In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: T. L. S., Parent

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0335

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: T. L. S., Parent.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-25-3

Brooks Beskau Warg, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant-mother T.L.S.)

Brea Buettner-Stanchfield, Buettner Law Group, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent-father F.L.B.)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Katie Westby, Rebecca Hanscom, Assistant
County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human
Services)

Jean M. Sanderson, The Law CTR, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Melody
Her)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Bond ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s order transferring permanent legal
and physical custody of her minor child to respondent-father. Appellant argues that the
district court abused its discretion in determining that respondent-county met its burden of

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proving the statutory elements for a transfer of permanent legal and physical custody by
clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother T.L.S. (mother) is the custodial mother of three-year-old Z.D.B.
(child). Child was previously adjudicated as a child in need of protection or services
(CHIPS) based on a February 2023 incident during which mother drove while intoxicated
with child unrestrained in the vehicle. The child-protection case was dismissed in October
2023, following reunification with mother.1
Mother has a long history of arrests and convictions for driving while impaired
(DWI) in Minnesota and other states. Relevant to this case, mother was charged with five
counts of child neglect or endangerment and one count of driving without a valid license
in 2017 and was convicted of a gross-misdemeanor DWI in 2019. In 2023, mother was
convicted of child endangerment for driving with an unrestrained child in the vehicle.
Mother was also convicted of gross misdemeanor driving with a canceled license in 2021
and again in 2024.
Mother was involved in another driving incident on June 4, 2024. That day, mother
drove with child unsecured in a vehicle during a high-speed police chase. Mother drove at
speeds up to 100 miles per hour during the approximately 17- minute chase, which ended
when officers deployed tire deflating spikes and engaged in pursuit intervention techniques

1 Mother has had prior child-protection involvement related to her other children not
involved in this case and voluntarily terminated her parental rights to seven of her children
in 2020.

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to stop mother’s vehicle. Upon approaching the vehicle, officers observed child unsecured
on mother’s lap and noted that mother’s eyes were red and watery, that her speech was
slurred, and that she smelled of alcohol. Mother provided a urine sample, which tested
negative for alcohol. At the time of this incident, mother did not have a valid license.
Mother was later convicted of felony fleeing a police officer and gross-misdemeanor child
endangerment.
On June 12, 2024, respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health
Department (the county) filed a CHIPS petition based on the June 4 driving incident. Child
was placed in protective supervision with her adjudicated father , respondent F.L.B.
(father), where she remained throughout the duration of this case. Mother entered a limited
admission to the CHIPS petition and child was adjudicated as CHIPS in August 2024. The
district court ordered mother to comply with a case plan that included requirements that
she demonstrate sobriety; seek appropriate care for relapses in sobriety; attend parenting
education and demonstrate proficiency in applying the lessons while parenting child;
remain law-abiding; and ensure child’s physical, mental, emotional, and educational needs
are met. Specific to the requirement that mother demonstrate sobriety, mother had to
submit to breathalyzer testing and urine analysis (UA) testing, although the district court
later removed the breathalyzer requirement.
In January 2025, the county filed a petition to transfer permanent legal and physical
custody of child to father. A trial was held on the county’s petition over the course of six
days in October, November, and December 2025. The district court heard testimony from

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mother, a police officer, father, a social worker, mother’s former parole officer, a guardian
ad litem (GAL), one of mother’s family members, and a visitation supervisor.
Following trial, the district court issued a detailed, 84- page order involuntarily
transferring permanent legal and physical custody of child to father. The district court
determined that (1) the county made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with child,
(2) mother failed to sufficiently use available services, (3) mother failed to correct the
conditions that led to child’s out-of- home placement, and (4) the transfer of custody to
father is in child’s best interests. The district court found mother’s testimony to be
generally not credible, including her testimony about the June 4 driving incident and her
testimony denying substance use or unsafe driving behavior during the pendency of the
case.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
In permanency proceedings, a district court may transfer permanent legal and
physical custody to a parent or a “fit and willing relative.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515,
subd. 4(a)(1)-(2) (2024). The district court’s transfer-of -custody order must include
detailed findings addressing:
(1) how the child’s best interests are served by the order;
(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social
services agency’s reasonable efforts or, in the case of an Indian
child, active efforts to reunify the child with the parent or
guardian where reasonable efforts are required;
(3) the parent’s or parents’ efforts and ability to use
services to correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home
placement; and

