Oscar Elias Padilla Jovel v. State of Minnesota

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0342

Oscar Elias Padilla Jovel, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 31, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-21-1176

Alyssa Nguyen-Schmitz, Nguyen Firm, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Beth Beaman, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and

Harris, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

FRISCH, Chief Judge

Appellant challenges the summary denial of his petition for postconviction relief

from his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the postconviction

court misapplied the law by denying the petition as procedurally barred without

considering the merits of appellant’s newly-discovered-evidence claim. Because the

postconviction court correctly applied the law, and appellant does not otherwise establish

that the postconviction court abused its discretion, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Oscar Elias Padilla Jovel with one

count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342,

subd. 1(a) (2010), based on his alleged sexual penetration of a victim under the age of 13

at the time of the incident.

Prior to his October 2023 trial, Padilla Jovel filed a motion seeking, in relevant part,

to question the victim about an alleged motive by the victim and his family members to

fabricate sexual misconduct allegations against Padilla Jovel for the purpose of obtaining

a U visa for the victim’s father. 1 The district court considered the motion on the first day

of trial and denied it, noting that evidence of bias may be excluded pursuant to the

Minnesota Rules of Evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, and that this court has affirmed the exclusion of evidence of a

witness’s immigration status where the defendant failed to establish a connection between

the U-visa process and a child-complainant’s allegations that would make immigration

1
Individuals may qualify for U nonimmigrant status, also known as a U visa, if they are
victims of certain types of crimes and cooperate in the prosecution of such crimes, and the
victim’s family members may be eligible for derivative U nonimmigrant status. See
generally 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (2026) (providing for different types of U visas).

2

evidence more than minimally relevant. 2 The district court stated that Padilla Jovel’s

argument was purely speculative and that his offer of proof contained no evidence “that

the father was in the U.S. illegally, that he was interested in obtaining a U visa, that he had

applied for a U visa or that his motivation to obtain a U visa caused him to induce his son

to make a false allegation of abuse.” The district court further noted that any evidence

regarding the victim’s father’s immigration status would only be marginally relevant

“because it would pertain to the father and not the victim himself” and would be “highly

prejudicial.” The district court also denied Padilla Jovel’s renewed motion later in trial to

question the victim about an alleged U-visa motive.

The jury found Padilla Jovel guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and

Padilla Jovel appealed his conviction to this court. In his principal brief on direct appeal,

Padilla Jovel raised the denial of his motion to question the victim about a U-visa motive,

arguing that “at the very least the [district] court should have allowed defense an

evidentiary hearing before deciding to exclude cross examination of U visa motive.” While

Padilla Jovel’s appeal was pending, the state sent his counsel a letter stating that it had

received an application for a U visa on August 19, 2024, and that it signed a certification

2
The district court discussed State v. Agudo, a nonprecedential case, in which we
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting cross-examination
regarding a child-complainant’s and her mother’s immigration status. No. A22-1151, 2023
WL 4199168 (Minn. App. June 26, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 17, 2023). We
considered the supreme court’s conclusion in State v. Larson that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of a witness’s immigration status when it was
“undisputed that [the witness] was not given any consideration for his testimony,” 787
N.W.2d 592, 598-99 (Minn. 2010), reasoning that “[a]s in Larson, nothing in the record
suggests that the witnesses received—or sought to receive—any consideration for their
testimony.” Id. at *5.

3

related to this application on August 28, 2024 (U-visa certification letter). In his reply brief

in the pending appeal, Padilla Jovel noted the existence of the U-visa certification letter,

stating:

At the very least, [the district court] should have allowed
defense to ask the Accuser, do you know what a U visa is?
Ironically, after filing Appellant’s brief dated August 18, 2024,
the State disclosed they received a U visa certification request
from the Accuser and his family but did not let counsel know
until about month later.

We affirmed Padilla Jovel’s conviction, in pertinent part concluding that the district court

“did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of immigration status based on bias

when [Padilla Jovel] failed to make an offer of proof that the witness was given

consideration for their testimony.” State v. Padilla Jovel, No. A24-0619, 2025 WL

1096806, at *9 (Minn. App. Apr. 14, 2025), rev. denied (Minn. June 25, 2025).

