Tynele Feasel v. Levell Thomas, EGC Estates and Holdings

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0374

Tynele Feasel,
Respondent,

vs.

Levell Thomas,
Appellant,

EGC Estates and Holdings,
Defendant.

Filed September 14, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Le Sueur County District Court
File No. 40-CV-26-68

John M. Skubitz, Anderson & Skubitz, PLLC, Le Sueur, Minnesota (for respondent)

Levell Thomas, Le Sueur, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bentley, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from an eviction judgment, appellant Levell Thomas argues that the
district court erred by (1) violating his due-process rights and (2) not considering or
excluding his defenses and affidavits. We affirm.

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FACTS
Thomas is the co-owner and authorized representative of defendant EGC Estates
and Holdings (EGC).1 On behalf of EGC, Thomas signed a written lease-to-own agreement
with respondent Tynele Feasel in April 2023. The agreement identified EGC as the
buyer/tenant and Feasel as the seller/landlord. Thomas himself is not a tenant under the
lease.
In December 2025, Feasel served Thomas and EGC with a written notice to vacate.
In January 2026, Feasel served—via a sheriff’s office—and filed an eviction complaint.
The complaint alleged that EGC had breached the lease agreement by failing to make rent
and utility payments, having a dog on the premises, subleasing without written
authorization, changing the locks, and denying access.
In February 2026, the district court held an initial hearing. Thomas, appearing
without counsel, attempted to make several arguments against the eviction. The district
court stopped him and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing later that month. It also
instructed Thomas that, as a corporation, EGC would need to be represented by counsel.
At the evidentiary hearing, Thomas again appeared without counsel, and the district
court entered default judgment against EGC. The hearing proceeded with regard to Thomas
personally. Feasel testified to the basis for the eviction, and Thomas cross-examined her.
During the cross-examination, the district court sustained objections to Thomas’s
questioning about Feasel’s license to rent the property. The district court also excluded two

1 EGC is not involved in this appeal.

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affidavits from persons not present at the hearing that Thomas attempted to introduce into
evidence. After the hearing, the district court filed its order and judgment granting eviction
against Thomas and EGC.
Thomas appeals.
DECISION
Thomas challenges the eviction judgment, arguing that the district court erred by
(1) violating his due-process rights and (2) not considering or excluding his defenses and
affidavits. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not violate Thomas’s due-process rights.
Thomas argues that the district court violated his due-process rights by interrupting
him during the initial hearing.
“Whether the government has violated a person’s procedural due process rights is a
question of law that we review de novo.” Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632
(Minn. 2012). Both the Minnesota and United States Constitutions prohibit the government
from depriving a person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. To satisfy due process, procedures “must
provide an individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.” Sawh, 823 N.W.2d at 632 (quotation omitted).
Thomas argues that “repeated interruptions by the court . . . undermined the fairness
of the proceedings and deprived [him] of due process.” The only citations to the record that
Thomas provides are two excerpts of the transcript of the initial hearing. The excerpts show
Thomas claiming that Feasel was defrauding the government and violating a city ordinance

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that requires a license to rent and the district court interrupting Thomas, saying, “We don’t
have all morning here. This is an admit/deny hearing.” The excerpts also show Thomas
complaining about improper service of notice of the eviction action and the district court
rejecting that claim based on an affidavit of service in the file. The district court then
scheduled an evidentiary hearing and concluded the initial hearing.
Nothing in these transcripts shows a due-process violation by the district court. The
district court allowed Thomas significant latitude to raise his arguments at the initial
hearing. It interrupted him when issues were outside the scope of the initial hearing, and it
set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. In doing so, the district court acted within its
discretion to control the proceedings and the presentation of evidence. See Minn. R. Evid.
611(a) (requiring district courts to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
. . . presenting evidence”); State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 609 (Minn. 2004) (“As a
general matter, courts are vested with discretion in managing trials.”). In addition, Thomas
fails to demonstrate error in the district court’s rejection of his improper-service claim. The
record supports that notice of the eviction action was served by the sheriff, and Thomas
never articulated any concrete issues with service. At the evidentiary hearing, Thomas
cross-examined Feasel and was given the opportunity to present witnesses and to testify
himself, both of which he declined. Thomas also presented a closing argument. We
conclude that Thomas received notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Sawh,
823 N.W.2d at 632.
The district court did not violate Thomas’s due-process rights.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not considering or by
excluding Thomas’s defenses and affidavits.
Thomas argues that the district court erred by not considering or excluding his
defenses and affidavits from evidence.
Appellate courts “afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on
evidentiary matters, and . . . will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that
discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015). “A district court
abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Thomas argues that the district court erred by not considering his “defenses”
because Minnesota law requires them to be considered. In support of this argument,
Thomas cites one excerpt of the evidentiary- hearing transcript, which reflects his cross-
examination of Feasel about whether she had a license to rent the property. Feasel’s counsel
objected on the basis of relevance, and the district court sustained the objection, explaining
that “this line of questioning is not relevant.” Thomas also tried to return to the issue later,
at which point the district court again sustained an objection, stating, “[T]he rental license
has nothing to do with this proceeding.”
Thomas fails to demonstrate error in the district court’s ruling. Evidence is relevant
if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. And “[g]enerally the only issue for trial [in an eviction

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action] is whether the facts alleged in the complaint are true.” NY Props., LLC v. Schuette,
977 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotation omitted), rev. dismissed (Minn.
Aug. 24, 2022). Here, the eviction complaint made no mention of whether Feasel had a
license to rent the property. And Thomas has not articulated how Feasel’s having a rental
license was relevant to whether he had breached the lease.2
Thomas argues that the district court erred by excluding his affidavits because the
decision “prevented [Thomas] from presenting corroborating evidence” and “resulted in
an incomplete record and prejudiced the outcome.” Thomas cites an excerpt from the
transcript of the evidentiary hearing. The excerpt reflects that Thomas attempted to
introduce into evidence two affidavits written by absent witnesses. The district court
refused to admit them, stating:
I cannot receive written affidavits; you need to have live
testimony.
. . . .
[I]t does not allow Ms. Feasel and her [counsel] the opportunity
to cross- examine those people, so they’re not allowed. You
would have needed those people to appear personally to testify.
Thomas fails to show error in this ruling. “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless an

2 To the extent that Thomas asserts that the district precluded any other “defenses,” he has
not described those defenses with any specificity. Asserted errors that are unsupported by
argument or authorities are forfeited “unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection,” and no error is obvious here. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co.,
187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).

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exception applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802. Thomas attempted to introduce affidavits written
by witnesses who did not testify at the hearing. The affidavits constituted inadmissible
hearsay, and the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit
them. Thomas makes no argument to the contrary and does not explain how the district
court erred by rejecting the evidence. As such, his argument fails. See Schoepke, 187
N.W.2d at 135.
Affirmed.