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(4) that the conditions which led to the out- of-home
placement have not been corrected so that the child can safely
return home.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1)-(4) (2024). The district court’s findings on these factors must
be supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11
N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 1
(providing that “[i]n a permanency matter other than a termination of parental rights matter,
the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence”).
On appeal from an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of a
child, we review the district court’s ultimate decision that there is a statutory basis for a
permanency disposition for an abuse of discretion. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D.,
865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). In doing so,
we review the district court’s factual findings to determine whether they address the
statutory criteria and are supported by “substantial evidence,” or whether they are clearly
erroneous. In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990).
When reviewing factual findings for clear error, appellate courts (1) view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, (2) do not find their own facts, (3) do
not reweigh the evidence, and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021); In re Welfare of Child of
J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney to a review of a
juvenile-protection order), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). Appellate courts “need not
go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of
the findings of the [district] court. . . . [A]n appellate court’s duty is fully performed after

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it has fairly considered all the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably
supports the decision.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotations and citation omitted).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that mother failed
to correct the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that there
was clear and convincing evidence that she failed to correct the conditions leading to
child’s out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(4).
In its order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of child to father, the
district court credited testimony that mother had complied with several of her case-plan
requirements, including obtaining safe housing, completing a psychological assessment,
engaging in weekly parenting-education services, and progressing from supervised to
unsupervised visits with child. But despite mother’s progress on her case plan, the district
court determined that the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement— mother’s
unsafe driving and substance abuse—had not been corrected at the time of trial so that child
could return safely home. The district court found that “[m]other ha[d] not addressed the
safety concerns in this case” because mother continued to drive without a license and had
failed to demonstrate sobriety throughout the pendency of the case . Relatedly, the court
found mother’s lack of insight particularly troubling because, while mother “had over a
year and a half to develop insight into her behavior,” she had failed to demonstrate that she
would not repeat the same unsafe behaviors which endangered child.
Mother challenges the district court’s determination that she failed to correct the
conditions leading to child’s out-of-home placement, focusing on the evidence related to

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her unsafe driving, chemical dependency, and lack of insight. We address mother’s
arguments in turn.
Unsafe Driving
Mother does not challenge the district court’s finding that she continued to drive
with a canceled license during the pendency of the case. Rather, she argues that there is
no evidence she drove dangerously, and driving with a canceled license is not grounds to
support a transfer of permanent custody. This argument is unavailing.
The district court’s factual finding that mother continued to engage in dangerous
driving conduct during the case is supported by the evidence. As of June 2024, mother’s
license was canceled as inimical to public safety. Although mother was legally prohibited
from driving, multiple witnesses testified that mother drove during the pendency of this
case. Father testified that he observed mother driving during the case, both father and the
social worker testified that they saw mother sitting in the driver’s seat of a vehicle during
a remote court proceeding, and mother’s former parole officer testified that she saw mother
with car keys. Further, the GAL testified that mother had implied she was driving with
another minor child in the car, and the social worker testified that mother told another social
worker that she had driven with child. The district court credited the testimony of father,
the social worker, mother’s former parole officer, and the GAL, determinations to which
we defer. See In re Welfare of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. App. 2007) (“We defer
to the district court’s determinations of witness credibility.”). Therefore, the district court
did not clearly err in finding that mother failed to correct her unsafe driving behavior which
led to child’s out-of-home placement.

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Chemical Dependency
Generally, when placing a child outside of the home of a parent, “the evidence
relating to [the decision] must address conditions that exist at the time of the hearing.” In
re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980). Here, t he district court
acknowledged that mother “recently had a period of negative test results,” but it found that
she had submitted positive breathalyzer and UA test results during the pendency of the case
and had consistently failed to acknowledge her substance use as a problem, which posed a
threat to child’s safety and well-being.
Mother argues that the district court improperly focused on mother’s history of
chemical dependency rather than the circumstances as they existed at the time of trial. But
mother cites no authority supporting her position that the district court cannot consider
evidence of relevant prior conduct, in addition to the conditions existing at the time of trial.
Additionally, substantial evidence in the record supports the district court’s finding that
mother failed to maintain sobriety during the case and consistently failed to acknowledge
her substance use as a problem. As recently as November 2024, mother missed 39
breathalyzer tests—all of which are presumed positive in accordance with mother’s case
plan—and performed three positive breathalyzer tests. And we defer to the district court’s
determination that mother’s testimony that she had maintained sobriety was not credible.
See T.D., 731 N.W.2d at 555. Thus, the district court’s finding that mother failed to correct
the substance-abuse issues that led to child’s out-of- home placement is not clearly
erroneous.