In October 2025, Padilla Jovel filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking a

new trial based on what he described as “newly discovered evidence - U visa motive.” The

expressed basis for the petition was the U-visa certification letter. In response, the state

argued that Padilla Jovel’s petition was procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 243

N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1973), because Padilla Jovel had litigated the district court’s denial of

his motion to question the victim about a U-visa motive in his direct appeal. The state also

argued that the U-visa certification letter could not serve as the basis for a newly-

discovered-evidence claim because (1) a U-visa application and certification did not exist

until approximately ten months after Padilla Jovel’s trial ended, (2) evidence related to a

U visa could only be used as impeachment evidence, and (3) the U-visa certification letter

4

would be excluded for the same reasons that the district court had excluded questioning

regarding U visas during Padilla Jovel’s trial. In reply, Padilla Jovel argued that had he

possessed the U-visa certification letter, he would have argued for its admissibility at trial

“to establish not only U visa motive on the part of the family but that the State helped

certif[y] they were eligible for the U visa.”

The postconviction court summarily denied Padilla Jovel’s petition without an

evidentiary hearing, concluding that the “U-visa certification issue is procedurally barred

because it was raised on appeal.” Specifically, the postconviction court noted that Padilla

Jovel had “extensively argued a U-Visa motive to this Court and the Court of Appeals.”

The postconviction court stated that it “does not find a difference between barring evidence

relating to a motive for a U-visa, and the fact that a U-visa certification document now

exists well after trial.”

Padilla Jovel appeals.

DECISION

Padilla Jovel argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily

denying his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.

“We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief, including the

petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion.” Tichich v. State,

4 N.W.3d 114, 119 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). “In doing so, we review the district

court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” Id. (quotation

omitted). A postconviction court abuses its discretion if it acts “in an arbitrary or capricious

manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or ma[kes] clearly erroneous

5

factual findings.” Henderson v. State, 906 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Minn. 2018) (quotation

omitted).

A postconviction court “may summarily deny a petition when the issues raised in it

have previously been decided by the court of appeals or the supreme court in the same

case.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2024). Once a direct appeal occurs, “all matters

raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a

subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741; see also Minn.

Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(2) (2024) (“A petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal

has been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct

appeal of the conviction or sentence.”).

Here, the postconviction court summarily denied Padilla Jovel’s postconviction

petition based on its conclusion that the petition was procedurally barred under Knaffla.

Because Padilla Jovel raised an alleged U-visa motive at the time of trial and appeal, and

this issue was extensively litigated, the postconviction court properly concluded that

Padilla Jovel’s petition is procedurally barred under Knaffla. We therefore discern no

abuse of discretion in the denial of Padilla Jovel’s petition without an evidentiary hearing.

We understand Padilla Jovel to make two arguments to persuade us

otherwise: (1) that the postconviction court erred as a matter of law by applying Knaffla

to procedurally bar Padilla Jovel’s petition instead of addressing the merits of his newly-

discovered-evidence claim, and (2) that even if Knaffla applies to Padilla Jovel’s petition,

the postconviction court abused its discretion by failing to address two exceptions to

Knaffla’s procedural bar. We address each argument in turn.

6

A. The postconviction court properly applied Knaffla to bar Padilla Jovel’s
postconviction petition.

Padilla Jovel argues that the postconviction court erred by applying Knaffla to his

postconviction petition instead of addressing the merits of the petition. This argument is

unavailing for three independent reasons.

First, Padilla Jovel provides no citation to applicable legal authority or legal analysis

to support his assertion that the postconviction court erred as a matter of law by considering

whether the postconviction petition was procedurally barred by Knaffla, and we thus

conclude that this argument is forfeited on appeal. See State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910,

915 (Minn. 2015) (observing that arguments based on mere assertion and unsupported by

argument or authority are forfeited on appeal); see also Schoepke v. Alexander Smith &

Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (“An assignment of error based on

mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is

waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere

inspection.”). Second, even if this argument were not forfeited, the postconviction court

properly applied the law in concluding that Padilla Jovel’s postconviction petition was

procedurally barred under Knaffla, as discussed above.

Third, even if we were to conclude that the postconviction court erred by applying

Knaffla to Padilla Jovel’s postconviction petition and by concluding that the petition is

procedurally barred—which we do not—any such error is harmless because the facts

alleged in Padilla Jovel’s petition do not entitle him to relief. A postconviction court may

also summarily deny a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing “when the

7

petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.”

Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). In determining

whether an evidentiary hearing is required, the facts alleged in a postconviction petition

are accepted “as true and construe[d] . . . in the light most favorable to the petitioner.”

Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn. 2017). The burden is on a petitioner to allege

facts supporting relief, and a petition “must do more than offer conclusory, argumentative

assertions, without factual support.” State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2007);

see also Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (“Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the burden

of proof of the facts alleged in the petition shall be upon the petitioner to establish the facts

by a fair preponderance of the evidence.”).

