-monthly income was reduced, which mother
asserts “resulted from father’s own choices.”

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“If a parent is voluntarily . . . underemployed, . . . child support must be calculated
based on a determination of potential income.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1. “For
purposes of this determination, it is rebuttably presumed that a parent can be gainfully
employed on a full- time basis.” Id. The statute specifies three methods to determine
potential income. Id., subd. 2. One method is based on “the parent’s probable earnings level
based on employment potential, recent work history, and occupational qualifications in
light of prevailing job opportunities and earnings levels in the community.” Id.
In the September 2025 order, the child-support magistrate explained her
determination that “father is not voluntarily underemployed,” reasoning that he had
“earned a gross-monthly income of $4,500 recently,” which was “consistent with his
employment history, education, job skills, and availability of jobs within the community
for an individual with . . . father’s qualifications.” In denying mother’s motions for review
and to correct alleged clerical mistakes in the September 2025 order, the magistrate ruled
that she had “properly analyzed . . . father’s income per Minn. Stat. § 518A.32.” More
specifically, the magistrate found that father “was not voluntarily underemployed” because
his “prior income from his 6-month employment . . . [in a full-time salaried position] was
not representative of his past or current income” and because the magistrate “calculated his
income based on his current actual income.”
Our careful review of the record reveals no error in the child -support magistrate’s
analysis. Although mother urges us to consider evidence that could support a different
finding, it is not our role “to weigh, reweigh, or inherently reweigh the evidence.” Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 223. Consequently, we conclude that the child-support magistrate properly

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determined that father’s income had substantially changed based on sufficient record
evidence and appropriate consideration of the relevant statutory factors.
III. The child-support magistrate acted within her discretion in determining the
amount of arrears father owed to mother.

Mother suggests that the child -support magistrate “erred by adopting an arrears
determination that is based on inconsistent and incomplete financial information.”
Relying on the child-support specialist’s unobjected-to statements at the September
2025 hearing,3 the child-support magistrate found in the September 2025 order that father
owed arrears to mother in the amount of $6,804.01. Viewed in the light most favorable to
the child-support magistrate’s findings without reweighing the evidence—as mother asks
us to do —the record establishes that the magistrate’s arrears finding is reasonably
supported and therefore not clearly erroneous. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221; Newstrand,
869 N.W.2d at 685.
We thus conclude that the child-support magistrate acted within her discretion in
determining the amount of arrears father owed to mother.

3 Mother did not object to the magistrate’s consideration of the child -support specialist’s
unsworn statements about childcare costs at the September 2025 hearing, and she does not
challenge the magistrate’s reliance on those statements on that ground in this appeal.
“[A]ppellate courts generally address only issues presented to and decided by the district
court.” Davis v. Davis, 631 N.W.2d 822, 828 n.2 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)). Moreover, “[a] party’s failure to brief and argue an
issue on appeal results in forfeiture of that issue.” Jundt v. Jundt, 12 N.W.3d 201, 204
(Minn. App. 2024) (citing In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 379 (Minn. 1990))
(other citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2024).

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IV. Mother has forfeited her argument that the magistrate erred in declining to
allow her to submit new information or to have an additional hearing.

Mother contends that, by declining to allow her to submit new information or to
have an additional hearing, the magistrate “created a twisting of procedural rules”:
Minnesota General Rule of Practice “354.14” and Minnesota General Rule of Practice
377.09.
Minnesota General Rule of Practice 354.14 does not exist. “Although some
accommodations may be made for [self-represented] litigants, this court has repeatedly
emphasized that [self-represented] litigants are generally held to the same standards as
attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Beardsley v. Garcia, 731 N.W.2d 843, 850
(Minn. App. 2007) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App.
2001)), aff’d, 753 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 2008). Appellate courts “will not consider [self-
represented] claims on appeal that are unsupported by either arguments or citations to legal
authority.” State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 165 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Because mother’s argument that the magistrate erred in declining to allow her to
submit new information or to have an additional hearing is inadequately supported by legal
authority, it is forfeited.
Affirmed.