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Lack of Insight
Mother argues that the record does not support the district court’s finding that
mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home placement based on her
alleged lack of insight into her harmful behaviors. Because substantial evidence in the
record supports the district court’s finding, we disagree.
The evidence shows that in 2023, mother drove with child unrestrained in the
vehicle without a license and in a highly dangerous manner, which resulted in a prior
CHIPS case. Mother repeated this dangerous behavior in 2024, driving with child
unrestrained in the vehicle without a license at speeds over 100 miles per hour. During the
pendency of the instant case, mother continued to drive with a canceled license with minor
children in the car. The social worker testified that mother had not taken responsibility for
recklessly driving with child in the car and the GAL testified that mother lacked insight as
to how her decisions impact child’s safety. The GAL also testified that she was concerned
about leaving child in mother’s care for extended periods of time absent the structure of a
case plan. The district court found the testimony of both the social worker and the GAL
credible. We conclude that the district court’s finding that mother lacks insight into the
reckless driving behaviors which endangered child and contributed to the out-of-home
placement is supported by substantial evidence in the record and therefore is not clearly
erroneous.
In sum, because there is clear and convincing evidence in the record supporting the
district court’s factual findings that mother failed to correct her unsafe driving behaviors
and substance-use issues and did not develop insight into her endangering conduct, the

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district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that mother failed to correct the
conditions that led to child’s out-of- home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(4) ;
see also Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (stating that a district
court abuses its discretion when it makes unsupported factual findings, misapplies the law,
or delivers a decision contrary to logic and the factual record).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with child.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the
county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify her with child. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.517(a)(2).
Generally, permanent placement of a child outside of a parent’s home may occur
only if the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(a) (2024). In an order permanently placing a child out of the home, a district
court must make “detailed findings” about “the nature and extent of the responsible social
services agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with the parent or guardian
where reasonable efforts are required.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(2). “[W]hat constitutes
reasonable efforts depends on the facts of each case.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601 (quotation
omitted). In determining whether the county’s efforts were reasonable, the district court
must consider whether the services provided were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and,
if appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and
child’s family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well- being of
the child;

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(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the
child and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). “The county’s efforts must be aimed at alleviating the
conditions that gave rise to out-of-home placement, and they must conform to the problems
presented.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012). The
services must be culturally appropriate, and “the child’s best interests, health, and safety
must be of paramount concern.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a).
The district court determined that the county made reasonable and timely efforts to
address mother’s chemical-dependency and mental-health issues, lack of parenting skills,
and her inability to care for child safely. Mother does not contend that the county failed to
make reasonable efforts to provide services aimed at addressing barriers to reunification
such as her history of dangerous driving and substance use. Instead, mother argues that
the county’s efforts were insufficient because the county failed to provide services to assist
mother in addressing mother’s lack of insight into her harmful actions.
For support, mother relies on In re Welfare of Child of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656 (Minn.
2008). There, the supreme court held the county’s provision of services aimed at
evaluating a parent’s deficits were unreasonable when the county failed to provide services
designed to treat those issues. Id. at 665 (“[S]imply testing for substance use, without more,
is not realistic under the circumstances to rehabilitate a parent who . . . suffers from
chemical dependency issues.”). But unlike in T.R., here, the county did not merely order

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mother to submit to evaluations; rather, the county provided ample services “aimed at
alleviating the conditions that gave rise to out-of-home placement.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at
88. For example, t he county facilitated mental-health and chemical-dependency
assessments, submitted a referral for dialect-behavioral therapy (DBT), 2 coordinated
unsupervised and supervised visits, provided transportation to visits, provided breathalyzer
testing, and modified the case plan to provide scheduled UA tests tailored to accommodate
mother’s work schedule. The district court credited the social worker’s testimony that the
services provided by the county were relevant, culturally appropriate, realistic, and
available to mother. See In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996)
(“Considerable deference is due to the district court’s decision because a district court is in
a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.”). Further, the reasonableness of
reunification efforts depends on the facts of the case, J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601, and here,
any additional services aimed at providing mother with insight into her actions would likely
be redundant of the robust services already provided by the county which focused on
addressing the underlying conditions that led to the out-of-home placement—including
mother’s lack of safe parenting skills, mental- health struggles, and chemical-dependency
issues.

