Paul Devereaux v. Medtronic USA Inc

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0329

Paul Devereaux,
Appellant,

vs.

Medtronic USA Inc,
Respondent.

Filed September 28, 2026
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-22-281

Colin J. Pasterski, Christopher J. Moreland, Ross D. Stadheim, MSB Employment Justice,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Jenny Gassman- Pines, Katherine M. Swenson, Erin R. Emory, Greene Espel PLLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bentley, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
This is an appeal from a summary judgment for respondent in appellant’s lawsuit
alleging sex- and age-based employment discrimination. Appellant argues that the district
court erred by concluding that, because appellant lived and worked outside of Minnesota

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at the time relevant to his claims, he is not entitled to protection under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.50 (2024). We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are taken from the summary-judgment record and stated in the
light most favorable to appellant Paul Devereaux.
Employment History
Respondent Medtronic USA Inc. is headquartered in Minnesota but conducts
business operations across the United States and internationally. Devereaux started
working for Medtronic in 2000 and, at all times relevant to this appeal, he lived in the state
of Georgia. He held various roles, including working for more than ten years as a regional
vice president for Medtronic’s Cardiac Rhythm Management (CRM) business unit within
the larger Cardio and Vascular group (CVG). In 2018, Devereaux transferred jobs to work
as a regional vice president for another unit within CVG, the Aortic and Peripheral
Vascular (APV) unit. In that role, Devereaux oversaw Medtronic’s “Central Area,” which
included Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, St. Louis, Kentucky, Pittsburgh, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas. Though based in Georgia, Devereaux traveled as
needed, including to Minnesota.
In the fall of 2020, Medtronic announced a plan to reorganize CVG. The APV and
CRM units executed the reorganization independently. APV ’s decision-makers chose to
eliminate all regional-vice-president positions within the unit and to instead rely on the
leadership of senior directors, which are lower-level positions offering lower pay. In
contrast, CRM maintained regional vice presidents within its unit’s leadership structure.

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Devereaux was aware that the restructuring could impact his position. At the advice
of others within the company, he contacted several individuals in leadership roles to
express interest in transferring back into a regional-vice-president position within CRM.
Though Devereaux continued to express interest in the CRM positions, no one within the
company followed up with him about a position. In mid-December, CRM leadership
announced the picks for the regional-vice-president positions. Devereaux was not included.
He was offered the opportunity to interview for a senior-director position within APV or,
alternatively, to receive a severance package. He declined both. Devereaux’s last day of
work was January 31, 2021, but he remained on the payroll and was not formally
discharged until May 1, 2021.
Procedural History
Devereaux filed a complaint against Medtronic, alleging three counts of
employment discrimination under the MHRA: (1) disparate-treatment age discrimination;
(2) disparate-impact age discrimination; and (3) sex discrimination. More specifically,
Devereaux asserted that Medtronic “institute[d] a quota-based directive to achieve specific
percentages of gender/racial representation in leadership positions” and “engage[d] in a
systemic pattern and practice of utilizing reductions in force or reorganizations in order to
change the makeup of its workforce, whether it be based on age, gender, or race.”
Devereaux further stated that Medtronic “prohibited [him] from applying to any of the open
Regional Vice President positions in [CRM], which [he] was qualified for,” that “[i]nstead,
[Medtronic] hired three substantially younger women and one substantially younger man
to fill these roles,” and that his position was eliminated as “a pretext to cover up invidious

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discrimination.” Invoking the MHRA, Devereaux claimed that Medtronic discriminated
against him and other employees “with respect to terminating, hiring, tenure,
compensation, terms, conditions, and/or privileges of employment” based on age and sex
in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 363A.08, subdivision 2.
Medtronic later moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds. It asserted that
“Devereaux cannot maintain MHRA claims” because he does not meet the MHRA
definition of “employee” under Minnesota Statutes section 363A.03, subd ivision 15.
Medtronic also argued on the merits that it had shown nondiscriminatory reasons for its
decisions: that the reorganization was a business decision, that CRM looked only at people
in its own unit for the regional-vice- president roles, and that the decision-makers had a
poor opinion of Devereaux’s attitude.
In his memorandum opposing summary judgment, Devereaux stated that he was no
longer “pursuing discrimination claims on the basis that the decision to eliminate his
position as [a regional vice president] in the Aortic Peripheral Vascular business was
discriminatory,” nor was he “pursuing Count II (Disparate Impact Age Discrimination) of
his [c]omplaint.” He clarified that he was pursuing only “Count I (Age Discrimination) and
Count III (Sex Discrimination), which are based upon Medtronic’s refusal to transfer him
to open [regional vice president] positions within CRM.”
Following a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment for Medtronic.
The district court’s order was a single page and did not explain the basis for the district
court’s decision. Devereaux appealed the decision to this court, and we reversed and
remanded because “the district court did not state any reasons for granting summary