A petitioner is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence if:

(1) the evidence was not known to the defendant or his/her
counsel at the time of the trial; (2) the evidence could not have
been discovered through due diligence before trial; (3) the
evidence is not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful; and
(4) the evidence would probably produce an acquittal or a more
favorable result.

Tichich, 4 N.W.3d at 121 (quotations omitted). All four prongs must be met before a

petitioner is entitled to relief. Id.

The facts alleged in Padilla Jovel’s postconviction petition, construed in the light

most favorable to Padilla Jovel, are legally insufficient to grant his requested relief. The

U-visa certification letter is not newly discovered evidence of consideration for the victim

or his family’s testimony because the U-visa application and certification discussed in the

letter did not exist until approximately ten months after the trial concluded. As opposed to

8

identifying evidence that could have been presented at trial had it been known to Padilla

Jovel or his counsel, Padilla Jovel is attempting to relitigate the U-visa motive issue based

on new events occurring after the trial, and Padilla Jovel does not point to any authority

authorizing a new trial under such circumstances. In any event, the evidence is not “newly

discovered” within the meaning of the newly-discovered-evidence rule because, as Padilla

Jovel readily admits, the purpose of this evidence is solely to impeach the credibility of

witnesses. See id. (concluding that appellant’s “claim fails the third prong because the

newly discovered evidence serves only to impeach” a witness’s testimony); Evans v. State,

8 N.W.3d 642, 649 (Minn. 2024) (stating that “to the extent that this evidence could have

been used for impeachment purposes, such evidence is excluded from the newly-

discovered-evidence exception”). Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

summary denial of the postconviction petition because the facts alleged in the petition do

not legally entitle Padilla Jovel to the relief he requests.

B. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by summarily
denying Padilla Jovel’s petition without addressing two exceptions to
Knaffla’s procedural bar.

Padilla Jovel also argues that even if Knaffla applies to his postconviction petition,

the postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily denying his petition without

addressing two exceptions to Knaffla’s procedural bar. The supreme court has explained

that two exceptions to Knaffla are: “(1) if a novel legal issue is presented; or (2) if the

interests of justice require review.” Gilbert v. State, 2 N.W.3d 483, 487 (Minn. 2024). “To

qualify under the interests-of-justice exception, a petition for postconviction relief must

have substantive merit and [the] petitioner must not have deliberately and inexcusably

9

delayed in bringing the claim.” Id. at 488. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating

that this exception to Knaffla applies. Id. at 489.

Padilla Jovel asserts, without citation to authority or legal analysis, that both

exceptions apply. We disagree.

“It is well-established that the Knaffla exceptions only apply to claims that a

defendant failed to raise on direct appeal.” Onyelobi v. State, 932 N.W.2d 272, 279 (Minn.

2019) (quotation omitted). Because Padilla Jovel raised in his direct appeal evidentiary

challenges related to the alleged U-visa motive, the Knaffla exceptions do not apply.

Even so, Padilla Jovel has failed to establish that the postconviction court abused its

discretion by denying his petition without addressing such exceptions. First, because

Padilla Jovel did not raise the novel-legal-theory exception to Knaffla before the

postconviction court, we do not now consider his argument on the applicability of this

exception. See Washington v. State, 845 N.W.2d 205, 216 (Minn. App. 2014) (stating that

“[petitioner] seeks to invoke an exception to the Knaffla rule, but he may not do so for the

first time on appeal because he did not assert the exception in his motion papers in the

district court”); see also Ashby v. State, 752 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Minn. 2008) (“A

postconviction court is not required to apply the Knaffla exceptions if they are not raised

by the petitioner.”).

Second, Padilla Jovel’s mere assertions on appeal are insufficient to meet his burden

to establish that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his petition

without expressly addressing the interests-of-justice exception to Knaffla. See Schoepke,

187 N.W.2d at 135. Padilla Jovel asserts that there is substantive merit to his argument

10

that “the reason the Accuser lied about this abuse is to get legal status for his father and the

whole family was in on this motive” and that he “did not deliberately and inexcusably delay

bringing the claim and did it promptly under the law.” But those speculative assertions

relate to witness credibility, and Padilla Jovel does not otherwise attempt to satisfy his

burden to demonstrate the necessity of application of the interests-of justice exception. We

thus discern no abuse of discretion in the postconviction court’s summary denial of Padilla

Jovel’s postconviction petition without explicitly addressing whether an exception to

Knaffla applies.

Affirmed.

11