2 The district court found that mother did not complete DBT but did not rely on this finding
in its order transferring permanent legal custody to father because it found there were “other
reasons supporting its decision.” Similarly, we do not rely on that finding here.

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We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that
there was clear and convincing evidence that the county made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate mother and reunify her with child.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that mother’s
efforts to use services to correct the conditions which led to out-of-home
placement were insufficient.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that she
failed to make sufficient progress and failed to utilize available services to correct the
conditions leading to child’s out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(3).
Failure to comply with case-plan elements “amounts to a failure to correct the
conditions leading to out-of-home placement.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 89. But there is no
such inverse presumption that completion of all case-plan elements amounts to a correction
of the conditions that led to out-of-home placement. Id. Rather, “[t]he critical issue is not
whether the parent formally complied with the case plan, but . . . whether the parent is
presently able to assume the responsibilities of caring for the child.” Id.
The record includes substantial evidence supporting the district court’s
determination that, while mother showed an ability to use services and comply with many
aspects of her case plan, she has not demonstrated an ability to use those services for the
purpose of correcting the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement. The district
court credited testimony at trial that mother continued to drive, at times with minor children
in the car, despite the fact that her license was canceled as inimical to public safety. And
while the case plan required that mother demonstrate sobriety, after the county filed its
petition to transfer permanent legal and physical custody of child to father on January 2,

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2025, mother missed three breathalyzer tests and UAs which are presumed positive and
presented two UAs positive for fentanyl in May 2025. Mother also performed positive
breathalyzer tests after the initiation of the CHIPS case but before trial. Notably, the district
court found that, throughout this case, mother has denied having had a substance-use
problem and provided dishonest answers during her chemical-use assessment, which acts
as a barrier to engaging in the services necessary to sustain her sobriety.
In sum, the record supports the district court’s finding that mother’s commendable
efforts to use the services provided by the county have nonetheless not led her to be able
to parent child safely due to the outstanding conditions that led to the out-of-home
placement. See id. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the transfer
of permanent custody to father is in child’s best interests.

Mother lastly argues the district court abused its discretion by determining that it is
in child’s best interests to transfer custody to father. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1).
“The paramount consideration in all juvenile protection proceedings is the health,
safety, and best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2024); see In
re Welfare of Child. of M.L.S., 964 N.W.2d 441, 449 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying the best-
interests rule in a permanency proceeding). The best-interests standard requires the district
court to consider and evaluate “all relevant factors,” including “the relationship between
the child and relatives and the child and other important persons with whom the child has
resided or had significant contact.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a)-(b) (2024). “Because the
best-interests analysis involves credibility determinations and is generally not susceptible

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to an appellate court’s global review of a record, we give considerable deference to the
district court’s findings.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (quotation omitted); see also Vangsness
v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000) (stating that the law “leaves scant
if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best -
interests considerations”).
Here, the district court found that child has lived with father for over half of her life
and that father has acted as child’s primary caregiver since June 17, 2024. The court found
that permanent placement with father would meet child’s medical, educational,
developmental, and cultural needs. These findings are supported by the record. The GAL
and the social worker testified that it would be in child’s best interests to remain in father’s
custody permanently, reasoning that father has consistently provided child with stability
and suitable housing and is willing to facilitate a relationship between child and mother.
In contrast, the GAL and social worker testified that mother failed to take responsibility
for her dangerous-driving conduct which led to the initiation of the CHIPS case and lacks
insight into how her driving and substance use are harmful to child. On this record, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that transferring permanent
physical and legal custody to father is in child’s best interests.
In conclusion, because substantial evidence in the record supports the district court’s
determination that the county proved the four statutory factors under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.517(a)(1)-(4) by clear and convincing evidence, the district court did not abuse its

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discretion in transferring permanent legal and physical custody to father. See D.L.D., 865
N.W.2d at 321; Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506.
Affirmed.