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judgment.” Devereaux v. Medtronic USA Inc., No. 24-1348, 2025 WL 1502652, at *1
(Minn. App. May 15, 2025) (order op.).
On remand, the district court stated at a status conference that it had “an opportunity
to look at the pleadings,” and it referenced the memoranda of law that the parties submitted
in support of their positions on summary judgment. 1 The district court did not invite
additional briefing or arguments and instead requested that each party submit a proposed
order on the summary-judgment motion. The district court subsequently granted summary
judgment for Medtronic, reasoning that Devereaux does not “work in” Minnesota and so
is not an “employee” within the meaning of the MHRA and cannot claim its protections.
Devereaux appeals.
DECISION
In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts review the district
court’s decision de novo. Bell v. St. Joseph Mut. Ins. Co., 990 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Minn.
App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 8, 2023). In doing so, this court “view[s] the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted to
determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district
court correctly applied the law.” Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 150
(Minn. 2014). Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that this court reviews de novo.
Greene v. Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs., 948 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Minn. 2020).

1 The case was assigned to a different district court judge because of the previous judge’s
retirement.

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The MHRA prohibits employment discrimination based on enumerated protected
characteristics. In relevant part, it sets out that:
Except when based on a bona fide occupational
qualification, it is an unfair employment practice for an
employer, because of . . . sex, . . . or age to:
(1) refuse to hire or to maintain a system of
employment which unreasonably excludes a person
seeking employment; or
(2) discharge an employee; or
(3) discriminate against a person with respect to
hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading,
conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment.

Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2 (emphasis added). The MHRA provides definitions for
“employee,” “employer,” and “person.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subds. 15, 16, 30. An
“employee” is “an individual who is employed by an employer and who resides or works
in this state.” Id., subd. 15. An “employer” is “a person who has one or more employees.”
Id., subd. 1 6. And a “person” “includes partnership, association, corporation, legal
representative, trustee, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, and the state and its departments,
agencies, and political subdivisions.” Id., subd. 30.
We begin with a brief discussion of the scope of the issue on appeal. In his summary-
judgment briefing, Devereaux argued that the MHRA protects “employees” from
discrimination, and that “Devereaux is an employee under the [Act].” Devereaux’s
complaint alleged claims under subsections (1), (2), and (3) of section 363A.08,
subdivision 2, related to both his discharge from the APV unit and the failure to hire or
transfer him to the CRM unit, but at summary judgment he dropped his discharge theory
under subdivision 2(2). He opposed summary judgment only with respect to the failure-to-

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hire and failure-to-transfer theories under subsections (1) and (3). Even though the text of
subsections (1) and (3) prohibits discriminatory practices against “a person,” not “an
employee,” Devereaux invoked only the definition of employee and did not assert any
distinction between the individuals protected under subsections (1) and (3) and
subsection (2). For purposes of this nonprecedential opinion, consistent with the parties’
presentation of the issues at summary judgment, we assume without deciding that the
definition of “employee” applies to theories of discriminatory conduct asserted under
subsections (1) and (3), as it does to a claim under subsection (2).2 In other words, we
assume for purposes of this case that an individual bringing a claim under subdivisions (1)
and (3) must be “an individual who is employed by an employer and who resides or works
in this state.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 15. And, because Devereaux never resided in

2 In his briefing for this appeal, Devereaux argues that the statutory definition of “person”
is broader than the definition of “employee,” such that he should be able to bring his claims
as a “person” even if he does not meet the definition of “employee.” But Devereaux did
not raise that argument in his summary-judgment briefing before the district court. Nor did
he raise it in his principal brief in the first appeal to this court . Rather, he included the
theory for the first time in his reply brief in the first appeal and in his proposed order
following remand. The district court did not consider the argument in its order granting
summary judgment, which is the order before us on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d
580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that this court should consider “only those issues that the
record shows were presented and considered by the trial court” and that a party may not
“obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a different
theory” (quotation omitted)); cf. Annis v. Annis, 84 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1957) (“The
general rule . . . is that litigants are bound . . . by the theory or theories, however erroneous
or improvident, upon which the action was actually tried below.”). The district court
addressed the argument briefly in its denial of Devereaux’s request for leave to bring a
motion for reconsideration, but “a district court’s decision to deny a motion for
reconsideration” is not appealable. Anderson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 696, 924 N.W.2d 911, 925
(Minn. App. 2019). For these reasons, we conclude that Devereaux forfeited the argument
that he may bring a claim under the MHRA as a “person,” even if he cannot bring a claim
as an “employee.”

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Minnesota and lived in Georgia at all times relevant to this case, the question before us is
whether he met the definition of an individual who “works in this state.” Id.
Turning to the merits of that question, we begin with the plain language of the
statute. See City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. 2013)
(“When legislative intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, we
interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to other principles of
statutory interpretation.”). We construe “words and phrases . . . according to rules of
grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1)
(2024); see also In re Surveillance & Integrity Rev., 999 N.W.2d 843, 856 (Minn. 2024)
(stating that courts “may consult dictionary definitions as part of the inquiry into a statute’s
plain meaning” (quotation omitted)).
Applying the dictionary definition of “in,” as it appears in the phrase “works in this
state,” an employee is an individual who works “[w]ithin the limits, bounds, or area of”
Minnesota. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 885 (5th ed. 2018).
In other words, the statutory language requires physical presence in the state. Reading
“works in this state” as a whole, then, for someone to be an “employee” within the scope
of the MHRA, the plain language of the statute requires that individual be physically
present in Minnesota while working. Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 15.
Considering the circumstances of this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact
that Devereaux was not physically present “in” Minnesota at the time relevant to his
employment-discrimination claims. In his previous position with Medtronic, Devereaux
worked primarily from a home office in Georgia, but traveled often for work. That travel

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included brief trips to Minnesota every year for meetings, trainings, and other work events.
But at the time of the events relating to his failure-to-hire or transfer theories, Devereaux
had not traveled to Minnesota in more than eight months. And he did not travel to
Minnesota in connection with or in pursuit of any of the CRM positions that are the subject
of his complaint. These facts are not sufficient to establish that Devereaux had a physical
presence in Minnesota such that he was an individual who “works in this state” within the
meaning of the MHRA. He therefore cannot recover as an “employee” under section
363A.08, subdivision 2.
Devereaux argues that this court should conclude that the MHRA’s protections
apply to “non-resident employees who had some contact with Minnesota.” He asserts that
he has alleged “Minnesota connections” that are “continuous and substantial,” pointing to
evidence that he “spent numerous days per year in Minnesota” and would have returned to
Minnesota for work purposes if he remained with Medtronic. Devereaux also points out
that he “communicated with his Minnesota supervisors and colleagues by phone, email,
and/or Zoom on a daily basis.” We are not convinced by these arguments. Devereaux’s
regular contact with people who live or work in Minnesota does not amount to him being
“in this state” within the statute’s plain meaning for the reasons described above.
Additionally, Devereaux’s visits to Minnesota were associated with his previous
position with Medtronic, and Devereaux has made clear that he is no longer pursuing a
discharge claim related to that position. To the extent Devereaux focuses on potential future
travel to Minnesota that would have accompanied a position in the CRM unit, that
interpretation ignores that the statute uses the present tense “works.” Present tense verbs

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“express[] action in the present time.” American Heritage, supra, at 1394. In the context
of the statute, “the present time” is most naturally understood as the time when the alleged
unfair employment practice occurred.3 Devereaux did not work in Minnesota when the
CRM hiring decisions were being made.
Devereaux also cites decisions from the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota that he argues interpreted the phrase “works in this state” to include a broader
range of contacts with Minnesota. See, e.g., Lapushner v. Admedus Ltd., Civ. No. 20-572,
2020 WL 5106818, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2020); Wilson v. CFMOTO Powersports,
Inc., Civ. No. 15-3192, 2016 WL 912182 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2016). But we are not bound
by those decisions, nor do we find them persuasive. See Midland Credit Mgmt. v. Chatman,
796 N.W.2d 534 , 536 n.3 (Minn. App. 2011) (“Only the decisions of the Minnesota
Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court are binding on this court.”). The plain language
of the statute creates a physical presence requirement, not a contacts requirement.
Moreover, in both Lapushner and Wilson, there were ties between the alleged
discrimination that took place and the employee’s physical presence in Minnesota. In
Lapushner, the plaintiff was discriminated against while attending meetings in Minnesota,
2020 WL 5106818, at *1-3, 5, and in Wilson, the plaintiff began experiencing
discrimination after attending trainings in Minnesota where others in the company learned

3 We recognize that applying the definition of “employee” to a failure-to-hire claim under
subsection (1) or (3) of section 363A.08, subdivision 2, is not a precise fit because
discrimination in hiring presumes that the person does not yet work at the company or in
the desired role. But for the reasons previously explained, we consider the arguments as
they were presented to the district court.

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of his race for the first time, 2016 WL 912182, at *1-2, 6. There are no similar allegations
here about Devereaux’s physical presence in Minnesota. Further more, there are more
recent federal cases applying Minnesota law that reject Devereaux’s proposed contacts-
based approach. See Kuklenski v. Medtronic USA, Inc., 134 F.4th 528, 531-33 (8th Cir.
2025); Walton v. Medtronic USA, Inc., No. 22-CV-0050, 2024 WL 3071477, at *2-3 (D.
Minn. June 20, 2024). Both cases conclude that the plain language of the employee
definition necessitates a physical presence, consistent with our conclusion here. Kuklenski,
134 F.4th at 531-33; Walton, 2024 WL 3071477, at *2-3. We find the reasoning in these
cases more persuasive than the cases relied on by Devereaux for the reasons discussed
above.
Before concluding, we note that Devereaux also argues on appeal that the district
court abused its discretion by denying two motions to compel discovery that he filed prior
to Medtronic’s summary-judgment motion. Because we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, we do not reach those arguments. The discovery sought by Devereaux
in his motions is unrelated to the question whether he was “an employee” under the MHRA,
so the discovery issues are moot.
Affirmed.